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Introduction 
This book is aimed at presenting some aspects of the Central and East European 
countries’ development during the transition period, as well as their prospects for 
growth. Special attention is paid to the Visegrad countries. The book collects the 
achievements of economists, who specialise in Central and East European related 
research fields, mostly connected with economic policy. 
It is a result of a project “Visegrad Seminars of Economic Policy” co-financed by 
the International Visegrad Fund, and co-organised by economic policy departments of 
the Warsaw School of Economics, Budapest University of Economic Sciences, the 
University of Economics in Prague and the University of Economics in Bratislava. The 
cooperation between them started as early as 1996 and deepened thereafter. The project 
began in 2001 and ended in 2002. The book also includes some papers from 
Luxembourg, London and different academic centres in Poland, collected with the help 
of the coordinator of the project. It should be emphasised that the articles in this book 
were collected in 2002 (some at the end of 2001), thus some of the data do not 
necessarily correspond with the actual data as the date of publishing (2003). 
The book begins by outlining external conditions of economic policy and growth 
as a whole, leading in the direction of the EU and the Baltics. The first paper in this 
part reviews some theoretical concepts of economic policy making from the 
institutional point of view. The next analyses the world economic recessions’ 
phenomena from the historical point of view and draws conclusions regarding the 
Central and East European countries’ development. The next paper concerns various 
aspects of employment convergence of transition countries to EU countries. The next 
two papers are aimed at presenting the Baltic countries financial and real convergence 
with European Union. The last in this part analyses theoretical matters connected with 
capital allocation in transition economies. 
The second part of the book entitled “European Union Integration Process and 
CEE Countries” is formed of five papers. It looks at the challenges for Central and East 
European countries of facing European Union integration, which are very up-to-date 
problems. It begins with EU enlargement topics and its institutional reforms, and then 
goes to the evolution of EU social security matters. The third paper analyses the 
convergence process of EU member-states and draws conclusions for the Czech 
Republic. The next papers concern EU-Polish related interests: the stability and 
sustainability of the Polish economy as well as future benefits of EU enlargement. 
Part three is devoted to the problems of “Economic Policy and Growth within CEE 
Countries”. The first paper relates to economic linkages between CEE countries, based 
on correlation analysis. The following paper also uses this technique, to identify 
international synchronisation of the Polish business cycle. The next papers are 
concerned with the macroeconomic analysis of certain countries: Slovak Republic 
development and Polish international debt, and the next - with changes in consumption 
behaviour in Poland, from the regional point of view. The next paper concerns the 
microeconomic comparison of Visegrad countries’ insurance markets, and the last one 
analyses the case of regional policy and SMEs in the Czech Republic. 
Vlll 
The last part of the book: “Technological Changes and Visegrad Countries’ 
Prospects for Growth” consists of three papers. All of them relate to the catching-up 
process and outline the future possible economic development of the Central and East 
European countries, which could be achieved thanks to technological progress. The 
first paper analyses institutional aspects, the next measures the technology gap, and the 
last concerns competitiveness performance. They emphasise the need for changes in 
economic policy towards knowledge-based economy. 
I would like to express my gratitude to the people who contributed to the creation 
of this book. I would like to thank the heads of economic policy departments: Prof Jan 
Kaja from Warsaw School of Economics, Prof Pavol Vincur from University of 
Economics in Bratislava, Prof Peter Akos Bod from Budapest University of Economic 
Sciences, Prof Milan Zak from University of Economics in Prague. I would like to 
acknowledge the organisational contribution to the “Visegrad Seminars on Economic 
Policy” project of Dr Ingeborg Nemcova and Dr Anna Kaderabkova, Dr Laszlo Andor 
and Tamas Nagy, as well as the authorities of the Warsaw School of Economics, who 
supported the project, especially its rector Prof Marek Rocki, and the publisher: School 
of Slavonic and East European Studies, University College London and its director 
Prof George Kolankiewicz. My special gratitude should be expressed to Dariusz 
Jagiello, who animated the whole project. Without his contribution, the project would 
not have succeeded. I am also grateful to those who helped with the editorial work on 
this book: Dan St’astny and Lukasz Wodkowski, as well as Christine Fernandes, who 
patiently read and amended the texts. 
I would like to thank many other people not mentioned above, for their 
contribution to the project, as well as the institutions: International Visegrad Fund, 
Warsaw School of Economics, Budapest University of Social Sciences, University of 
Economics in Prague, School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University 
College London, MB Grabowski Fund (London), Foundation for Polish Science 
(Warsaw), the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (London), and The Knowledge 
Institute (Warsaw). 
Krzysztof Piech 
February 2003, London 
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Part 1 
External and Theoretical 
Conditions of Economic Policy 
and Growth of Central and 
East European Countries 

The Institutional Approach to Economic Policy 
Anna Horodecka 
This article’s topic is the institutional approach to economic policy based on 
economics schools, but not in all cases. The lack of one consistent theory that will help 
the policy makers is the main challenge that we meet in the theory of economic policy: 
scientific discipline, which aims at giving explanations and describing the concept of 
practical economic policy, using available methods and information (see: Piech, 
2002).' The method used in economic policy is either a deductive one or an empiric 
one. We can use here an experiment or a quasi-experiment (Gajek and Kaluszka, 2000, 
p. 13). Many problems that are met when using the neoclassical approach cause 
increasing interest in the heterodox schools of economics. 
Economic policy is a part of economic sciences (more precise classifications can 
be found in Gide, 1922, p. 41 2 3; Krajewski, 1998, p. 230; Bartling, 1993, p. 9) so it 
should take its assumptions from economy. As the neo-classical thought is an orthodox 
trend in economics, the rules that are in neo-classical thought should be (a positive 
approach) proper for economic policy. This is the predominant opinion in many books. 
Economists describe such an approach as positive . Economists in favour of this 
approach focus on universalistic solutions and try to build a coherent model 
(Tomidajewicz, 1999, p. 165). 
Many policy makers expect accurate statements from economy, i.e. how they 
should create policy to achieve the desired goals. This approach is defined as 
normative. Such an approach presents no coherent theory. Very often many doctrines 
and beliefs can be found here.4 
The last approach, the descriptive one, is new. It can be found in the publications 
of Kaja (1999) but its background can be traced to American and Japanese literature. 
There it is called the contingency or situational approach. The theory of economic 
policy should examine economic policy in one country very precisely. Economists 
should describe all facts, providing information on reasons for such a policy in any 
given country, on the time and on the facts influencing it. They make no assumptions 
nor do they say that their conclusions should be of any importance for another country 
or for another time. Their theory is valid only for a specific time and place. 
The approach I will describe in this article is new one. It is based on the three 
above-mentioned approaches. It uses the theory of economics but not the neo-classical 
school, so it has the characteristics of the positive approach. However, they do not say 
1 They present their definitions on the basis of a normative or positive approach. The normative approach 
according to these definitions means that the theory of economic policy gives answers about methods we 
can use to achieve a desired goal. See other definitions such as Piech, 2000; Winiarski, 2000, p. 22; 
Lange, 1959, p. 85; Taylor, 1947, p. 39; Tinbergen, 1978, p. 6. 
“ He saw economic policy as a part of social economic sciences. 
3 The beginning of this theory is associated with the name of Weber. 
4 More about this approach and its origin can be found in Smith (1954) and his followers in contemporary 
studies like Pies (1993, p. 311), especially interesting are his thoughts on normative institutional 
economics. 
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that in all countries there are the same rules on the basis of which policy makers should 
make their decisions. The institutional approach has much to say to policy makers 
about how they should create their policy and about the priorities, so they are, in this 
point similar to the normative approach. On the other hand, they do not base their 
theory on the doctrine but on the coherent theories that are developed regularly by new 
institutionalists. Finally, we see similarities to the descriptive approach. The 
institutional approach is not a neo-classical one, where only the economical factors are 
of importance. The representatives of institutionalism claim that all factors, especially 
social and historical, can create an institution and so they are of importance and the 
economist should be interested in them. We do not say that we absolutely cannot 
discover anything about a non-examined country because in all countries there are 
institutions. The evolution of the institution can decrease or increase the transactional 
costs. We need only examine the institutions in this country in more detail. 
Economic policy should be based on the institutional economy. But what does 
institutional economy mean? At this point I am going to describe the evolution of this 
heterodox stream of economy. 
Institutionalism has its background in a broader stream (Stankiewicz, 1998). 
Firstly, it is based on the German Historical School, which is one school of the 
heterodox stream. These heterodox approaches have the same critical relation to the 
classical / neo-classical school. They have emphasised the role of historical and social 
factors that influence the economy. They also say that each country has its individual 
history and culture so we cannot say that the same rule for e.g. liberalism, can have the 
same results in all countries. And liberalism is one of the postulates of neo-classical 
economists. Heterodox economists do not attempt to create a theory that will be valid 
for all times and places. The next common characteristic of these schools is 
evolutionary thinking. Economy is an evolutionary process not a static phenomenon 
(see Landreth and Colander, 1998, p. 471-476). They have opposed the strict 
formalism of the classical (later neo-classical) school (see Reuter, 1996, p. 62). The 
second school that had a significant impact on institutionalism was Pragmatism, and 
the third - Darwinism and evolutionism (see Reuter, 1996, p. 61). 
This stream was the base for another heterodox thinker, Thorsten Veblen 
(1857-1929; 1919), “the father” of the institutional school. His innovation was the 
institutional approach to economy. He was the economist who was the first to say that 
institutions should be the primary categoiy of economic thought. That means that 
institutions evolve trom a set of traditions that are of importance in one country. 
His followers, John R. Commons (1862-1945) and Wesley C. Mitchell (1874- 
1948), have tried to operationalise the social categoiy of institutions. The latter is 
especially known because of his statistical tables. He concentrated in his works on 
country-specific aspects, and on empirical research. Thus, his work was characterised 
as the “measuring without theory”, but he is also the specialist in the field of business 
cycles (Mitchell, 1913). 
Because of the difficulties in operationalising the category of institution and the 
lack ot the consistent theory, the above-mentioned heterodox theory was almost 
forgotten and did not come into mainstream thought. They perceive the institution as a 
stable and dominant way of thinking or acting, that is embodied in traditions of the 
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people and their customs (Hamilton, 1932, p. 84-89).5 Its critique of the neo-classical 
approach was principally well structured, so the neo-classical thinkers have been more 
and more interested in this approach. They tried not to lose their own identity. They did 
not want to resign from the main assumptions of neo-classical thought. The central 
concept of which is that the individual’s needs are assumed as given. In this way, a 
new school in economics was created - the New Institutionalism (see more by: 
Langlois, 1989; Erlei, 1999). The differences between old and new institutionalism 
were presented by Rutherford, 19966. The main task for the New Institutionalists was 
the construction of a theory. They asked themselves how to measure the influence on 
the economy and in which categories. Their idea was then to ask the question of why 
institutions exist. The answer required the setting up of the category, transaction costs. 
These costs are incurred when entering into contracts, due to the lack of security. The 
lack of well described and fully-enforced property rights is a good example of such 
costs. People can operate only when they think that the execution of the transaction 
will be secure. Property rights are not the only factor contributing to transactions cost. 
When a product is sold, the producer uses advertising. The potential buyer has to take 
time and money to obtain information about the product. All this contributes to the 
costs that were not mentioned in the neo-classical theory. The costs would not arise if 
people were honest, and all the potential buyers and sellers and quality of products, 
were known. As such a situation is an ideal one, there is an effort by people to protect 
themselves by creating an institution or organisation. In conclusion, we can say that not 
only institutions influence the behaviour of men, but the individual influences the 
institution as well (Held and Nutzinger, 1999, p. 7). 
The government is a special case. The cost of governing and execution of the law 
is so high that even a non-majoritarian institution has power, and such situations occur, 
even in the democratic system (Majone, 2001, p. 59). An example of such an 
institution is a central bank. That is why the main function of the state is to lower the 
transaction costs. 
We have already discussed transaction costs and their elements. We have said that 
there are many rules that can simplify transactions and that can distort the contacts (for 
example dishonesty, egoism and so on). All the rules (elements of an institution) can 
affect the contract positively or negatively. We see that the rules can have a second 
classification: they can be formal and informal. Formal rules using the definition of 
Douglass C. North are divided into political, economic and contracts (North, 1997, 
p. 7). Informal rules evolve because of the lack of precision of the formal ones. They 
are useful because sometimes it is very difficult to cope with the amount of 
information we have. So we simplify it using informal rules such as conventions, 
behaviour norms and codes of behaviour. We can say that these are the most important 
assumptions of this theory. As to the most important characteristic features of 
institutionalism, I shall present these according to Mark Blaug (1994, p. 744-746): 
5 Institution is also defined as the system of social roles and norms which regulate the way of behaving; 
see: Kopalinski, 1968, p. 337. 
6 The main difference at the conception of the institution. The new institutionalists apply the term 
“institution” only to precisely described organisations. 
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1. critical attitude towards the high abstraction level and static character of neo¬ 
classical theory, 
2. the desire of integration between social and economic sciences, 
3. critical standing to empiricism of the neo-classical thought. 
The economists who have publicised within this stream are Willamson (1998), 
North (1981; 1997)7, Tool (1993), Pejovic (1995), Olson, Hayek, Sugden, Mirowski, 
Demsetz, Polsner, Schotter. 
At the same time not only economists were interested in institutions, economic 
sociology also started exploring the domain. The very important publication of Smelser 
and Swedberg (1994) is an example for the activity of scientists who are engaged in 
this field. As far as Polish publications are concerned, we can mention 
Morawski (2001, 1998); Gilejko (1994). Economic sociology is based on three 
assumptions: 
• Economic action is embedded in networks of social relationships, 
• Economic action is described as the social process, 
• Economic institutions are socially constructed (see Schotter, 1981, p. 18). 
Its discipline is focused mainly on such themes: 
• macro relations between society and economy, 
• industrial relations, 
• social setting of individuals in the terms of social change, 
• sociology of the market (see Morawski, 2001, p. 31). 
The long lack of cooperation between these approaches resulted from the neo¬ 
classical core of the New Institutionalism. That is why sociology could not take such a 
school into account. New Economic Sociology (NES) is less differential to New 
Institutionalism but it still has no interest in the evolutionary approach to institutional 
economics and it is not preoccupied with technology. NES have three most important 
traditions: American (Parson), French (Durkheim) and German (Weber) (see Velthuis, 
1999, p. 630). 
Now, when we are accustomed to the terminology of institutionalism, we can say 
something about the institutional approach to economic policy: what the policy makers 
should do and how institutions can affect an economic policy. 
Institutions as part of the social-economic system in the state, have an influence on 
economic performance. According to E. Okon-Horodyriska, the economic system 
should be subject to interdisciplinary studies (empirical, sociological, psychological 
and economical) because of its complexity (Okon-Horodyhska, 1996, p. 20). It does 
not imply that neo-classical thinkers do not appreciate the importance of these 
conditions, but they have taken them as given. And when we apply the institutional 
approach we know how it functions and we know that the role of government will 
probably be to introduce appropriate changes to the institutional setting disturbing the 
economy. We do not change the system (system goals of economic policy), but its 
effectiveness. 
He focuses mainly on the so-called institutional change, which influenced the shaping of economic 
history. 
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The second element of economic policy is its goals. There are many classifications 
and definitions that are constructed on the basis of the neo-classical or Keynesian 
theory. But we also have to look at the current experiences of our own or other 
countries. In Germany, we have a set of goals, the so-called stabilisation’s goals in the 
law (so-called “Stabilitatsgesetz”8, StabG, 1967). One of the most important, or at least 
most cited goals, is economic growth. We use GDP in all contemporary studies. The 
level of economic growth in the situation of a world recession is very important for 
many countries. That is why there is so much interest in the theories of economic 
growth. We are acquainted with two: the classical and Keynesian theory. Both of them 
have their good and poor points. The critique of the classical factorial theory 
(Altmann, 1995, p. 74) was that technical progress was taken as exogen, there was no 
place for the state. The Keynesian one saw the role of the state as increasing 
expenditures. It affected output. But it is short-term growth (“bubbled growth”), the 
period after such an intrusion in the market was a return to the previous level of 
growth. On the basis of these two there evolved a new one: new neo-classical theory of 
economic growth, which also accepts the neo-classical assumptions and the factorial 
approach but at the same time says something new: the technical progress is an 
endogen factor and its source lies in R&D expenditures, education, human capital and 
so on. 
The institutional approach is very similar. The factor of technical progress is the 
innovation which results from institutional change. The technical, organisational and 
institutional innovations are the basis of long-term economic growth (Galbraith, 1991, 
pp. 296-313). Ideological and cultural factors play a very important role (Okori- 
Horodynska, 1996, p. 85). The crucial role of the historical factor is the innovation of 
institutionalists. D. C. North says that it was the dominant factor that influenced 
economic growth in the eighteenth century (North, 1997). That is why the classical 
approach of contemporary economists like Adam Smith does not mention factors like 
changes in organisation and technology. The same can affect our way of thinking about 
current changes in organisation and technology. We mention (see: Drucker, 1999) the 
information revolution and post-industrial society. The new institutionalists stressed 
the role of transactional cost. They see economic growth as the process of accumulated 
changes either in quality or in quantity that are gathered and embodied in the system. 
(Rosenberg and Birdzel, 1994, pp. 5-12). We shall also take into account the 
evolutionary character of the economic system (Kowalik, 2000), because evolutionary 
change is the source of economic growth, as it was presented by Mazur (1991, p. 329). 
Effectiveness of institutions helps to lower these costs and so the economic 
performance can be higher. E. Okon-Horodyriska listed the role of institutions in 
economic development in such a way: 
• organisation and coordination of economic activity, 
• motivation for achieving high effectiveness (it is very important to motivate people 
and their moral behaviour, see: Held, Nutzinger, 1999, p. 7), 
• control of the performance and appropriate revenues, 
• efficient operation and better distribution in the whole system. 
Gesetz zur Fordemng der Stabilitat und des Wachstums der Wirtschaft. 
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We can present all the factors influencing economic growth in the form of a table. 
We do stress that all the factors should be taken into account by the policy maker. They 
can be divided into general, social, political and economic. For a more detailed 
classification see Israel (1989). 
Table 1. Institutional factors that influence economic growth 
Conditions Factors 
General • Ideas and opinions that are dominant in society. 
• The history of society. 
Social • Comparatively stable characteristics of the social system that has 
changed the evolution of society. 
• Psychological features of the people who live in this society. 
• The special role played by national culture, mentality, ethical 
patterns of behaviour. 
Political The quality of the constitution, methods of the cooperation between 
state and business, political culture, informal rules and traditions. 
Economical • Strict ‘'rules of the game”, selection of the activity that can be 
effective or not effective. 
• Precisely defined propriety rights. 
• Functions and social rules of the trade. 
• Effective working financial and banking system. 
• Appropriate methods of management of risk and insurance system 
• Accepted and not disturbing tax system. 
• Multi-centre structure of economy. 
• Basic assumptions of the economical institutions that influence 
positively long-term growth. 
We can say that the main challenge for the practical economic policy is the 
contemporary activity on the political, social, economical level. All this should be done 
in order to obtain better performance, in terms of economic growth. The main power 
that has an impact on economic growth is innovation, so there should be not only 
bigger expenditures on R&D, but also better organisation of the educational system. 
According to this, the role of the state can consist in paying more attention to education 
(Held and Nutzinger, 1999, p. 7; Jickeli, 1999, p. 879). The state should also set more 
effective rules (formal) and influence in the long term, the informal ones. The most 
important rules are proprietary and liberty rights. They should be well defined and 
effective. To enlarge the motivation and moral capacity of the country, the state should 
help organisations which promote well motivated behaviour and moral values (for 
example church organisations, voluntary organisations). A very important factor is 
harmony between competitiveness and cooperation. Systems not characterised by these 
features do not reach economic growth (McRae, 1996, p. 15-42). So we can say that 
According to Jickeli (2001) the pure market solution concerning education will fail because the problem 
of education is too important to be the parents’ responsibility. They are sometimes tempted to keep 
children at home so that they can work. 
Institutional Approach to Economic Policy 9 
institutionalism as an approach to economic policy is closely connected to heterodox 
thinking as far as the role of interventionism10 is concerned, but, on the other hand, it 
has an impact mainly on organisational aspects of life and no direct influence on 
production (see the opinion of Kaja and Xinli, 2000). 
So there is a big challenge for the theory of economic policy, which should be 
interested in the institution present in the country being examined and the relations 
between them. They should be well described because many of them cannot be 
changed (Le Bone, 1999, p. 74). They should also prove the formal and informal rules 
and their impact on the transaction costs. They should show an interest in cultural 
factors and the historical setting of the country. They should remember that researching 
of an institution is necessary to understand social life and human behaviour 
(Baldassari, 1998, p. 4). 
In conclusion, I want to say that there are many new fields in heterodox economy, 
which could be applied to economic policy. In my opinion, economists should take 
incentives from heterodox theories and experiences, especially when orthodox theories 
have so many unrealistic assumptions. 
10 The term “state intervention” (French: “I’interventionnisme” or “/’intervention 
introduced to the social sciences by French economists, see: Szostak (1999, p. 18). 
de l'EtaE), was 
10 Anna Horodecka 
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Imperfect Capital Allocation in a Transition Economy 
Jan Kubicek 
Inefficient allocation of resources is a frequently mentioned reason why the growth 
rates in transition economies are somewhat smaller than had been expected. The aim of 
this paper is to make a more detailed classification of capital allocation inefficiencies 
and to discuss whether there are any sources of particular kinds of inefficiencies, which 
are specific for the transition countries. The final part of the paper is devoted to the 
question of whether, and under what conditions, inefficient capital allocation exerts 
any influence on economic growth. 
1. Intrafirm and interfirm capital allocation inefficiency 
We can discern inefficient capital allocation within a single firm (intrafirm 
inefficiency) and inefficient allocation of capital among different firms (interfirm 
inefficiency). In the case of intrafirm inefficiency, the firm is below its production 
possibility curve and so it produces less than it is technologically possible given the 
quantities of resources. Another kind of intrafirm inefficiency arises if the product mix 
(i.e. the ratios of quantities of particular goods that the firm makes) does not lead to 
profit maximisation given the resources, even though the production of the firm is on 
the production possibility curve. 
For further analysis a production function / is used, which connects capital stock 
per unit of labour k (e.g. per working hour) and production per unit of labour y. This 
function is increasing and it is assumed that, at least from a certain point, decreasing 
marginal product of capital per unit of labour starts to prevail. 
2. Excessive employment 
The term “excessive employment4 ‘ is frequently used in connection with the formerly 
state-owned firms in transition economies. However, the term should not be used 
automatically if a firm uses more employment for producing the same quantity of 
goods in comparison with a comparable firm in a standard market economy. As the 
labour costs are substantially lower in the former centrally-planned economies, the 
maximisation effort of firms implies that they will use more labour than comparable 
firms in Western Europe. 
Excessive employment must be understood in a stricter sense. By excessive 
employment, I mean a situation, in which, given the firm’s capital stock, a given 
product can be produced with less units of labour than is actually used. 
Using the production function, the excessive employment can be depicted as a 
combination of k andy, which is below the production function/and for which it holds 
at the same time, that volume of labour units can be decreased without k/y ratio. In 
figure 1 the point A corresponds to excessive employment. In the situation depicted by 
this point, it would be technologically possible to produce the same volume of product 
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keeping the firm’s capital stock intact, while decreasing employment roughly down to 
a half. 
Figure 1. Excessive employment and excessive capital goods 
3. Excessive capital stock 
Excessive capital stock or permanently free production capacities of a firm belong also 
to a situation when the firm is below its production possibilities frontier. Similarly, as 
in the case of excessive employment, I mean by the term “excessive capital stock” such 
a situation that there exist some capital goods in the firm’s assets, which are not used 
for production. Thanks to the absence of secondary markets for capital goods, or 
thanks to bad management, these assets are not reallocated elsewhere. Excessive 
capacities therefore, mean that a given product could be produced using the same 
amount of labour but using a smaller quantity of capital goods than is actually used. 
Excessive capacities are depicted in figure 2 as a combination of k and of y, which 
is below the production function / and for which it holds at the same time that 
reduction of capital stock per worker leaves the production per worker intact. The point 
B in figure 1 represents excessive capacities. The excessive capacities can be 
eliminated by selling the capital goods that are not used by the firm or by their 
incorporation into the production process. 
Obviously, the firm may find itself in the situation of both excessive employment 
and excessive capital stock. To each point below / there exists just one point on the 
production function, for which it holds that the same quantity of product is produced 
without excessive labour and capital goods. 
In figure 2, it is suggested how such a point can be found. Let D be a point of both 
excessive capacities and of excessive employment. First, let us consider elimination of 
excessive capital goods. If a firm manages to sell all the capital goods that were in no 
way used tor production, capital stock per unit of labour is reduced whereas production 
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per unit of labour remains the same. Therefore the firm shifts from point D to D'. The 
point D' is consequently a point of “pure” excessive employment. 
Figure 2. Elimination of excessive employment and capital goods 
Reduction of the labour force given the firm’s production manifests itself in figure 
2 as a proportionate increase in capital per unit of labour and in production per unit of 
labour. The point, in which there are no more excessive employment and excessive 
capital stock, can be found at an intersection of the production function with a ray 
running from the beginning through the point D'. 
4. “Inferior” combination of capital goods 
A special situation, which concerns capital allocation and which should be 
distinguished from other kinds of allocation inefficiencies, is a situation in which all 
capital goods are used for production but the kind or ratios of their quantities are not 
“optimal”. A given combination of capital goods is not “optimal” in the sense that a 
firm would not choose this combination if it were to install the capital goods today, 
given today’s relative prices and technology. 
On the other hand, this situation can be optimal for the firm in a different sense. 
Capital goods are not homogenous, they are not malleable and they can be used only 
for a limited number of purposes. A changed set of relative prices and new 
technologies may cause reallocation of capital goods. But even if all existing capital 
goods were reallocated into fields of production in which they would be the most 
productive, it does not imply (due to their specificity) that the combination of capital 
goods is optimal in each firm. Despite that, the firm knows that the combination of 
capital goods, which it is currently using, would not be optimal if it were to start the 
production today, it is the best combination of already existing capital goods. 
Adjusting the original capital structure to a new “optimal” structure implies adjustment 
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costs. Therefore the firm will adjust the capital structure only if the new combination 
of capital goods is so much more productive than the old one that it overwhelms the 
adjustment costs. If this is not the case, then a change of structure of capital goods is a 
waste of scarce resources disregarding the fact that the new combination of capital 
goods is more productive. 
However, this situation cannot be perceived as inefficiency in the true sense of the 
word, if it is not possible to increase production by reallocating existing capital goods. 
In this case, capital allocation is efficient given the constraints arising from the non¬ 
malleability of capital goods. The economy is, however, on a lower aggregate 
production function, because under the new set of relative prices and with new 
technologies, it would be possible to produce more with the same amount of capital per 
unit of labour, when using the optimal combination of capital stocks. 
5. Inferior combination of outputs 
Inferior combination of outputs in the case of a multi-product firm is another category 
within intrafirm resource allocation inefficiencies (and specially of capital allocation 
inefficiencies). In this case, the firm is on its production possibilities frontier. All 
resources are used in the production process and so it is not possible to reduce the 
volume of resources without reducing production, as well. The problem is that if the 
firm produced its goods in different ratios it would increase its profit. In other words, 
the firm’s marginal rate of transformation (slope of a production possibility curve in a 
given point) is different from marginal rate of substitution in exchange. Therefore, it is 
possible for the firm to reduce production of one of its goods and to increase 
production of the other and in this way gain higher profit without changing total costs. 
This kind of intrafirm inefficiency is in its nature similar to interfirm inefficiency, 
because it deals with inefficiency due to misallocation of resources between different 
potential uses. However, it is connected with interfirm problems such as weak 
corporate governance. Moreover, capital allocation within a single firm is usually not 
coordinated via an impersonal mechanism and it is not complicated by activities of 
various independent intermediaries, as it is in case of interfirm allocation. 
6. Interfirm capital allocation inefficiency 
Interfirm inefficiency is due to misallocation of resources. If marginal products of 
production factors are not equalised among firms then it is possible to reallocate the 
resources in such a way that it would be possible to produce more with the same 
amount of resources. 
In figure 3 the slopes of tangents touching points Al, A2 and B represent 
marginal products of capital. A necessary condition for existence of capital allocation 
inefficiency is that there exists at least one pair of firms such that or 
f'A(km) * f'B (kn) • We can further discern between, on the one hand, inefficiency within a 
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single “industry”1, i.e. inefficiency due to the fact that firms with the same production 
function have different capital stock per unit of labour, and on the other hand, 
inefficiency due to imperfect capital allocation among firms with different production 
functions. It should be mentioned here that it cannot be said that allocation would be 
perfect if e.g. the capital stocks per unit of labour kt, k , km, kn in figure 3 changed 
into some kn k,, km,, k„. such that it would hold f't(kr) = f't(kr) or f’4(km,) = 
Figure 3. Interfirm allocation inefficiency 
What we call “capital” are in reality different non-malleable capital goods, the 
relative prices of which as against both other capital goods and consumption goods 
change as capital stock for production of various goods changes. In the present 
graphical illustration it implies that reallocation of capital would not only lead to 
changes in kt, kj, km , kn, but also to shifts of the production functions f A , fB . If a 
unique production function / existed for all kinds of goods (including capital goods) 
and at the same time, if capital per unit of labour were the same in all firms, it would 
be possible to talk about perfect capital allocation because relative prices would be 
constant. In reality, firms differ in their production functions and these shift because of 
changes in relative prices of both capital and consumption goods. 
7. Inefficient allocation in transition economies 
Any economy can suffer from all the kinds of inefficiencies that were mentioned 
earlier. However, some sources of their existence are specific for transition economies. 
As for excessive employment, a transition specific reason for it is that it was to a 
great extent inherited from the previous economic system. Elimination of excessive 
Industry is perceived as a group of firms with the same production function, so that no external attributes 
of the goods produced serve as classification criteria. 
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employment as a kind of intrafirm inefficiency is mainly a matter of corporate 
governance of individual firms. Therefore, from the point of view of economic policy, 
the task is not to hinder economic decisions of the firms and to enable them to follow 
their maximisation effort. Reduction of labour employed is not usually costly and 
therefore it cannot be expected that excessive employment is more frequent at private 
firms in the longer term in transition countries than in standard mixed economies. 
Substantial costs of labour reduction could be expected only in the case of very strong 
trade unions. Excessive employment can be intentionally maintained in state-owned 
firms, which quite often intentionally do not maximise profit. On a macroeconomic 
level, excessive employment will therefore be higher in the long term in transition 
economies if they have a bigger share of state-owned firms. The same thing can be said 
about the inferior combination of outputs in a multi-product firm. 
The two other kinds of intrafirm inefficiencies are, however, more characteristic 
for transition economies. Excessive capital goods in transition economies are mainly 
due to misallocation of capital goods in the centrally-planned economies. Decisions 
about the structure of investment were not made on the basis of profit motive. 
However, even if they had been made with this motive, capital could have been 
allocated at best according to prices that were not market prices and thus they were 
giving false signals. After the dramatic changes of relative prices that took place hand 
in hand with price liberalisation and after liberalising the trade, lots of capital goods 
proved to be useless for a given firm. 
In the case of excessive capital goods there is, of course, a space for their 
subsequent reallocation. Reallocation between firms can take place only through 
secondary markets of capital goods. However, capital goods are often very specific, 
they are not malleable and so their secondary markets (i.e. markets with partially 
depreciated capital goods) are frequently very shallow and furthermore there exist 
substantial transaction costs connected to finding out the true state of capital goods. 
Some capital goods are unchangeably located (e.g. buildings) on a site, which is for 
many reasons inconvenient for the kind of economic activity for which the capital 
goods could have been otherwise used. On the whole, it can be said that the process of 
reallocation of excessive capital goods will take a longer term and in some cases, there 
does not have to be any reallocation whatsoever. 
As mentioned earlier, the inferior combination of capital goods is not inefficiency 
in the strict sense of the word. Though, it is a very characteristic situation for transition 
economies. Its origin is, as in case of excessive capital goods, in the preceding 
coordination mechanism of the economy. Whereas some capital goods are found to be 
useless after a new set of relative prices is settled down (they become excessive capital 
goods), in most cases the firms find their capital structure to be only worse than 
optimal given the new relative prices and new technologies. But because the capital 
structure does already exist, the best the firm can do is to continue to use it and to 
adjust it only gradually as the former capital goods are depreciated. 
Similarly for reallocated capital goods, which were transferred from other 
production processes, it is likely that they are technologically obsolete and that their 
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replacement costs are very high". However, the task that is solved by the impersonal 
market system is not allocation of a fictitious abstract “capital1’ with a given volume. 
Individual capital goods, which are more or less malleable, are in reality allocated. 
With regard to the usual rate of investment, size of total capital stock and durability of 
certain capital goods, it is clear that the inferior combination of capital goods can last 
in transition countries for more than a decade. 
The interfirm capital allocation inefficiency is found, of course, in all economies 
but again there are certain reasons why it seems likely that this phenomenon is more 
important in transition economies. The basic reason is that there is a different situation 
in the field of financial intermediation. The sector of financial intermediation connects 
individual firms via the interest rate. If this sector functions well, capital resources can 
flow from firms with lower than average marginal product of capital towards firms 
with higher than average marginal product of capital. The spread between deposit and 
loan interest rates is given mainly by transaction costs and the market power of the 
intermediaries. Net marginal products of capital are not literally equalised by financial 
intermediation, but their difference corresponds to the spread. 
In transition economies the spread is usually much wider because the banks face 
much higher risks. Higher risk premiums are due to a more volatile economic 
environment, to unsettled property structures in firms and also, they are due to defects 
in the institutional framework. Wider spreads imply that the tendency for equalising 
marginal product of capital is weaker in transition economies. Moreover, the credit 
market is not cleared, credits are rationed and this rationing takes place on the basis of 
the banks’ abilities to assess potential projects. I believe that these abilities are smaller 
in transition economies than in standard market economies, where the intermediaries 
have long-term experiences. This strengthens the hypothesis that financial 
intermediation contributed to equalisation of marginal products to a smaller extent in 
transition economies than in standard market economies. 
8. Capital allocation inefficiencies and economic growth 
We can ask whether inefficient capital allocation has any effect on economic growth 
and, if so, in what direction. An answer to this question is not as straightforward as it 
might at first seem and it depends on a more detailed formulation of the problem. 
Let us suppose for simplicity that despite aggregation problems we can describe 
the relationship between capital and output in the economy with imperfect allocation 
by means of an aggregate production function. Let / in the figure 4 stands for a 
production function with perfect capital allocation and let fs stand for a production 
function in the real economy, i.e. in economy with imperfect allocation. 
1 
“ In the case that existing capital goods are reallocated, they will be reallocated for prices lower than 
replacement costs. A given capital product is characterised by its replacement cost for the purposes of the 
production function, this price, however, is not relevant for an agent’s economic calculation if he or she is 
buying the product for a lower price. 
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Figure 4. Comparison of production functions in an economy with perfect and 
imperfect allocation 
Obviously, given the capital stock k0, the output is higher in case of perfect 
allocation than in case of imperfect allocation, but we are interested in the implications 
for economic growth. Let y stand for output per unit of labour and let g and gs stand 
for economic growth in case of perfect capital allocation and imperfect allocation 
respectively3. It follows that 
r _ y _ f(k)k _ l'{k)k k . , _ y, _ f!{k)k k 
y f(k) f(k) k an 8’ ys fs (k) fs (k) k 
Now there are different ways in which we can formulate the problem. We can ask 
what influence the inefficient capital allocation has on economic growth given the 
k 
capital stock and given the volume of net investment, i.e. given —. If the problem is 
k 
formulated in this way, the relationship between g and gs depends only upon the 
f'(k) f'(k) 
relationship between -——^ and . However, in this case the inefficient allocation 
/(*) /. * 
does not necessarily lead to lower economic growth. If m 
/.(*) > 
f'(k) 
f{k) 
, then growth in 
the economy with imperfect capital allocation would be the same or higher than growth 
rate in the economy with perfect allocation. 
Symbols with the dots stand for time derivatives of the corresponding variables. 
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There is no a priori reason why this inequality could not hold. Although it is true 
that given the capital stock k0, the marginal product of capital will be lower in the 
imperfect allocation case, on the other hand the output will be lower as well. Therefore, 
the question is whether the marginal product of capital will be more times lower than 
will the product be lower as compared with the perfect allocation product. Only then 
the imperfect capital allocation implies unambiguously lower economic growth. 
Let us consider that the rate of capital allocation inefficiency is the same all along 
the production function in the following sense: for any capital stock k , the output is x 
times lower in imperfect allocation case than in perfect allocation case, where i is a 
constant and it is bigger than 1. Under this assumption we can write f(k) = x /.(*)• 
However, then for the economic growth we get that it is the same in both cases: 
z = f(k)k _ xf'(k)k = f'{k)k = 
y f (k) xft{k) f,{k) 
This solution is a consequence of assumed constancy of x but because we do not 
have any a priori reason why x should be an increasing or decreasing function of k , it 
seems to be a reasonable assumption. 
The fact that lower efficiency of resource allocation does not necessarily lead to 
lower growth may seem paradoxical, but of course, the paradox is only seeming and it 
belongs to the class of paradoxes (which are quite numerous in economics) resulting 
from an insufficient distinction between growth and state variables. 
However, if the problem is specified slightly differently, we get a different 
solution. Let us suppose, as well as in the previous specification, that the volume of net 
investment Ak is given but instead of capital stock, it is the volume of output ys that 
is given now. What will be the influence of the imperfect allocation on economic 
growth? This specification of the problem is illustrated in figure 5. 
Figure 5. Difference in growth rates given the volume of initial output and net 
investment 
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In this case, economic growth is faster when there is perfect capital allocation 
because the marginal product of capital is higher while the volume of output is the 
same (by the assumption) and from this it follows that the relative increment of output 
is higher. The difference of growth rates would be even more striking if it is not 
volume of net investment but of gross investment that is given. For in such a case, net 
investment in the perfect allocation economy would be higher than in the imperfect 
allocation economy because the capital stock kl necessary for production of ys (fig. 
5) is smaller in the perfect allocation economy and so is the depreciation of capital. 
Therefore, if gross investment and output are given, the growth rate of the perfect 
allocation economy is higher, not only because of higher marginal product of capital, 
but also because the volume of net investment is bigger. All this can be summarised in 
the following proposition: if the current volume of output were produced with perfect 
capital allocation, then the same investment would lead to a higher growth rate. 
This is a different result as compared with the previous specification of the 
problem, which led to a conclusion that less effective capital allocation does not 
necessarily imply lower economic growth. Certainly, even this conclusion, however, 
does not mean that the capital allocation is irrelevant. What it means is that the capital 
allocation efficiency has mainly a scale effect: higher efficiency is connected with 
higher product and on the contrary, but not necessarily, with higher growth rate. 
Figure 6. Shifts of production functions due to changes in allocation efficiency 
If capital allocation efficiency changes, e.g. if it is increased (see figure 6, in which 
the increase of capital allocation efficiency is depicted as a shift of /0 towards /,), the 
growth rates will temporarily change too as the production is shifting to a higher level 
(in case the capital allocation efficiency is decreased then, of course, the growth rates 
will be smaller and the product will shift towards a lower level). After achieving the 
higher production function there is no longer any a priori reason for higher growth 
rates (again assuming the same volume of investment). 
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And similarly, in the case of a decrease in capital allocation efficiency - it can 
imply smaller or even negative growth rates. Low level of efficiency, however, 
probably does not cause low growth rates. 
9. Conclusion 
The aim of the paper was to classify capital allocation inefficiencies because the term 
“capital allocation inefficiency” is too broad and to discuss further sources of particular 
kinds of inefficiencies with a special regard to transition economies. 
First, it is necessary to distinguish intrafirm and interfirm inefficiencies. Excessive 
employment, excessive capital goods and inferior combination of outputs are 
inefficiencies that belong to the intrafirm level. A special kind of inefficiency is 
inferior combination of capital goods. However, it is not an inefficiency in the strict 
sense of the word, it is inefficiency only with respect to the new set of relative prices 
and new technology, which were not expected in time when the combination of capital 
goods was installed. Maximising firms taking into account the existing capital stock 
and therefore, even given the maximising effort, the ratios of quantities of capital 
goods used for production are not “optimal” (optimal given the new relative prices) 
because the capital goods are not malleable. On the contrary, frequent arguments about 
insufficient “restructuring” and slow “modernisation” usually fail to take into account 
the existing set of capital goods and various proposals for the “modernisation” of the 
economy would usually lead to waste of scarce resources. Interfirm capital allocation 
inefficiency is implied by not equilibrating the net marginal product of capital. 
There are some special reasons for worse capital allocation in transition economies 
in comparison with standard market economies. As far as the intrafirm allocation is 
concerned, weaker corporate governance is a characteristic feature in newly privatised 
firms and there is also a bigger portion of state-owned firms in most of the transition 
countries, at least at the beginning of the transition process. Moreover, liberalisation of 
prices and of trade led to dramatic changes in relative prices of both consumption and 
capital goods. As for the interfirm level, the capital allocation inefficiency is connected 
with peculiar reasons in the field of financial intermediation. 
The answer to a question concerning the impact of capital allocation inefficiency 
on economic growth depends on a more detailed specification of the question. If capital 
stock and volume of investment (not rate of investment) are given, then inefficient 
capital allocation does not necessarily imply lower economic growth in comparison 
with perfect capital allocation. On the contrary, if we compare two economies with the 
same level of production and the same rate of investment (either gross or net), but with 
different levels of capital allocation efficiency, then the one with better capital 
allocation will grow faster. 
24 Jan Kubicek 
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The Evolution of World Economic Recessions 
- Their Regularities and Consequences 
for Central and East European Countries’ Development 
Krzysztof Piech 
The goal of the paper1 is to present some of the so-called “stylised facts” connected 
with world economic recessions, especially with the length of a world business cycle 
and the regularities of its recession phases. It is also to prove that there is regularity in 
the occurrence of the world economic recessions, thus they can be predicted. 
1. Introduction 
The notion “recession” closely relates to a business cycle and is a phase of it. Further, 
in this paper I will concentrate on the chosen stylised facts of the so-called world 
business cycle, especially on their regularities of occurrence and - when it is necessary 
- on some reasons influencing it. 
The stylised facts are the characteristics describing a business cycle. They are 
“stylised” because of no fixed and unquestionable, quantitative proofs. There are many 
different research results, as well as methodical approaches, to analyse a business 
cycle. They can refer to a cycle of a certain country, a group of countries, a region and 
to the world economy. One of the main stylised facts concerns the length of a cycle. 
Other characteristics include amplitude, frequency, pro- and anticyclical variables, 
leading and lagging variables, cyclical components, measures of the course of a cycle, 
its phases, turning points, synchronisation (of cycles, recessions), and a trend. 
The idea of a world business cycle is to be used only with a certain restriction. 
There is a debate as to whether there is a world business cycle or not. It is well 
documented that there is, for example, the European business cycle (especially 
consisting of Euro zone countries), some other regional (Canada and the United States; 
Australia and New Zealand etc.) or international business cycles (see: Christodoulakis 
et al., 1995; Artis and Zhang, 1997; Fiorito and Kollintzas, 1994). The so-called world 
business cycle is a weighted average of national business cycles (weighted with their 
share in the world GDP), and not a phenomenon of world economic rules. 
That which is understood under this name does not refer to the whole world with 
all its countries, but only some of its parts. A process of growing synchronisation of the 
business cycles plays a crucial role in creating the world business cycle. It usually 
applied only to the most open economies. Later, it referred to the majority of countries, 
however in different scope and intensity. 
1 I would like to express my gratitude to those who gave me helpful comments on the topics presented: 
Prof Grzegorz Kotodko, Prof Barbara Polszakiewicz and Dr Krzysztof Marczewski. 
26 Krzysztof Piech 
2. An outline of evolution of business cycle studies 
The author of the first theory of a business cycle, formulated in 1862 (after the crisis of 
1857), was French economist, Clement Juglar (1819-1905). He was the first economist 
who found and described the regularity accompanying the growth and recession 
phases. The length of ‘his’ cycles was about 8.2 years.^ According to Stanley Jevons 
(1835-1882), the business cycles in 1721-1872 were on average 10.46 years long, and 
were caused by sun spots. The cycles described by Henry Moore (1869-1958) had a 
similar length - eight years on average. In 1923, Joseph Kitchin (1861-1932) 
discovered shorter cycles, which were 39 months long. One of the most well-known 
business cycle researchers was also Nikolai Kondratiev (1892-1931 ?3). He elaborated 
in 1922 the theory of long term business cycles, known today (following Schumpeter’s 
terminology) as “Kondratiev cycles”. They vary from 45 to 60 years. A few times 
shorter were the “Kuznets cycles” (18.3 years, or from 16.5 to 20 years), discovered by 
Simon Kuznets (1901-1985), the Nobel Prize laureate in 1971. They were connected 
with the changes in population growth rates and migration. 
Those lengths were approved by Johan Akerman (1896-1982), who usually 
indicated the cycles’ length as a multiplication, by two.4 His ideas were to some extent 
approved by Joseph Schumpeter (1883-1950), who was an author of a complex theory 
of business cycles, which were based on Kondratiev, Juglar and Kitchin cycles, taking 
into account inventions, as well.5 
Later many economists followed those authors, contributing new elements 
explaining the reasons for cycles and recessions. One of these was John M. Keynes, 
whose theory was mainly influenced by The Great Depression (1929-33). Later, for 
example, Milton Friedman after having analysed 18 cycles in the United States after 
1870 concluded that one of their reasons was money supply. As he argued with Anna 
Schwartz in their ‘classical’ work (Friedman and Schwartz, 1963), the major reasons 
for recessions (including The Great Depression) are monetary changes. In addition, 
Robert Lucas contributed to the understanding of economic phenomena by the notion: 
rational expectations. Because of two supply shocks in the 1970s, a need for revision 
of those ideas emerged. Thus since 1982 the real business cycle school has developed 
(Kydland and Prescott, 1982). Its representatives (e.g. Robert Barro, Sergio Rebelo, 
Finn Kydland, and Edward Prescott) concentrate on real shocks. Their opinions are 
widely criticised however, for not respecting the monetary shocks. This school brought 
many new ways of analysing the cycles (e.g. models’ calibrating, HP filter). 
One of the latest new ideas on business cycles is a political business cycle theory, 
developed especially in the 1990s6. According to its representatives (e.g. Alberto 
~ There are different values of this kind of cycle, given in literature, usually ranging from 8 to 10 years. 
Kondratiev was sent to a prison camp in Siberia in 1931. The exact year of his death is not known. 
1) Short seasonal changes (1/2 year), 2) long seasonal changes (one year), 3) agricultural cycles (2 
years), 4) short business cycles (3-4 years), 5) long business cycles (8 years), 6) very long cycles (18 
years), 7) secular changes (50-60 years), 8) perions of wars escalation (140 years), 9) long fluctuations of 
industrialisation processes (250 years). See: Rusinski (1973). 
In his opinion, one Kondratiev cycle includes six Juglar cycles, and one ‘Juglar4 - full three Kitchin 
cycles. 
However, its precursor is a Polish economist Michal Kalecki (Kalecki, 1943). Theory of the political 
business cycle was presented by Nordhaus (1975) and then by Hibbs (1977). 
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Alesina), the date of national elections influences the macroeconomic variables 
(especially economic growth, and also inflation; see: Gartner, 1999), and may, for 
example, create fiscal policy cycles (Schuknecht, 1999). There was also a discussion 
on the role of central banks in the political business cycle (Sieg, 1997), particularly on 
the so-called Roland Vaubel’s hypothesis (Vaubel, 1993) about partisan central banks7. 
Although economic policy may cause economic recessions (e.g. Mexico 1994/95), 
there is a little evidence that may influence the business cycle in developed countries 
on a larger scale. 
A national business cycle, instead of four or five years (according to the political 
business cycle), lasts - according to the IMF (2002, p. 116) research results for 21 
industrial countries - about six years in the 1980s and 1990s (four in the 1970s). 
Roughly, 40 percent of all cycles during those periods lasted more than eight years. 
3. What is a recession? - a few definitional approaches 
Business cycles can have different geographical ranges. As mentioned above (with all 
the restrictions), there are national (relating to one country), international, and regional 
business cycles as well as a world one. 
In order to describe the recession, it is necessary to define the business cycle as a 
whole and to establish borders between different phases of a cycle. There are two main 
approaches distinguishing the business cycle phases: 
• The European approach - business cycle consists of four or five phases (e.g crisis, 
depression, recovery (revival), expansion, prosperity), and 
• The American approach (supported by the National Bureau of Economic Research) 
- with only two phases: recession and expansion.8 
Because of the differences in business cycles’ definitions, there are also differences 
in definitions of recessions. 
There are three major definitional approaches to the term “recession”: 
1) The European definitional approach - a recession is a drop of real GDP in two 
constitutive quarters, 
2) The American definitional approach (i.e. mainly used by NBER) - a period from 
peak to trough of a business cycle, where these points are indicated by a 
composition of several economic variables; 
3) The Japanese definitional approach - a recession is defined in accordance with 
countries specific variables, especially real GDP growth rate.9 
Another interesting definitional debate is a distinction between two terms: 
economic “recession” and “crisis”. It is usually accepted that a crisis is a deeper form 
of a recession.10 
7 See: Berger and Voitek (1997) and the response for their arguments: Vaubel (1997). 
However IMF in its last WEO report, under typically strong influence from the NBER side, distinguished 
also the period of “recovery” - the time it takes for output to returns to its previous peak. Ibidem, 116-117. 
9 This definition mixes two other definitions: it approves American treatment of a cycle as a unique 
phenomenon, additionally using quarterly real GDP as a proxy measure for aggregate economic activity, 
as it is usually used in Europe (and also by IMF). 
10 According to the authors’ methodology, economic crisis is a fall of real GDP in at least one year. 
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Further hesitation is connected with the way of measuring the length of a business 
cycle. According to a traditional approach, it is measured from the beginning of a 
recession. Other approaches promote a beginning of a revival phase. NBER measures 
the length both between peaks as well as troughs of a business cycle. Further in the 
article, measurement was taken from the trough to the following one, as there can be 
many peaks of growth cycle and because recessions occur less often and with a greater 
regularity than the phases of expansion or peaks. The business cycle will be based on 
growth rates instead of changes of nominal values (Zamowitz, 1992). It is also 
assumed that a business cycle is measured by annual (because of the lack of more 
detailed data) real GDP growth rates (as in the European and the Japanese approach). 
4. World economic recessions in pre-war period 
Early works on world recessions are concerned with the financial crises in individual 
countries. Charles Kindleberger (1999) dates the first of these to the years 1618-23. 
These took place after the Thirty Years’ War in the Holy Roman Empire and between 
1636-1637 in the Republic of Holland, after speculations of the Dutch East India 
Company stocks, real estate and rare tulip bulbs (see e.g.: Kindleberger, 1999, p. 386). 
There were other financial crises also, such as the money crisis in England in 1696, 
speculative crashes in 1720 induced by the cheating operations of John Law in France, 
the trade crises in Hamburg in 1763 and 1799, crisis in 1815 in England and in the 
United States, which were described by Wirth (Mendelson, 1959, p. 171-172). 
According to Kindleberger there were the following financial crises: in 1720, in 
1763 (also in Prussia, Holland and Scandinavia), in 1772 in Amsterdam, England, 
Scotland, Sweden, Russia, in 1793 in England and France, in 1799 in Hamburg and 
Liverpool, in 1810 in England, in Hamburg and in New York. They were caused 
mostly by speculations with goods and stocks. They were local - limited only to one 
country or even some of its parts, but the phenomena of financial crisis spillover was 
noticed. 
According to Lev Mendelson, the financial crisis in 1825 (named by him as the 
first crisis of global overproduction) had an international character, but not a global one 
(Mendelson, 1959, p. 159).11 Before 1825 there were only local (i.e. national) or 
international recessions, e.g. 1810, 1815, 1819, mainly in England. After 1825, 
international economic recessions occurred in 1836, 1847. World economic recessions 
started from the year 185712, and the next one was in 1866. 
11 The difference between these two types lies in the range of countries, which suffered the crises. 
Mendelson often used the term: world economic crisis. According to author’s research results and author’s 
definition of a crisis, that was a mistake. The proper name should be world (or sometimes only 
international) financial crisis. Further in the paper, the author finds that there were world economic 
recessions instead of crises, because they not connected with a fall of world GDP but only with a drop of 
the real GDP growth rate. Where possible, the author tried to estimate the world GDP to identify the 
periods of recessions. 
“ According to Mendelson, that was the first crisis in the history of capitalism, which was not only of an 
international character (like in 1847), but world character (Mendelson, 1959, p. 614). 
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Thus, we can observe the differences among historical economists as far as the 
dates of the first world economic recessions are concerned.13 As one of the best Polish 
economists in this field, Barbara Polszakiewicz has written: the works of Mendelson 
and W. W. Rostow are very close. The only big difference referred to the years 1854 
and 1857. However, J. A. Estey did not note the emergence of crises of the world 
economy in 1847 and in 1866; these were - according to him - the dates of the English 
crises only (Polszakiewicz, 1989, p. 190). 
The year 1873 was one of the most important, from the point of view of the course 
of the world financial crises. According to Mendelson (1959), the world recession in 
1873-75 was the deepest in the nineteenth century, and only the crash started in 1929 
exceeded the devastating results of this recession (thus it is often called The Great 
Recession). The next world economic recessions were in the following years: 1883-84, 
1892-93, and 1902, and later in 1908 and 1914, usually one or two years after the 
financial crises. 
Figure 1. Synchronisation of nominal GDP fall, 1851-1900 (in percent of countries) 
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Note: the sample consists of a different number of countries: period 1850-60 only four (Great 
Britain, Germany, France, Denmark), period 1860-64 eight (plus Italy, Sweden, Finland, 
Australia), 1865-69 nine (plus Norway), 1870-84 eleven (plus United States and 
Canada), 1885-1900 thirteen (plus Japan and Russia). The data presents changes of 
nominal GDP only. 
Source: own calculations based on NBER (2001). 
All these opinions should be verified by the statistical data. Due to the lack of 
them, it is usually very difficult to do this. Even having the national data for some of 
the largest countries, it is difficult to draw a course of the world business cycle. 
13 It should be reminded that because of the lack of proper data (of world and even national real GDP of 
the most important countries) it is not possible to indicate the dates of world recessions clearly. The author 
did it based only on a review of literature. 
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As can be seen, the dates of national crises do not always cover the dates indicated 
by historical economists (although the question of reliability of the data remains). 
According to some data, the frequency of recessions can be presented as in figure 1. 
If the periods of higher synchronisation of national ‘crises’ (defined by nominal 
terms only) may be the periods of world (or at least international) recessions, the 
following dates should be indicated: 1858, 1875, 1877-79, 1884-86, and 1892. Those 
results differ from the historical descriptions or IMF estimates, which show that the 
global downturns were in the early 1890s, the early 1900s, 1907-08 (IMF, 2002, 
p. 112). 
Figure 2. Synchronisation of recessions, 1881-1913 (in percent of countries) 
1881 1888 1889 1893 1897 1901 1905 1909 1913 
Notes: the sample consists of 16 countries: Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, Norway, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
United Kingdom, and the United States. The shaded areas indicate the years when the 
United Kingdom was in recession. 
Source: IMF (2002, p. 112). 
IMF (2002) used a different sample of countries as well as data, thus influencing 
the differences between these two charts (fig. 1, 2). It is surely not possible to 
approximate the course of the world GDP using those two charts. By doing so, there 
would be an assumption that the size of all the countries (and their share in world 
GDP) in a sample is the same (surely not true). 
After the crisis in 1890, the phenomena of monopolisation escalated, leading to the 
shortening of the so-called world business cycle from the period of 10-11 years 
(nineteenth century) to 7-8 years (the beginning of the twentieth century). 
Due to the lack of yearly data about the course of the pace of changes in world 
GDP, it was necessary to do some estimating. 
The available and comparable data for five of the most developed countries in the 
world were weighed with their share in world industrial production between 1910-1913 
(see fig. 3).14 
14 • • 
Estimations on a longer period i.e. after the World War I was not possible, because of too large a variety 
of data (provided by NBER, 2001) sources, making the use of comparable data impossible. 
The Evolution of World Economic Recessions - Their Regularities ... 31 
The calculations give the result that in 1908 in five of the largest countries of the 
world an economic contraction occurred. They produced c. 78% of world industrial 
production at the time. Thus, it can be said, with high probability, that there was a 
world recession in 1908 (see also fig. 2).15 
Figure 3. Approximation of nominal GDP dynamics of five countries between 
1901-1913 (in %) 
Note: The estimated indicator is a weighted average of nominal GDP of the following 
countries: United States, France, Great Britain, Russia and Germany. 
Source: own calculations based on: NBER (2001). 
The world economic recession occurred also in 1914.16 It is worth noting that the 
world financial crises in 1907 and 1913 resulted in the occurrence of global economic 
default the following year. 
5. World economic recessions in interwar period 
The next world financial crises started in 1920, 1929 and 1938. There is no doubt that 
there was a world recession of 1921 (although it can be questioned as to whether it 
appeared in 1920; see fig. 5 and fig. 4). The Great Depression of 1929-33 was not only 
a world recession, but can also be called - one of the few - world economic crises. 
Counting it in terms of a drop of world GDP, it lasted from 1930-1932 (or up to 1933; 
see fig. 5 vs. fig. 4). It is sometimes forgotten that there was also a world economic 
recession just before World War II - in 1938 (see fig. 4 and fig. 5). Thus, there is quite 
a good consensus among economists on the dates of world recessions in the interwar 
period (especially in comparison to the previous period). 
Due to the difficulties with the access to the statistical data for the two world wars 
or the lack of it, there are no approximations of the world GDP for this period given. 
15 It can also be confirmed by the values of GDP of 13 of the most developed countries (not shown here) 
that only two of them (France and Russia) did not account for the fall of GDP. See: NBER (2001). 
If1 From a sample of 13 countries in only one (Australia) the GDP had grown. See: Ibidem. 
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Figure 4. Average nominal GDP of 16 countries, 1918-39 
Note: The estimated indicator is a weighted average of nominal GDP of the following countries: 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great 
Britain, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, Sweden and United States. 
Source: Morawski (1994, p. 31). 
Figure 5. Synchronisation of recessions, 1919-38 (in percent of countries) 
Notes: set of countries as on fig. 2. The shaded areas indicate the years when the United States 
was in recession. 
Source: IMF (2002, p. 112). 
6. World economic recessions during the Bretton Woods period 
Similar calculations of synchronisation of the recessions in 16 countries were made by 
the IMF (2002) for the period 1950-72 (figure 6). It can be seen that there were world¬ 
wide recessions in 1952 and 1958, but it should be noted that they were less common 
(in a number of countries) as previously. Thereafter the decade of the 1960s was 
without a world-wide recession. 
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Figure 6. Synchronisation of recessions, 1950-72 (in percent of countries) 
- 1SSB-72 -30 
Source and Notes: see fig. 5. 
As many economists accept, such a phenomenon was caused by the use of a proper 
economic (stabilisation) policy based on the Keynesian doctrine in many advanced 
economies. Another explanation can be the functioning of the Bretton Woods system, 
which was established, among others, to stabilise the world economy and to prevent 
the occurring of the world economic recessions, having in mind the Great Depression. 
Similarly, as in the previous periods, the synchronisation of recessions is not the 
best way to estimate the dates of world economic recessions (defined according to the 
world GDP). 
The author tried to estimate the course of world GDP after World War II. It was 
done based on information from the International Financial Statistics database (IMF, 
2000b). The set of data of GDP in constant prices as in 1995 was chosen. The sample 
17 j O 1 Q 
consisted of 25 of the most developed economies in 1977. 
17* They were as follows (in accordance from the largest economy, a year from which the data was 
available is indicated in brackets): United States (1948), Japan (1956), Germany (1960), France (1950), 
Great Britain (1948), Italy (1960), Canada (1948), Spain (1954), the Netherlands (1956), Brazil (1963), 
Australia (1960), India (1950), Mexico (1948), Sweden (1950), Iran (1966), Belgium (1953), Argentina 
(1951), Saudi Arabia (1968), Switzerland (1948), Turkey (1967), Indonesia (1958), Austria (1964), 
Denmark (1950). The sum of their GDP in 1995 accounted 83% of the world GDP (79% in 1970) at 
market prices. 
1 o 
' According to the values of GDP in dollars in current prices taken from: IMF (2000a). 
19 With the exemption of China and Poland. It was due to the unavailability of data for China, because it 
started in a used database not before 1978, and for Poland - in 1994. Willing to avoid some serious 
corrections in world GDP data and because of the goal of calculations, the year 1977 was chosen, and 
those two countries were not taken into account. It should be also noted that in this database there were no 
data for the Soviet Union. 
Only 25 (or properly: 23) countries were chosen, although it was possible to choose more. However, the 
next country in a “ranking” in 1977 was Yugoslavia, but it was not included in IFS IMF. Czechoslovakia 
took 31st place, which was also not included in the used database, and the 35th was Romania (with a 
restriction the same as for Poland, but the data were from 1980). The elimination of these countries and 
abandoning the other, does not guarantee that the estimations of the annual changes of world GDP in an 
analysed period will be better. 
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Due to the necessity of counting the weighted average (not the arithmetic one), the 
annual changes of GDP of certain countries counted from one-base data had to be 
weighted with the share of a certain country’s GDP in a sum of GDP of analysed 
sample of countries. Further, the “weighted” GDP obtained were added. 
More precisely presented, the GDP sample in constant prices between 1949 and 
1979^ were approximated as follows: 
GDPs, = X GDK > 
where: GDPst - the change of real GDP of the whole sample of countries in a 
year /, 
/ = {1949,.. .,1998}indicator of a country, ne {1,2,... ,23}21, 
GDP. - the change of real GDP of a country / for the year t weighted with its 
share in sample’s GDP and were calculated: 
GDP t = GDP! 
__ ** 
GDP, i,t 
GDPs 
** 5 
where: GDPj t - the change of real GDP of country i in the year t, 
^^ • 
GDPst - nominal GDP of a sample of countries in the year /, calculated as: 
GDPst = 2^ GDPt t , and GDPf t - nominal GDP of country i in the year t\ 
/—i 
IP'S GDP} t was counted through a simple bringing of GDP: t , i.e. the one-base series 
(1995=100) of GDP of country /' to the chain series (there was lost one value from 
the first year), and this value was taken from the IFS IMF database; 
k ** 
gdpk, = gdp,a995 GDP IFS Gt 
where: GDPt )995 is of course the nominal GDP of country i in the year 1995. 
The results of calculations are shown in the next figure (fig. 7). 
Comparing the data obtained for the period 1970-77 with the data for all IMF 
member countries (WEO database) some differences can be noted, thus the results 
shown are only the trial of approximation of the world GDP." The results shown do 
not vary much from those by Morawski (1994, p. 31 ).23 
20 
It was also possible to count the values for the next years, but it was not justified, because of having 
those data in the IMF’s World Economic Outlook Database. 
21 In many of the starting years of a series, due to the lack of proper data, less than 23 countries were taken 
into account. 
22 
Recounting these differences into per cents (not percentage points), the size of differences were as 
follows: for 1975 - 73% (1.85% from WEO against 0.5% according to the author’s approximations, thus 
1.35 p.p. of difference), for 1974 - 58% (2.75% in WEO; 1.15% - author). In these years there was the 
world economic recession. The differences may be explained by the content of the sample of countries - 
the values obtained are lower than for the sample of all countries (WEO IMF), so the studied 23 most 
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Figure 7. Average real GDP of a sample of countries, 1949-1977 (in %) 
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Note: The estimated indicator is a weighted average of GDP of the 23 largest world economies. 
Other notes: see in text. 
Source: own calculations based on: IMF (2000a, 200b). 
Thus the author’s way of approximation of world real GDP for 1970-77 shows 
(fig. 8) that the method used for the period 1950-1970 is good enough at least to 
indicate possible dates of world economic recessions. 
Figure 8. Differences in approximations of world real GDP (in %) in 1970-1977 
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Source: see fig. 7 and IMF (2000a). 
developed countries suffered a deeper recession than the rest of the counties. The next differences are: 
1971 - 16%, 1997 - 11% (again the values are lower than in WEO IMF), and the rest - under 10%. 
The explanation given above is not the only possible reason for differences: the IFS and WEO databases - 
although they are from the same institution (IMF) - differs. 
" The most important differences in results are: smaller growth of GDP in 1949 (caused probably by the 
content of a sample - only five countries), the peak of a short business cycle in 1950 (according to 
Morawski in 1951), different direction of GDP in the period 1955-56, and greater growth of GDP in 1959, 
and 1968. 
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After World War II, a typical post-war default occurred, connected with the 
devastation of many economies (especially where war activities were conducted, e.g. in 
Europe) and the necessity of transition from military production to a civil one (so- 
called “reconversion crisis”).24 
Approximation of the world GDP shows that there were recessions in 1949, 1954, 
and 1958. According to the IMF’s estimations (fig. 6), the world-wide recessions could 
have been in 1952 and 1958, but in 1954 the recession appeared in the United States 
rather than in the rest of the world. The US influenced the world GDP in 1952, but has 
not induced many recessions all over the world." Thereafter was a decade of quite 
permanent economic development (the so-called ‘golden’ 1960s)" , which ended with a 
slowdown in 1970. 
It is difficult to find such regularities after World War II, as before. Thus, the 
Bretton Woods period is often called the period of the world business cycle 
desynchronisation (Sokolow, 1964)." It means countries developed more 
independence than before World War II. 
Some other causes of changes are also indicated in a business cycle course. The 
most frequent is the thesis about a shortening of the business cycle: from 8-10 years to 
3-4 years, and it is usually proved by (usually only!) the most developed countries like 
the United States, Great Britain or Germany. Not everybody shares this idea." 
29 Recessions in the Bretton Woods period became milder but not shorter." 
7. World economic recessions in the post-Bretton Woods system 
After the default of the Bretton Woods system, due to the growth of oil prices, the first 
oil crisis occurred. It restored the regularity of the world business cycle and lengthens 
their duration to middle-sized (Juglar) cycles. 
The next world recession lasted from 1974 to 1975. These years were very 
important from the theory of crises spillover’s point of view, confirmed by economic 
events from 1979 (next oil price growth) resulting in a recession in 1980-82. The 
sample of 16 countries used by IMF (2002) indicates that over 35% of those countries 
'4 It can be assumed that during World War II and in 1946, world economic recession (or even crisis) 
occurred, but its scale is difficult to estimate because of the lack of data or the incomplete international 
statistics. This recession had not a cyclical character, thus it cannot be taken in account as a regular world 
recession (although it significantly influenced the course of business cycles in the following periods). 
25 The question of definition of world economic recession can be raised again: if it deals only with world 
GDP or the geographical scope of recessions. With increasing synchronisation of business cycles there 
will be more regularities in world recessions’ occurrence, which justify an approach based on world GDP. 
" The recession in 1958 is broadly accepted, only sometimes the recession in years 1967-68 is noted. 
Although Zarnowitz (1992) found that growth cycles in major industrial countries were highly 
synchronised throughout 1948-80. 
28 • ^ 
According to B. Polszakiewicz, her “empirical research results give evidence that the period of the post¬ 
war cycle vary from 7.5 to 10 years. Many indicate also that the crises in 1957-58, 1967-1968, 1974-1975 
and 1981-1982 were world-wide.” (Polszakiewicz, 1989, p. 189). 
However, “expansions were especially long, lasting about 10 years on average. Some expansions lasted 
20 years, and several countries did not experience a year of negative output growth at all. (...) even though 
average growth rates were similar in the prewar and post-Bretton Woods periods, recession years were less 
common in the later period...” (IMF, 2002, p. 109). 
The Evolution of World Economic Recessions - Their Regularities ... 37 
also suffered a recession in the years 1981-82, while more than 50% in 1975 and 50% 
in 1994 (fig. 9). 
Based on the sample of IMF’s 16 countries, it should be noted that the world-wide 
recession of the early 1990s lasted in 1990-1994 (or taking the ‘heuristics’ used by 
IMF of 50% of countries - only in 1994). 
Figure 9. Synchronisation of recessions, 1973-2000 (in percentage of countries) 
- 1173-2011D -60 
Figure 10. Synchronisation of recessions, 1970-2001 (in percentage of countries) 
Note: The sample consists of 178 countries. Data for 2001 are the forecasts. 
Source: own counts based on: IMF (2000a). 
Looking closer at the synchronisation of national crises the following periods of 
world-wide recessions can be indicated (using heuristics of 25% of countries): 1975, 
1980-83, 1991-93. As it can be seen, these periods are not the same as the dates 
occurring in economic literature. 
World economic recession was defined as a significant slowdown of the world real 
GDP growth rate. Although it is not a precise definition, it is commonly accepted that 
during the last three decades there were three world economic recessions: 1974-75, 
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1980-82, 1990-92 (see: figure 10). There was also a ‘growth recession’ in 1998 due to 
the Asian financial crisis in 1997 as well as the Russian crisis in 1998 (fig. 11). 
Figure 11. World real GDP in the period 1970-2000 (in %) 
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Source: IMF (2000a). 
There are a few ways of defining a world recession. Due to the lack of quarterly 
data, it is impossible to base it on the European definition of recession. Thus, one of 
the ways can be a “simple observation” (used above). A ‘heuristics’ can also be used to 
indicate how large the fall of GDP should be to treat it as a world recession, but this 
approach needs human intervention30, rather than an objective, qualitative way. It was 
possible in the European definitional approach to compare the countries. However in 
the case of the world, it is not possible to compare the data related to it with other 
worlds. Thus, it is justified to create a unique definition of the world recession (as in 
the Japanese definitional approach). 
Another way can also be employed, using more sophisticated, quantitative 
methods. One of them is the Hodrick-Prescott Filter (Hodrick and Prescott, 1980), used 
usually by the representatives of the Real Business Cycle School of economic thought. 
The use of any kinds of quantitative filter is more objective than the use of heuristic 
techniques. One of the results used to identify the cycles of the world GDP is shown in 
figure 12. 
Assuming that the zero-line will indicate the deviations from trend obtained with 
the use of the HP filter, world economic recessions were in the following years: 
• 1970-71, but it should be noted that the course of world real GDP does not confirm 
it (see fig. 4 and 5), because HP Filter uses the relative values, i.e. compared to the 
trend; 
• 1974-75 (the First Oil Crisis), 
() For instance, assuming the 20% tall of the rate of real world GDP growth, world recessions would be in 
the following years: 1974-75, 1980-82, 1985, 1989-91, 1998. 
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• 1980-83 (after and as a result of the Second Oil Crisis started in 1979, which 
negative effects ended three years later causing in 1982 the world debt crisis of the 
developing countries, especially of Latin America), 
• and 1990-93.31 
Figure 12. Deviation from the trend of the world real GDP in 1970-2000 (in 
percentage points), obtained with the use of HP Filter 
Source: own calculation based on data from: IMF (2000a). 
There are differences in indicating the periods of world economic recessions 
between the results of three approaches shown. To judge which method gives the best 
results, the most proper in the author’s opinion is to use the simplest method and thus 
to choose the “simple observation” of the real GDP course. Thus, the following periods 
will be obtained: 1974-75, 1980-1982, and 1990-1992. There should be no doubts that 
the troughs of the world business cycle were in the years: 1975, 1982 and 1991. More 
serious ‘growth recessions’ could be observed in 1985-87 and in 1998. It gives the 
average duration of a world business cycle of about eight years (in the period 
1975-1992). 
8. World economic recessions and their historical regularities 
- summary 
The whole period after World War II can be presented in one picture, adding to the 
reliable data from IMF for the last three decades, the author’s estimations for the 
previous period.32 
31 Better results - from the historical analysis point of view - can be obtained assuming the -0.5%-line: 
1974-75, 1980-82, 1990-93. 
32 It should be noted that the author is conscious of the fact that it is not quite the right way from the 
methodological point of view, but it is justified because of the willingness to use the simple observation 
technique. 
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Figure 13. Deviation from the world real GDP trend in the period 1949-2000 
(in percentage points), obtained with the use of HP Filter 
Source: figure 12 and own calculations based on the figure 7. 
It can be concluded that the course of the world business cycle before the collapse 
of the Bretton Woods system was very volatile, especially compared to the last three 
decades. ~ It was not enough to identify the recessions properly based only on the 
deviations from the trend, because in the 1960s there were none, but the calculations 
gave different results. It should be noted that usually, after the huge growth, there was 
a fall the next year. It could suggest that the year 2000 could be the last year of such a 
huge growth (fig. 12) and the next one will show a significant slowdown of the world 
economy’s development. All the dates of world economic recessions are shown in the 
next figure (fig. 14). 
Thus, we can observe (fig. 14) that world economic recessions were quite often in 
the nineteenth and the twentieth century. Their regularity was often disturbed by 
various non-economic factors (like wars, state stabilisation policy etc.). According to 
the data and opinions presented, the world economic recessions started in 1825 and 
repeated with a regularity corresponding to the so-called Juglar cycle (which originally 
was 8.2 years long). In the period 1825-2000, they occurred 22 times (during 176 
years). Thus, the average frequency of the world economic cycles was equal to eight 
years. It is worth drawing attention to the year 2000 and the conclusions derived, as 
well as to interpreting the regularity of the world economic recessions (fig. 14). 
Figure 14. The dates of the world economic recessions during the period 1825-2000 
Note: lower values indicate the years of a world economic recession; upper - remaining years. 
Source: own counts. 
Amplitude of about 0.3 percentage points in the pre-Bretton Woods period and of 5.3 p.p. later. 
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9. Inevitability of the next world economic recession 
The ‘stylised facts’ of the world business cycle presented above led the author - at the 
beginning of 1999, the year of high economic growth, perfect prospects and even some 
opinions about the end of a business cycle - to the main conclusion that the next world 
economic recession is unavoidable. However, this conclusion was contrary to the 
contemporary economic theory state, and opinions of many economists (e.g. Dow, 
2000). As for me, the only open question was the length and deepness of the next 
recession. 
The advance of instabilisation policy is nowadays better than in the nineteenth or at 
the beginning of the twentieth century. It shallows the recessions. In addition, due to 
the increased business cycles’ synchronisation of many countries, the recession at the 
beginning of the twenty-first century can be shorter than previously. Bearing in mind 
the enormous investment in technological stock markets, which was not stopped by 
economic politicians or central bankers, it was obvious, that it will end with a huge 
collapse. There were too many financial, speculative bubbles in the world during the 
last two centuries to forget it, although some economists had their doubts. Add to this 
the growth of oil prices, which contributed to the last three recessions, and we have all 
the basic reasons necessary to create the next world economic recession. The 11 
September 2001 only contributed to this fact and deepened the ongoing recession. 
The policy of OECD countries, as well as the synchronisation of monetary policies 
should have helped with overcoming the present recession, but not prevented them. 
The contemporary state of economic thought and knowledge was too small to achieve 
this. 
10. Contemporary world economic recession versus Central and East 
European Countries’ performance 
World economic recessions do not necessarily significantly influence all countries. 
There are many factors which can change or even prevent such an influence. One of 
them is openess of a country, its economic relations with other countries. Despite the 
weakening of economic relations between Central and East European countries after 
the fall of Berlin Wall, some of them strengthened by the end of 1990s. They have 
built economic relations with similar partners, especially Germany or the European 
Union as a whole. It might lead to the synchronisation of their business cycles and 
synchronous occurrence of national recessions. Although it is easy to observe that the 
transition economies develope increasingly more in the same direction (fig. 15), the 
synchronisation of CEE countries business cycles can and should be quantatively 
checked (Jagietlo, 2003; Piech, 2003; and later in this text). 
However, using even quite simple calculations, based on the most up-to-date 
available data (IMF, 2002a), I have conducted some comparisons of the scale of 
chosen CEE countries’ synchronisation of development. The sample consists of the 
following, 11 countries: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia and Slovenia. I have measured the 
dispersion (sum of modules of minimum and maximum values of data for a certain 
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year) of real GDP annual data (in constant prices) of above sample. I have also counted 
the standard deviation of the sample. Results are in the table 1. 
Figure 15. Real GDP and forecasts of chosen transition economies and of world in 
1994-2003 
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Notes: The data presented are mostly real GDP in constant prices, apart from world GDP: 
which is real GDP, market exchange rate weighted. Data for 2002 and 2003 are the forecasts. 
Source: IMF (2002a). 
Table 1. Dispersion of real GDP of Central and East European countries 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Dispersion 18.8 11.5 14 15.9 10 9.3 10.8 8.6 6 9 
Standard 
deviation 404.4 148.1 182.8 297.4 149.8 85.3 47.1 30.3 13.6 9.4 
Source: own counts based on: IMF (2002a). 
The calculations made confirmed the previous conclusions derived from data 
series’ observations. The ECC countries develop usually increasingly more 
synchronously. Standard deviation coefficients especially confirm this trend. 
11. Conclusions 
If we observe that the pace of world economic growth decreased in 2001, the next 
world economic recession has begun, and if we notice that the countries in transition 
began to develop more similarly to the world economy (especially from 1997, at the 
beginning at least as the directions are concerned, and later, from 2001, more 
similarly), and if we see and calculate, that the transition countries develop more 
closely to each other, we can derive the following conclusion: the contemporary, world 
economic recession influenced significantly the CEE economies. Although the 
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influence was not huge, it really was, because it is not likely, that the transition 
economies could have slow down so much altogether only due to their own, internal 
problems, or transition countries’ business cycles synchronisation without any external 
influence. The influence was not high in 2001 (see: Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and 
Slovakia - fig. 15), but more significant in 2002, with Poland, as the slowest 
developing country from the sample taken. Also, the forecasts (IMF, 2002a) for 2003 
show that the pace of economic growth of CEE countries will slightly improve, 
accompanied by the world economic recovery, anticipated for this year. 
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Economic Interrelations between 
Central and East European Countries 
Dariusz Jagiello 
1. Aims and method 
This article is aimed at verifying a hypothesis about the existence of economic 
relations between chosen Central and East European (CEE) countries in terms of the 
synchronisation of their business cycles, and to measure their strength (see also: 
Jagiello et al., 2002). The Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary and Slovakia have been 
chosen as the main subject of the study. The connections with Estonia, Lithuania, 
Latvia and Russia have also been investigated as explaining factors. 
The economic transition of CEE countries is very similar. It may be confirmed by 
the COMECON system creating a common framework for economic development of 
countries and presenting a starting point for the systemic jump in the early 1990s. At 
the same time, the authorities of the individual countries similarly marked the direction 
of the reforms: towards a market economy, with a struggle to access into the European 
Union. Given similar starting points and the common target to be achieved, one might 
suppose that one way was adopted. However, ten years of experience denies this, 
proving that every country uses its own, unique economic policy mix most appropriate 
to their situation. This article tries to answer the question, to what extent these ways are 
convergent. 
The correlation coefficient will be used to achieve this aim. The analysis will be 
supported by description, to investigate if the interdependencies are present or not. The 
study will be based on GDP - the category that is the most synthetic and easily 
measurable factor of the country’s economic development and effectiveness of 
economic policy. 
To ensure comparability and the best illustration of changes taking place in 
economies, the GDP figures used in the calculations are: 
• expressed in constant prices in order to eliminate the disruptive influence of 
different inflation pace in individual countries, 
• changed into the annual GDP growth rates in order to represent better dynamics of 
the processes and eliminate the impact of different GDP levels in absolute 
numbers. 
The analysis of the linear correlation coefficients between real GDP growth rates 
will be the research method. The “World Economic Outlook” database of IMF is a 
source of the figures. Data concerning the year 2000 is from the Czech Statistical 
Office, the Statistical Office of Estonia, the Hungarian Central Statistical Office, the 
Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia, the Lithuanian Department of Statistics and the 
Main Statistical Office (Poland). The positive correlation coefficient means growth in 
value of one feature in line with growth in average values of the other one. It is not 
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necessarily the most precise measure of the relation between the data due to 
assumption about its linear character. 
The analysis of the strength of the correlation will be conducted in two phases. The 
first one is aimed to check if any significant linear relation between the economies 
exists. In order to achieve this the correlation coefficients between time series of GDP 
growth rates will be calculated for individual pairs of countries since 1991 (since 1993 
for the Czech Republic and Slovakia) till 2000. The statistical significance with the 
confidence coefficient at a level of a = 0.05 (with two degrees of freedom) is a 
background to assess the strength of a relation. Then the changes of the value of the 
coefficient in time will be studied, using rolling correlation coefficients in constant 
periods (5 years) moved by 1-year. A coefficient, calculated in such a way, is being 
assigned to the middle year of the period (e.g. the coefficient assigned to 1995 will 
concern the period 1993-1997). 
Using the method, the statistical similarities between two time series could be 
confirmed. To prove existence of real interdependencies qualitative analysis is 
necessary. The preliminary idea about a degree of the convergence of the pace of 
economic development in the countries comes from figure 1. 
Figure 1. The pace of economic development of the chosen countries 
Source: IMF (2000a). 
2. Interdependencies of the economic development of the Czech Republic 
and other CEE countries 
According to table 1 the dynamics of the Czech economic development does not show 
any important convergence with the other countries concerned. The analysed relations 
are not significant in the whole period and only twice in the case of Hungary they are 
in 5-year subperiods (but negative). This suggests a conclusion that the Czech 
economy was developing independently from the others in the region. 
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Table 1. Correlation of the Czech GDP growth with other CEE countries 
Country 1993-2000 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Poland 0.36 0.39 0.47 0.55 -0.03 
Slovakia 0.33 0.47 0.62 0.56 0.02 
Lithuania 0.14 0.30 -0.20 0.01 -0.01 
Estonia 0.09 0.09 -0.37 -0.16 -0.09 
Russia 0.07 0.01 -0.18 -0.38 0.30 
Latvia 0.04 0.11 -0.69 -0.52 -0.07 
Hungary -0.32 -0.28 -0.99 -0.98 -0.49 
Note: correlation coefficients significant at 5% level are in bold. 
Source: Own calculation on the base of IMF (2000a). 
2.L The case of the Czech Republic and Russia 
Following the economic regime change and a fall of former Soviet markets, the 
Czech Republic started to establish close relations with the European Union countries 
and relations with Russia have been weakening. The short and insignificant weakening 
of the crown caused by the Russian financial crisis in 1998, without bigger influence 
on the Czech economy, confirms limited impact of the Russian economy on the 
development of the Czech Republic. 
2.2. The case of the Czech Republic and the Baltic States 
The above calculations show almost no relations between the countries. The 
volumes of their trade with the Czech Republic are low. Besides, the economic 
transition in the Baltic countries started two years later (in 1993) and the processes 
have had different courses. The economic relations with Russia were also much 
stronger while starting the reforms and they lasted longer in the Baltic countries than in 
the Czech Republic. 
Only in the case of Latvia the correlation is definitely negative in two periods. We 
may find some explanation watching the foreign investment in both countries. 
Table 2. Foreign investment in Latvia and in the Czech Republic (millions US$) 
1996 1997 1998 
Latvia: Direct investment 382 521 357 
Latvia: Portfolio investment 24 -32 27 
The Czech Republic: Direct investment 1435 1286 2554 
The Czech Republic: Portfolio investment 771 1152 1146 
Source: EP (2000, pp. 1211,2226). 
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3. Interdependencies of the economic development of Slovakia and other 
CEE countries 
The GDP of Slovakia shows certain convergence in pace of development with other 
countries. In individual subperiods there are statistically significant relations with the 
Baltic states and statistically significant correlation between the GDP dynamics of 
Slovakia and Poland. It will be explained later in this text. 
Table 3. Correlation of real GDP growth rates of Slovakia and other CEE countries 
Country 1993-2000 1995 1996 1997 1998 
The Czech Republic 0.33 0.47 0.62 0.56 0.02 
Estonia 0.76 0.85 0.47 0.71 0.60 
Hungary 0.30 0.70 -0.57 -0.62 -0.63 
Latvia 0.79 0.92 0.07 0.33 0.53 
Lithuania 0.77 0.86 0.45 0.82 0.78 
Poland 0.84 0.91 0.95 0.94 0.95 
Russia 0.14 0.62 0.60 -0.56 -0.66 
Note and source: see table 1. 
3.1. The case of Slovakia and Russia 
In the period studied this statistical relation does not exist. It is surprising as 
Slovakia has been trying to tighten the relations with Russia. Although, for a long time, 
Russia has been Slovakia’s second most important trading partner, Slovakia’s share in 
Russia’s trade balance has been marginal. In addition, Germany overtook Russia’s 
position in Slovak trade. Concerning Slovakia’s intention to access the European 
Union, the reforms inevitable to improve market mechanisms and the mighty troubles 
of the Russian economy, the two countries are likely to develop independently, which 
is confirmed by calculated correlation coefficient changes. 
3.2. The case of Slovakia and the Czech Republic 
The correlation of these two countries is small, which is the more surprising that 
only a few years passed since they created a federated country. This may be caused by 
different economic heritage after the split of Czechoslovakia into two separate 
countries (especially inefficient heavy industry in Slovakia). Besides, Slovakia 
continuously aimed to weaken its relations with the Czechs, stating that they are too 
asymmetric (with advantage for the Czech Republic), and deep dependence on one 
trading partner can be harmful in the long run (EP, 1997, p. 706). Besides, while the 
Czech Republic directed its trade mainly to Germany, Slovakia struggled to boost 
export to Russia in order to offset a huge value of import (mainly petrol). The different 
ways and the different pace of adjustments to market economy (especially much faster 
privatisation in the Czech Republic) seem to be the main factor of lack of convergence. 
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Table 4. Inflow of foreign investment to Slovakia and to the Czech Republic (millions 
USD) 
1993 1994 1996 1997 1998 
The Czech Republic 654 878 1435 1268 2554 
Slovakia 199 203 -38 -95 -134 
Source: EP (1997), p. 307, 713; EP (2000), p. 1211, 3243. 
The fall in the correlation coefficient in the last few years to almost zero is, to a 
certain extent, a result of different times of crises in both countries. Although for the 
moment the interdependencies have practically disappeared they may be expected to 
increase in the future. 
3.3. The case of Slovakia and Poland 
The results of the studies show the existence of linear correlation of Polish and 
Slovak GDP changes. From the economic point of view, the countries do not show 
many similarities, except of being in transition. They are not mutually significant 
trading partners. Only some similarities may be noticed in the changes of the volume 
of their foreign trade. The foreign investment structure does not provide an explanation 
of the situation either. The economic policies of the countries are also very different 
(although their effects are similar). 
There is a possibility that due to the character of the correlation coefficient and 
very short period it may be only a statistical coincidence. The existence of non¬ 
economic factors causing a similar business cycle course is also possible. It should be 
mentioned that due to political factors, the calls to limit the social costs of conducted 
reforms were popular in both countries. In economic policy they were reflected by the 
struggle to curb unemployment, stop decrease of disposable incomes and boost growth. 
In certain periods, in both countries the GDP growth was a priority of economic policy 
as a response to claims, especially by labour unions. It caused macroeconomic 
imbalances and finally led to a change of ruling parties and paying more attention to 
balance the economies, which caused growth to slow down. 
4. Interdependencies of the economic development of Poland and other 
CEE countries 
The calculations conducted show the statistically significant correlation of the Polish 
GDP growth with Hungary and Slovakia, weak relations with the Czech Republic, the 
Baltic states and independent development of Russia. 
Table 5. Correlation of the Polish GDP growth with other CEE countries 
1991-2000 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Hungary 0.87 0.97 0.81 0.65 -0.38 -0.55 -0.50 
Slovakia 0.84 n.a. n.a. 0.91 0.95 0.94 0.95 
Estonia 0.50 0.33 0.96 0.93 0.56 0.71 0.68 
Latvia 0.41 0.21 0.90 0.83 0.13 0.28 0.64 
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The Czech Republic 0.36 n.a. n.a. 0.39 0.47 0.55 -0.03 
Lithuania 0.34 0.05 0.96 0.94 0.44 0.68 0.72 
Russia 0.16 -0.17 0.91 0.81 0.63 -0.32 -0.45 
Note and source: see table 1. 
4.1. The case of Poland and Hungary 
The strong relation between Poland and Hungary is due to convergent directions in 
their economic policies. In the short run, however, it shows weakening dynamics, 
reaching an even notably negative level. 
In the early years of the transition-shock recovery, the trends of the growth 
dynamics are almost perfectly convergent. The Hungarian growth started, however, 
from the lower dynamics in the beginning of the period. The further changes result in 
contrary fluctuations in both countries around similar medium-term trends (the fall 
from 7% to 4% in Poland versus the growth from 1.5% to over 5% in Hungary 
between 1995 and 2000). The speeding-up in Hungary is connected with the successful 
Bokros plan, when not satisfying disinflation forced the introduction of more strict 
monetary policy and slower growth dynamics. 
The foreign trade also supported convergence both in mutual terms as well as its 
similar geographical structure. 
Table 6. Poland’s trading partners (millions USD) 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
The Czech Republic n.a. n.a. 693 958 1590 1997 2231 2485 2513 
Estonia n.a. n.a. 13 23 33 79 80 88 110 
Hungary 261 309 340 405 619 736 956 1063 1163 
Latvia n.a. 29 44 53 614 98 135 210 231 
Lithuania n.a. 91 136 192 256 340 450 568 636 
Russia n.a. 2016 1916 2388 3234 4180 4840 3969 3386 
Slovakia n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 660 713 833 927 924 
Source: Own calculations on the base of IMF (1997), IMF (2000b). 
4.2. The case of Poland and Slovakia 
The higher values of the correlation may be surprising. After 1993 market reforms 
in Slovakia were sluggish. Although the strong position of Germany and Russia in the 
current accounts balance and about 5% Slovakia’s share in Poland’s export may be 
somewhat helpful. It is nevertheless difficult to find convincing justification for these 
values. 
The statistical features of the coefficient may, to a certain extent, influence its 
overvaluation in a shortened period. The political changes in both countries help to 
explain these strong similarities. Despite different economic philosophies, Meciar’s 
government struggled to boost economic growth regardless of general disequilibrium. 
The left-wing, ruling in Poland in 1993-97, has seen economic growth as a means to 
reduce the social costs of the tough transition process. The 1998 changes at the arena 
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resulted in tightening economic policy in Poland and a return to the determined market 
reforms in Slovakia. 
The Russian crisis of 1998 has also contributed to slowdowns in both economies. 
Concerning the above, lowering of the correlation may be expected. 
4.3. The case of Poland and the Baltic states 
All the economies show limited positive correlation with Poland (insignificant in 
statistical terms). The dynamic analysis shows certain similarities but is strongly 
influenced by time differentiation of the transition reforms. The latter, beginning in the 
Baltic states, is reflected in low values of the coefficient in the early years. The 
subsequent period of simultaneous recovery caused the correlation to jump to a very 
high level till the pace of Polish growth had stabilised, resulting in the coefficient to 
fall again. In addition, while the Russian crisis contributed to a stabilisation of the 
dynamics of the Polish GDP on the lower level, the Baltic states’ economies faced a 
rigid slump (with recessions in Lithuania and Estonia in 1999) offset by later recovery. 
The foreign trade links illustrate the image with a 20% share of Russia in the case 
of the Baltic trio (especially Lithuania which was strongly dependent on Russian fuels) 
and, in comparison to Poland, was significantly lower than that of Germany and higher 
than that of the Scandinavian countries. The only significant direct link is Poland being 
a source of 5% of Lithuanian import. 
4.4. The case of Poland and the Czech Republic 
The weak correlation in this case may be surprising. The contribution of the 
shortened period should be mentioned here, but with the results opposite to Slovakia’s 
case. By not concerning the “shock” period the correlation is significantly undervalued. 
Except for that, due to a different economic policy, even in this shortened period, 
its different results are visible. The very restrictive monetary policy of the Vaclav 
Klaus government and deferring the micro-level reforms influenced a slower pace of 
post-shock recovery and a further currency crisis and recession. The significant GDP 
growth was observed already in 2000, after the socialdemocrats had come to power. 
The structure of foreign trade shows many similarities (but with the more 
important role of the “eastern markets” in the Polish balance). Moreover, Poland buys 
over 5% of the Czech export. 
4.5. The case of Poland and Russia 
The coefficients show almost no correlation between Poland and Russia, except for 
a short period of decrease in Russia’s GDP fall. 
The likely reason for the situation is in fact the lack of effective market reforms 
and consistent government economic policy in Russia, leaving the power over the 
economy in the hands of “oligarchs”. The strong differentiating factor is also the totally 
opposite effect of world fuel prices for both economies. When the prices increase it 
influences positively the Russian economy, but negatively the Polish. 
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5. Interdependencies of the economic development of Hungary and other 
CEE countries 
From the coefficients below, only Poland fulfils the criterion of statistical significance. 
Foreign trade may be one of the explanations. Except for Russia, European Union 
countries are Hungary’s strategic partners. Only the major role of Germany may be a 
common element. 
Table 7. Correlation of the Hungarian GDP growth with other CEE countries 
1991-2000 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Poland 0.87 0.97 0.81 0.65 -0.38 -0.55 -0.50 
Estonia 0.63 0.39 0.88 0.78 0.41 0.10 0.16 
Latvia 0.61 0.33 0.95 0.88 0.66 0.42 0.22 
Lithuania 0.46 0.04 0.70 0.59 0.20 -0.12 -0.15 
Russia 0.46 -0.16 0.70 0.54 0.21 0.48 0.56 
Slovakia 0.30 n.a. n.a. 0.70 -0.57 -0.62 -0.63 
The Czech Republic -0.32 n.a. n.a. -0.28 -0.99 -0.98 -0.49 
Note and source: see table 1. 
The relatively lower value of the coefficients may be significantly influenced by 
the gradual strategy of Hungarian transition, contrary to predominantly “shock” 
therapies in the other countries. 
5.E The case of Hungary and the Baltic states 
A clear influence of the later start of the reforms may be observed in this case: 
lowering the values of the correlation coefficients at the beginning of the studied 
period and after stabilisation of the pace of Hungarian development. The severity 
suffered by the Baltic states from the Russian crisis has driven the coefficient values to 
the level close to zero in the short-term prospect. 
Some positive influence may be due to the significant position of Russia as a 
significant trading partner of these countries. 
5.2. The case of Hungary and Russia 
Although the coefficient suggests some limited correlation, no analysis confirms it, 
despite the significant (but diminishing) role Russia plays in Hungary’s foreign trade. 
The opposite reactions for the fuel prices’ changes are not favourable for the strong 
correlation. Actually, no significant reaction to the Russian crisis seems to confirm 
lack of interdependencies in this case. 
5.3. The case of Hungary and Slovakia 
Despite geographical proximity, the analysis shows almost no correlation between 
these countries. After significant similarity in the first period, the relation changes its 
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direction dramatically, mainly due to political change in Slovakia and the subsequent 
slowdown. The Russian collapse has also influenced Slovakia significantly. 
5.4. The case of Hungary and the Czech Republic 
The value of the coefficient is low and surprisingly negative. The developments in 
the analysed period seem not to be representative for the long-term nature of the 
relation. Despite comparable levels in the changes taking place, their short-term 
direction is opposite: while growth is stable in Hungary, the Czech crisis caused 
fluctuations in the pace of the GDP dynamics. From the point of view of problem 
analysis, concerning exclusion of the similar 1990-92 period, the above value of the 
coefficient seems to be rather incidental and not reflect the long-term background. 
Probably law risk is associated with a statement that the factor will reach not only a 
positive, but a significantly high value soon. 
6. Conclusions 
The above analyses show different values of the similarities in the development paces 
of the countries, which may signal the existence of ties and interdependencies among 
them. Statistical relations have been proved between Poland and Hungary and between 
Poland and Slovakia.1 
It should be noted that the long-run relations have not necessarily been revealed in 
the post-transition reality. The weaker strength of the correlation results from varied 
economic policies applied in every country. This proves the major role of the political 
factor in analysing the problems of the transition countries’ economic growth. 
The above differences may cause doubts if the concerned countries constitute a 
coherent economic region. The transition realities create a common framework, but the 
national policies show great differentiation. To address this question one needs to wait 
till more long-term tendencies can be identified and analysed. A conclusion can be 
drawn that the pace of economic development in the region’s countries is strongly 
determined by national policies than by external factors during the transition period. In 
line with strengthening internal stability and opening the economies, creation of strong 
international relations will gain in importance. 
The doubt also arises if creation of the CEFTA has supported the strengthening of 
its members’ mutual relations. The problem is also worth mentioning from the point of 
view of the future accession to the EU and the EMU. The above method may be used 
as an alternative way of quantifying the Maastricht convergence criteria. 
The similarities are also vital in the prospect of the investors’ reception of our 
countries. If they share the point of view described above, it may stimulate by spill¬ 
over effects, the streams of investments, which is a particular danger in the case of 
crisis transmission mechanisms. The above method may also help to explain why the 
Czech turmoil in 1997-98 has not spread to the other countries and why the Russian 
And also between Poland and United Kingdom and the US (see: Piech, 2003). Moreover, as Piech (2001) 
noticed, from the sample of 181 countries regarding the most synchronised economy with the US, Poland 
was placed at a very high position in the period 1970-2000. 
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crisis of 1998 has had only limited impact on the region’s economies. The answer is 
simple: very weak interdependence of growth of CEE countries. From the conducted 
research another thing can also be noticed. If CEE countries do not create a common 
market in the economic interrelations sense (although Visegrad countries to some 
extent - do), there should be initiatives undertaken in order to improve this situation 
(e.g. by supporting the International Visegrad Fund). It is also an argument in favour of 
speeding up the process of integration with the EU. It is also important from the point 
of view of explanation of calculations: some synchronisation between certain countries 
could be explained by the close relations of CEE countries with the EU (and the US). 
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Convergence in Employment Structures: 
Transition Countries versus the EU: 
Reforms, Income Levels or Specialisation Patterns? 
Tomasz Mickiewicz 
This paper investigates the structural characteristics of employment in the transition 
countries, and possible link with the reform process. It argues that the identification of 
‘old’ and ‘new’ sectors may be based on convergence benchmark, with the 
employment structures in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) compared with those 
present in the most developed European Union (EU) economies. The paper 
demonstrates a link between structural adjustment and reforms. It discusses also 
alternative measures of structural change and patterns of structural evolutions. 
Introduction 
The aim of this paper is to investigate the link between structures of employment and 
the reform process in transition countries. The paper argues that the identification of 
‘old’ and ‘new’ sectors may be based on convergence measures, with the employment 
structures in CEE compared with those present in the most developed EU economies. 
The paper provides an indication that there is a link between structural adjustment and 
reforms. It also discusses alternative measures of structural change and patterns of 
structural evolutions. 
First, we discuss employment data on the most aggregate level (agriculture, 
industry, services). Patterns of structural change in post-communist countries are 
presented and compared with the standard relationship between GDP per capita levels 
and structures. Next comes discussion of structural changes in transition countries on 
the more disaggregate level (ISIC-3). The subsequent section introduces alternative 
measures of structural change and analyses their usefulness. In this context, the link 
between unemployment and structural change is discussed. Finally, the last section 
demonstrates the relationship between reforms and restructuring. 
1. GDP per capita and structures of production 
The typical development path of economic structures corresponds to the well 
documented empirical relationship between the level of per capita GDP and the 
sectoral patterns of production and employment. Low income countries’ economies are 
almost entirely agricultural. Economic development brings in an increased share of 
manufacturing and services. In the later phase, the share of industry stabilises, then 
starts to fall, while the service sector increases further (Rowthom and Wells, 1987; 
Dohm and Heilemann, 1993, 1996; EBRD 1997, 1999). 
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The communist countries did not follow this pattern. The share of industry was 
much higher than for comparator countries with a similar level of income per capita.1 
This is illustrated by the figure belowr 
Figure 1. GDP per capita and share of industry, 1990, 71 countries 
Share of 
industry in 
employment 
GDP per capita in $ 
Source: UN (1997), and WI1W database. 
The relationship between income per capita and size of the industrial sector is not 
perfect. The more exact fit could result from (/) controlling for the phase of the 
business cycle (as, say, measured by some unemployment indicators) and (z7) 
controlling for export specialisation (Rowthorn and Wells, 1987). In addition, Dohm 
and Heilemann (1996) introduce some more elements including (Hi) natural resource 
endowment and (/v) investment. They also (v) exclude some groups of countries, all 
low income in particular, where dispersion is large. This latter operation is 
problematic, and seems not to have a specific grounding in theory. On the other hand, 
natural resource endowment is correlated with the share of primary sector in exports 
(i.e. ii and iv are collinear). 
What is the economic significance of this general long-term relationship between 
GDP levels and structures? Rowthorn and Wells (1987) answer the question presenting 
a simple (but not trivial) dynamic model, where structural change is driven by two 
factors: 
• the improvement in productivity, with a different rate of productivity change for 
the three sectors (low for services and high for both agriculture and 
manufacturing), and 
' The difference between the Soviet bloc and the rest of world would be even more striking with non¬ 
employment added as a fourth sector, as employment was exceptionally high in the socialist countries. 
When the socialist countries are excluded from the sample, coefficient of determination increases from 
0.15 to 0.29. 
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• differences in income elasticities of demand, with the demand for food being 
income-inelastic. 
Combined together, those two driving forces are sufficient to result in the dynamic 
structural evolutions corresponding to Figure 1. 
If this model is correct, any econometric exercise, which tries to explain sectoral 
composition of employment (or output) by GDP per capita should take into account 
that the real model has more than one dimension, with the different pace of 
productivity change across sectors being the major driving force. For instance, it is not 
the case that some countries are poor due to excessive share of employment in 
agriculture, but rather that this share is excessive due to low productivity. 
More generally: 
(1) V = /(£', ,E2,...,En), 
where V is value-added, E corresponds to share of employment in a sector of economic 
activity and function / may be either additive, or not. In the latter case, there are 
complementarities between sectors. For instance, efficiency of manufacturing is 
enhanced by the existence of a developed financial sector, other business-oriented 
services, transport services and educational system. 
Income per capita corresponds to average productivity level, but it also affects the 
structure of demand. In particular, income elasticity for some services is high. As they 
are nontradables, their production is driven by domestic demand, which is increasing 
more than proportionally with real incomes. 
Thus, the link between structures and GDP per capita results from a mixture of 
demand and supply factors. Part of the process is well explained by standard factors 
affecting economic growth: capital accumulation, human capital, infrastructure, legal 
and macroeconomic stability result in increased productivity in agriculture, and next in 
industry. The resulting transfer of employment to services is a mixture of a shift 
towards more efficient production structures (including increased financial sector and 
business services, transport networks and educational systems) and a response to a 
shifting pattern of demand. 
2. Transition: ‘horizontal’ versus ‘vertical’ convergence 
Figure 1 confirms the well-known fact: socialist economies were characterised by 
exceptionally high shares of industry. Romania, Russia and Ukraine are clear outliers, 
followed by Poland, Hungary and Estonia and three former Soviet Union republics, 
slightly above the trend line (Azerbaijan, Moldova, Kirgistan). The large share of 
industry is an explicit effect of the imposed pattern of development under socialism. 
Yet, there were some additional system-specific factors: the workforce’s high level of 
literacy and education, extensive urbanisation, and the predominance of large scale 
organisation in agriculture (resulting from collectivisation in all the transition countries 
except Poland) (EBRD, 1997, p. 64). 
Before focusing the discussion on post-communist countries, it is convenient to 
map figure 1 into purely structural space (figure 2 below). 
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Figure 2. Employment structures, 1990, 71 countries 
Industry 
Note: Agriculture (counts 100% minus industry and services) corresponds to either IS1C2, 
division 1 or IS1C3, categories A and B; industry means either ISIC2, divisions 2-5, or 
IS1C3, categories C-F, while services relate to remaining sections 
The fact that the link becomes stronger, as compared with Figure 1 is not 
particularly surprising, as the shares of both sectors (plus agriculture) must add to one, 
so they are correlated by construction. Again, the post-socialist group is a clear outlier.3 
Figure 3. Structural changes, 1989-1998 
Share of industry in 
employe me nt 
Note: Greece, Portugal - 1989/1997, Russia, Ukraine: 1990/1998. 
Source: ILO (1998, 1999), WIIW database. 
Similarly to Figure 2, when the socialist countries are excluded, coefficient of determination for the 
trendline increases from 0.24 to 0.42. 
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What is the direction of change in the region? Figure 3 uses the same aggregate 
structural framework to present basic data on structural evolutions in Central and 
Eastern Europe, with several other countries presented for comparison. 
Everywhere, the share of services increased; therefore the direction of change is 
always from left to right, with the first point representing 1989 and the second point 
1998. As the distances on both axes are approximately the same (by construction), the 
measure of slope matters. If the slope is positive, then both the share of industry and of 
services increased (Turkey). The slope of the vector between 0 and -45° corresponds to 
the faster growth in services than decrease in industry, which implies a decrease in 
agriculture. On the contrary, a steep slope (i.e. <-45°) would represent an increased 
share of agriculture, which corresponds to rapid deindustrialisation not matched by 
growth in services. That relates to Romania, Ukraine and Russia. In the latter economy, 
the share of agriculture increased from 13.2% in 1990 to 15.4% in 1994 and next 
started to fall, back to 13.0% in 1998 (WIIW database).4 
The length of the vector may be interpreted as a measure of speed of restructuring, 
as it is given by: 
(2) d(i,s) = ( | igy - i&9 |“ + | S97 - S89 \~) 1/2 
where / corresponds to the share of industry and s to the share of services. 
Poland, Hungary and Estonia started with fairly similar structures of employment 
(relatively high shares in industry) and they all seem to be converging towards the EU 
countries represented on the graph. Noticeably, the three transition countries are very 
close to the two South European ‘cohesion’ countries, Portugal and Spain. The pace of 
restructuring (as measured directly by the length of the vector) was faster in Central 
European countries than in the two southern EU economies over the same time period. 
As a matter of fact, in 1998, both Estonia and Hungary already had a service sector 
larger than that in Portugal and close to the same size as that in Spain. On the other 
hand, the process of change in Central Europe did not consist of rapid 
deindustrialisation, as represented by the relatively flat slopes of the vectors. 
Both central and southern European economies appear to be following a course 
similar to the earlier development path of three north European economies: the 
Netherlands, Denmark and the UK. Yet, between 1989 and 1998, the pace of change in 
those three was slow (again, as measured by the length of the vectors), with almost no 
change in Denmark, mild adjustment in the Netherlands and relatively faster 
deindustrialisation in the UK, resulting in convergence towards the other two countries. 
Greece seems to be on a different path, parallel to all the above but characterised by a 
much lower share of industry. 
For the central and east European economies, adjustment towards the countries 
with a similar level of per capita GDP (i.e. ‘vertical convergence’) would mean a loss 
of the large share of industrial employment. Such a scenario could materialise for two 
reasons: 
A 
The flows in and out of labour force (changes in the activity rates) are left aside. That is an interesting 
topic for future work. Here, only the composition of the labour force is analysed. Therefore, restructuring 
means shedding labour in one sector, taking up in another or both. This will be elaborated further in the 
next sections of this paper. 
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1. existence of oversized, distorted industrial structures, characterised by negative 
value-added and difficult to restructure5, 
2. inadequate reforms that did not result in both incentives and resources for 
restructuring. 
The first factor affected the size of industrial decline in the initial period of 
transition. The second (reforms) was crucial for employment creation in new sectors. 
This view is supported by existing econometric studies on economic growth in the 
region (see Berg et al., 1999). 
The scenario of rapid deindustrialisation was followed by Ukraine and Romania, 
and to a greater or lesser extent, Russia. The alternative path is more typical for those 
countries, where liberalisation programmes were more effectively implemented 
(‘horizontal convergence’). After the initial period of transformational recession and 
employment shedding, the employment levels in industry stabilised (see data on 1994- 
1998, below). As a result, the process of deindustrialisation has been much slower and 
it was brought about mostly by the development of the service sector, not by a 
‘backward’ flow of employment from industry to agriculture. In general, efficient 
(horizontal) transition paths do not appear to be correlated with the highest levels of 
job shedding in industry. 
3. Transition countries: structural change on disaggregate level 
More detailed evidence on structures is provided by Tables 1 and 2, which compare 
employment between 1994 and 1998. 
Table 1 presents 1994 employment data for the five Central European countries, 
which were in the first group to start accession talks with the EU, plus Slovakia and 
Romania, which joined EU negotiations more recently6. The post-recession 
development may be assessed by comparison with the more recent 1998 data on ten 
accession countries plus Croatia. 
While the early transition period of 1989-1994 was characterised by an intensive 
process of labour shedding, the situation has changed more recently. In particular, 
comparing categories D in both tables, one can see that employment in manufacturing 
has stabilised, with a rate of change varying between +3% for Poland and Hungary, 
5 In 1992, 51.75% of USSR employment was in value-subtracting branches (world prices). The figure for 
Bulgaria was 33.81%. Hungary and Czechoslovakia had correspondingly 16.83% and 16.84%. In Poland, 
which started the major reform programme earlier (in January 1990), only 0.47% of employment was 
located in value-subtracting branches already in 1992 (Hughes and Hare, 1992; ILO, 1996). Moreover, 
Hughes and Hare found that ‘most industries in Poland had DRCs which are compressed into a small band 
around the average, whereas in the USSR the distribution is much more dispersed’ (Ibid., p. 89). 
According to this, the potential for restructuring was more evenly distributed across Polish industries, 
while in USSR, there were some sectors, with very high potential cost of restructuring (machinery, 
metallurgy), thus almost doomed to collapse. 
6 Following decisions of the Luxembourg Summit (1997), the EU enlargement process was launched on 
March 30, 1998 and negotiations started with the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia 
(‘First Wave’ candidates). The Helsinki Summit (December 1999) abolished First/Second Wave division. 
Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia were invited to join negotiations. The enlargement 
process relates also to three countries outside the former Soviet bloc: Malta, Cyprus and Turkey. 
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+2% for Slovakia, -1% for Slovenia, -2% for Estonia. Only the Czech Republic7 (-7%) 
and Romania (-13%) experienced significant job losses in manufacturing. 
Table 1. Employment in thousands, 1994, ‘First Wave’ candidates, Slovakia, Romania 
Category j ISIC3 I Cz. R. j Hungary | Poland j Romania I Slovakia I Slovenia 
Agriculture.i..A+B.i..'.346!. 328.[. 3514.1....4261.)..214.!.~.98" 
Minin 
Manufact. 
Source: International Labour Office, 1998, Yearbook of Labour Statistics 1998, Geneva. 
Table 2. Employment in thousands, 1998, accession countries and Croatia 
ISIC31 Cz.R. 
"a+b1... 285 
Rom Slovak! Sloven 
660 
v.v 
472.2 2117 925.894 
1 ^ 
266.5 111 89J 141.0! 
165 121.6 219 142.112 63.1 38 15.6 15.51 
383 301.9 958 529.360 168.2 51] 59.5 
1 8:    7. 1 
86.of 
97 81.8 354 81.764 36.8 9.81 
253 163.0 464 153.923 82.0 
..47 37.0 29.5! 
321 294.3 7791 504.564 149.1 41 36.8 59.81 
M 307 305.5 972 428.123 164.1 2.1.60 .M 90.6 149.3 233.0 78.8 
N 272 237.8 1056 335.391 143.6 41 .35.1 51.81 107.0 170.0 75.7 
6 160 171.8 558 217.513 72.0 29 29.8 48.0 67.1 105.0 27.7 
p 
..i 1.5 8 2.7 i 1.9 
Q 2 3.0 1 °-4l 
X 
V" .. 
2 0.2 L_  7 4 
TOTAL 4942 3697.7 15354 10845 2167 908 642 1015 1588 3106 1071 
Note: the Czech Republic and Latvia: 1997. 
Source: ILO (1999), WIIW database. 
7 Figure for 1994-1997 period, which does not take into account the recent employment/ unemployment 
shock in the Czech Republic. Thus, comparative difference would, in fact, be even higher. 
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However, the interpretation for each of those two countries is different. The Czech 
Republic appears to be on a convergence path (see evidence below). Yet in the past, its 
policy choice was to delay employment reductions in manufacturing, mainly by 
delaying bankruptcies (see: Hoshi et a/., 1998). This is confirmed by the fact that of the 
six Central European countries analysed by Jackman and Pauna (1997), the Czech 
Republic was characterised by the smallest percentage decrease of employment in 
manufacturing between 1989 and 1994. On the other hand, Romania is not converging 
towards the EU. It has sustained a protracted economic contraction to the point where 
Q 
it is dismantling its manufacturing sector without making much progress in services 
(see both Figure 3 and more detailed analysis below). 
While employment in manufacturing stabilised in most countries, the agricultural 
sector has been losing employment fast in all countries except Romania and Slovenia. 
All of the central/east European countries are already below the world middle-income 
averages for the share of employment in agriculture. From this perspective, it is not the 
high share of agriculture in Poland which is exceptional, but the low share in other 
transition countries. This can be linked to the forced collectivisation in the past, which 
was not implemented in Poland.9 
Within the service sector, the development of the financial services is quite visible, 
as all the countries moved from a system which neglected the active role of money to 
one which is based on financial control. But much larger numbers of jobs were created 
in trade and catering, yet another sector once suppressed by central planners. 
Net employment creation in services relates both to “market-oriented services and 
“non-market-oriented services.”10 The increase in employment in non-market (public) 
services may come as a surprise, but it reflects the fact that both social welfare and 
political control functions were located within the productive sphere in pre-transition 
socialist economies. An important part of the transition process consisted of 
o 
Romania is a very interesting case for future studies. One interpretation (macroeconomic, demand side) 
is that the progress in services has been inhibited by insufficient aggregate demand, which in turn is 
caused by falling productivity in other sectors. Here, we would have the implications of failed 
restructuring being transformed into longer-term effects. Another (microeconomic, supply side) line of 
argument is that the development of the new sectors in Romania was inhibited by bureaucratic failure and 
obstacles to the new firm creation and development (evidence on the latter point: see Dimofte, 2001). 
^ Bean et at. (1998, p. 61) present data on the size of the farming population at the date of accession for 
cohesion countries. It was correspondingly: 24.1% for Ireland (1973), 30.8% for Greece (1981), 23.8% for 
Portugal (1986) and 16.2% for Spain (1986). From this point of view, the Polish agricultural sector does 
not look unique. Moreover, as the comparison of corresponding entries in Tables 1 and 2 reveals, 
agricultural employment in Poland has been shrinking fast recently. This fact is not always noticed by 
observers, who concentrate on data based on ownership of farms. Yet, only 43% of private farm 
households in Poland consider farms as their main source of income at present (Wos, 1999). Thus, the 
farm owners are strongly pushed to search for their main employment outside agriculture, and the process 
is captured by ILO-type survey data that this text is based on. No wonder that Polish farmers are notorious 
in blocking roads. It seems that there is more in it than an inherited inclination to fight against the 
authorities. 
10 EBRD Transition Reports (1997 and 1999, sections 4.1) include ‘transport and communication’ in 
‘market-oriented services' and shifts ‘other services’ to the ‘non-market-oriented’ sector. The second may 
be justified by the lack of detailed data. Yet the first is highly questionable, as the old transport sector 
(most of employment in the ‘transport and communication’ category) was functionally linked to both 
industry and construction and has been characterised by inefficiency and excessive employment as much 
(or even more) as the two others. 
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disentangling specialised welfare services from enterprises (see: Rein et al., 1997). 
Similarly, with the rise of democratisation, political control by communist party 
committees within socialist firms was replaced by a diversified government 
administration, which in many cases had to be created from scratch. The magnitude of 
the increase in public administration employment is striking. Employment in this 
sector (excluding defence) increased by 83% in Poland between 1990 and 1996, from 
159,000 to 290,000 (GUS, 1997). 
4. Reference point: what makes the North EU economies similar? 
The assessment of the convergence process implies a benchmark. Following Jackman 
and Pauna (1997), the chosen comparator structure is based on four high-income 
northern EU economies (Germany, UK, Denmark and Netherlands).11 
Table 3. Employment in thousands, 1998, Northern EU 
Category ISIC3 J Denmark [ Germany [Netherlands! UK 
j Agriculture 
Mining 
[Manufacturing 
[Utilities 
(Construct. 
(Trade, rep. 
(Hotels,rest. 
Transp.com 
[Finance 
(Real Estate 
(Administration 
Education 
(Health, soc. 
[Other serv. 
[Priv.househ 
Int.Orgams. 
Not classif. 
TOTAL 
Source: 1L()( 1999). 
A- B 
.—."i.-4. 
3.201 182j 11 99.8 
516.03[ 846 it 1104 4986.9 
20.48 3051 47 
177.54 3183! 451 
178.6 
1896.0 
367.65] 5154) 1220 4117.3 
71.30) i 13 5J 267 1238.7 
181.89; 1920: 442 
7945! ~  1273 f '    264 
1755.5 
1184.3 
227.58 
168.301 
198[8T 
458.79 
118.49 
rr~ 
26971 
2581 j 
3174 
1927 = 
3534:" 
1826: 
—. 
150 
35860: 7394 ( 
2768.0 
1563.7 
2040.8 
2964 1 
26948 
The corresponding employment figures are presented above. 12 
11 In respect to manufacturing, Germany is an interesting outlier, among the high-income EU economies. 
The share of industry in employment was still 34.3% in 1998 (services: 62.8% and agriculture: 2.9%). It is 
related to the specialisation in exports (see section 1 above and in more detail: Rowthom and Wells, 
1987). However, in discussion on this paper it was pointed out that the structural composition may be due 
to organisational characteristics prevailing in German manufacturing, i.e. internalisation of some business 
services (this should have corollary related to market structures, as we know from Coase, 1937). 
17.. . 
The results for indices based on southern EU (Greece, Portugal, Spain and Italy) are available on request 
from the author. The southern European economies are placed close to the convergence path between the 
CEE countries and northern EU (the inclusion of high-income Italy in southern group is justified by the 
fact that its employment structures are greatly affected by its underdeveloped southern regions). 
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There are obviously some differences in employment structures of those four 
countries. How much diversity is lost by creating one index based on averages? To 
what extent the four high-income EU economies differ between each other? Table 4 
presents coefficients of variation for the percentage shares in employment, for all 
sectors. 
Table 4 presents the list of sectors ranked from those with the most similar 
percentage shares to the most diverse. To get some additional intuition, the sectors 
were divided into four groups, according to the degree of similarity between the four 
13 
economies. 
Table 4. Coefficients of variation for percentage shares in total employment, Northern 
EU, 1998 
IISIC Code | 
Highly similar shares 
Category Coefficient of Variation 
Trade and Repair G 8.27%! 
Transport, Storage, Communication I 10.06%! 
Other Services 
Utilities 
Education 
Financial Intermediation 
Construction 
Manufacturing 
Public Administration 
Real Estate & Business Activities 
O 
Similar shares 
IT 
Dissimilar shares 
11.09%! 
13.47%! 
15.36% 
l6.59%| 
16~98%| 
18767% 
19.26%] 
19L62%1 
Hotels & Restaurants H 
Health & Social Work 
ricuiture & Fishing 
j .N .!. 
I A+B 1 
Highly dissimilar shares 
Private Households with Employed P 
Mining and Quarrying C 4" 
24.74%: 
28.17%] 
39.79% 
64.73% 
Sectors with dissimilar shares (last two groups of sectors) correspond to the 
differences in natural endowment and export specialisation, but also to the size and 
organisation of the welfare system, with the size of health and social work sector much 
higher in Denmark (17.0% of total employment) than in the other three (between 9.9% 
and 13.9% of employment). In the category ‘households employed persons’, the UK 
has the highest share in total employment (0.5%), however this category is too small to 
13 
The division was not arbitrary, i.e. the cuts were made, where the differences between the two adjacent 
coefficient were highest. Except that 'mining and quarrying’ and 'household employed persons’ should be 
further separated into two categories, one-entry each. They are both included in the ‘most diverse’ 
category. 
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have any significant impact on subsequent measures of restructuring. It is interesting to 
notice that manufacturing is not a diversified category, in spite of the relatively high 
share in Germany (23.6%). Apparently, patterns of specialisation relate more to 
branches of manufacturing than to its total aggregate share in employment. In general, 
the list of similar sectors is not surprising, with the size of trade, transport, finance, 
construction but also educational system, being similar in all four countries. 
Before moving to indices of restructuring, one can use Tables 2 and 3 to find the 
major structural differences between Northern Europe and Central European accession 
countries. The comparison reveals that in finance and real estate and other business 
services, the share of employment is more than twice as large in Northern Europe as in 
Central Europe (simple averages). The third largest negative difference relates to health 
services and social work. While the first two categories correspond to the way the 
modem economic system is organised (supply factors, see above, section 1), the third 
one is indicative of the level of wealth and higher spending on social consumption 
(demand factors). It is also interesting to note that difference in shares of education is 
small and the sector is actually slightly larger in Central Europe on average (as it is 
affected by both policy choices and demographic structures). 
While some ‘market-oriented services’ and ‘public services’ are much larger in 
Northern Europe than in Central Europe, the reverse is true in relation to the primary 
sector. In both agriculture and mining, the ratio of the shares of employment in 
Northern Europe and Eastern Europe is smallest. 
5. Structural change: measures of convergence 
The employment structures presented above may be used to assess the convergence 
process on a multidimensional scale. The first measure, ‘restructuring index’ (RI), is 
taken from Jackman and Pauna (1997). It is defined as “a proportion of the workforce 
in each country which would need to change sector to enable the country to attain the 
same structure of employment as that of a comparable Western European economy” 
(Ibid., p. 377).14 Thus, the restructuring index has a straightforward, intuitive 
interpretation, in terms of the extent of intersectoral reallocation of labour force, unlike 
other measures of similarity, starting with correlation coefficient. A lower value of the 
index corresponds to less restructuring required for convergence. Based on the above 
definition, the formula for RI, for country a and comparative structure c, is simply:15 
RI = 
2 
where s relates to shares in employment of sectors i. Results are presented in table 5. 
The indices reported here for 1994 may differ from those obtained by Jackman and 
Pauna for two reasons. First, here, the Northern EU 1998 structure was used for both 
14 Here, as characterised by the Northern EU Group in 1998. 
15 Jackman and Pauna (1997) do not provide formulae for their indices, but there are relatively easy to 
derive using their Table A (in the appendix). 
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1998 and 1994, to avoid a problem of “moving goalposts.”16 We are interested in the 
convergence process towards the structures prevailing today. Second, the number of 
categories is doubled, as RI here are based on IS1C-3 instead of ISIC-2 classifications. 
Thus, the indices could show that more restructuring is required, as there is more cross- 
sectoral movement. However, in practice the impact of this factor is negligible, as the 
categories which are expected to shed labour are defined in the similar way by both 
ISIC-2 and ISIC-3 (primary sector, manufacturing). 
Table 5. Restructuring indices: 1994 and 1998 
Country RI-N94 RI-N98 
Bulgaria # 31.1% 
Croatia # 15.9% 
Czech Republic 20.5% 18.5% 
Hungary 19.8% 17.2% 
Poland 27.0% 21.5% 
Romania 44.9% 42.5% 
Slovakia 23.2% 19.5% 
Slovenia 25.4% 23.6% 
Estonia 20.0% 18.1% 
Latvia 24.1% 
Lithuania 21.6% 
Spain 17.2% 15.0% 
Greece 23.0% 22.9% 
Portugal 17.6% 18.3% 
Note: the Czech Republic, Latvia, Greece, Portugal: 1997. 
All Central European countries have made some progress in restructuring, with 
Croatia, Hungary and Estonia being closest to structures found in the Northern EU. 
This is entirely consistent with figure 3. Similarly, Romania is again an outlier, with 
employment structures farthest from the EU. 
Yet comparison with figure 3 reveals different results for the three South European 
countries. While Spain is converging (with the 1997 index lower than 1994), there is 
no indication of a convergent change in either Greece or Portugal. Even if the service 
sector is growing in these two countries (figure 3), this change has not been convergent 
recently in terms of the composition of the service sector. 
The speed of restructuring is captured by the first column of table 6 below, which 
corresponds to the new index, which will be called the “pace of restructuring” (PR), 
17 defined simply as a rate of change in the restructuring indices: 
16 In fact, RI are not affected (in terms of ranking) by the choice of a year. Also, in Mickiewicz and Bell 
(2000) we present results for 1997. 
1 Jackman and Pauna use a different measure called ‘speed of restructuring’, defined as a proportion of 
the labour reallocation required for convergence that has taken place during a given period of time (1997, 
p. 380). The problem with their measure is that it does not take into account the non-convergent changes, 
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(4) PR — (RI94 - Rigs) /RIg4 
It is easily observed that the rate of change was fastest in Poland: 5.5% of its 
employment was transferred from old to new sectors within four years. If the transfers 
remain as high as in the current period, it would take another 16 years to achieve all the 
transfers necessary to converge with 1998 North European structures (21.5% of 
employment to be reallocated). It is also interesting to notice that Slovakia comes 
second and assuming present speed of reallocation, it would take another 21 years to 
converge. 
The pace of restructuring is slowest in Romania and Slovenia, but the problem is 
more serious for Romania, which has both a high value of the index of (required) 
restructuring (Rl) and a slow pace of change (PR). It is interesting to notice that Spain 
still has a relatively fast rate of change, comparable with the best-performing Central 
European economies. One may speculate that this acceleration of structural change in 
18 Spain may have something to do with labour market reforms introduced in 1997, 
however it may be too early to assess its impact yet. 
Table 6. “Second order” indices: 1994-1998 
Pace Efficiency Job creation Job destruction 
(PR) (EI) (JB) (JD) 
Czech Rep. 12.9% 79.3% 2.7% 4.8% 
Hungary 13.3% 87.7% 2.4% 4.3% 
Poland 20.5% 88.8% 8.8% 4.4% 
Romania 5.2% 75.8% 3.2% 4.0% 
Slovakia 15.9% 82.5% 5.3% 3.3% 
Slovenia 7.2% 65.8% 7.7% 0.5% 
Estonia 9.6% 69.9% 1.7% 8.2% 
Spain 12.8% 64.9% 8.8% 0.8% 
Greece 0.4% 48.4% 2.1% 1.2% 
Portugal -5.4% 40.4% 1.4% 4.0% 
Note: PR, JC and JD indices were multiplied by (4/3) for the Czech Republic, Greece and 
Portugal, to make them compatible with others, as computations were based on a shorter 
period (1994-1997) for those three countries. 
The three other indices relate to efficiency, job creation and job destruction. The 
first is based on Jackman and Pauna’s definition, the other two are new. 
The efficiency measure shows “the proportion of the total employment change that 
has been convergent towards the warranted structure” (Jackman and Pauna, 1997, 
p. 380). The computational equivalent of this definition is relatively more complex 
than the previous two indices, as we have to take into account the possibility of 
overshooting. If et relates to the level of employment, st to the percentage share in total 
which may counterbalance the impact of convergent shifts. In the latter case, the index of speed would 
remain high, with no change in the distance from target structures. 
Ix On those, see: Guell-Rotllan and Petrongolo (2000). 
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employment (both in sector /), and E to total employment, the comparator level of 
employment is given by: e\ — s\ E98. 
Next, using comparator level of employment, we may define convergent change 
in sector i in the following way:19 
(5) def. Aec°n : 
Ae™ 
Ae.on 
=min(e98 - e94, e] 
=max(e98 — e94, e\ 
Aec°n =0 
Ae™n =0 
sign(e™ -e94)=sign(e< -e94)=l 
sign(e98 - e94)=sign(e. - e94)=-l 
sign(e9H - e94)=sign(e. - e94 )=0 
sign(e9s - e94)*sign(e. - e94). 
And the efficiency index (El) is given by the ratio of convergent change to total 
change in employment: 
The intuition behind this measure is that all sectoral changes are costly; therefore, 
non-convergent changes should be avoided. For instance, if employees are moving 
back from industry to agriculture, only to move again to services in the future, an 
avoidable social cost is involved. In general, it may be plausible to assume that the 
liquidation of jobs in a given sector leads to higher risk of unemployment, as those jobs 
are “replaced” by new in another sector (in contrast to a situation where jobs shift 
between different firms within the same sector). The more structural changes, the 
higher the chance that transfers to “new” sectors would become more difficult (say, in 
terms of necessary retraining), some human capital would be lost and also that new 
employment will be less productive, at least initially. Therefore, “unnecessary” 
structural changes are not efficient. The primary example of inefficient change is a 
‘backward’ movement towards agriculture, which will be reversed in the future. 
In general, Central European countries are doing well on this measure, with Poland 
and Hungary scoring best. On the other hand, relatively low figures for Greece and 
Portugal are noticeable. It is possible to argue that the process of change was 
becoming noisier for the countries closer to the benchmark EU group. However, 
structural differences between these two countries and the EU (i.e. the restructuring 
indices presented in Table 6) are not much different from those for Central Europe. 
Thus, the reason why the process is becoming noisier may be related to the differences 
in patterns of specialisation in southern and northern EU. 
!) Again, this definition is derived from table A of Jackman and Pauna (1997), even if the explicit formula 
is not given there. 
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The two final measures attempt to distinguish between structural changes brought 
by job destruction in ‘old’ sectors and job creation in ‘new’ sectors. They are different 
from the measure used by Jackman and Pauna (1997), called “new job creation”. The 
latter one is described by “the number of new jobs created in the sectors with deficient 
employment as a proportion of the total new job creation required for convergence” 
(Ibid., p. 381). “Sectors with deficient employment” relate to those, for which the 
initial levels of employment are lower than those derived from comparator structure 
imposed on final level of employment (e- = sf E, as discussed above). Yet, there are 
two problems with the Jackman and Pauna index: 
First, it does not correspond to actual computations presented by the two authors. 
A check on data, shows that, similarly to efficiency index, Jackman and Pauna take 
only convergent new job creation, that is, exclude overshooting in deficient sectors. 
That is, a more exact definition of the index should possibly read: the actual 
convergent job creation as a proportion of the total job creation required for 
convergence.20 
The second problem is even more serious. Convergence is defined by imposing 
comparator shares of employment on actual final aggregate level of employment. Yet, 
the aggregate level is affected by both actual job destruction and actual job creation. 
Whenever the resulting aggregate change in employment is small, the ‘new job 
creation’ index will show higher values. Thus, the index does not measure job creation, 
but, implicitly, the relation between job creation and job destruction, because the final 
level of employment is affected by the latter. The more general problem still is that any 
change in sectoral employment cannot be defined a priori as convergent, without 
reference to changes in other sectors, as they affect final level of employment. 
Here, the proposed solution is to separate entirely job creation from job 
destruction. Therefore, the new proposed index is called ‘job creation’ (JC). First, job 
creation (in ‘deficient’ sectors) is defined as: 
(7) def Aefe : 
a ere 98 94 Ae- = et -e, 
Ae™ =0 
Ae7e =0 
Ae7e =0 
r 98 94 c for e\ ,et , : sign( e,9S 
r 98 94 c. for et , et , ef. signfe,9S 
r 98 94 c for <?,. , ei , . sign( 
r 98 94 c for et ,<?,. sign( e9S 
94 
94 
94 
94 
And ‘job creation’ index is given by: 
20 More formal definition of convergent new job creation may be easily constructed by setting Ae- 0'1 in 
the second row of (5) equal to zero, that is, by excluding convergent job destruction from efficiency index. 
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(8) JC= 
which is the ratio of job creation in deficient sectors to initial level of employment. 
Following similar logic, we can construct ‘job destruction’ index, first by defining 
job destruction (in ‘overpopulated’ sectors): 
(9) def. Aefes: 
A efes =0 j' 98 94 c for et , et , : sign/e,% - -e?)=sign(ef -ef*)=l 
Aefs =|e,98 -e,94! r 98 94 c. fore, ,e, ,e,: sign( e,9S -e?4)=sign(e‘ -e*4)=-l 
Aefs =0 p 98 94 c for et , 6i , et : sign( e,9s -ef4)=sign(e‘ -e*4)=0 
>
 
Hi II r 98 94 c. for et , et , et . sign< et - e,94)^sign(e‘ - e?4A 
and next by identifying the ‘job destruction’ index as: 
Values for both indices are presented in table 6, above. Comparison between the 
“job creation” (in deficient sectors) and “job destruction” (in overpopulated sectors) is 
instructive. 
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Approximately, it amounts to the decomposition of structural adjustment, i.e. the 
sum of the two indices is strongly correlated with the “pace of restructuring” index (see 
table 6). Yet, this decomposition helps to distinguish between the countries where 
restructuring was done mostly by liquidating jobs in “old” sectors and those, where 
change was achieved by job creation in the “new” sectors. The result is presented in 
figure 4. 
The comparison between Poland and Slovenia is interesting. Both countries have 
been characterised by a high rate of job creation in ‘new’ sectors. Yet, in Poland there 
was parallel destruction of jobs in ‘old’ sectors, while in Slovenia those are not 
downsizing. Interestingly, the position of Slovenia is very similar to Spain in this 
respect. As a result, the aggregate pace of restructuring (PR index, table 6) is much 
faster in Poland than both in Slovenia and Spain. The case of the two latter countries 
may be also contrasted with Estonia. It is a country, where the pace of restructuring is 
similar to Slovenia, however it is predominantly achieved by job destruction in old 
21 
sectors, without corresponding job creation in new sectors. Hungary and the Czech 
Republic are both characterised by relatively radical downsizing of old sectors, similar 
to Poland. However, the process of job creation in new sectors is slower than in 
Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia. It is interesting to notice that the position of Romania is 
close to Hungary and the Czech Republic. The reason why the pace of restructuring 
(see: table 6) is much lower in Romania in spite of radical changes in employment 
structures, is that those are dominated by non-convergent flows, not accounted for by 
figure 5 (inflow back to agriculture, in particular). Finally, there is almost no structural 
change in Greece, along both dimensions, which is confirmed by the value of the PR 
index close to zero. 
6. Pace of restructuring and unemployment 
The differences between individual countries, as illustrated by figure 6, show that there 
are alternative paths of restructuring. Radical job shedding is not the only possible 
way. This conclusion has important implications for labour markets. If it is true, then 
the corollary is that unemployment is not a necessary prerequisite for restructuring. 
This is a point reiterated by Jackman (1998). 
However, for transition countries, job shedding in old sectors typically resulted in 
an increase in unemployment, even if most flows were between jobs (at least in the 
initial phase). Additionally, the effect of restructuring was in some cases mitigated by 
It is interesting to notice that Estonia has also the largest informal sector (hidden economy) among the 
seven countries discussed here, according to the estimates presented by Lacko (2000). Rapid job 
destruction in old sectors may be correlated with emergence of large informal sectors; this is characteristic 
not only for Estonia, but also for the two other Baltic States and CIS as contrasted with Central Europe. 
The presence of the informal sector distorts any employment statistics. Yet, from the perspective of 
economic growth, the problem may not be so important as it appears. Informal activities are typically 
located in low value-added branches, with no potential for growth (see: de Soto, 1989). Thus, even if 
excessive employment in agricultural or unemployment is in fact equivalent to employment in the 
informal sector, all three may in fact be polled together as a ‘reserve sector’, as described in section 1. As 
productivity in all the three sectors is either zero (unemployment) or close to zero in relative terms, the 
classification would not change negative implications for economic development. 
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outflows outside the labour force - in Hungary in particular (Mickiewicz and Bell, 
2000, chapter 1). 
Yet, the evidence seems to be mixed. Jackman and Pauna (1997) produce a scatter 
diagram showing no relationship between convergent job creation in new sectors and 
unemployment. Indeed, the impact of availability of new jobs on unemployment may 
be ambiguous. While directly reducing unemployment by some outflows, new jobs 
may also lead to increased separations and additional search activity. 
However, there seems to be some link between our new global measure of 
restructuring (“pace of restructuring”, as defined above) and unemployment. This is 
illustrated by figure 5, below. The “pace of restructuring” index is for 1994-1998 and 
figure for unemployment for 1998. 
While figure 5 does not prove anything, it indicates that at least part of 
unemployment may be explained by turbulence created by inter-sectoral restructuring 
processes. It supports conclusions on the link between restructuring and unemployment 
derived from empirical research on micro level (see esp. Newell and Pastore, 1999). 
Figure 5. Pace of restructuring and unemployment 
= 25.915x + 5.6398 
R2 = 0.4904 
7. Reforms, incomes per capita and restructuring 
As already discussed, transition countries started with distorted employment structures. 
They do not conform yet with the typical relationship between structures and income 
levels, as illustrated by figure 1. Simple econometric checks reveal no relationship 
between income levels and structures. Structural evolutions in transition countries 
seem to be affected by the speed of reforms, not by the GDP levels. 
Table 7 and figures 8-10 below present the results of regressions, with 1998 
restructuring indices and income levels as independent variables, and two different 
measures of structural reforms as dependent variables. 
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Table 7. RI explained by transition indicators, EU accession criteria and GDP per 
capita (1998) 
to (2) (3) 1 
Constant 0.91 (0.20)** 0.88(0.17)*** 0.83(0.13)*** | 
Average of 8 EBRD indicators -0.17(0.05)* -0.16(0.42)*** | 
Average of 3 enterprise indicat. -0.17(0.04)** 
GDP per capita in S, PPP -0.00 (0.05) | 
R2 0.62 0.61 0.70 1 
| Adjusted R2 0.53 0.57 0.67 | 
F-statistics 6.53* 14.3*** 21.1** | 
i Number of observations 11 11 n | 
Notes: LOS, standard errors in parentheses; * - significant below 0.05 level; ** - significant 
below 0.005 level; *** - significant below 0.001 level. 
Source: GDP data (purchasing power parity) from the World Bank Atlas 2000. 
The most widely used aggregate measure of institutional reforms is the one 
constructed annually by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 
Therefore, in equation 1 (table 7) average values of eight indicators measuring the 
progress of transition (EBRD, 1999, Table 2.1, page 24) were used as an explanatory 
variable , together with GDP per capita. Results reveal that income per capita has no 
explanatory power whatsoever, while the reform measure is significant, despite a small 
number of observations (11) and controlling for income levels. In equation 2, income 
per capita is excluded, and the results are also illustrated by figure 6. 
The link between liberalisation and restructuring is clear. It would become even 
stronger, if Romania was excluded, as the country is an outlier in the region in terms of 
structures of employment. While Romania has the highest positive residual, Croatia 
has the highest negative. It is characterised by structures of employment, which are 
most similar to the North-EU comparator, yet this is accompanied by a relatively less 
advanced reform process. The results are more consistent for Hungary, which is most 
advanced in terms of reforms and second after Croatia in terms of structural 
convergence. 
We may further investigate, which of the eight EBRD indicators are most strongly 
related to the restructuring outcomes. Examination of correlation coefficients for all 
indices shows that the three most important factors are: “large-scale privatisation”, 
“small-scale privatisation” and “governance and restructuring”. Together, they all form 
a group of indices described jointly by EBRD reports as “enterprise reform”. 
Thus, we have the interesting, if not unexpected result: the progress in employment 
restructuring is mostly related to the privatisation and corporate governance reform. 
““ EBRD indicators relate to: large-scale privatisation, small-scale privatisation, governance and enterprise 
restructuring, price liberalisation, trade and foreign exchange system, competition policy, banking reform 
and interest rate liberalisation, securities markets and non-bank financial institutions. The scores are: 1, 1+, 
2-, 2, 2+, 3-, 3, 3+, 4-, 4, 4+. Here, minuses were transformed into -0.333 and pluses into +0.333. Nuti 
(1999) uses a different transformation for his comparisons between reforms and GDP growth: pluses into 
+0.5 and minuses into -0.5. However, that eliminates any distinction between scores different from round 
numbers. 
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Figure 6. Restructuring and EBRD transition indicators 
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Thus, instead of average transition indicators, we may narrow down our 
explanation and interpret restructuring as dependent on the average of the three 
enterprise reform indicators. The results are presented by equation 3 (table 7) and 
figure 7. 
Figure 7. Restructuring and enterprise reform 
♦ Ro 
♦sBu 
La*\* Sn 
Li* \* PI 
Sk*V,( 
« A Es' Cr+ 
:z 
,*Hu 
The average of enterprise reform indicators 
The explanatory power of this equation is stronger. Thus, there is reason to believe 
that it is the enterprise reform, which is mostly responsible for the restructuring 
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processes. The location of a transition economy on a spectrum between 
deindustrialisation and successful convergence with the EU seems to be determined by 
the extent to which reforms have been introduced, in particular, by the extent to which 
the enterprise reform was successfully implemented. Reform of corporate governance 
is crucial for efficient downsizing of ‘old’ sectors. Legal framework, which supports 
development of small private firms, is important for the growth of‘new’ sectors.“ 
8. Conclusions 
Lack of impact of income levels on structures (demonstrated in section 7) indicates that 
the transition economies are still on their specific structural adjustment path. 
On the other hand, the characteristics of the structural adjustment paths are affected 
by the speed of reforms, enterprise reform in particular. 
We identified two broad types of the structural adjustment paths: vertical and 
horizontal. Both terms relate to the diagrammatic illustrations of those paths, where the 
share of services is given on the horizontal axis, the share of industry on the vertical 
axis and the share of agriculture is implicit. 
Vertical path corresponds to the situation, where the share of employment 
increased in agriculture after transition and the service sector remains underdeveloped. 
Within the sample of economies we consider, the examples of this path relate to 
Romania, Russia and Ukraine. Those are also the countries, where the reform process 
was less consistent. 
Horizontal path relates to the mode of adjustment, where the decrease in the share 
of industry is slower, but the build-up of the service sector is faster. As a result, the 
share of agriculture decreases as well. Empirical examples include Visegrad-4 (the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia), Estonia and Croatia. All those 
countries score well in terms of the reform indicators. 
In addition, our measures of restructuring enable to disaggregate structural change 
into two processes: job creation in the new sectors and job destruction in the old 
sectors. Both lead to structural change, which facilitates economic growth. Poland 
would be an example of the structural evolution, which was brought about more by job 
creation in new sectors than by job destruction in the old sectors. Estonia relates to a 
reverse case. 
We also found some additional support for the thesis that structural change results 
in higher unemployment. That implies some optimum pace of structural change, as part 
of transitory high unemployment may be transformed into higher equilibrium rate of 
unemployment, given that the long-term unemployed are losing skills, and their 
negative impact on the wage pressure tends to decrease with time (Mickiewicz and 
Bell, 2000). 
23 This conclusion is supported by one more interesting distinction. The correlation coefficients between 
RI-1998 and the three individual indicators were: with large-scale privatisation -0.66, small-scale 
privatisation -0.81, and governance and enterprise restructuring -0.86. The same order of results was 
obtained for 1997 and are available on request. Thus, it is clear that privatisation of large enterprises was 
probably less relevant than both introduction of efficient corporate governance and full implementation of 
small-scale privatisation. 
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The Viability of the Baltic Way towards Convergence 
and the European Union 
Gabor Orban 
This study analyses the way the three Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) 
have chosen to respond to the requirement of converging both in nominal and real 
terms to the European economy. I begin by describing the successful convergence 
process and the conflicts and problems that policymakers necessarily come across 
while looking for the optimal policy framework. The main findings include the 
explanation of the viability of the fixed exchange regime and the sustainability of large 
current account deficits. The paper also makes an attempt to point to some of the long- 
run shortcomings of the system the Baltic countries have opted for. 
1. Introduction 
Pre-accession countries are particular in the sense that they are faced with the 
simultaneous challenge of catching up to the development level of advanced EU 
countries and joining the common currency area. This requires from them active 
nominal and real convergence. 
Several authors point to potential conflicts between nominal and real convergence 
of pre-accession economies and analyse the different cases for exchange rate regimes 
from the point of view of the managing of these conflicts. Studies such as Gaspar 
(2001) come to the conclusion that a relatively flexible alternative fosters convergence 
and helps most in managing the trade-offs between nominal and real convergence. 
Having accepted this, however, we are confronted with the counter-example of the 
Baltic States: Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia. These countries adopted hard pegs early 
on in the last decade and still seem to be faring well as far as convergence is 
concerned. The problem dealt with in this paper is how these countries could have been 
successful in avoiding the risks usually associated with achieving convergence while 
maintaining a fixed exchange rate regime. 
In the first section of the paper I shall outline the most important conflicting points 
between real and nominal convergence with special regard to pre-accession economies. 
In the second part, it will be necessary to point out some key factors that make fast 
liberalisation of the capital account together with hard pegs a rather risky choice for 
pre-accession countries in general, not least because of its potential negative effect on 
the pursuit of real and nominal convergence at the same time. In the next section, I 
shall try to give empirical evidence (using economic indicators from ICEG) to support 
the statement that these countries have been converging to the EU levels both in 
nominal and in real terms in past years, while running major foreign deficits every 
year. In the remaining part of the paper, I shall point to some specifics of the Baltic 
States that might explain the viability of the large current account (CA) deficit and the 
different path in general followed by these states, toward convergence and the EMU. 
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2. Conflicts between nominal and real convergence 
According to Gaspar (2001) real convergence may accelerate after nominal criteria are 
met, but the two objectives may also be in conflict. In the following paragraphs I shall 
highlight potential conflicts and trade-offs associated with the particular economic 
situation of pre-accession economies, with special reference to those most relevant for 
the Baltic States. 
There are several channels through which nominal convergence can support real 
convergence and vice versa. To give some examples, we must mention that price 
stability and fiscal soundness are generally reflected in lower interest rates, exchange 
rate stability on the other hand creates better conditions for exports, which are all 
preconditions for higher growth. At the same time, growth allows for more non- 
inflationary wage increases and for a better fiscal consolidation, which help meet the 
nominal criteria. 
Contrary to such synergetic effects, nominal criteria may be in conflict among 
themselves or work against real convergence. Exchange rate-based stabilisation was 
widely used in Central and Eastern Europe as part of the disinflation efforts, because of 
the relatively high degree of exchange rate passthrough. First, the output costs of 
disinflation increase the lower the rate of inflation, thus economic growth may be 
suppressed in order to meet the inflation criterion. 
Second, the Balassa-Samuelson effect described by e.g. Halpem and Wyplosz 
(1998) makes the fulfilment of the inflation criterion particularly difficult for pre¬ 
accession countries. Dividing the economy into tradable and non-tradable sectors1, we 
see that there is a marked trend of productivity increases in the former one which is not 
the case for the latter, and yet the wage level is equalised on a national basis. This 
contributes to a large-scale appreciation of the real exchange rate, and ultimately 
results in either the strengthening of the currency in nominal terms (in case of a 
flexible exchange rate regime), or creates inflationary pressures independent of policy 
decisions (in a fixed regime). In both cases, one of the nominal criteria - either the 
reduction of exchange rate volatility or low inflation - is impossible to meet, which is 
why inflation targeting systems introduced by several of the central banks of pre¬ 
accession countries do not support exchange rate stabilising policies. 
Real exchange rate appreciation driven by real convergence is the source of 
another type of risk as well. In a small economy open to massive capital flows as 
Central and East European countries, an overvalued exchange rate can lead to current 
account sustainability problems, especially with domestic savings being as low as they 
are and given vulnerable financial systems. Reduced exchange rate volatility 
improving conditions for foreign trade can also shoot back on real convergence if the 
exchange rate is fixed and misalignment problems occur. In this situation, the 
misalignment problem can only be remedied through loss in credibility, whose costs 
would exceed those of the original problem. This argument points to the relevance of 
the analysis of current account sustainability, given the high risk of currency and 
banking crises, which, needless to say, would significantly delay both real and nominal 
convergence in these countries. 
Industries that compete with foreign products are taken as tradables, the rest as non-tradables. 
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Fourth, a slower convergence of interest rates is a general phenomenon among the 
countries in question. On the one hand, this is explained by the so-called “convergence 
play”. This argument points to the fact that although expected price convergence and 
the EU-accession in perspective suppress long-term interest rates in Central and 
Eastern Europe, due to short term risks and potential sources of instability, the region 
is still perceived as emerging markets by investors, which keeps risk premia relatively 
high. Real exchange rates thus remain high and drive up real exchange rates, and as a 
consequence, the risk of crises referred to above are not negligible. On the other hand, 
in countries where sterilised intervention is a major policy tool in managing capital 
inflows, interest rate differentials are unlikely to disappear. 
Fifth, the pressure to maintain a reasonable (flow and stock) fiscal position can 
have negative effects on real convergence, for that would require strategic capital 
investment by the government. Most of the countries did not use upturns in economic 
performance to improve the budget balance, so problems are to occur at the “bust” pail 
of the cycle. The risk is increasingly high when public debt is large, imposing a burden 
on the budget and lowering fiscal authorities’ capacity to absorb shocks. Institutional 
reforms in the social security systems yet to come in these countries will only worsen 
that. 
3. Liberalisation and the choice of exchange rate regimes 
Small open economies in general are exposed to various instabilities, among them 
speculative short-term capital flows. Empirical results from Edwards (2001) support 
the view that emerging economies are different in the way they are affected by capital 
market liberalisation. Therefore, pre-accession countries were advised to pay attention 
to the sequencing of the liberalisation process. 
As regards exchange rate regimes, in the early 1990s pegs were popular among 
Central and East European countries, and were used as an external anchor of inflation. 
With stabilisation becoming less of a need, these regimes shifted toward more flexible 
arrangements. By the end of the decade, according to the hollowing-out hypothesis 
given by Fischer (2001), the general trend in the choice of exchange rate regimes is a 
shift toward comer solutions, that is maintaining either a “hard peg” or a flexible 
regime, in-between solutions being considered more crisis-prone. 
Pre-accession countries were advised to follow more flexible exchange rate 
policies (pegging their currencies to the euro within a broad band), which is supposed 
to increase their capacity to handle conflicts between nominal and real convergence. 
The main benefit of this approach advocated by the European Commission is that it 
supports the fulfilment of nominal convergence criteria, while fostering real 
convergence, especially because it allows for substantial exchange rate appreciation. 
The Baltic States have followed a different path from the rest of the pre-accession 
countries in several respects. They are extremely small and open, still opted for fixed 
exchange rate regimes and liberalised their capital accounts relatively early and fast, 
well before having a strong financial system. Adopting a very hard peg can also help in 
managing some of the conflicts pointed to in the previous paragraphs. It allows 
efficient nominal convergence through the decreasing of country and exchange rate 
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risk, lowering inflation and interest rates (while the exchange rate criterion no longer 
makes any sense). Growth is supported by lower nominal and real interest rates and by 
exchange rate stability. 
Nevertheless, there are considerable risks involved. For Baltic States with fixed 
exchange rate regimes, the most relevant problems out of the ones outlined in the 
previous section are potential exchange rate misalignment, that is real exchange rate 
appreciation and the resulting current account sustainability problems. This, coupled 
with the losing of investor confidence has resulted in the case of many countries in 
financial crises, which had a long-term impact on growth and general welfare. A 
banking crisis can be especially damaging with the central bank deprived of its 
function as lender of last resort. The recent example of Argentina has shown that while 
economies with hard pegs are more resistant to sudden speculative attacks coming 
from capital markets, the real costs of adjustment are higher. 
4. Real and nominal convergence in the Baltic States 
The narrowing of the gap between the income, wage and price levels of pre-accession 
economies and that of the European Union is described with the concept of real 
convergence. On the other hand, nominal convergence is the term for the process in 
which countries meet the inflation, interest rate and fiscal criteria of the Maastricht- 
Treaty. 
The Baltic States have in common their size and level of development, as well as 
their real and financial openness. The data available underline the fact that these 
countries have performed reasonably well in both nominal and real terms. 
Before 1991 around 95% of Estonia’s outside trade was with the USSR (Sutela, 
2002). The same is true for Latvia and Lithuania. The dependence on the Russian 
market delivered a huge blow when the Soviet bloc collapsed in 1991. GDP declined 
by 40% in the Baltic region as a whole and was accompanied by hyperinflation in 
1991-92. The data below indicate that a favourable trend is leading the Baltic states out 
of their initial disadvantageous conditions. 
The stabilisation programme and the introduction of credible fixed exchange rate 
regimes in the early 1990s was successful in bringing down the inflation rate close to 
EU-levels. 
Estonia established its DEM-based currency board in 1992, Lithuania a dollar- 
based one in 1994“ and Latvia has maintained a very hard peg to the SDR since 1994. 
Responsible fiscal policy has also supported disinflationary efforts and the 
convergence of interest rates. Another important point in explaining the fair inflation 
performance is that factors increasing labour market inflexibility do not result in 
inflationary pressures through higher wages, but are reflected in alarmingly high levels 
of unemployment (16.6% in Lithuania according to ILO methodology). 
The figure 1 shows that the major setback in growth suffered in 1999 as a 
consequence of the Russian crisis could only temporarily break the favourable decade- 
long trend in the Baltics. 
2 . 
“ Lithuania has tried to exit its currency board earlier on, but has kept it for credibility reasons. With the 
consent of the IMF, they have re-pegged the litas to the euro in February. 
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Table 1. Inflation rates in the Baltics 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Estonia 41.7 28.9 14.8 12.5 6.5 3.9 5.0 4.2 
Latvia 26.3 23.1 13.1 7.0 2.8 3.2 1.8 2.6 
Lithuania 45.1 35.7 13.1 8.4 2.4 0.3 1.4 2.1 
Source: Bank of Estonia, Bank of Latvia, Bank of Lithuania. 
Figure 1. Rate of economic growth (1994-2001) 
- - Estonia Latvia —A— Lithuania 
Source: Bank of Estonia, Bank of Latvia, Bank of Lithuania. 
One of the most important reasons behind high growth performance of the Baltic 
States was the successful reorientation of foreign trade. The pick-up in exports beside 
the gradual recovery in domestic demand has balanced the unfavourable world 
economic conditions since the second half of 2001. Both Latvia and Estonia scored the 
highest on the IMF’s trade openness index; trade to GDP ratios are over 100% in the 
region. 
All three countries have been running major trade deficits, which are reflected in 
the current account balance below. The trade deficits, however, are almost always 
covered by net capital inflows, especially non-debt creating FDI. The current account 
deficit is decreased by the positive services balance, in Latvia especially through 
transportation incomes between Russia and the Baltic sea. It follows that the current 
account deficit is more than covered by FDI, which leads to growing official reserves 
and the practice that neither the government, nor the monetary authorities borrow from 
abroad. 
Table 2. Current account deficit (in % of GDP) 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Estonia -7.2 -4.4 -9.2 -12.1 -9.2 -4.7 -6.4 -6.5 
Latvia -0.2 -3.6 -4.2 -6.1 -10.6 -9.6 -6.9 -6.3 
Lithuania -2.1 -10.2 -9.1 -10.2 -12.1 -11.2 -6.0 -6.7 
Source: Bank of Estonia, Bank of Latvia, Bank of Lithuania. 
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Although there is substantial FDI inflow into these countries, unemployment is 
relatively high (and persistent) compared to other countries in the peer group of pre¬ 
accession economies. The main reason behind the high rate of unemployment is that 
new investments following privatisation are labour-substituting ones (ICEG, 2001). 
Moreover, FDI is mostly used to enhance existing features and does not take up a new 
labour force. Another short-term negative impact of growing FDI is the rising import 
demand from the side of foreign investors, which further increases the gap between 
trade incomes and expenses. 
The combination of a large current account deficit, hard pegs and financial 
openness is usually regarded as a source of high external vulnerability. In spite of the 
large foreign deficit, there has been no significant external financial shock or currency 
crisis in the Baltic region. The indicators for external vulnerability (especially those of 
Estonia) are favourable, growth and current account deficit look sustainable. In the 
previous sections I have pointed to some of the most important factors slowing 
convergence in the typical case of small, open economies and the risks associated with 
the real and financial openness and the fixed exchange rate regimes. 
How can these countries sustain such trade deficits? Sutela (2002) provides three 
reasons to explain this phenomenon: 
1. virtual absence of public debt and fiscal discipline, 
2. few and thin asset or debt markets, 
3. low degree of monetisation. 
5. Specifics of the Baltic economies 
The fixed exchange rate regimes maintained in the Baltic already have their own 
particularities. The correlation between the change in foreign reserves and the reserve 
money is 0.89, 0.39 and 0.40 respectively, so if the first two regimes are declared 
currency board arrangements, Latvia can also be considered a quasi currency board3. 
The arrangements in place are now judged consistent with the ERM-II requirements, so 
the Baltic States are to enter the Euro directly from their currency boards. 
The small size and non-diversified production base of the Baltic countries are 
consistent with the fixed regimes, but their inflation-proneness and openness to capital 
flows is a source of risk. The Balassa-Samuelson effect detailed earlier in this paper 
suggests that pre-accession economies face the problem of real exchange rate (RER) 
appreciation, which, in the case of fixed exchange rate regimes, puts pressure on 
inflation. Despite this factor pushing inflation upward, the relatively favourable 
inflationary trends outlined in the first section are the result of monetary and fiscal 
discipline and that labour market inflexibility is reflected in the rate of unemployment. 
The appreciation of the RER also heightens the risks of speculative attacks. Having 
a very hard peg does not follow directly that speculative attacks and an exchange crisis 
The low values also point to the fact that the Baltic arrangements are somewhat different from classical 
currency boards, where correlation is expected to be 1.00. This can be partly explained by nominal 
changes in the reserves caused by fluctuations in the anchor exchange rate, and partly by the specifics of 
these states mentioned below. An important argument made by Sutela (2002) is that from the low 
correlation value it does not follow that the authorities pursued sterilisation policies - the Baltics had 
different means in avoiding or if any occurred, overcoming the crises. 
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are made impossible. Official reserves usually cover a much narrower monetary 
aggregate than, for instance M2. Given the low degree of monetisation, reflected in the 
low levels of domestic savings and the total credit/GDP ratio (about half of the market 
economy benchmark), this type of risk is less relevant. It remains a question to what 
extent this low degree of monetisation affects growth rates. Another important factor is 
that Baltic central banks have accumulated reserves backing the money base at well 
over 100%, which increased the capacity of the Baltic States to survive speculative 
attacks. 
The Estonian currency board has managed to avoid the other often-cited problem 
of the currency board arrangement: the absence of the central bank’s lender of last 
resort function. Estonia established with its high reserves the Stabilisation Fund, 
though minor in size, that allows the monetary authority to intervene in case of a 
liquidity contract. Excess reserves up to 6% of base money were used to provide 
liquidity support to problem banks during the 1994-5 banking crisis, which was a 
consequence of the very fast growth of the banking sector not accompanied by a 
similar development in the banking system supervision. During the Russian crisis in 
1998 the central bank of Latvia provided similar financial assistance. In the 1995 
banking crisis however, the Bank of Lithuania could not provide sufficient funding for 
large problem banks and the crisis was resolved through government loan guarantees. 
The experience further encouraged the central bank, which had initially opposed the 
currency board, to opt for a more flexible regime that allows for higher monetary 
autonomy, i.e. LOLR-function, sterilisation, etc. Nevertheless, Lithuania was not able 
to exit the currency board because of a serious threat to its credibility and pegged its 
currency to the Euro. 
Another important variable of external vulnerability is public and especially 
foreign debt. As the Baltic States emerged from the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia 
adopted all foreign assets and liabilities of the USSR, so the Baltics started out without 
any foreign debt. On the other hand, they were able to regain reserves (gold) that were 
initially used to back up the currency. The original zero level debt has played a major 
role in facilitating the running of large foreign deficits without overly loss of 
credibility, especially given the responsible fiscal stance of Estonia and Latvia shown 
in the table below. 
Table 3. Budget deficit (in % of GDP) 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Estonia 1.3 -1.3 -1.9 2.2 -0.3 -4.7 -0.7 0.0 
Latvia -4.0 -3.9 -1.7 0.1 -0.8 -4.0 -2.8 -1.8 
Lithuania -5.5 -4.5 -4.5 -1.8 -5.8 -8.2 -3.3 -1.4 
Source: Bank of Estonia, Bank of Latvia, Bank of Lithuania. 
Fiscal prudence in Estonia is more or less guaranteed by the legal constraint that 
the government cannot propose a budget with deficit. Latvia has also maintained fiscal 
equilibrium. As a result, both countries external debt is in single digits (that of 
Lithuania is no more than 17%), which means that one of the key vehicles of currency 
crises is absent. 
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The low levels of debt are not merely the result of the Baltic fiscal stance. Sutela 
(2002) argues that a key factor in the lack of indebtedness is that local debt and equity 
markets are still quite underdeveloped. The small size of these economies contributes 
to the smallness of domestic financial markets in the first place. With equity market 
capitalisation as low as 35% in Estonia, 10% in Latvia and just 5% of GDP in 
Lithuania, there is very little scope for potentially destabilising short-term inflows. 
Even more importantly, with the exception of Lithuania running chronic budget 
deficits, government bonds are virtually non-existent, so there simply are not any 
assets available. 
Stock exchanges went through a boom in late 1996, followed by the extraordinary 
growth rate of 10.4%, the highest in Europe that year. In the end the cycle came to a 
bust in late 1997. Interest rates increased so banks started calling back credits and the 
stock exchange index dropped by 19.4%. At this point, one of the major drawbacks of 
the CB system manifested itself: the central bank was deprived of its capacity to 
provide liquidity to ease the liquidity crunch. Given the sound fundamentals, the 
authorities argued that the unfavourable events were the direct consequences of the fast 
credit expansion and the large current account deficit and an adequate correction in the 
macroeconomic variables. In November a stand-by-agreement was signed with the 
IMP and eventually market confidence was regained and speculative pressures faded. 
Trading value at the stock exchange declined in 1998 and as a consequence, the index 
froze and has stagnated since then. 
The low levels of public debt, the responsible fiscal stance and the virtually non¬ 
existent markets for assets has reduced the risk of speculative attacks and the following 
capital account crises. The low degree of monetisation on the other hand facilitates the 
maintaining of a hard peg and acting as a lender of last resort by the central bank. For 
the time being, these factors reduce the external vulnerability of the Baltics and allow 
for running large current account deficits necessary for sustainable growth 
accompanied by financial stability as seen in the previous section. In the long run, 
however, the absence of a sound financial culture may become an obstacle to further 
development. 
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The Appropriate Exchange Rate System for Integration 
of the Baltic Countries into the European Monetary Union: 
The Case of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia 
Katarzyna Wisniewska 
The exchange rate strategy can simplify the accession process to the EU and later entry 
to the EMU. The position of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia regarding the use of the 
fixed exchange rate is stated in the EMU chapter. In 1999 the EMU chapter was closed 
for Estonia, in 2000 for Latvia and in 2001 for Lithuania. This means that the candidate 
countries having closed this chapter have committed themselves, before accession, to 
abandoning direct public sector financing by the central bank, to eliminating privileged 
access to the public sector to financial markets and achieving the independence of the 
central bank. After accession they will make the remaining necessary changes to the 
central bank legislation as it becomes part of the European Central Bank System, and 
will start applying the EMU provisions regarding sound public finances, to mention 
just the two main items. 
Upon accession each new member state will adopt the EMU legislation, but will 
not immediately become a member of the euro zone. The process of adoption of the 
euro may start, but according to legislation, at least two years will have to elapse 
before a decision to allow entry into the euro zone can be taken. Initially, each 
accession country will have the status of a member state with derogation with regard to 
that particular provision of the EC Treaty. 
A more specific question to be clarified concerns the exchange rate aspects 
relevant for the candidate countries both before and after accession. To clarify the 
different stages and the requirements to adopt the euro finally, the ECOFIN Council 
issued in November 2000 a report drawn on a report by the Commission, and the result 
was endorsed by the Nice European Council in December 2000. 
The main conclusions in this report were: 
• prior to accession, there are no formal restrictions on the choice of an exchange 
rate regime; 
• upon accession, new member states shall treat their exchange rate policy as a 
matter of common interest; 
• after accession, although not necessarily immediately, accession countries are 
expected to join the ERM II. 
With regard to the last point, it was clarified that floating, crawling pegs and pegs 
against anchors other than the euro are incompatible with the ERM II. A currency 
board with the euro as the anchor could, after careful assessment, be considered 
compatible with the ERM II as a unilateral commitment to fixed euro rate. 
During the first stage a candidate country is formally free to chosen its exchange 
rate system. However, even in the first stage the choice should be related to the general 
macroeconomic stability and a smoother accession to the EMU. It is not a formal or 
legal requirement, but it follows from the economic argumentation. The EU institutions 
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retain the power to monitor the evaluation of their progress made in the 
implementation of pre-accession programmes and through other means of co¬ 
ordination of economic policy with the EU. The distinctiveness of this stage is that the 
EU institutions do not discuss the issue of the exchange rate system as a separate issue 
of coordination, and it makes up part of the general economic policy. In the subsequent 
stages the significance of the exchange rate system will increase only to the extent that 
the exchange rate regime is important with regard to the coordination of institutional 
requirements. 
Respectively, accession to the EU does not distinguish any universal or most 
acceptable exchange rate system. So, the country is essentially independent in choosing 
an exchage rate system. However, the EU institutions clearly express their negative 
opinion regarding an unacceptable instrument - unilateral euroisation as it contradicts 
the essential logic of the requirements of the Treaty on the introduction of the euro. 
The EU institutions have stated that it should be made clear that any unilateral 
adoption of the single currency by means of ‘euroisation’ would run counter to the 
underlying economic reasoning of EMU in the EC Treaty, which foresees the eventual 
adoption of the euro as the end point of the structured convergence process within a 
multilateral framework.” (ECOFIN, 2000). 
During the second stage, upon accession of the country into the EU, the issue of 
the exchange rate regime/strategy acquires a different status. It is no longer a derivative 
of the general economic policy, but an independent element that requires coordination. 
The new member state will have to treat their exchange rate as a matter of common 
interest. Upon entry into a new economic space, certain shocks are possible and 
additional time may be necessary for the economy to reach the balance. Thus, it may 
be more acceptable for certain countries to allow the amortisation of certain shocks 
through changes in the exchange rate. This partially explains why it is not obligatory to 
participate in the ERM II from the date of joining the EU and why the introduction of 
the euro is conditional on the country's prior participation in this mechanism. This 
probably reflects the fact that economies are fully capable of adapting to the changes, 
i.e. amortising shocks through prices instead of the exchange rate. A country has a 
certain level of freedom in deciding when to join the ERM II. 
The third stage is participation in the ERM II. The participation in this mechanism 
is based on agreed principles that reflect an agreement on the central exchange rate and 
the margins for its fluctuation. The ERM II was established by the resolution of the 
European Council on the New Exchange Rate System (signed in June 1997 at the 
Amsterdam Summit). The main operational features of the exchange rate mechanism 
are as follows: 
• the exchange rate mechanism is based on central rates; 
• the standard fluctuation bands is ± 15% around the central rates; 
• central rates and standard wide bands are set by mutual agreement between the 
ECB, the ministers of the euro area member states and the ministers and governors 
of central banks of the non-euro area member states; 
• the intervention at the margins will principally be automatic and unlimited; 
• closer exchange rate cooperation, possibility by formal agreement regarding bands 
naiTower than the standard ones, will be provided. 
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Besides, individual countries will be able to attempt to maintain narrower 
fluctuation bands under unilateral commitment. 
After examining the operation principles of the ERM II it is possible to come to the 
conclusion that a free floating or crawling peg exchange rate system is not possible. 
The countries that use the currency board system may formally retain their exchange 
rate within the ERM II. This may be treated as a unilateral obligation of the country to 
maintain the fixed exchange rate within narrower margins. According to this view, the 
strategy of the fixed exchange rate system is most acceptable in avoiding additional 
shocks resulting from alterations of the exchange rate system. 
Taking into account the fact that during the second stage the exchange rate is a 
common issue of coordination, it is not possible to state exactly under what conditions 
and when the participation in the ERM II will take place. However, joining the ERM II 
should not be delayed. The participation in the ERM II will lead to the introduction of 
the euro. Then the country will be a member of the EMU. 
The candidate countries have chosen different exchange rates strategies. Some of 
them adopted a regime of free floating exchange rate and they will enter the ERM II 
(Poland). Other countries made a commitment to defend a fixed exchange rate by 
locking into a reserve currency through currency boards. This solution was chosen by 
the Baltic countries (Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia). They are allowed to retain the fixed 
exchange rate within the ERM II. 
After regaining independence in 1991, the countries initiated market-oriented 
reforms. The stabilisation and structural reform programmes were aimed at rapid price 
liberalisation, elimination of subsidies, tightening of finances and establishing a liberal 
trade and payment system. At an early stage of the adjustment process Latvia, 
Lithuania and Estonia introduced its own currency. On 20 August 1992 the Estonian 
kroon became a legal means of payment. In Lithuania and Latvia this process had two 
stages. There were two legal currencies in circulation. Since 7 May 1992, the Russian 
rouble and Latvian rouble had been in use together. In Lithuania, the local currency, 
talonas, was introduced on 1 October 1992 and functioned together with the Russian 
rouble. Then the Latvian rouble and talonas were freely floated (LB, 2000). 
The stabilisation programmes in these countries were based on the exchange rate 
system. Their monetary policy sought to maintain exchange rate stability and to control 
the amount of bank reserves so as to limit excessive lending. The exchange rate policy 
of Estonia since 1992 has been similar to that of a currency board and the monetary 
base is backed by gold and foreign currency reserves. The Estonian kroon was pegged 
to the German mark (at the rate 1 DM = 8 EEK). 
Latvia has been using the exchange rate-based stabilisation programme since 1993. 
In March 1993 the Latvian rouble was replaced by lats, the new national currency. The 
exchange rate was 1 LVL = 200 Roubles. In mid-February 1994, the Bank of Latvia 
pegged the lats to the SDR basket of currencies (at the rate 1 SDR = 0.7997 LVL) 
(Kowalewski, 1996). 
Also, Lithuania continued the stabilisation reforms. In 1993, the Bank of Lithuania 
reduced the growth of money supply by applying the reserve requirement and deposit 
and credit auctions. These instruments have greatly reduced inflation and stabilised the 
foreign currency exchange rate (on the eve of the introduction of the Litas as the new 
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national currency). On 25 August 1993 talonas were replaced by the Litas at the rate 1 
LTL = 100 talonas. Later, the Bank of Lithuania started to reorient gradually its 
operations towards the maintenance of a stable Litas exchange rate. Finally, a fixed 
exchange rate regime was chosen and implemented by means of a currency board 
arrangement provided for in the Law on the Credibility of the Litas that came into 
effect on 1 April 1994. The Law requires that the Litas put into circulation be backed 
fully by the Bank of Lithuania’s holdings of convertible foreign exchange reserves and 
gold. The Litas exchange rate against the US dollar was fixed in April 1994 (1 USD = 
4 LTL). In early 2001, the Lithuania government announced that it would repeg its 
currency, the litas to the euro. It was introduced on 2 February 2002. 
The Baltic countries have established one of the most liberal foreign exchange 
regimes in the world. The residents of these countries and foreigners alike are allowed 
to open accounts in national currencies and foreign currencies without any restrictions. 
They can buy and sell national currencies or exchange them for other currencies. To 
ensure free convertibility of national currencies, the central banks of these countries 
buy and sell unlimited amounts of the reserve currencies to banks at their request. 
There are no restrictions, even on capital account transactions. The legislation and 
policies of these countries ensure free movement of capital to and from these countries. 
Both foreign currencies and the national currencies can freely enter and leave the 
country. Foreign investors can repatriate their profits in any currency without 
restrictions. This is possible because Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia pursued robust 
foreign exchange policies. They have endured several shocks, both internal and 
external. In the 1990s many crises occurred in the South East Asian countries and in 
Russia. Some other countries had to devalue their currency. Latvia, Lithuania and 
Estonia have always clearly demonstrated their resolve in defending their currencies. 
Markets always calm down quickly after shocks. 
The fixing of the exchange rate, if it is durable and credible, reduces uncertainty, 
eliminates exchange risk and provides businesses with a sound basis for planning and 
pricing, thereby fostering investment and international trade relations. A stable 
exchange rate imposes a constraint on domestic monetary policy (a so-called ‘nominal 
anchor’), which could be regarded as a useful safeguard against unsound financial 
policies. The expected economic benefits include low inflation, low and stable interest 
rates and low costs of external borrowing. Some of these benefits can be significant for 
a small economy, which is closely integrated with, and dependent on a large reserve- 
currency country. Such benefits may also offset the potential costs of no longer being 
able to use interest and exchange rates in response to domestic and external shocks, 
and manage business cycles as well as the loss of sovereignty over printing money. 
The other danger by such an exchange rate regime as currency board, is loss of 
competitiveness due to appreciation of the national currency. It can be reduced if prices 
and wages are flexible and adjust rapidly to misalignments in the real exchange rate. A 
corollary to this is that the economy needs to be open, so that the impact on trade by 
changes in the real exchange rate is felt quickly. 
The Latvian, Lithuanian and Estonian economies are also open and small. When 
most goods, including raw materials, are imported, devaluation would not improve 
competitiveness and could even worsen it. It could even be an obstacle to the increase 
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of productivity. Capital and intermediate goods are the major part of all imports in 
these countries. In Lithuania it made up 72% and in Latvia 68% of all imports in 1999. 
A fixed exchange rate stimulates inflows of foreign direct investments. Estonia has 
been a major recipient of foreign direct investment, although the inflow has decreased 
recently. Foreign direct investments flows (% of GDP) in 1999 were in Estonia 5.9, 
Latvia 5.2, Lithuania 4.6. The countries are net debtors for long-term capital and net 
creditors for short-term capital. Among the candidates countries Latvia, Lithuania and 
Estonia had the lowest inflation in 2000 (1.4% Lithuania, 2.6% Latvia, 4.0% Estonia). 
The system of currency board imports low inflation from abroad, thus enhancing 
price stability. 
Table 1. Inflation in Lithuania (in %) 
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
1162.6 188.7 45.1 35.7 13.1 8.4 2.4 0.3 1.4 
Source: Bank of Estonia, Bank of Latvia, Bank of Lithuania. 
The euro has declined significantly against the dollar since its introduction at the 
start of 1999. Even though the Litas is fixed to the US dollar, Lithuania has managed to 
increase the share of its exports to the EU countries. In 2000, the largest share of export 
47.8%, was bound for the EU countries. This reflects an increase in exports to the EU 
countries by 22.04% (export to the CIS countries rose by 13.39%). Imports from the 
EU amounted to 49.7% of the total imports in 2000 and their level increased by 5.7% 
(17.34 % in 1999). Imports from the CIS countries were augmented by 43.6% (during 
1999, it declined by 20.4%). 
The fixed exchange rate as such does not automatically ensure exactly the same 
inflation rate as that in the country of the base currency. But, in the case of a small 
country with an open economy, a fixed exchange rate regime can help achieve price 
stability in the longer-term perspective. Under the fixed exchange rate system, money 
supply and interest rates in the banking system, as well as inflation, are factors that 
may not be regulated by the central bank. Interest rates reach a certain equilibrium 
under the maintained fixed exchange rate. Respectively, under the purchasing power 
parity (PPP), the rate of inflation approaches the rate of the base country. 
Participation in the ERM II would increase confidence and encourage interest 
convergence even further. Respectively, the country would have a relatively lower 
interest rate due to the lower country or currency risk premium. In addition, the 
elimination of uncertainty regarding the future exchange rates helps ensure relative 
price stability in the long-term. These would achieve compliance with the Maastricht 
criteria in the long run. Certainly such compliance will not be achieved immediately. 
However, as it had been mentioned, the beginning is the transitional stage i.e. 
participation in the ERM II and besides nominal indicators may not be regarded as 
absolute. If there is a risk that compliance with the exchange rate stability requirement 
will hamper compliance with the inflation criterion, then the compliance with the 
inflation criterion may pose the same threat for compliance with the exchange rate 
stability requirement. At the same time there is no need in stay in the ERM II for too 
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long, since it may diminish confidence in the country’s ability to participate in the 
ERM II or to utilise fully advantages presented by the single currency. 
The essential thing is the necessity of flexibility in the economy. The economy 
should be able to absorb shocks sufficiently and effectively without necessary changes 
in the exchange rate. This may be defined as the level of real and nominal convergence 
reached. Development indicators of the country, and the speed of solving problems 
during the participation in the ERM II serve as a kind of test to show if the economy is 
flexible enough for the country’s successful participation in the EMU. The Maastricht 
criteria expressing the nominal convergence are only one part of the indicators of 
capability of participation in the EMU. Compliance with them partially reflects how 
close the country is related to the EMU. However, to include entry into the EMU as 
one of the conditions, or even requirements, regarding the real convergence in reaching 
the permanent synchronisation of cycles, is not a serious proposition. 
Participation in the ERM II, and later in the EMU, essentially means the 
application of the fixed exchange rate system. If the economies of Lithuania, Latvia, 
Estonia were able to function successfully under the conditions of the fixed exchange 
rate, it would not face any significant problems during participation in the EMU as 
well. Respectively, judging from the result of the development of the economies of 
Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia and taking into account the roots of the problems, there 
is no need to pay much attention to instruments that bring short-term benefit. 
Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia are transitional economies and are still shaping their 
economy. This allows for the formation of the nature of the economy in advance, 
taking into consideration the unavoidable participation in the EMU. Therefore, the 
ability to operate under the conditions of the fixed exchange rate regime, the 
appropriateness of the fiscal policy, and especially its coordination in the subsequent 
stages, becomes the most important points. At the same time, this explains why it could 
be expedient and useful for Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia to seek participation in the 
ERM II immediately after accession to the EU, and not to delay participation in the 
EMU. 
Attention has to be paid to two important events that allow more successful 
utilisation of the strategy chosen. These are the 13 April announcement of the ECB on 
the compatibility of the currency board arrangements with the ERM II and the report 
by the (ECOFIN) Council to the European Council in Nice on the exchange rate 
aspects of enlargement. They narrow the scope of possible speculations regarding the 
inappropriateness of the currency board when joining the EU and participating in the 
ERM II. On the whole, it is meaningless to seek a possible ideal way, since in the case 
of the economy real comparisons are impossible and only certain presumptions can be 
made. Therefore, in the absence of evident reasons for inappropriateness of the 
exchange rate system, there is no need for changes. Besides, according to the said 
report by ECOFIN, “Potential EU members wishing to join ERM II relatively swiftly 
after accession are already now expected to consider their policies with a view to their 
prospective membership in ERM II”. 
Namely, the characteristic features of the economy of a specific country determine 
the strategy acceptable for the transition period that is needed in order to reach 
flexibility of the economy in the long-term. The fixed exchange rate strategy is 
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acceptable to Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia as they are small and open economies. 
Participation in the ERM II, and later in the EMU, essentially means the application of 
the fixed exchange rate system. If the economies of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia were 
able to function successfully under the conditions of the fixed exchange rate, then there 
would be no major problems during their participation in the EMU. Stability of the 
financial sector, the presence of an appropriate fiscal policy and increase of flexibility 
of the economy become the most important criteria of economic reforms and policy. 
These factors influence such priorities of these countries as the strengthening of 
supervision, the coordination of statistical requirements and the developments of 
economic research. All this will allow Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia to enter the new 
stage of more intensive cooperation on the issues of the coordination with the EU 
economic policy. 
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Part 2 
The European Union 
Integration Process and CEE 
Countries 

The Reform of European Union Institutions 
in the context of Enlargement 
Dana Viktorova 
1. The current situation of institutional reform 
In 1999 the European Council decided to consider the following states as candidates 
for membership in the European Union: Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. 
The process of enlargement brings a challenge for member states, too. Coming 
enlargement is different not only from the point of view of quality - economic and 
political situation in candidate countries, which are under the transition process - but 
also of quantity in a number of applying countries. Smooth procedures depend on the 
preparedness of the EU also. 
The EU cannot accept new members until the substantial reform process of the 
whole institutional framework takes a part; especially the body of the European 
Community, concerned with the system of institutions such as the Council of the EU, 
the European Commission, the European Parliament, the European Court of Justice, 
etc. and legal rules. These institutions have certain negotiation and decision making 
rules. 
The system was prepared for the European Economic Community consisting of six 
or nine members. In connection with the increasing number of member states, 
modifications were made, but there was no substantial change over. 
Institutional changes, including the decision making mechanism, are adherent to 
enlargement. Extension of the current system would lead to its collapse. This system is 
not able to display heterogeneity of economic development and different interests 
among member states and candidates. The political system of today's EU cannot 
imbibe such a heterogeneity and diversity in a larger Europe. 
The decision-making mechanism already faces certain problems. Different 
interests of an increasing number of members of the decision-making process are 
difficult to treat by unanimous, or even by qualified majority voting, which stipulates a 
majority of 70%. 
It is obvious, that principal institutional reform is an essential requirement for 
adopting candidate countries. This reform has to be considered from the point of view 
of the future, when the EU’s 27 member states, will operate. 
Even the huge number of the EU member states causes problems in efficient 
institutional proceedings (Srein, 1999): 
• Their decision-making substantiality is closed because of the large number of 
members. The founding six member states could have found compromise much 
easier than the 27 members would. 
• Almost all of the candidates are small states, and there is a danger of originating an 
institutional imbalance between small and large member states. 
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2. The European Commission 
Today the European Commission has 20 commissioners. The largest countries, the 
United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy and Spain have two commissioners. If this 
allocation is maintained during the first round of enlargement, involving Poland, 
Hungary, Slovenia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus and Malta; Poland would 
qualify for two commissioners and the others for one. That would establish the 
Commission of 28 commissioners. And further enlargement, involving the rest of the 
candidates, would set the Commission at 33 commissioners, which is a big number for 
the Commission's tasks. 
The Treaty of Nice Protocol on the Enlargement of the European Union proposes 
that while the first round of enlargement of the EU comes into force, each country 
would delegate just one commissioner. Suddenly, there would be a changed proportion 
of weighted votes in the Council on behalf of those countries, that do not nominate its 
second commissioner. 
After further enlargement of the Union, to 27 members, Article 231(1) of the 
Treaty establishing the European Community must be altered as follows. A number of 
members of the Commission should be lower than the number of member states. 
Members of the Commission should be assembled according to the rotational equality 
principle, which should be endorsed by a unanimous vote of the Council. The number 
of members of the Commission should be determined by unanimous vote of the 
Council. This modification would stand from the first day, when the Commission 
undertakes its incumbencies with the twenty seventh member state. With further 
enlargement, the maximum number of commissioners must be retained. 
There are many suggestions as to how the Commission should be organised. One 
of these is to establish a constricted College of Commissioners with a special liability, 
supported by commissioners without position. The constricted College of 
Commissioners would endorse a proposal by single majority to relegate it to the full 
College of Commissioners to endorse it by qualified majority. 
Even though the commissioners are not delegated to represent their country, but to 
serve EU interests, the member states are not willing to lose their representative in the 
Commission; if this two-stage College of Commissioners system were introduced. 
Enforcing the principles of expertise and independency of the commissioners is the 
only solution. The president of the Commission would be the key figure, forming a 
team of commissioners. The Council and the Parliament would approve the 
_ 
Commission (Srein, 1999). The President of the Commission would make up the team 
without limitation of national personal quotas. 
The process of enlargement brings many pragmatic embarrassments for the 
internal working procedures of the Commission. If the one-stage Commission were 
sustained, it would be difficult to find a sufficient number of directorate-generals while 
the number of commissioners increases. And an increase in the number of directorates 
generals would increase a growth in activities. Although there would not be enough 
comparable posts for each of the representatives, it would lead to first-rate and low-rate 
commissioners. Such a situation might establish a Commission hierarchy. 
Enlargement will bring the need to engage employees from new member states and 
absorbing a relatively large number of new countries will be difficult, particularly if 
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those employees have no experience of the workings of EU matters and totally 
different administrative habits and traditions. 
3. The Council of the EU 
According to Article 205 (ex Article 148) of the Amsterdam Treaty, each member state 
has votes allocated from 10 for large countries to two for the smallest ones in the 
Council. 
In the case of qualified majority voting, the weighted votes system is used. In this 
system, the large countries have more votes but not proportionally according to the 
population. Smaller countries have more votes than they should get according to their 
population. From the total number of 87 votes, there are 62 needed to pass a proposal 
as a qualified majority voting, 26 of them as a blocking minority. 
If today's decision-making process is maintained, with the same weighted votes 
system, the small countries would entirely dominate the Council of the EU composed 
of 27 members. This is because those principles were originally structured for the 
integrated unit of six member states - three large and three small. And it is not possible 
to copy such system to the EU of 27 members, where just four member states are large 
ones (the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy), three of them medium-sized 
(Spain, Poland, Romania) and 20 small ones. 
Scenarios for the EU of 27 member states, which studied situations that could 
occur if the votes in the Council were allocated according to today's system, gave the 
advantage to small countries (see table 1). 
According to this scenario, small countries voting together with one large country 
and two medium-sized countries would create a blocking minority with a population 
involving just half of the whole EU. An association of Malta, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia 
and Slovakia would count 11 votes in the Council representing 7.3 million of 
population whilst Germany's 10 votes would represent 80 million of people. 
Small countries representing 12% of the population could also create a blocking 
minority, which is not reasonable for large countries either. In fact, we should admit, 
that there is no alliance of small countries against large ones existing in reality. 
Let us take the case of the EU extended by seven new countries such as the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia and Malta. In this EU of 22 
members, the states of the integration core1 would gain 32 votes and four large 
countries (France, Italy, Germany, United Kingdom) - 30 votes altogether. This would 
not be enough to create a blocking minority, because in the EU of 22 states, creating a 
blocking minority requires 34 votes. Creating a qualified majority, 56 votes in the 
Council, is absolutely impossible for all large and medium-sized countries, which 
actually represent 77% of the population. The reform of weighted voting in the 
decision making process would be needed, as new small countries, involving 5.7% of 
the population, will gain 14.9% of votes in the Council (Jaks, 1999). Creating a 
majority convenient for large countries or reform on behalf of large countries, would 
be precluded. 
Constituent member states - Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Germany, the Netherlands. 
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Table 1. Weighted votes in the Council of the EU-27 
Current members Population (millions) Weighted votes 
France 58.0 10 
Italy 57.3 10 
Germany 81.5 10 
United Kingdom 58.5 10 
Spain 39.2 8 
Belgium 10.1 5 
Holland 15.4 5 
Portugal 9.9 5 
Greece 10.4 5 
Austria 8.0 4 
Sweden 8.8 4 
Denmark 5.2 3 
Finland 5.1 3 
Ireland 3.6 3 
Luxembourg 0.4 2 
Incoming members 
Bulgaria 9.0 4 
Czech Republic 10.3 5 
Estonia 1.5 2 
Cyprus 0.7 2 
Lithuania 3.7 3 
Latvia 2.6 2 
Hungary 10.3 5 
Malta 0.3 2 
Poland 38.3 8 
Romania 22.8 7 
Slovakia 5.3 3 
Slovenia 2.0 3 
Total 478.2 134 
Qualified majority 95 
Blocking minority 40 
Source: Miller (1999). 
On 1 January 2005, Article 205(2) and (4) of the treaty establishing the EC will be 
changed. If the Council needs to make a decision by a qualified majority voting, the 
votes of member states should be reweighed in the manner shown in Table 2. The total 
number of votes in the Council will be 237. A qualified majority required to pass a 
proposal will be 170 votes. If 12 new members join the EU, the weighted votes system 
will not change and the votes to new countries would be allocated as follows in table 2. 
A qualified majority required to pass a proposal will then be 258 votes. 
The Reform of European Union Institutions in the context of Enlargement 107 
Table 2. Weighted votes in the Council, EU-27 
Germany 29 Bulgaria 10 
United Kingdom 29 Austria 10 
France 29 Slovakia 7 
Italy 29 Denmark 7 
Spain 27 Finland 7 
Poland 27 Ireland 7 
Romania 14 Lithuania 7 
Holland 13 Latvia 4 
Greece 12 Slovenia 4 
Belgium 12 Estonia 4 
Portugal 12 Cyprus 4 
Czech Republic 12 Luxembourg 4 
Hungary 12 Malta 3 
Sweden 10 Total 345 
Source: EC (2001). 
So far, the reweighing of votes has been the most important change made. The aim 
was to adjust particularity to today’s decision-making system. After all, the basic 
principle has been maintained. Three large countries and one small country would be 
able to block any majority. 
For the first time, there would be a chance for each member state to protest against 
a decision of the Council, which does not represent at least 62% of the population of 
the EU. 
Of course, it is not possible to establish a decision-making system, which would be 
totally proportional to a number of populations of each member state. The sovereignity 
status of the country has to be taken in to the size of the country. But, if the small 
countries maintained broad disproportions in weighted votes and in to the EU new 
countries came, those broad disproportions would increase even more. The difference 
between the percentage of votes needed for a qualified majority and percentage of 
European population representing these votes would become immoderate. 
Without any reform, the EU of 27 members might become a unit, where the 
countries with a minor rate would outvote countries with major rate of European 
population. And that would disclaim the democratic justification of the Council. 
Another alternative is to set up a two level system, where the size of population 
would be entirely accounted for. The indicator of qualified majority would include an 
explicit percentage of all votes and those votes representing an explicit percentage of 
the population. 
3.1 Extension of qualified majority voting 
As the process of enlargement progresses, and the number of member states widely 
increases, it will be more and more difficult to achieve a unanimous decision. The 
extension of qualified majority voting could simplify the decision-making process. 
And the qualified majority voting is a standard for a major part of European legislation. 
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It should be closely revised whether the qualified majority voting ought to be extended 
on behalf of efficient decision making while enlarging the EU. 
Nowadays, there are 73 Articles and sub-articles in the main Treaties, which need 
to be carried by a unanimous vote. Obviously, there would still be some areas, which 
have to be carried by a unanimous vote, such as modification of the Treaties and 
enlargement of the EU. But, it should be considered, whether the unanimous vote is not 
a potential barrier for further and deeper integration. 
The member countries and the European Parliament agree that the extension of 
qualified majority voting is essential, if the EU wants to operate efficiently with 20 or 
30 members. But such an extension can be a challenge for sovereign states. The 
unanimous voting system cannot be abolished, because it is an aspect of equality. 
3.2 The presidency of the Council 
The system of the presidency in the Council requires a revision too. Today’s half- 
a-year rotation procedure would be very difficult to manage in the EU of 27 members. 
Each state would reach a presidency once in 13.5 years. It means that a certain 
politicians cannot actually experience this post. Such a system has another handicap for 
the efficient work of the Council, because the period of the presidency is too short. 
There are many solutions. For example, enlarging the presidency period up to one 
or two years with the election. So the new members would be spared from the mistakes 
coming from their lack of experience with the presidency. In that case, they would not 
be ready for it. 
4. The European Parliament 
It has been necessary to reallocate the number of seats in the Parliament in the context 
of the enlargement. Otherwise the Parliament would become ungovernable and 
ineffective. The aim is to establish a Parliament that would be similar to the House of 
Commons in the United Kingdom or to the Bundestag in Germany. In the Amsterdam 
Treaty, some changes were made to the structure, functions and competences of the 
Parliament to create suitable conditions for the enlargement of the EU. 
The ratio between the smallest, Luxemburg, and the largest, Germany, in terms of 
population, is 1:205. Hereafter, it is not possible to provide even an estimate of a fair 
proportional representation in the Parliament. Today’s situation is the ratio 1:19. 
The Parliament nowadays has 626 members, who are directly elected in member 
states. The number of the seats is determined according to the size of the country and is 
more favourable for small countries. A number of the representatives from each 
country are resolutely set in the Article 190(2) of the Amsterdam Treaty. 
European politicians have observed a danger, that the Parliament was going to 
face. While enlarging the EU, the Parliament would become monstrous. If today's 
quotas of numbers of members were applied, the Parliament would extend to more 
than 1,000 seats. And that would, of course, not allow it to operate. It was a necessity 
to solve the following problems (Srein, 1999): 
• a maximum number of the representatives, 
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• use of a proportional system - the same number of voters for one mandate in a 
large and small country, 
• use of the minority prevention system, 
• implementation of one or more mandate election districts overlapping national 
borders, where the European parties would be candidates. 
Article 189 of the Amsterdam Treaty states that a number of members of the 
Parliament will not exceed 700 seats. This limit means that on-coming enlargement 
will require the reallocation of the seats of today’s members. According to the Treaty 
of Nice, a number of representatives should not exceed a margin of 732 
representatives. The principle of mandates for particular countries has had to be 
reppraised, so even the smallest country would occupy at least two or three seats. 
Table 3. Number of sits in the European Parliament, EU-27 
Germany 99 Bulgaria 17 
United Kingdom 72 Austria 17 
France 72 Slovakia 13 
Italy 72 Denmark 13 
Spain 50 Finland 13 
Poland 50 Ireland 12 
Romania 33 Lithuania 12 
Elolland 25 Latvia 8 
Greece 22 Slovenia 7 
Belgium 22 Estonia 6 
Portugal 22 Cyprus 6 
Czech Republic 20 Luxemburg 6 
Hungary 20 Malta 5 
Sweden 18 Total 732 
Source: EC (2001). 
On 1 January 2004, the first sub-paragraph of Article 190(2) of Treaty establishing 
the EC ought to be changed. The number of the representatives in the Parliament in the 
EU of 27 member states will appear as follows in table 3. 
5. Conclusions 
At least a year before the sixth candidate joins the EU; the intergovernmental 
conference must determine deeper reforms. They are very important before further 
enlargement; otherwise the whole system would collapse. In contrast to the last 
enlargement processes, the new enlargement would cut down the operational ability 
and manageability of the EU. 
The EU takes an interest in its enlargement, but this effort is threatened by 
incomplete institutional reform. 
The preparedness of the European institutions will decide about further 
development in Central and Eastern Europe. Enlargement must not weaken the EU. 
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The EU has to be prepared for a community of a large number of member states and 
must succeed in achieving common European goals. 
The institutional reform should be finished in 2005 and we can examine whether it 
has brought the required effects or not. This also will be a year when the EU is able to 
accept the new members. 
The EU ought to establish such a system that does not require quota’s changes 
whenever new members are going to join it. 
If the EU wants to operate effectively, efficiently and responsible, it must have 
institutions, which work effectively, efficiently and responsible. 
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The Evolution of the European Social Fund as an Instrument 
supporting the Fight against Unemployment 
in the European Union 
Dominik Sobczak 
Introduction 
In this article I would like to present the evolution of the earliest created Structural 
Fund of the European Communities, the European Social Fund (ESF). I will show in 
what conditions and economic situation it started operating, and how it was being 
transformed as the Community was being enlarged, and new problems considering 
human resources were appearing. At the end of my work I will present the current 
framework of the ESF, the framework Poland and other CEE countries will be 
subjected to when we are admitted to the EU. 
1. Establishment and the initial phase (1957-1971) of ESF 
The European Social Fund (ESF), established by article 123 of the Treaty of Rome in 
1957, is the earliest of all four structural fund created by the European Union. As in the 
early years of the ESF operation, unemployment was not a serious problem in the 
Community, and it was expected to be solved by economic growth and supporting 
training and mobility of workers. Therefore the aims of the ESF concentrated on 
improving job opportunities in the European Community by promoting employment 
and increasing the geographical and occupational mobility of workers. To achieve this, 
the original rules, set in article 125 of the Treaty, provided for grants reimbursing 
public authorities in the Member States half the cost of vocational training, allowances 
and grants to workers suffering a temporary drop in wages during restructuring 
operations in their enterprises, and assistance to workers moving from one region to 
another in search of work and those needing to acquire new skills in sectors 
undergoing modernisation or conversion of production methods. 
ESF started its regular operation in 1960, and until 1974 it assisted the retraining of 
almost one million workers and resettlement of about 700,000. In terms of numbers 
assisted, Italy was the main beneficiary with 65% of the total, followed by Germany 
with 25.5%, and in terms of the total value of grants, Germany was the major 
beneficiary with 42%, followed by Italy with 36%. The aid was financed by direct 
contributions from the member states. This, however, proved to be the main weakness 
of the ESF, as it was supposed to have a redistributive role, with the poorest countries 
(Italy) being the biggest beneficiaries, and the richest countries contributing relatively 
more. In fact this was true in the first few years, but from 1967 onwards the most 
prosperous member state, Germany, became the major beneficiary. The other main 
problem to become apparent during the lifetime of the first ESF was the fact that the 
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system of retrospective grants precluded any Community influence on the national 
labour market and vocational training policies (EC, 1998). 
2. The European Social Fund reform in 1971 
In the second half of the 1960s there was a growing realisation in the Community that 
earlier ideas about counteracting unemployment proved inefficient, and that part of the 
unemployment problem was caused by the community policy. Moreover, it was also 
becoming evident that, in some regions, employment was hampered by structural 
factors. Due to this, in 1969 the European Commission presented its first proposals of 
the ESF reform. Its main aims concentrated on transforming the Fund into a broader, 
more efficient and more flexible instrument, which would respond to Community, 
rather than national, objectives. The ESF, which emerged in 1972, had much greater 
resources, which exceeded in its first two years the total budget for the first twelve 
years of the ESF operation. On top of this, the whole procedure of applying for grants 
was changed, as now forms were to be submitted prior to the beginning of operations, 
replacing, the previous retroactive system. 
There was also a considerable change in areas of support, as for the first time, the 
private sector became eligible for ESF grants, as long as a public authority 
guaranteeing the scheme was also contributing. However, the main hitherto aims of 
ESF remained unchanged, as there was continual support for training and re-settlement 
of workers, together with allowances for the training of instructors and trainees. New 
rules also provided for wage subsidies in less developed regions for workers being 
trained during their first six months of employment, and similar grants were accessible 
to workers over 50 and for the adaptation of work stations to the needs of people with 
disabilities. In practice, most of the resources (about 90%) still went to vocational 
training (EC, 1998). 
3. Amendments of the late 1970s 
Due to a considerable deterioration in the unemployment situation in the European 
Community in the second half of the decade, (the unemployment rate rose from about 
2% at the beginning of the 1960s to almost 5% at the end of the 1970s), especially 
among young people, the Commission broadened areas of the ESF support to migrant 
workers, unemployed women over 25 years of age, especially those wishing to return 
to work after a longer period out of the labour market, and unemployed young people 
below 25 years of age, especially seeking their first job. Moreover, due to increasing 
regional disparities in the European Community, the ESF support for regional 
development was also significantly enlarged (EC, 1998). 
4. The 1983 revision of the European Social Fund 
At the beginning of the 1980s the unemployment rate was growing constantly, rising to 
7.8% in 1981, 9.3% in 1982, and 10.3% in 1983 (CEC, 1996, p. 21). To a large extent 
this situation affected young people, many of who lacked basic schooling and training. 
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which would allow them to find a job. Additionally, the acquired qualifications were 
usually ill-adapted to the needs of the job market. Facing all these problems, Member 
States were preparing new education schemes to adapt these people to the demand of 
the labour market, which resulted in higher expectations of help from the ESF. 
Responding to this, the Commission proposed a new scheme for the Fund, a 
scheme, which would concentrate on the fight against youth unemployment. An 
objective was set to provide support which would guarantee training for all young 
people in need, stipulating that young people should make up at least 75% of all 
beneficiaries of the Fund. Laying out specific guidelines, the Commission gave priority 
to vocational training for young people with inadequate qualifications for jobs 
involving new technologies, and to schemes for secondary school students combining 
vocational training and work experience. The ESF support for regional development 
was also stressed, which resulted in the increase of help in regions struck by industrial 
restructuring and a high level of long-term unemployment. As a result of these 
changes, nearly 42% of the ESF budget was allocated to projects in the absolute 
priority regions and only little more than 10% went to wealthy regions. Due to this 
reform some new areas of support have also been added, with grants for training aimed 
at modernisation of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) as the main one. 
Additional support was also given to innovatory actions to combat unemployment, 
training of instructors, and organising expert guidance (EC, 1998). 
5. Drawbacks of the European Social Fund and its reform of 1988 
With the continuous rise of the unemployment rate, budgetary resources, though 
reaching ECU 237 million in 1986 compared to ECU 155.6 million in 1982, remained 
seriously inadequate to fulfil all the needs in the priority areas. Serious problems were 
also arising with managing the Fund, as the total number of applications was rapidly 
increasing, and the system required individual processing of thousands of payment 
applications. Moreover, due to an increasing tendency that local planning, a bottom-up 
approach, could lead to more effective use of funds, numerous voices were heard 
saying that the whole ESF managing system should be reconsidered, because it was 
outdated, and the single project approach should be replaced by integrated 
programming of ESF assistance (EC, 1998). 
The problems listed above did not only refer to the ESF, but also to all other 
structural funds, aimed at improving the operation of the whole structural policy. In 
1988 the European Community adopted a radical reform of all structural funds. Its 
main effect entailed reshaping all structural funds, working hitherto in isolation, into an 
integrated system of support aimed at working together towards the goal of economic 
and social cohesion in the European Community. The EFS itself played an important 
role in the system which emerged, as its allocation of 20 billion ECU for the period 
1989-1993 was second largest behind the European Regional Development Fund, and 
made up 31.7% of the total structural funds allocation. 
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Figure 1. Breakdown of structural fund allocations (1989-1993) 
7% 
ERDF 
47,6% 
Note: ESF - 20bn, ERDF - 30.1bn, EAGGF - 11.3bn, Others - 1.8bn, Total - 63.2bn (all 
numbers in ECU) 
Source: EC (1998). 
The new approach was built on four basic principles - concentration, partnership, 
programming and additionality. Concentration meant setting out five objectives to be 
achieved collectively by all funds. The ESF was the only one to finance combating 
long-term unemployment (Objective 3) and ensuring a decent start for young people in 
working life (Objective 4). Moreover, the ESF was also involved in regional objectives 
(1,2, and 5b) with the aim of ensuring the development of human resources needed to 
maximise the investment in regional and rural development financed by other 
structural funds. Partnership was realised during the process of setting priority areas of 
support, as all member states prepared analyses of their situation together with regional 
development plans, and a discussion involving the Commission and national 
authorities was held, resulting in the creation of the Community Support Framework. 
Programming, on the other hand, meant setting these priority areas of support for the 
whole period of 1989-93, which could not be subjected to change. The sense of it was 
to ensure continuous assistance in priority areas of support in order to maximise the 
effectiveness of structural policy expenditures. Finally, the additionality principle 
required that resources from structural funds did not simply replace national assistance 
in the member states, but contributed to the increase of the total support for priority 
areas in the European Community. 
As a result of this reform, the scope of the ESF was also significantly increased. 
For the first time it covered training for public servants, but only in subjects relevant to 
structural funds. Moreover, it involved the broadening of eligibility for the ESF 
support in the underdeveloped regions, as it also included people threatened with 
unemployment. In 1992 recruitment subsidies were phased out, except for self 
employment. As in the past, vocational training was still strongly supported, and 
included both, trainees and instructors. One of the innovations in ESF included 
technical assistance in preparation and execution of projects supported from the ESF. 
Finally, social dialogue also became eligible, as long as it involved the exchange of 
knowledge and experience between workers in different member states. 
The Evolution of the European Social Fund as an Instrument ... 117 
Figure 2. ESF funding per objective and community initiatives (1989-1993) 
Objective 
3+4 
32,3% 
Objective 5b 
1,5% 
Community 
Initiatives 
4,3% 
Objective 2 
7,1% 
Objective I 
54,8% 
Source: EC (1998). 
From the technical point of view also much has changed, as decisions on project 
applications were no longer at the Community level, but usually at national or even 
regional level. A new payment system was also designed, aiming at reducing previous 
delays and cash flow problems. The main change involved releasing 50% of the 
payment at the beginning of the project, and a further 30% at halfway. 
The 1988 reform of the Structural Funds also involved setting up several 
Community Initiatives, which constitute an instrument designed to strengthen the 
Community dimension of the operation of the Structural Funds, aimed at tackling 
specific problems. Three of them were chiefly financed by the ESF: EUROFORM 
(ECU 300 million) which was aimed at developing new qualifications and employment 
opportunities for the single market; NOW (ECU 156 million) which was concerned 
with promoting equality of opportunity for women on the labour market and 
HORIZON (ECU 304 million) targeted at improving job prospects for people with 
disabilities or at risk of exclusion from employment for other reasons. The ESF also 
contributed in the period of 1989-93 around ECU 125 million to the development of 
human resources in several other Community Initiatives (EC, 1998). 
6. Further growth of the European Social Fund in the 1994-99 period 
Following the provisions of the Maastricht Treaty, which put greater pressure on 
economic and social cohesion due to increasing unemployment (from 8.2% in 1991 to 
10.7% in 1993, according to OOPEC, 2000, p. 147), rising disparities between 
different regions, and moves towards establishing the Economic and Monetary Union, 
the European Council in Edinburgh in December 1992 decided on considerable 
increases in budgets of all structural funds. In fact, the resources assigned for the 
period 1993-99 doubled the resources for the previous period. 
As the next chart shows, ESF was not an exemption, as its budget was increased 
from ECU 20 billion for the period 1989-1993 to ECU 42 billion in 1994-1999. Due to 
problems with unemployment, the European Council in December 1993 in Brussels 
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adopted solutions proposed by the Commission in The White Paper on Growth, 
Competitiveness and Employment. 
Figure 3. Comparison of structural fund allocation for periods 1989-93 and 1994-99 
Source: EC (1997), p. 154/155. 
These proposals called for a significant increase in investment in human capital 
and greater and more effective efforts in vocational training, especially in reference to 
increasing skill levels, mainly in the new technologies, and promoting life-long 
learning. 
Youth unemployment remained a chief concern, and support was expanded on 
education and initial training to develop entrepreneurial spirit, which would contribute 
to larger self-employment among young people. As in the previous programming 
period, long-term unemployment was recognised as a grave problem, and even greater 
emphasis was put on equality of men and women in the labour market. Moreover, due 
to the increasing problem of social exclusion, it was given much greater consideration 
in the new programming period. Additionally, the importance of preventive measures 
in combating unemployment was recognised, which stipulated assigning significant 
resources for actions in this area. As in the previous period, there was continuous ESF 
support for innovative projects in training techniques and for projects implemented in 
the context of the Social Dialogue. The figure 4 presents a breakdown of the whole 
ESF support into different categories. 
Based on lessons from the previous period, Objectives of Structural Funds were 
slightly redefined. This referred also to ESF, as the previous Objectives 3 and 4 were 
combined into new Objective 3 - combating long-term unemployment and integrating 
young people into working life. The new Objective 4 was designed to provide support 
for workers at risk of unemployment due to changing industrial structure throughout 
the European Union. 
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Figure 4. ESF Funding per Objective and Community Initiatives (1994-1999) 
Objective 3 
30,4% 
Objective 4 
5,4% 
Objective 5b 
2,2% 
Objective 6 
0,4% 
Objective 2 
8,8% 
Objective I 
52,8% 
Source: EC (1998, Ch. 3 - The 1993 review). 
ESF, as in the precious period, also participated in financing human resources 
components in projects under all other Objectives, including a newly set, especially for 
new Scandinavian members, Objective 6. These alterations naturally also caused a 
change in allocation of ESF assistance to different Objectives (see table 1). 
As we can see on the chart below, in the period 1994-99 ESF, as in the previous 
period, also supported several Community Initiatives. Although there was an ESF 
component in most initiatives, it was dominant in EMPLOYMENT and ADAPT. The 
EMPLOYMENT Initiative consisted of three components, the first two of which were 
drawn from the original NOW and HORIZON Initiatives. 
Table 1. ESF allocations in different areas of support (1994-99) 
Integration of young job-seekers 20.2% 
Support for employment, growth and stability 19.0% 
Integration of long-term unemployed 18.8% 
Improvement of education and training systems 12.2% 
Integration of people at risk of exclusion 10.8% 
Adaptation to industrial change 9.9% 
Technical assistance 3.1% 
Promotion of equal opportunities 3.1% 
Boosting human potential in research, science and technology 2.4% 
Training of public officials 0.5% 
Source: EC (1996). 
These three components are: 
• Now - promotion of equal opportunities for men and women, 
• Horizon - supporting employment of people with disabilities and other threatened 
with exclusion, 
• Youthstart - integrating young people without adequate training or qualifications 
into the labour market. 
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The new ADAPT Initiative was built on the experience of EUROTECHNET and 
EUROFORM and was designed to assist in the preparation of workers for industrial 
change, with the emphasis on building an information society. 
This review of the Structural Funds brought also some changes to the technical 
side of the ESF operation. As far as Programming is concerned, administrative 
procedures were simplified, which sped up the transfer of allocated resources. Greater 
emphasis was placed on assessment and monitoring of the realised projects in order to 
ensure greater efficiency of the given support. An ex post obligatory evaluation of each 
project was also foreseen as the best means to monitor the effects of each project, and 
to draw lessons for the future. 
In this period the ESF also played a very important role in supporting the 
implementation of the European Employment Strategy, accepted by the European 
Council in Essen in December 1994 (EC, 1998). 
7. Provisions of the ESF Congress in 1998 
The ESF Congress was held in Birmingham on 26-28 May 1998. It was the first such 
event in the ESF history and it focused on the general theme “investing in people”. The 
Congress had two objectives. First, to assess the hitherto achievements of ESF, and 
second, to discuss the future policy framework of ESF. The Congress consisted of six 
workshops, corresponding to major problems connected with human resources 
development nowadays. These were as follows: 
• Workshop 1 - Long-term unemployment 
Supporting Member States’ efforts to combat long-term unemployment was 
confirmed to be one of the most important roles of ESF. Moreover, the discussions 
revealed, that hitherto concentration of assistance on vocational training proves 
inadequate, and these measures should be supported by personal guidance and 
counselling schemes. 
• Workshop 2 - Young people 
This workshop focused on ways of improving the current ESF practices in helping 
young people into employment. During discussions a major drawback of ESF was 
noticed, as its actions were hampered by lack of a cohesive youth policy, which led 
to the situation that there were no programmes designed exclusively for the young. 
An urgent need for such programmes was emphasised, as the young are faced by 
tremendous challenges connected with a rapidly changing labour market, which 
causes marginalisation of those poorer living in the modem society. 
• Workshop 3 - Exclusion from the labour market 
It was agreed, that ESF recognises quite well different groups threatened with 
exclusion, but it has problems with reaching particular people in need. In order to 
improve this, ESF should cooperate more with NGOs, which are closer to the said 
groups. It was also emphasised, that considerable ESF support should be 
continued, as it requires a lot of effort to bring the socially excluded people back to 
normal life. 
• Workshop 4 - Equal opportunities 
The Evolution of the European Social Fund as an Instrument ... 121 
This workshop concentrated on the problem of equal opportunities for men and 
women in the labour market, as there are still considerable disparities in this area. 
It was concluded, that ESF should continue to provide assistance in introducing 
women into the labour market, but it should do so with greater recognition of 
women’s needs and expectations. 
• Workshop 5 - Adaptation to industrial change 
Discussions during this workshop concentrated on how ESF can help to match the 
demand for skills in the contemporary labour market with appropriate training. It 
was stressed that the track of concentrating on preventive measures should be 
continued, because it so far gave very good results, however, there is still a strong 
need to improve the anticipation of labour market changes. Nevertheless, 
unemployed people cannot be forgotten on this issue, as preventive measures 
mainly refer to the employed. 
• Workshop 6 - The European Social Fund in the Objective 1 regions 
Evaluation and prospects of ESF operations in the Objective 1 regions is vital due 
to the fact that almost half of ESF budget is allocated there. ESF actions in this 
area are of core importance, as the goal of creating the Economic and Monetary 
Union is dependent on the level of economic and social cohesion of all member 
states, therefore ESF, through its programmes concerning development of human 
resources, should contribute to the development of the poorest regions. It was also 
stressed that each region should be approached individually, and horizontal 
approach should only provide a framework for ESF actions, as only then ESF 
assistance can be truly effective (EC, 1998a). 
This Congress made an important contribution towards increasing the effectiveness 
of human development programmes financed within the ESF framework, as its 
provisions were reflected in the ESF reform of 1999, which laid the foundations for 
ESF operations at the beginning of the twenty-first century. 
8. The European Social Fund Framework for the period 2000-06 
Despite the considerable success of the cohesion policy in recent years, following the 
provisions of the ESF Congress, the Commission still identified several serious 
problems to be dealt with by the Structural Funds. One of these problems is 
unemployment, which did not decrease significantly, especially in less developed 
regions. Taking into account the past experiences of the Structural Funds operations, 
and challenges that lie ahead of the European Union in the next century, a deep reform 
of the whole structural policy was adopted by the European Council in Berlin in June 
1999. In general, it was the continuation of the previous reforms of the Structural 
Funds. Elere I will discuss only these provisions which refer to the European Social 
Fund. 
First of all, the number of Objectives was cut down from six to three, with 
Objective 1 designed for less developed regions, Objective 2 for regions confronted 
with major economic and social restructuring needs, but not eligible for Objective 1, 
and Objective 3 with a role to assist in the development of human resources in regions 
not eligible for Objective 1 and 2. Its main tasks considered fighting unemployment, 
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promotion of equality of all groups of people on the labour market - women, ethnic 
minorities, etc. (CR, 1998). 
Taking into account all the above mentioned problems and challenges, the 
European Council adopted in July 1999 a new regulation which created the ESF 
framework for the period 2000-06. The reformed ESF finance projects were carried out 
under all three objectives, and it concentrated on developing and promoting active 
labour market policies to combat unemployment, especially long-term unemployment 
and unemployment of young people. ESF should also assist in promoting equal 
employment opportunities for all by supporting training and counselling schemes. 
Moreover, ESF also supports development of entrepreneurship, as well as education 
aimed at adapting a workforce to the changing needs of the labour market. 
Considerable attention is also paid to improving women’s access to the labour market, 
especially after maternity leaves. In realising these objectives, ESF should concentrate 
on support for local initiatives concerning employment, labour market needs of the 
information society, and equal opportunities for men and women. Special assistance 
should also be given to innovative projects concerning training or employment, 
development of a highly qualified workforce, and increasing self-employment. ESF 
should also develop systems of anticipating changes in employment and qualification 
needs in order to act preventively also. Finally, the possibility of financing preparatory, 
monitoring and evaluation operations was also maintained, especially when it involves 
innovatory operations, studies having a multiplier effect, and exchange of knowledge 
and experience between different beneficiaries of the Fund. 
The regulation also redefined the principle of concentration of assistance. 
According to this, the ESF should concentrate its efforts in a limited number of areas, 
and should be directed towards the most important needs, and the most effective 
operations, in order to maximise the efficiency of the ESF resources. 
Finally, the concept of Community Initiatives was also reformed, as their number 
was cut down to four, one of which, EQUAL, aimed at combating discrimination and 
inequalities in connection with the labour market (OOPEC, 1999, p. 5-8). 
As far as financial resources for the structural policy are concerned, there was also 
great progress, as the total budget for all structural funds for the period 1994-99 
amounted to EUR 138 billion, and for the period 2000-06 amounted to EUR 195 
billion (Kawecka-Wyrzykowska and Synowiec, 2001, p. 407). 
9. Conclusions 
Studying the case of the oldest of all the Structural Funds, the European Social Fund, 
we can observe a particular pattern in operation for the European Community. This 
pattern involves a tremendous ability to take actions, which respond to momentarily 
appearing needs. Naturally, as this is a very big organism, there is a certain time lapse 
in these actions, but it only allows deeper analysis of the current situation and choosing 
instruments which are best suited to tackle a particular problem. This remained true 
throughout the whole-analysed period. With new problems arising, new instruments 
and measures were created, and support was adequately increased. This conclusion 
arouses one important question, very much relevant at the threshold of the accession of 
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a large number of new member states to the EU: In what way will the European Union 
respond to the increased problems which this accession will bring? Will it be able to 
expand structural policy to such a dimension, that all countries, old and new members, 
will receive the needed help? In my opinion these questions are very important, as the 
answers to them depend upon the future welfare of the whole European Union, and 
especially its poorer members. We all know what problems candidate countries have in 
executing the financial commitments of the EU, especially when future Structural 
Funds are concerned. But the real unknown awaits beyond the year 2006, when a new 
programming period starts. I am afraid, that with the growing unwillingness of the 
richest countries to pay for the poorest, it will be very difficult for the new members to 
force solutions, which will guarantee lowering the civilisation gap. 
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Convergence across European Union Members and 
Consequences for the Czech Republic 
Patrik Bauer 
The difference in GDP per capita between the Czech Republic and the EU average is 
considerable. Because the Czech Republic’s aim in the long run is convergence to the 
EU average, the essential question is whether the Czech Republic would converge after 
its expected entry into the EU. 
In this paper convergence based on neo-classical growth models is analysed. 
Theoretical and empirical results of convergence are deduced and the main 
determinants, by which the value of GDP per capita in a steady state is influenced, are 
specified. 
Then the hypothesis of absolute convergence (p convergence) in the EU in the 
period of 1960-2000 is tested by an econometric model. The convergence among the 
EU members was observable, but the speed of convergence was slow. 
The EU enlargement of the CEE transition countries is unique, however, the 
growth effects of economic integration with the EU can be illustrated, primarily by the 
experience of 1970-80s enlargements. Thus the experience of the entries of Ireland, 
Greece, Spain and Portugal into the EU is examined and the possible consequences of 
the Czech Republic’s entry to the convergence are derived. 
The main result is that EU accession should have a positive impact on the GDP per 
capita of the Czech Republic and should support convergence to the EU average. But 
convergence will not be an automatic phenomenon and the real benefits will depend on 
the Czech Republic itself. 
1. Introduction 
After the Velvet Revolution of 1989 the Czech government declared the most 
important political and economic issue - European Union (EU) accession. Although 
the Czech Republic is supposed to become an EU member in a few years, nowadays 
EU accession remains the most important political and economic aim. 
Considering the Czech Republic as a country belonging to European structures, the 
economic indicators of the Czech Republic have to be compared with the economic 
indicators of EU members. Adopting the GDP per capita (in PPP) as an indicator for 
comparing living standards, the immense difference between the EU average and the 
Czech Republic has to be admitted (in the year 2000 GDP per capita of the CR was 
only 59% of EU average (see: Ekonom, 2000) and 91% of the poorest EU member, 
Greece, while in the 1955 it was 350% of Greece and 230% of Spain (see WB, 1999). 
If the Czech Republic aspires to converge to the EU average after entry into the 
EU, the crucial question is whether the convergence occurs between the EU members 
(if there is higher economic growth in countries where GDP per capita in PPP is 
lower), if need be, how fast is this convergence? 
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Empirical results indicate the occurrence of convergence between the countries (or 
regions) with similar institutional environments'. If these environments differ 
significantly, then the empirical results prognosticate slow divergence. 
From the experiences of past European integration (during the 1970-80s) it can be 
derived that the convergence after entry into the EU can be substantial (the cases of 
Ireland, Spain and Portugal), however, convergence is not automatic (in the case of 
Greece, divergence occurred slowly). 
In this paper the hypothesis of absolute convergence (p convergence) across the 
EU members is tested and past European integration is analysed. Then possible 
consequences for the countries seeking EU accession (especially the Czech Republic) 
are predicted. 
The paper is divided into the three parts. In the first part, the models of economic 
growth and questions of convergence are analysed. In the second part, the empirical 
results of convergence are summarised and the econometric model for the absolute 
convergence hypothesis testing is arranged. In the third part, past European integration 
is analysed and the consequences for countries seeking EU accession are discussed. 
2. Models of economic growth and convergence 
In the 1960s the basic neo-classical growth model was formed (by Robert Solow, thus 
the model is called the Solow growth model). By the integration of some factors that 
were exogenous in this model, the models of endogenous growth were formulated. 
As the basic Solow growth model (see for example Romer, 1996) claims, GDP per 
capita in a steady state of a particular economy depends on the amount of capital per 
capita and the technology”. 
The basic model is specified by the endogenous growth models , however, the 
main factors, by which the value of GDP per capita in a steady state is influenced, are: 
• amount of physical capital per capita, 
• amount of human capital per capita, 
• technology (the other factors). 
2.1. Questions of convergence 
Convergence is predicted by the neoclassical growth models under specific 
circumstances (the absolute convergence hypothesis (p convergence) is accepted). As 
is declared by the absolute convergence hypothesis, within two countries (or regions) 
with similar institutional conditions the country (region) with lower GDP per capita 
will tend to grow faster. 
As is stated by the World Bank (WB, 1999, p. 33): “A less strict version of 
convergence, which assumes that all countries are not equal and in fact differ in many 
1 In this paper, institutional environment means tastes, technologies, political institutions, policies and so 
on. 
“ In the model technology is considered as a “residual value”- it is called Solow residual (it includes the 
other factors by which the GDP per capita in a steady state is influenced). 
Primarily research and development models and human capital models - see Romer (1996). 
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aspects is the so-called conditional convergence, also known as a convergence. This 
type of convergence implies declining cross-sectional dispersion of per capita income 
across units [...] The basic difference is that while absolute convergence relates to the 
relationship with initial level of income and subsequent growth rates, conditional 
convergence implies that each country has its own steady state level of income and will 
grow faster the farther away it is from this level. Growth is thus affected by a number 
of things, including the policy framework a country chooses to implement.” 
In neo-classical growth models, an increase in GDP per capita is a consequence of 
an increase in the amount of capital (physical or human) per capita or the development 
of technology. 
Convergence depends on assumptions of the models. Under the assumption of 
production function with diminishing returns to capital, an economy with a lower 
amount of capital per capita will tend to grow faster than an economy with a higher 
amount of capital per capita (thus an economy with lower GDP per capita will tend to 
grow faster than an economy with higher GDP per capita and convergence will occur). 
The speed of convergence depends on the rate of free movement of production factors 
that should flow from richer to poorer economies (because of the higher rate of return 
in poorer economies). 
Another way in which convergence can occur is the technology development. In 
theory it is assumed that there are no barriers to adopt the best technology (including 
the institutional environment) in every economy, but it can be a problem in practice. 
According to the assumptions of the models, the technology development is in the long 
run the main source of the GDP per capita growth. 
As the long-run result the same “best” technologies are established and the same 
amount of capital per capita in every economy. Then there are the same GDP per capita 
in a steady state in every economy. 
Under other assumptions, the results are different. For example, under the 
assumption of increasing returns to capital divergence will occur instead of 
convergence. 
3. Empirical analysis of convergence 
In recent years, there have been a large number of empirical studies aimed at the 
problem of convergence (see Barro, 1994, 1997; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995; EC, 
2000a). 
As Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995, p. 413) claim: “We can interpret the results as 
consistent with the neoclassical growth model [...] if regions within a country have 
roughly similar tastes, technologies, and political institutions. This relative 
homogeneity generates similar steady-state positions. [...] One surprising result is the 
similarity of the speed of p convergence across data sets. The estimates of p are around 
2-3 percent per year in the various contexts. This slow speed of convergence implies 
that it takes 25-35 years to eliminate one-half of an initial gap in per capita incomes.” 
As the European Commission (EC, 2000a, p. 180) declares: “Neven and Gouyette 
(1994) investigated p convergence for all NUTS II level EU regions for the period 
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1980-89 in terms of per capita income relative to the EU average. Absolute 
convergence was found to be very weak (0.5% per annum).” 
3.1. The absolute convergence ((3 convergence) hypothesis across the EU 
members 
The absolute convergence hypothesis across EU members will be tested by using a 
simple econometric model. 
The data for 14 EU members will be used to estimate the coefficients of the model 
(all members except for Luxembourg4). The data sources are the European 
Commission (EC, 2000a) and the calculations of the author. 
As is assumed by the absolute convergence hypothesis, an economy with the 
smaller value of GDP per capita will tend to grow faster than an economy with the 
higher value of GDP per capita. To test this hypothesis GDP per capita in 1960 is 
chosen as an explanatory variable and average GDP per capita growth (during the 
period 1960-2000) as a dependent variable. Thus the coefficients of the following 
equation are estimated: 
g = (3o + pi * log GDP60 + u, 
where: 
g average GDP p. c. growth (during the period 1960-2000, p.a.), 
log GDP_60 log GDP per capita in 1960 (PPS of Eurostat). 
Table 1. Regression results: 
B St. Err. of B t(13) p-level R2=0.81 
Intercpt 0.1288 0.0141 9.1209 0.0000 
Log GDP 60 -0.0340 0.0048 -7.0954 0.0000 
Notes: for verification of basic assumptions, see: Appendix. 
The explanatory variable GDP 60 is statistically significant at 99% level and the 
coefficient of determination is relatively high. Because Bt is negative the hypothesis of 
absolute convergence would be accepted (for the 40 year long period 1960-2000). 
Convergence across the EU economies occurred during the past 40 years. How fast 
was this convergence? As can be stated from the results, the higher was the gap 
between the GDP per capita of the particular economy in 1960 and the EU average, the 
faster was the convergence. But the speed was generally slow, per annum was closed 
less than 1% of the existing gap. 
The main shortage of the model (except of small data sample) is the fact that not 
all 14 economies were the EU members during the whole 40 year long period 
1960-2000 (only seven countries were EU members in the past 40 years). 
While the countries which joined the EU in 1995 (Austria, Finland, Sweden) are 
not so interesting examples of the recent EU candidate countries (especially the CEE 
4 Some anomalies were exhibited by the Luxembourg economy, thus it was omitted from the analysis. 
There will not be a strong distortion in results because GDP of Luxembourg is only 0.2% of the EU and 
population is 0.12% of the EU. 
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transition countries), the experiences of countries which joined the EU during the 
1970-80s are more relevant. In the next chapter there is the analysis of this past 
European integration, the EU accession of Ireland (joined the EU in 1973), Greece 
(1981), Spain and Portugal (both 1986). 
Figure 1. Graphical illustration of the regression results (as in table 1) 
g=0,129-0,034*Log GDP_60+eps 
Log GDP_60 
4. The experience of Ireland, Greece, Spain and Portugal in European 
integration 
However the EU enlargement of CEE transition countries is unique, the growth effects 
of economic integration with the EU can be illustrated by the experience of 1970-80s 
enlargements. 
Ireland, Greece, Spain and Portugal were all in a better position than recent CEE 
candidate countries because a functioning market economy existed. By the time they 
joined the EU their GDP per capita was at 59% of the EU average for Ireland, 69% for 
Greece, 70% for Spain and 54% for Portugal, which is more or less similar to CEE 
candidate countries. 
Because sufficient time has passed since these countries joined the EU, the growth 
effects of economic integration can be analysed. Some facts are summarised in table 1. 
As is shown in table 2, the convergence occurred in three cases out of four, in the 
case of Greece slow divergence occurred. The speed of convergence was slow, except 
for Ireland in 1990s. C. 2% of the gap between the particular country and EU average 
was closed per year. In the case of Ireland in 1990s, its GDP per capita growth was 
accelerated by institutional environment reforms. GDP per capita in a steady state was 
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probably increased by these reforms and because of conditional convergence, Ireland 
did not only converge to the EU average, but exceeded this level significantly. 
Table 2. GDP per capita convergence of Ireland, Greece, Spain and Portugal 
1960 1970 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 Index 
GDP 3er capita (EU-15 average = 100) 
Ireland 61 60 64 65 74 96 119 202 
Greece 44 63 70 64 58 66 67 97 
Spain 57 71 70 70 77 79 83 119 
Portugal 40 50 55 53 61 71 75 139 
Notes: Index measures the improvement of a particular country relative to the EU-15 average 
between the year of accession and 2000 (for example 202% for Ireland means growth 
from 59% to 119%). 
Source: WB (1999), EC (2000a), calculations of the author. 
Thus, mainly Ireland profited from EU membership, while Greece did not utilise 
the potential of EU membership. The results are probably determined by the 
institutional environment. Then convergence is not a natural phenomenon, but it is 
conditioned by the institutional environment. 
4.1. Benefits of the EU accession for the Czech Republic 
In chapter 2 the neoclassical growth models were analysed and the main factors by 
which the GDP per capita in a steady state is determined were described. How will EU 
accession influence these factors and consequently the GDP per capita in a steady 
state? 
• Amount of physical capital per capita - Ireland, Spain and Portugal experienced 
after entry an increase in investment, while Greece instead, experienced a 
consumption boom. According to the World Bank (1999, p. 27): “The investment 
boom was driven primarily by the reduced political risk, the restructuring of the 
capital stock in view of new production patterns, and the introduction of new 
technologies accompanied by increased FDI.” A similar positive effect on 
investment of entry into the EU can be reached by the Czech Republic. 
• Amount of human capital per capita - the Czech Republic should experience an 
increase in the amount of human capital per capita as a consequence of joining the 
European educational system, adopting higher standards in education and 
introduction of new technologies, demanding more human capital. 
• Technology - entry into the EU should cause the convergence of technology 
(institutional environment, technologies of production, and so on) to European 
standards. The integration of Czech companies into European production structures 
and the inflow of FDI will also be important. 
Thus EU accession should have a positive impact on the GDP per capita of the 
Czech Republic and should support convergence to the EU average. But convergence 
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will not be an automatic phenomenon and the real benefits will depend on the Czech 
Republic itself5. 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper convergence based on neoclassical growth models was analysed. 
Theoretical and empirical results of convergence were inferred and the main 
determinants of the GDP per capita value in a steady state were specified (the amount 
of physical capital per capita, the amount of human capital per capita and technology 
»the other factors«). 
By the econometric model was accepted the hypothesis of absolute convergence ((3 
convergence) in the EU in the period of 1960-2000. The convergence among the EU 
members was observable, but the speed of convergence was slow (only 1% of the gap 
between the particular country and the EU average was closed every year). 
EU enlargement of the CEE transition countries is unique, however, the growth 
effects of economic integration with the EU can be illustrated, primarily by the 
experience of 1970-80s enlargements. Thus, the experience of the entries of Ireland, 
Greece, Spain and Portugal into the EU was examined and the possible consequences 
of the Czech Republic’s entry to the convergence were derived. 
Convergence occurred in three out of four cases (Ireland, Spain and Portugal), in 
the case of Greece slow divergence arose. The speed of convergence was slow, except 
for Ireland in 1990s. Approximately 2% of the gap between the particular country and 
the EU average was closed per annum. In the case of Ireland in 1990s, its GDP per 
capita growth was accelerated by institutional environment reforms. GDP per capita in 
a steady state was probably increased by these reforms and because of conditional 
convergence, Ireland did not only converge to the EU average, but exceeded this level 
significantly. 
Thus, mainly Ireland profited from EU membership, while Greece did not utilise 
the potential of EU membership. The results were probably determined by the 
institutional environment. Then convergence is not an automatic phenomenon, but it is 
conditioned by the institutional environment. 
EU accession of Ireland, Greece, Spain and Portugal influenced the main 
determinants of the GDP per capita value in steady state. Ireland, Spain and Portugal 
experienced after entry an increase in investment, while Greece instead underwent a 
consumption boom. The technology was influenced mainly by the FDI inflow 
(especially in the case of Ireland). 
The main result is that EU accession should have a positive impact on the GDP per 
capita of the Czech Republic and should support convergence to the EU average. But 
convergence will not be an automatic phenomenon and the real benefits will depend on 
the Czech Republic itself. 
As was investigated, the positive impact of the EU accession on growth is conditioned by the 
institutional environment. 
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Appendix 
Verification of Basic Assumptions 
a) Normality 
To test for normality, a test based on the values of moments of distribution can be used 
(see Kmenta, 1997, p. 266). 
index of symmetry.a3=1.2587 
index of kurtosis.a4=5.7591 
stat = n(a32/6+(a4-3)2/24) ~ yj2 
stat = 8.138 
Tabulated value of yj2 at 5% (1%) level of significance is 5.99 (9.21). At 5% (1%) 
level, the hypothesis of normality would (would not) be rejected. 
b) Homoskedasticity 
To test for homoskedasticity, White test can be used (see Visek, 1997, p. 87). 
White d = 2.64473 
White d ~ X2 
Tabulated value of yj2 at 5% (1%) level of significance is 5.99 (9.21). At 5% (1%) 
level, the hypothesis of homoskedasticity would not be rejected. 
c) Independence of disturbances 
To test for the absence of autocorrelation, Durbin-Watson test is usually used (see 
Durbin and Watson, 1952). 
d = 1.803 
Tabulated value is du= 1.350 (du=1.054) at 5% (1%) level of significance. 
Thus dy < d < (4-du) at 5% (1%) level and the hypothesis of no autoregression would 
not be rejected at 5% (1%) level of significance. 
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The Stability and Sustainability of the Polish Economy 
to integrate into the European Union 
Abey Hailu Senbeta 
1. The macro-economic framework 
It has become commonplace in recent years to name Poland as one of the most 
successful of the transition economies (Berg, 1993). A pioneer in transition from the 
very start, the country has since confirmed this status on numerous occasions, most 
importantly in being the first to reverse the output decline in 1992. Rooted in the bold 
and comprehensive reforms of the initial big-bang (Wolf, 1991), this success owes 
equally to the remarkable continuity of commitment to the principles of market 
orientation and financial stability, irrespective of the composition of the seven 
governments that have been in power since 1990 (Havlik, 1993). Two particular 
milestones in this regard were a major second round of fiscal adjustment and structural 
reforms in 1992, and sustained adherence to those principles by the new left-wing 
coalition that came to power in late 1993, embodied in the medium-term Strategy for 
Poland adopted in mid-1994 (Kaja, 1999). The results have been successive years of 
economic growth, averaging 6% over the past years; steady, even if gradual, progress 
to moderate inflation; and a dramatic shift from a chronically weak external position to 
one of fundamental strength with large reserves. 
While much has been achieved, transition is by far not finished so far, in part 
reflecting the somewhat fitful progress in economic, systemic and structural reforms 
after the initial big bang (Kolodko, 1993; see also: Gotz-Kozierkiewicz, 1991c; Lane, 
1991). Increasingly, moreover, the agenda of outstanding reforms is dominated by 
Poland’s over-arching goal of full integration with the most advanced industrial 
economies, in particular its objective of early accession to the European Union. From a 
macroeconomic perspective, key issues here include Poland’s relatively low savings 
and investment ratios (both below 25% of GDP) and its still high inflation rate about 
10%, both obstacles to the kind of sustained rapid growth required for smooth 
integration. A strategy to overcome these obstacles should centre on further fiscal 
consolidation, tight monetary policy, and structural measures to bolster private savings, 
most important among them, comprehensive and deep pension reform (MLSP, 1993). 
Another key policy imperative arises from the still pervasive role of the state in the 
economy; in particular, rapid privatisation of most of the remaining 3,000 or so 
enterprises still under the umbrella of the state will be pivotal in raising efficiency and 
attracting private capital on the scale required to ensure continued rapid economic 
growth. 
Taking this and other factors into consideration, I will try to analyse the facts, 
which I consider, is the picture of the Polish social and economic description. To begin 
with, I will first try to portray the social and demographic situation of the country. 
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2. The social and demographic structure 
Since the beginning of the last decade, the Polish demographic picture has taken a 
dramatic turn, and the number of little Poles coming into the world has started to fall 
(Holzer and Kowalska, 1997). In only one decade, Poland's demographic structure has 
changed from that of a semi-traditional society into a stabilised and mature population, 
which is still different from those of neighbouring European countries, in that it 
includes a larger share of youths since Polish families only recently psychologically 
adopted a restrictive birth rate. 
Besides the decline in mortality typical of developed societies, Polish demography 
has been featured in recent years by three developments which are directly linked to 
each other: a fall in the fertility rate, the decline in the birth rate and a slower natural 
rate of growth of the population. Thus the fertility rate in Poland, which was 76 per 
1000 women in 1980, fell to 39 per 1000 women 1998 (GUS, 1997, 1999), well below 
that required for a population growth rate, among the lowest level in the CEEC (the 
average for the EC in 1990 was 1.55. The Polish reproduction rate of population was 
halved during the same period, from 2.276% in 1980 to 1.431% in 1990. 
As a result, even though Poland enjoys a comparatively young age demographic 
structure, natural growth of the Polish population has significantly plummeted. As the 
sudden change in the demographic trend took place only recently, the Polish 
population is still one of the youngest in Europe along with those of Ireland and 
Portugal. Consequently, the impact of the sharp fall in the Polish birth rate will be felt 
mainly in the coming decades. 
This does not seem to be the classical problem of the work force/number of 
dependents ratio, because the low ratio of the work force to the total Polish population 
(on account of the lag in the number of women joining the labour market) will lengthen 
the period for adjusting to the new demographic structure, particularly if the increase in 
the number of women in the work force is combined with an increase in productivity 
by massively (and intelligently) introducing new technologies in the work process. The 
social problem arising from the new demographic model might rather consist in the 
difficulty of such an extrovert culture as the Polish culture, based on typically youthful 
values, adjusting to a population in which older age groups prevail (Maret and 
Schwartz, 1993). Adding to that the almost inevitable trend towards a growing 
immigrant population, which is younger and has a higher birth rate, Poland could end 
up having a conflicting demographic structure like that of some other European 
countries where an aged native population is culturally in conflict with its own children 
and with the younger generations in which foreign social groups and ethnic minorities 
are over-represented (Gal, 1999; see also: Opalski and Dutkiewicz). 
However, such a future (loaded with negative prospects) is not inevitable. Having a 
more balanced age pyramid than most other EU countries, Poland still has some time 
to go before arriving at a critical situation regarding population growth, and the trend 
could still revert towards higher fertility and birth rates. There is nothing that proves 
that a declining birth rate is a long-term trend in developed societies (UN, 1999). For 
instance, the recent trend seen in Scandinavian societies is quite the opposite: Sweden 
has the highest fertility rate in Europe today. 
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In fact, demographic behaviour seems to be closely linked to the condition of 
women in society. Thus, in the initial period of modernisation, when women join the 
work force without any basic change taking place in the sexual division of labour, they 
find it hard to hold a job and to do the housework at the same time, while their level of 
education rises and birth control methods enable them to control strictly the number of 
children (UNICEF, 1993). As the condition of women in society advances and 
nurseries as well as child care services become available, and as labour legislation as 
well as cultural patterns correct the family and labour inequality of the sexes to a 
certain extent, women have more choice and can therefore have more children again 
without self-amputation of their lives. The fact that Poland has reached the level of the 
German model with a sufficient lag to take a qualitative jump to the new ‘Swedish’ 
model before becoming an aged society, provides hope that a belated modernisation 
may turn out to be a more intelligent modernisation in demographic terms as well 
(Stolnitz, 1992). But that will depend to a large extent on the condition of women in 
Polish society undergoing a complete change. Because in the last analysis, the sexual 
division of labour, both in the family and in society, remains the basis of the social 
structure. 
3. Trade: import and export 
Poland is a large and increasingly open economy: exports account for roughly one 
quarter of GDP, which makes the openness of the Polish economy comparable to that 
of EU member states of a similar size in terms of population. 
In June 1995, the IMF confirmed the full current account convertibility of the 
zloty. Analysts have unanimously shown interest in the question of the competitiveness 
of the Polish economy in the studies they have carried out on the Polish economic 
situation and prospects since the beginning of the transition period (Gotz- 
Kozierkiewicz, 1991b; see also: Black, 1976; CEC, 1993; Kolodko, 2000; 
Balcerowicz, 1993; OECD, 2000; PlanEcon). But when they come to defining, 
measuring and, above all, discussing the necessary moves for improving this 
competitiveness, they take different views (Havlik, 1993; see also Lipschitz arid 
McDonald, 1991). 
The competitiveness of an economy is a very complex variable, which can be 
measured in three ways (Marsh and Tokarick, 1994): 
• in terms of production costs; 
• in terms of prices; and 
• in terms of the market share of the exports. 
In principle, costs, prices and share of exports could all be expected to behave 
consistently. But the empirical evidence available shows that it is not always so (Isard, 
1977). That is due to the fact that costs are reflected in prices in different ways 
depending on the type of activity in question. The competition in world trade 
nowadays is based not only on prices, but also on the size of companies, on the 
development of transnational marketing networks, on the offer of good post-sale 
services, or on the design of differentiated products (GATT, 1993). The above explains 
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why exports do not always behave according to the trend in the indices, which reflect 
the competitiveness in terms of costs and prices. 
Figure 1. Domestic and foreign trade of Poland 
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186.9 
1 995 1996 
□ Total retail sales of goods 
E3 Imports of commodities (in per cent) 
1997 1998 1999 
13 Exports of commodities (in per cent) 
Source: Compiled from GUS (1999). 
The comparative study of the evolution of these variables disaggregated by sectors 
shows which are the branches of industry where the Polish domestic market as well as 
in export performance is not in line with the trend in relative costs and/or prices 
(Gomulka, 1993). In what may seem a paradox, many industries in Poland have done 
better in exports during the 1990-1999 period than the manufacturing industry has on 
average, despite showing a worse index of costs and/or prices. 
A single indicator reflects the changes which took place in the competitiveness of a 
given industry for reasons other than costs and prices, i.e. merchandise exports as a 
percentage of merchandise imports within the same sector. 
The share of exports in nearly all the branches of Polish manufacturing industry 
has been increasing systematically, which could in principle be taken as a sign that the 
competitiveness of goods made in Poland is relatively improving. However, before 
taking that to be a fact, we have to find out, if Polish products have also been able to 
increase or at least hold on to their share of the domestic market in the face of imported 
products. 
That has not been so. Polish products have steadily lost ground to imported 
products in meeting domestic demand throughout the period, even though there are 
certain minor exceptions to this general rule. That questions the conclusion drawn in 
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analysing exports about a good performance of the competitiveness of Polish products, 
and brings to light the true meaning of these results, which is that Polish industry is not 
adjusting commercially to integration in the EU and to global competition in the 
manner that could be expected according to the more favorable forecasts (Kaminski, 
1993). In theory, a number of sectors, which initially had lower labour costs and where 
investment and innovation have been carried out, were expected to have a competitive 
advantage. 
Other branches of Polish industry, which were not in such good condition to 
compete but in which there is a high level of foreign investment and action has been 
undertaken to modernise production, were also expected to improve their 
competitiveness. The industries with better prospects are the technologically more 
sophisticated ones (computers, office equipment, telecommunications, etc.), in which 
Polish companies only have a small presence in the domestic market and are clearly at 
a disadvantage on the world market. However, things have turned out differently. 
As data shows, Polish products are losing out in Polish markets to goods imported 
from other EU countries and, to a lesser extent, from third countries. The darker-than- 
expected picture concerning the competitive performance of Polish industry at a time 
when trade is being liberalised as a result of changes at the beginning of the 1990s, 
turns out to be even more serious on looking at the changes recorded in the trade 
balances by branches of the manufacturing industry in recent years. According to these 
charts, during the transition/transformation period, the trade balance for all branches, 
without exception, with both EU and other countries, worsened noticeably. 
As the disaggregated Polish foreign trade figures show, the trade balance has 
worsened in every sector, including those which had a competitive advantage prior to 
the transformation period. What we are witnessing are the combined effects on 
Poland's foreign trade with the integration of the EU economies and of the spread of 
technological innovations in the field of information, communications and new 
materials. 
The new forms of production and organisation are altering the international 
structure of comparative advantages (Rollo and Smith, 1993). These types of 
constraints on the one hand, tend to undermine the competitive position of countries 
whose advantages consist only in the availability of raw materials, and of those whose 
main advantage is the low cost of their unskilled labour (Ksiezopolski, 1991). On the 
other hand, the availability of such technologies enhances the competitive position of 
those economies whose comparative advantages are having qualified human resources 
and technological capacity. 
Polish trade has been reoriented since the beginning of the economic 
transformation process in 1991. The major structural change in Poland's trading 
relationship is due to the collapse of the COMECON-trading block (Vlad, 1990; see 
also: Calvo and Coricelli, 1993; Chadha et. al., 1993; Commander and Coricelli, 1992). 
The EU remains Poland's main trading partner and Poland is the seventh trade partner 
for the EU. In 1997, Poland exported 64% of total exports to the EU and imported 64% 
from the EU. More recently however, Polish exports to Central and Eastern Europe and 
Russia have rapidly expanded (presently 20-24% of Polish exports). Russia has 
become Poland’s second biggest trade partner, after Germany. 
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Even without similar studies on many sectors and particularly on the agricultural 
sector, I may say that the weak competitive position of the Polish industrial structure 
should not be considered as a problem arising solely from an unfavourable trend in 
comparative costs and of exchange even though these are important factors, but it 
should be considered as a problem arising from a wider restriction linked to rigidities 
in the Polish labour and capital markets, low innovative capacity of Polish companies 
and other factors (trademark image, design, marketing networks, etc.) which are 
essential for competing in world markets today. The EU has had a trade surplus with 
Poland since 1991. Over the first six months of 1997, this surplus amounted to 4.96 
billion ECU1 and the coverage (exports/imports) was 172%. The trade surplus has 
expanded in 1998 to 5.91 billion ECU and the coverage rate was 175%. 
The changes in the direction of trade have been accompanied by shifts in the 
products exchanged. Imports of transport equipment in 1997, related to a very dynamic 
automotive sector, showed the largest increase. The emerging import/export pattern 
with the EU includes a growing importance of many commodities but has a relatively 
sharp fall in the role of food and agriculture. The EU-Poland trade relations are 
regulated by the Europe Agreement. In 1997, Poland ranked the EU’s eighth import 
market, with 2.1% of extra-EU share, and 5th export market, with 3.5% of extra-EU 
share. Poland's trade with the EU has continued to increase its share of total trade 
(Lenain, 2000). The largest part of trade concerns manufactured goods. During the first 
five months of 1998, Polish exports to the EU accounted for 65% of total Polish 
exports (Germany 30%, Italy 6% and Austria 6%). Imports from the EU amounted to 
70% (Germany 29%, Italy 9% and Austria 6%) up from 64% in 1997. Poland’s trade 
deficit with the EU widened from ECU 5.9 billion in 1996 to ECU 9.2 billion in 1997. 
In the first six months of 1998 EU exports to Poland totalled 13.7 billion ECU, 
which represents an increase of 16% over the same period of the previous year. The 
evolution of EU exports to Poland (+16%) has increased faster than total EU exports to 
the rest of the world (+6% for the first half of 1998). Accordingly, Poland's relative 
share in total extra-EU exports increased from 3.49% in the first six months of 1997 to 
3.80% over the same period in 1998 (compared to 0.95% in 1989) (GUS, 1999). 
4. Consumption 
In the face of weakening dynamics of business activity, the rate of indirect 
consumption increase has also fallen (consumption of products and services for their 
manufacturing). A fall of individual consumption was connected with a slower increase 
of household income, both as a result of reduction of hired work earnings dynamics 
and as a result of weakening of production and services growth in small corporates. 
The opening ‘price scissors’ in agriculture (relationship between price changes of 
products sold and price changes of products purchased by farmers from the level 
101.8% in 1995, 96.0-95.8% in 1996-1997, deteriorated to 92.3% in 1998) resulted, 
despite favourable production results, in a further fall of nominal income of households 
connected with agriculture. The dynamics of capital expenditures was smaller than in 
previous years even though the rate of their increase was much higher than for other 
Using ECU is appropriate at this time, since euro has not yet been introduced. 
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components of the final demand. During the year, a gradual weakening of investment 
activity dynamics was observed as the assessments of future production sales 
deteriorated. Poor financial results of enterprises, limiting possibilities of investment 
execution on the basis of own funds, also contributed to that. The fiscal policy 
positively influenced reduction of demand in the first half of 1998 (NBP, 1999). 
An increase of individual consumption was slightly higher than of gross disposable 
income. That resulted, after an increase in 1997, in a fall of gross savings rate of 
households. As it is preliminary assessed, that resulted from a relatively low growth of 
financial savings. There was a high increase of zloty deposits, indeed (although smaller 
than a year before), but the increase of cash money was smaller than in 1997, foreign 
exchange deposits diminished (NBP, 1999). 
So it may be said, that the weakening of income growth not only reduced the rate 
of consumption growth, but also resulted in reduction of a tendency to savings by 
households. There were further changes in the structure of households expenditures. 
The share of expenditures connected with maintenance of accommodation rose from 
about 16.5% to almost 19%. The share of expenditures on flat hiring became close to 
4%. The share of health expenditures exceeded 4%. Shares of expenditures on food, 
clothes and shoes decreased. Changes in the expenditure mix were consistent with a 
generally known regularity of reducing the share of primary needs in consumption with 
increasing income and wealth of households. An excess of supply of goods satisfying 
these needs and changes in the structure of consumer demand maintaining in the 
market, promoted a reduction of inflation. 
In 1998 the rate of individual consumption growth was reduced to 4.8% compared 
with 6.9% in 1997 and 8.3% in 1996. The rate of individual consumption growth in 
1998, like in 1997, was close to the GDP growth rate. In 1996 the real growth of 
individual consumption was clearly ahead of GDP growth. A decrease of consumer 
demand dynamics was connected with a reduction of the growth of disposable income 
to households. As currently estimated by the NBP they were in nominal terms about 
16% higher than in 1997 and their purchasing power rose by about 4% (in 1997 by 
23.4% and by over 7%, respectively). 
Reduction of disposable income dynamics resulted mainly from a slower increase 
of gross primary income of households, especially connected with a gross operating 
margin on business activity. It is estimated that in farming households it was smaller 
than in 1997, even in nominal terms. In households outside agriculture hence mainly 
within families of small shops and manufacturing plants owners, to a large extent 
dependent on bazaar and frontier trade, a fall of income in real terms occurred. The 
dynamics of income from hired work, making more than 50% of primary income, 
despite an increase of employment was reduced from over 21% in 1997 to about 17% 
in 1998. Average earnings in the enterprise sector rose in 1998 by 16.1% and in real 
terms by 3.8%, compared with 3.2% growth assumed in the Budget Act for 1998. 
Average earnings in the budget sector (according to the GUS classification) rose in 
1998 by 16.9% and in real terms by 4.6%, compared with the assumed growth of 1.8%. 
The share of government institutions subordinated to local self-governments increased 
substantially in 1998 and the higher level of pay in those entities vitally affected 
achieving a higher growth of average earnings in the entire budget sector. 
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5. Investment 
Gross capital expenditures increased in real terms by 14.5% compared with 21.7% in 
the previous year. Significant investment activity was maintained in enterprises, even 
though with the generally deteriorating economic situation and financial results of 
enterprises (that for the future may denote a reduction of enterprises capability to 
accumulate free funds) a fall of investment rate was observed from over 27% in the 
first half of the year to about 19% in the third quarter and about 14% in the fourth 
quarter. Deterioration of enterprises financial results was apart from poor assessment. 
The two key variables which are crucial for keeping up a high pace of growth are 
savings and exports (Berg, 1993). This is simply the result of the accounting principle 
that a country cannot systematically consume more resources than it is able to generate. 
Moreover, the economic history over the past years has shown that the bottleneck of 
the Polish economy lies essentially in the external deficit and, less frequently, in the 
economy's difficulty to generate savings (Kolodko, 1993). 
Table 1. Dynamics of Gross Domestic Product volume growth and total gross capital 
expenditure in the economy and investment rate in 1991-1998 
Specification 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
GDP 93.0 102.6 103.8 105.2 107.0 106.0 106.8 104.8 
Gross capital 
expenditure 95.6 102.3 102.9 109.2 116.9 119.7 121.7 114.5 
Investment rate 
(current prices) 21.7 18.7 17.7 18.0 18.7 20.9 23.6 25.0 
Source: GUS (1997, 1998a, 1998b). 
With this background, the main challenge confronting the Polish economy is the 
need to open it up and be competitive in the international market. This is a historical 
issue, and a sensitive one with a view to the future. 
Poland’s ability to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) has been impressively 
enhanced in recent years (see also: Kocwin, 1999). This has been in part due to its 
liberalised policies concerning the free movement of capital in the context of its 
accession to the OECD in November 1996.“ Until 1997 FDI into Poland was relatively 
low, but it has increased substantially since then. The inflow of FDI in the first half of 
1998 was as large as for the whole of 1997, which would bring the accumulated inflow 
since 1990 at ECU 13 billion.3 
In qualitative terms, FDI is playing a key role in the development of the Polish 
economy. More than 10% of total equity, and some 5% of overall employment, is 
connected with foreign capital. Moreover, the share of companies with foreign 
participation in investment outlays is approaching 50% in the manufacturing sector and 
OECD currently has 29 member countries. The original 20 members of the OECD were the Western 
countries of Europe and North America. Next came Japan, Australia, New Zealand and Finland. More 
recently, Mexico, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Korea have joined. 
According to the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development estimates, EBRD (1999). 
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in trade and services (Du Pont, 2000). Interestingly, average labour productivity in 
these companies is reported to be twice as high as in the economy as a whole. 
Apart from the above point, what matters for FDI in Poland is the difference of 
domestic and overseas interest rates, one of the factors that determine capital flows and 
hence exchange rate. When the domestic interest rate, taking into account the existing 
premium for the country risk and expectations in respect to a change of the domestic 
currency value, is higher than the foreign one, then portfolio investments rise resulting 
in the appreciation of the domestic currency, in a fall of overseas demand and of 
domestic production dynamics. Hence, appreciation may result in deterioration of the 
balance in the current account. On the other hand, the current and expected inflation is 
reduced by reduction of imports price dynamics and by increase of competition in the 
domestic market. So the exchange rate affects inflationary processes in the country 
both directly and indirectly.4 
Since late 1993, foreign exchange reserves have been growing rapidly because of 
steady inflows of foreign and portfolio investment. In 1996 reserves stood at close to 
ECU 14bn, covering six to seven months of imports. The remarkable increase which 
took place in foreign investment within a period of a few years had a noticeable 
impact. ‘They are buying up the country’,5 was and still is an often-repeated phrase, 
even though at 4%, the GDP share of foreign investment in the GDP is lower than in 
the time of Spanish and Portuguese integration to the EC. In some sectors, such as the 
automobile industry, selling a company like Polish Fiat to foreign capital was justified 
on account of the need to link it to a multinational company in order to ensure its 
viability. 
In other sectors, such as the food industry, acquisitions of medium and large-sized 
profitable companies by foreign investors reflected a weakness on the part of Polish 
businessmen to face the challenge of open markets. The breakdown of foreign 
investment shows that most of it was direct investment, and was concentrated in real 
estate, the financial sector, and in scale-intensive industries (automobiles, food, banks, 
chemicals), as well as in technologically advanced industries (machinery and 
equipment). Regarding its origin, foreign investment came mainly from EU member 
countries, and foreign companies already operating in Poland, many of them Germany 
and American companies. 
Growth during the last years showed, that had foreign investment been halted, 
domestic investment would hardly have been able to fill the gap, as domestic savings 
did not suffice. In fact, over the last period, Polish families showed little propensity to 
save or, what amounts to the same thing, showed a high propensity to spend. The new 
trend of the social and economic structure reflects the weight of young people in the 
Polish population, new opportunities for obtaining liquidity as the financial system 
which has become liberalised, and the optimistic attitude which is natural in times of 
expansion and encourages people to believe that their income will grow in the future. 
However, fiscal treatment of savings also influences this trend. 
4 Inflation Report 1998, Monetary Policy Council - National Bank of Poland, Warsaw, June 1999, pp. 34- 
35.' 
The Economist, 14 October 2000. These type of opinions have been presented in various media (Radio, 
TV, Newspapers) in Poland and abroad. 
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6. Employment and unemployment 
The profile resulting from the overall changes over time in the economically active 
population comes out of the performance of the economy itself. Just to take the recent 
picture of this aspect, the economically active and inactive population, in the second 
quarter of 2000, the economically active persons amounted to 17,343,000, while the 
population of economically inactive persons amounted to 13,193,000. Compared to the 
previous quarter, the number of the economically active increased by 145,000 (i.e. 
0.8%), which meant a growth in the number of the employed by 199,000 and at the 
same time a decrease in the number of the unemployed by 55,000. Compared to the 
first quarter of 2000 the number of economically active men increased by 77,000 (i.e. 
by 0.8%), while the number of women increased by 68,000 (i.e. by 0.9%). Whereas 
both: the number of economically inactive men as well as women was lower 
(respectively by 51,000, i.e. by 1.0% and by 45,000, i.e. by 0.6%). 
More positive changes occurred on the rural labour market where a significant 
growth in the number of the employed was observed (by 125,000, i.e. by 2.3%) and a 
decline in the number of the unemployed (by 88,000, i.e. by 0.8%). In urban areas the 
number of the unemployed increased by 34,000, i.e. by 1.8%, while the number of the 
employed increased by 75,000, i.e. by 0.8%. At the same time the number of 
economically inactive persons declined in urban areas (by 68,000, i.e. by 0.8%) as well 
as in the rural ones (by 28,000, i.e. by 0.6%). As a result of ongoing changes, a 
disproportion between urban and rural areas in the liability rate of working people by 
non-working increased. 
A significant rate of employment increase in the enterprise sector observed by 
April 1998 (2.4% compared with the analogous period a year before) started to fall 
since May 1998 by 0.1 point monthly with weakening of business activity. An increase 
of average employment in the enterprise sector in the period January to October 
amounted to 1.9% compared with the analogous period of the previous year and the 
same growth factor maintained by the end of 1998. However, the increase of 
employment in 1998 in the enterprise sector as well as the increase of employment in 
the entire economy has not ensured a reduction of the unemployment rate to the level 
defined in the Budget Act, i.e. to 10.1%. 
A permanent decrease of the unemployment rate had occurred since the beginning 
of the year reaching in November the rate of 9.9% indicated that it would not exceed 
10% at the end of the year. However, in December 207,500 new unemployed were 
registered and only 119,500 were cancelled from the register and the unemployment 
rate at the end of 1998 amounted to 10.4%. It is estimated that the growth of unearned 
income was higher than in 1997, especially interest and dividend yield, and the growth 
of benefits and social transfers income (especially pensions and disability pensions 
payments) and current transfers (in 1998 the balance of insurance compensations and 
premiums was much smaller than in 1997, when the majority of flood related 
compensations were paid) slower. 
As Table 2 shows that people engaged in agriculture, their share in the working 
population is as compared to the year 1996 has declined by 16% and their share in the 
total working population in year 2000 is almost 18%, in the industry sector, the number 
engaged declined by 3.7% as compared to year 1996, and it has about 31% in the 
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working population registered in year 2000. On the other hand, the number of people 
working in the service sector compared to the year 1996 increased by 7% with a share 
of 51% in the working population. 
Table 2. Economically active and inactive population in the second quarter of 2000 
Specification 
Economically active population Persons 
economically 
inactive Total 
employed 
persons 
unemployed 
persons 
In thousands 
Total 17343 14518 2825 13193 
men 9334 7975 1359 5218 
women 8009 6543 1466 7975 
Urban areas 10907 9022 1886 8335 
Rural areas 6435 5496 939 4858 
First quarter of2000 =100 
Total 100.8 101.4 98.1 99.3 
men 100.8 101.6 96.4 99.0 
women 100.9 101.1 99.7 99.4 
Urban areas 101.0 100.8 101.8 99.2 
Rural areas 100.6 102.3 91.4 99.4 
Source: GUS (2000). 
In terms of the growth in numbers, there are some occupations that clearly stand 
out from the rest. In order of magnitude, these are: administrative personnel; household 
assistants; miscellaneous manual labour; skilled technical and professional personnel; 
construction workers; salesmen; middle-level technical and professional personnel. 
Even though the mixture of more skilled occupations with less skilled occupations may 
surprise readers, in fact it is a characteristic trend of occupational development in 
advanced societies, as studies carried out in other countries have shown (Markusen and 
Venabl, 1996). 
In its recent development, Polish society started generating high-skill jobs and 
products with high added value, at the same time as low-level and low-paid jobs which 
are characteristic of a whole range of labour-intensive services. A more detailed 
analysis also shows, that the fastest positive rates of change in the recent period have 
been achieved in occupations which although accounting for a minority of those 
employed, are linked to rapid modernisation of the economy and society: these are 
under ‘other professional and technical’ occupations which include, insurance and real 
estate agents, stockbrokers, operators at radio and TV stations, and similar occupations. 
An observation of the occupations whose share of the total has shrunk in the 1996- 
2000 period, confirms the above results: the three occupations showing a massive 
decline in numbers are farm workers, farm labourers and ‘other industry workers4, i.e. 
activities linked to the old production structure which is quickly falling apart: in 1995, 
126,600; in 1997, 94,900; in 1998 101,800 jobs were lost in these years. While the 
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number of new jobs generated showed the greatest increase, which shows that the 
social structure is undergoing a speedy transformation. Within the urban social 
structure, the sectors in which the number of jobs fell sharply are also highly 
significant ones. These are the mining and the metal-working industry. 
There is a widespread and lively debate under way on how to attain the acceptable 
level of living standards and goals. In order to be steady, the pace of growth must not 
strain the production capacity of the economy. In other words, the economy cannot 
sustain for too long a pace of growth that pushes the rate of inflation as well as the 
public sector and external deficits beyond certain levels. However, the various Polish 
economic and social agents take rather different views on which are the tolerable levels 
of such imbalances.6 
7. Budget deficit 
Within general government, the state budget (core central government that is, 
excluding the social funds and a number of extra-budgetary funds) is responsible for 
about two-thirds of revenue and gross spending; it is the almost exclusive focus of the 
domestic fiscal policy debate (Bird and Wallich, 1993). Through the 1990s, it has run a 
deficit slightly larger than for the overall general government, supporting other small 
agencies by various types of transfers. 
After the large fiscal imbalances associated with the early and most difficult years 
of transition, Poland achieved a major fiscal turnaround in 1993, through a series of 
ambitious reforms and a rigorous budget. Since then, the general government deficit 
has been held consistently below 3% of GDP, compared with close to 7% in 1991. 
Besides maintaining the deficit at 2.3% of GDP since 1993 and a primary surplus 
since 1994, Poland has cut its public debt, while building a substantial government 
bond market from scratch. It has accomplished difficult reforms of income taxation, 
indirect taxation, and lately trade taxation; and has recently begun equally key reforms 
of government institutions and the social security system (pensions, disability, and 
unemployment). 
These achievements have not come easily. At the beginning of this endeavour, the 
Government that came into office in 1993, while committed to continued stabilisation 
and reforms, saw its mandate as one of enhancing equity in a more gradually paced 
transition. This limited its ability to reform the large social spending blocks in the 
budget: health, education, and pensions; these remain the main impediments to 
expenditure consolidation. 
In 1997, 1998, 1999 (see chart 2 and 4), exports began to grow slower than imports 
and this trend has continued into the first half of 2000. This favourable development, 
together with the growth in GDP, kept the current account deficit away from Poland's 
self-declared danger zone of 6-8% of GDP. The deficit in 1997 amounted to $4.3 
billion - or 3.2% of GDP - which is much better than one can expect. It is also 
comfortably financed by an increasing inflow of foreign direct investment, which 
6 The debate over this point is manifested in many public media as well as in the Sejm by various political 
parties. 
The Stability and Sustainability of the Polish Economy to integrate... 147 
amounted to $6.6 billion in 1997. Even after taking into account the possible impact of 
the Russian crisis. 
The Polish balance of payments includes a large surplus on unclassified 
transactions on the current account. The trade deficit in 1998 has been only slightly 
larger than in 1997. Contrary to expectations, the lasting surplus on unrecorded trade 
with neighbouring countries has hardly decreased. The corresponding surplus on 
unclassified transactions on the balance of payments offsets the trade deficit for the 
largest part, and the remaining part is covered by the inflow of foreign direct 
investment. Data for 1998 shows improvements in the current account (US$ -2.4 
billion from January to August 1998, against US$ -3.3 billion in the same period of 
1997) and a substantial increase in gross foreign reserves (US$ + 6 billion since the 
beginning of 1998. Covering the first eight months of 1998, these figures do not take 
into account the effects of the Russian crisis). 
There is a need to resolve problems related to illegal trade, serious under-reporting 
of the value of imports and corruption. It is estimated that some 25% of trade on the 
eastern borders, and 15-20% of trade on the border with the EU, goes unrecorded. The 
‘foreigners law’, which came into force on 1 January 1998, introduced stricter controls 
and visa regulations at Poland's eastern borders, partly in anticipation of the future 
obligations of EU membership (Sejm, 1998). Although the implementation of the new 
law was softened in response to the initial confusion and protest of traders, there are 
indications that truck traffic across some of the eastern borders is increasing and that at 
least part of the previously unclassified and informal trade might now be officially 
recorded (Lipton and Sachs, 1990). 
8. Balance of payment 
The transformation of Poland’s balance of payments has matched the dramatic changes 
occurring elsewhere in the economy. From the very start of transition, Poland has used 
trade liberalisation to redirect the economy toward a more market-oriented system, and 
also to bring down inflation through increased import competition (Rutkowski, 1998). 
Though goods markets were opened to foreign competition, capital market integration 
has progressed more slowly. Until recently, foreign capital was deterred by Poland’s 
heavy foreign debt burden, as well as by delays in normalising relations with 
commercial bank creditors. 
Poland’s balance of payments experience since transition can be divided broadly 
into three phases. In the first phase, the problem was how best to shore up reserves. 
With the economy open to foreign trade, but capital inflows negligible, Poland had to 
build up reserves by generating the current account, at a time when instead of 
accumulating claims abroad, foreign savings might have been used profitably to help 
finance the pressing investment needs of transition. The fragile external position also 
forced monetary and exchange rate policy to be geared in part toward safeguarding the 
level of international reserves. 
The second phase changed in 1994. With surpluses on both current and capital 
accounts, international reserves became plentiful. Devaluation in late 1993 and rapid 
growth in productivity had provided a substantial boost to competitiveness, which led 
148 Abey Hailu Senbeta 
exports to increase by almost 70% over the next two years. The result was a current 
account surplus (including unrecorded trade) of about 2.8% of GDP in 1994 (Liam et 
al, 1994). Second, and of greater permanence, successful completion of a Brady-style 
debt and debt-service reduction (DDSR) agreement in late 1994 paved the way for the 
return of capital inflows (Calvo, 1993; see also: Gotz-Kozierkiewicz, 1991a). 
The third phase was that exchange rate has played a dual role in Poland’s 
stabilisation, at times acting as the main anchor for domestic economic policy, while 
also being responsive to developments in external competitiveness. For example, as 
part of the initial big bang reforms, the exchange rate was fixed in 1990 as a means of 
reducing inflation, a classic nominal anchor approach but only after the external 
position had been safeguarded by an initial devaluation of almost 50%. Though 
inflation came down sharply, it still remained well above partner country levels, and 
international competitiveness worsened. Because of this, and to adjust to the shock of 
the CMEA collapse, in May 1991 the exchange rate was devalued by 16.8% and 
pegged to a basket of five currencies (WB, 1992, 1993). This was followed in October 
1991 by the introduction of a crawling peg exchange rate system. Since then, the initial 
1.8% rate of crawl has been progressively lowered. 
Despite the primarily exchange rate-based strategy, the government had also been 
ready to adjust the exchange rate, both to preserve competitiveness and, when 
necessary, to restore its nominal anchor role. At first these adjustments were mainly 
devaluation, prompted by concerns over the weak external position. The foreign debt 
also has a significant part in the Polish economy. In the 1980s, Poland had the fourth- 
highest foreign debt in the world, and was unable to service it (Baer, 1995). Debt 
reduction and rescheduling agreements were reached in 1991 and 1994 with 
government and commercial creditors, making it possible for Poland to resume debt 
servicing payments. The debt-servicing burden has lessened and is being steadily 
reduced by strong export growth: only 10% of earnings from exports went on debt 
repayment in 1995 compared to 70% (on a due basis) in 1991. Poland has, as a result, 
regained access to international capital markets. 
9. Inflation 
Despite the social, political and economic achievements, Poland’s economic record 
during transition has not been without blemish. In particular, inflation has proven more 
resilient than anticipated and remains significantly higher than in many of the advanced 
Central and East European economies. Though there was considerable success in 
fighting inflation in the first year of transition, conditions of near-hyperinflation being 
brought swiftly under control, subsequent progress has been more modest. In 
particular, from 1993 to late 1994, inflation remained in the 30% range, in 1999, price 
indices of consumer goods and services were 7.3% as compared to 1998 (GUS, 1999). 
These problems notwithstanding, Poland’s record of accelerating recovery has 
sustained, if somewhat slow and fitful, disinflation testifies to the overall success of its 
transition strategy. As is well known, this strategy combined wide-ranging external and 
domestic liberalisation with generally tight financial policies, under a multiple-anchor 
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approach that included low fiscal deficits, hard budget constraints on enterprises, an 
incomes policy, and an exchange rate anchor. 
Poland’s economic recovery started back in 1992, only two years after the big bang 
of macroeconomic stabilisation and economic liberalisation. At first the recovery was 
tentative, consumption-led and vulnerable to balance of payments constraints. The 
recovery strengthened in 1994, led by sizeable increases in exports: the share of 
domestic demand in GDP fell, and the contribution of external demand to real GDP 
growth became strongly positive. Sustained rapid increases in productivity, moderate 
real wage increases, and the lagged effects of devaluation (NBP, 1999). 
Throughout Poland’s transition, monetary policy has operated with the exchange 
rate as a key nominal anchor. In 1990, the turnaround from near hyperinflation to 
inflation below 50% occurred under a fixed exchange rate regime, with high interest 
rate, a large fiscal adjustment, and the opening of the economy to foreign competition. 
The more gradual disinflation since has also been achieved with a largely exchange 
rate-based strategy. Throughout the 1990s, monetary policy was conducted under a 
crawling peg arrangement (NBP, 1999), with periodic reductions in the rate of crawl in 
line with the disinflation objective and several step devaluation to preserve external 
balance (Pinto et al., 1993). 
In practice, the exchange rate has not been the only nominal anchor. The 
governments have followed a multiple anchor approach to achieve moderate 
disinflation without jeopardising the recovery and with a view to preserving the 
external balance. Domestic interest rates and the rate of crawl have generally been 
geared to the inflation target, while the level of the exchange rate has been set with a 
view to securing external balance. Fiscal and incomes policies have acted as additional 
anchors. 
Against the impressive growth record of recent years, Poland’s inflation 
performance has lagged somewhat, although hyperinflation has long since disappeared. 
However, inflation in Poland remains well above the average of its fellow Visegrad 
countries, let alone the average inflation rate in the European Union. Even so, generally 
tight financial policies have ensured a continued downward path for inflation, even if 
immediate progress has, at times, been complicated by undervaluation of the exchange 
rate or supply side shocks to the economy. 
After declining sharply from over 600% during 1989 to 38% during 1993, inflation 
became stuck in the 10.2% range in 1998 (GUS, 1999). In part, this was because 
gradual reductions in the rate of crawl were unable to resolve the underlying inflation 
problem caused by undervaluation of the level of the exchange rate. In addition, part of 
the explanation lies in the poor harvest: agricultural production fell, and food prices 
increased. 
There has been much debate about Poland's monetary policy in recent years. 
Although most would agree that the Polish economy has staged a remarkably 
successful performance, the contribution of monetary policy to this outcome has been 
more controversial, especially over the past two-three years when views have differed, 
at times sharply, over the appropriate stance of policies. To some extent, this 
controversy has reflected the considerable tensions that monetary policy has had to 
cope with, and which would have strained even the most sophisticated policy 
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framework. At the same time, there has also been some disagreement about the 
regime's basic rationale and operating principles. For example, while some have 
emphasised the fundamental anchor role of the exchange rate, others would focus on 
the need to control the money supply; and in practice, it seems that neither of those 
“anchors” was given priority in actual policy implementation. 
The 1990s can be characterised by accelerating export-led growth while domestic 
demand remained subdued; widening current account and overall balance of payments 
surpluses; and the fuelling of rapid monetary expansion. Not surprisingly, inflation and 
unemployment did not come down much further in this environment. In hindsight, 
rapid transition-related productivity growth combined with the August 1993 
devaluation had made the zloty progressively undervalued. Once western markets 
recovered from the recession, this undervaluation induced a growing external surplus 
that proved difficult to sterilise. The authorities initially were reluctant to appreciate 
the zloty to contain these pressures, for fear of overvaluation and, on the part of the 
NBP, a desire to increase NIR. Instead, the NBP relied mainly on sterilisation through 
open market operations, and exchange rate action was limited to slowing down the rate 
of crawl. However, a series of cuts in the monthly rate of crawl failed to stem the flood 
of NIR, and it took increasingly aggressive (and costly) open market operations to hold 
up interest rates during this period. 
10. Competitiveness 
The answer to the problem of competitiveness lies, in the first place, with the 
companies, which have to adjust their business structure, production processes and 
products to the new circumstances (Skawinska and Zalewski, 1999). That is an 
extensive field in which there are factors at play such as technological innovation, on- 
the-job training, improving product quality and design, organising good post-sale 
services, improving foreign marketing networks (Drew, 1992), for example, 
participating in willing multinationals, and merging companies in order to become 
sufficiently large for competing in world markets (Hughes, 1993). That means there is 
little use for short-term profit, authoritarian management and ostentatious behaviour, 
which is more fitting to the world of entertainment (Whiteley, 1994). 
Another answer to the unequal competitiveness problem in Polish industry is the 
way in which the public administration handles public expenditure. The growth of this 
variable will be contained in forthcoming years and that should not take place at the 
expense of social benefits, public services or the development of the country's 
infrastructure. How? By taking advantage of the many opportunities for improving 
management of expenditure, applying suitable criteria in choosing investment projects 
and adopting consistent objectives (Blanchard et a/., 1993). Regarding public 
enterprises, by efficiently managing those, which are or can become competitive and 
are a significant industrial asset to the Polish economy, setting them apart from those 
others which exist for political and social reasons whose cost is to be met under the 
Government budget. 
Another way of improving the competitiveness of the Polish economy is to make 
sure that the labour market functions more effectively, on which subject the labour 
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unions must take important decisions, basically on three questions (Tymowska and 
Wisniewski, 1993). Firstly, on wages, as the competitiveness of some sectors of the 
economy will be reduced, if real wages grow faster than productivity. Secondly, on the 
labour market, as more job opportunities will be opened up by doing away with certain 
rigidities in hiring workers indefinitely and at the same time by avoiding abuse of 
temporary labour contracts. In the third place, the labour unions will have to choose 
between sticking to a strategy of confrontation, which is a socially limited approach 
and cannot be kept up for too long, or taking a negotiating stance in which they are 
prepared to share responsibilities and to face up to the middle-term problems of the 
Polish economy. 
Finally, the competitiveness and future of the Polish economy depend on important 
questions which call for a social consensus (Malana, 2000), for example on developing 
a more suitable taxation system for achieving the objective of optimising steady 
growth, with citizens and companies accepting the duties democratically imposed on 
them under the tax laws in force, no matter how unpleasant these are, as the very name 
in Polish “narzucac” means imposition. That would save the shame of having to read 
things like ‘... it should be noted that a number of Polish companies do not pay the full 
amount of tax due; and with local knowledge and good accountants there is no reason 
why foreign resident companies should do either.’7 
The 1990-1999 period can be summed up in two points: 
1. modernisation of the production system through stepped-up investment, 
2. irreversible internationalisation of the Polish economy. 
The performance of the Polish economy in 2000 can be viewed basically in two 
different ways: the economy may have been taking a breath and will soon recover and 
resume strong growth, or the economy may have run out of steam and will only pull 
slowly ahead with considerable effort. In addition, if Poland accomplishes its goal of 
belonging to the core of the Monetary Union, it will no longer be able to use, as in the 
past, zloty devaluations to cushion competitiveness shortcomings. What seems most 
clear is that in the future, the Polish economy will be increasingly influenced by its 
integration in what we might call the ‘European economy4 (Tsoukalis, 1993). This 
concept describes the prevailing economic links and those foreseen in the future among 
EC countries and also with neighbouring European countries. These are special links, 
half way between the integration of territorial units in a national economy and the 
interdependence existing today among the world's major domestic economies. 
The Economist, 14 October 2000. 7 
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Main Issues and Benefits of European Union Enlargement 
concerning Poland 
Marcin Kulikowski 
Introduction 
The enlargement of the European Union is one of the most important challenges in 
Europe for the twenty-first century. It is a unique and historic opportunity to further 
integration of the continent. The enlargement will spread peace, stability and prosperity 
to all new members of Europe, which has the first chance in its long history to be fully 
united. 
The process of the EU enlargement was formally launched in March 1998. It 
embraces 13 applicant countries: Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Turkey. 
Enlargement of the EU has a historical and moral dimension because it will bring 
to an end the division of Europe after the Second World War. The reunification process 
of Europe began with the unification of Germany. 
In this paper I describe issues of the enlargement concerning Poland and especially 
Polish economy and politics. Poland is the largest and one of the most important 
candidate countries. Poland will benefit from being a member state of an enlarged 
Union. The same trade rules, a single tariff, and a single set of administrative 
procedures will apply not only just across the existing member states but also across 
the Single Market of the enlarged Union. This will significantly improve investment 
conditions and trade activity in both. Some of problems are still not regulated, cause 
tensions or are under discussion. I would like to concentrate on these issues. 
1. The benefits of accession 
This enlargement will change the face of Europe and will affect all Community 
institutions and areas of policy. The two underlying strategic aims - projecting political 
stability and strengthening Europe as an economic power - look set to be achieved. 
The benefits of enlargement are already visible. Stable democracy in Poland is 
current at the best in all its history and is a model for all candidate countries. 
Systematically, all participating states have such a robust democracy that there is no 
risk of a relapse into authoritarianism. The credit for this success belongs mainly to the 
people of those countries themselves. They alone took the decision to follow the 
difficult path and build open societies, modern democracies and functioning market 
economies. 
The political stability in Poland and Central and East European candidate countries 
is rooted in common European values - democracy, the rule of law, respect for human 
rights and the protection of minorities. This reflects an improvement in the security 
situation in Europe and the opening up of a huge potential for economic development. 
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Both the existing EU member states and the prospective members benefit equally 
from political stability. A stable political situation is a condition for peace, good 
economic results and cooperation. 
The enlargement gives Poland and candidate countries an opportunity to increase 
their living standards and improve their prospects in European competition. The 
advantages for the member states are already tangible. They run considerable surpluses 
on their export trade with the candidate countries, and these translate into more jobs, 
more tax revenue and more money for social security systems. 
The enlargement of the European Union will improve its ability to confront the 
challenges of the new century. The present round of enlargement brings in countries 
that wish to contribute wholeheartedly to the European project, and will help to shape 
the institutions and governance of the future Europe (EUO, 2001). 
2. Economy 
The member states have already concluded, that Poland is a functioning market 
economy and it should be able to compete with market pressure forces within the 
European Union. Despite its developing and fast growing private sector, it should 
proceed with trade liberalisation. 
Poland was one of the most successful transition economies over the last decade 
thanks to consistently sound economic policies. Privatisation has steadily moved 
forward with most Polish banks and insurance institutions already privatised. In 1999 
privatisation of the Polish power sector started and is expected to be completed by 
2002. The forthcoming stage of privatisation includes water, railways, steel, copper 
and coal mining, and the postal service. 
The following sectors have been identified as offering good investment or export 
opportunities: automotive components, IT, telecommunication, electronics, energy 
production, environmental products and services, food production and processing, 
financial services, transport and distribution, tourism and security sector. 
During the last few years, the macroeconomic situation of Poland has improved. 
Since 1994 annual GDP growth rates have been over 4.5% and despite the Russian 
crisis, the Polish economy did not suffer and GDP grew by 4.1% in 1999 and 2000. 
Provided current macro-economic policy is pursued, such growth should continue. The 
average annual inflation rate was 7.3% in 1999 and 10% in 2000. 
Accelerating domestic demand and external investments caused strong 
improvement in production output. The substantial problem of the Polish economy 
concerning accession is a high level of unemployment (over 15%), which is still rising. 
The export output has increased but import growth is even more robust, reflecting 
the rapid increase in domestic demand. The public sector deficit is still increasing and 
it is partly generated by difficult implementation of four social sector reforms: health 
care system, education, pensions system and public administration with territorial 
partition reform. 
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3. Agriculture 
In the EU countries, a whole range of simplifications and stereotypes distorts the image 
of Polish agriculture and of the Polish countryside. This is disadvantageous, as the 
manner in which the Polish agricultural sector is viewed in the European Union 
constitutes an important element in the membership negotiations in this field, and, 
taking into consideration the political significance of this sector, it also represents an 
important element of the entire negotiation process. 
The lack of discrimination here consists chiefly in forgetting the very high degree 
of support which the agricultural and food sectors in the European Union have 
received, which means that they are not the best points of reference either for Poland or 
for the majority of other countries aspiring to membership in the European Union. In 
indicating the scale of differences between Poland and the European Union, the 
dynamic pace of transformations in Poland is under appreciated or entirely ignored. 
Basing Polish agriculture on the same instruments of agricultural policy as in the 
European Union, the liberalisation of trade between both markets could increase 
agricultural production in Poland and theoretically improve the Polish exchange 
balance with the European Union. 
In next few years the tendency towards a real appreciation of zloty will cease, and 
simultaneously, within the framework of Agenda 2000, the level of agricultural prices 
in the European Union is being gradually reduced. This could substantially weaken the 
competitiveness of the Polish farmers in the EU market (EC, 2000, p. 42). 
Even in some sectors with the greatest differences in price levels between Poland 
and the EU, Polish farmers even without help from the budget of the EU will still be 
competitive in the European market. 
Concerning EU quality standards, Polish agricultural producers will have to make 
extensive investments to adapt to them, which will entail higher production costs, and 
Poland’s joining the European single market area will be connected with an increase in 
prices (Jagielinski, 2000). 
Polish farmers would lose their competitive strength with other EU farmers if they 
were to be even partially excluded from the most important EU agriculture support 
instrument or if allocated production limits were to be set too low. With support from 
the EU, Polish agriculture could have enormous competitive potential amid other 
members of the common market (Jelonkiewicz, 2000). 
The restructuring of farm organisation saw a decline in employment in agriculture, 
decreasing over the past years to 18% of total employment in 1999. 
4. Free movement of workers 
Member states such as Germany, Austria, France, and Belgium claim that the EU 
expansion will lead to a migration of jobs to the East with its lower labour costs. 
Frankly speaking, Poland is actually creating jobs in industry in Germany and Britain, 
two of its key trading partners, because it is running a huge trade deficit, importing far 
more goods than it exports. 
The argument that after accession thousands of workers will go to Western Europe 
seeking jobs is also a mistake. Now Poland is economically and politically in the 
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similar situation as Spain and Portugal when they acceded to the EU. And almost 
nobody went for work to the old member states. The enlargement is not a danger for 
Western European countries in relation to a job market, it is a rational solution and 
both sides will benefit mutually (Partridge, 1998). 
The EU says there is not enough progress in the adoption of mutual recognition of 
professional qualifications and adopted legislation. The concept of professional 
recognition still does not exist in Polish legislation, there are only provisions for 
academic recognition. Still, according to the European Commission, no concrete 
progress has been implemented in relation to citizen’s rights. 
In the field of free movement of workers, steps have been taken to strengthen and 
improve employment offices around the country. 
The enlargement will also bring up problems of free movement of workers also to 
Western countries and they are afraid of the accession. Some officials of the EU were 
in agreement with implementing a temporary period for Polish workers, which could 
be some kind of quantitative restriction on a Polish labour force. Polish negotiators 
stated that citizens in applicant countries should have the same rights to travel and 
work and live anywhere in the union as the citizens of the 15 current member states. 
Free movement is one of the most evident benefits and grounds of membership (EC, 
2000, p. 36). 
5. Copyrights 
The adoption of a new Copyright and Company Law is important, as this is a key piece 
of the internal market legislation. Less progress has been achieved in the area of 
company law in the strict sense. 
Concerning intellectual property rights, provisions have been implemented that 
close Polish copyright legislation to EC law. The new law significantly improves 
stricter protection, however the execution of the law remains unchangeable and is not 
sufficient. Still in Poland there is huge level of piracy, one of the highest of the 
candidate countries. In terms of legal protection of databases, also no progress has been 
achieved (EC, 2000, p. 40). 
6. Corruption level 
In the intervening period the issue of corruption has jumped up the political agenda and 
in the public consciousness following the publication of a number of critical reports 
about Poland. 
The reports have different methodological approaches and were prepared from 
different standpoints, but all points show that the Polish political and business 
environment is plagued by corruption activity caused by insufficient controls, lack of 
transparency and ineffective law provisions. The data shows that in 1999 over 650 
cases of active and passive corruption have been detected, defined by Polish law. 
Poland signed the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Officials 
in International Business Transactions. It was ratified in September 2000 on the 
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grounds that a sustained effort would be required to step up the fight against corruption 
(Apanowicz, 2000). 
7. Monetary union 
Poland will participate in EMU upon accession. It will need to implement the 
necessary changes to its institutional and legal framework by the date of accession. 
Overall, Poland has adopted substantial parts of the EMU-related rules. Necessary 
legislative adjustments are well identified and are under the preparation process. 
Remaining legal provisions are being harmonised by the National Bank of Poland. 
There are voices in Poland saying that enlarging the euro zone into participating 
countries would be good idea for integrating them with structures of the EU. However, 
not all member states are willing to do this. The reason for such a situation is a 
sustainable growth of the Polish economy, reflected in high inflation and high interest 
rates. Fast joining the European Union could cause an increase in interest rates among 
all countries of the EU, which are not prepared for a such change (Rostowski, 2001). 
8. Environment protection 
Poland has achieved very limited progress in aligning with the EC environmental rules. 
However, a wide range of environmental laws has been prepared and many of them are 
already implemented. Poland has not yet adopted implementation programmes in the 
field of air, waste, water and industrial pollution. Also, the Polish authorities consider 
that a legal basis (through the adoption of the various acts) is necessary before 
implementation. 
Poland’s environmental investments should be much larger that they are nowadays. 
The investment strategy should focus on the concrete implementation of the EC 
environmental directives and the execution of selected areas. 
The Ministry of Environment needs to be strengthened. At the central level, 
coordination between ministries needs to be improved for better implementation of the 
EC environmental policy. Poland should also further develop its monitoring capacity 
towards environmental programmes execution (EC, 2000). 
9. Neighbours issues 
EU enlargement, after joining Poland and Lithuania, two countries that surround the 
Russian enclave of Kaliningrad, would create certain problems. The solution to this 
problem is being discussed together with the European Union and candidate countries. 
The Polish government stated it is ready to cooperate and strengthen connections with 
the Kaliningrad region. 
Some newspapers reported that Germany was discussing plans to become the key 
economic power in Kaliningrad in exchange for cancelling part of Russia's debt to 
Germany. The solution would be the creation of a special economic zone with a status 
similar to Hongkong in China. Without any comprehensive solutions after the 
accession of Poland and Lithuania, Kaliningrad will become a Russian enclave closed 
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within the borders of EU. Regional cooperation and partnership could be an important 
element of strategy concerning the Kaliningrad region. All of these ideas concerning 
Kaliningrad could stay only on the paper, if the nuclear weapon were already installed 
in this region. 
Poland, Lithuania and Ukraine are carrying on dialogue with the democratic 
opposition in Belarus, trying to restore normal democratic rules in this country 
(Bielecki, 2001). 
Conclusion 
The membership of Poland and the other Central European candidate countries in the 
European Union will close the Post-Yalta chapter in European history once and for all. 
It will also foster the eastward expansion of the zone of security, stability and good- 
neighbourly relations now enjoyed in the European Union area. It will therefore 
provide benefits, which lie in the interests of all of Europe. 
Despite the problems and issues, which should be solved, Poland now has a great 
chance to change its political and economic position in Europe. 
It is generally held in Poland that its membership of the European Union will help 
to speed up its economic development and modernisation as well as to liquidate 
a civilisation gap between Poland and the countries of the Western part of Europe. 
The membership in the EU will be the best guarantee for Poland's democracy. It 
will ensure the transformation process by consolidating those values that link Poland to 
the European Union states and the entire Western economic and political-defence 
system. 
Such a membership of the European Union should also elevate Poland's 
international rank and determine its new place in Europe. This, after all, means 
participation in Europe's most serious international organisation, which has achieved 
tangible success in its activities to date and has impressed the world with its effective 
pursuit of its goals. As is now the case with all the Union's member-states, medium¬ 
sized and smaller countries included, Poland will be able to initiate and take common 
decisions of vital importance to international relations and its national interests - 
something which would not be possible to the same extent outside the European 
Union. 
Other countries will perceive Poland differently, including its immediate 
neighbours, from how it has been in the past. They will see that they are now dealing 
with a member-state of a great political, economic and, in future, possibly also a 
defensive, bloc. Although it is still not a defence structure, the European Union already 
constitutes an objectively effective factor counteracting internal threats. 
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Part 3 
Economic Policy and Growth 
within Visegrad Countries 

The Synchronisation of the Polish Business Cycle 
Krzysztof Piech 
This paper studies the synchronisation of Poland’s business cycle with others. It aims 
to discover the existence and measure the strength of this synchronisation, using 
various approaches. The main conclusion is that the Polish business cycle (precisely 
speaking: growth cycle, while all the calculations base on growth rates instead of 
nominal values) shows synchronisation with British-American cycles as well as with 
some CEE countries’ cycles. 
Analysis conducted by Piech (2001) has shown that among over 150 countries, 
several were characterised by a course of business cycles similar to the Polish one in 
the period 1970-2000, which could be explained by logical analysis. It indicated that a 
Polish business cycle showed much synchronisation with the American one. The US 
economy influences the growth of the United Kingdom and other countries, which in 
turn influence the Polish business cycle. Later in this paper I will study further 
relations between the economies of Poland and other countries, especially during the 
last few years. 
1. The Synchronisation of the Polish business cycles in 1992-2000 
GDP was chosen as the most universal measure (or approximation) of the business 
cycle. The growth cycle, instead of the classical business cycle, was chosen as a basis 
for the analysis. The first is based on the GDP pace of growth, while the second is 
based on the accumulated value of growth. 
For Poland and other post-socialist countries it is important to analyse the last few 
years, instead of concentrating on the whole period of the last three decades. Taking 
the sample of over 150 countries, a few relations can be found, which are significant 
(at 5% level), from the statistical point of view in the period 1992-2000. The 
correlation coefficient was significant in 27 cases (20 of them were presented on table 
1), from which 22 cases accounted positive statistical relations. 
Table 1. Correlation coefficients between real GDP of Poland and countries most 
similar to it in this field in 1992-2000 
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The results indicate the existence of‘apparent synchronisation’ (as in Piech, 2001), 
because there are no economic relations between Poland and e.g. Bhutan etc. This 
could be caused by using too short a time serie. Additionally, the similar course of 
development of transition countries caused the phenomenon that many countries show 
their similarities of business (growth) cycles. That is why this approach, based on data 
mining rather than seeking for logical (economic) relations, should be overruled and 
another research approach should be used. 
2. Synchronisation of the Polish business cycle, according to the share 
in exports 
Instead of data mining, countries could be chosen, which can have an influence on the 
Polish economy, e.g. by the real channels (of course, it should not be excluded that 
Poland could have relations based on a financial channel). Thanks to this approach, a 
part of ‘apparent correlation’ can be rejected. The trade channel was chosen, and more 
precisely - the destination of Polish exports. 
Figure 1. Structure of Polish exports to the 20 main export partners (as in 1999) 
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3. The synchronisation of cycles of Poland and its main trade partners in 
the period 1970-2000 
It was verified that the business cycle of the 20 largest (as in 1999) Polish export 
partners could have had influence on the Polish business cycle in the period 1970- 
2000. 
This approach does not stress the importance of the period after the transformation 
crisis, which is more important for the present situation of Polish and other CEE 
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economies. Because the number of countries is relatively small (in comparison to the 
previous, where over 150 countries were considered), the Hodrick-Prescott Filter 
(1980) can be used - results in table 2. 
Table 2. The correlation table of deviation of the real GDP from the trend counted with 
the use of HP Filter (1970-2000) for Poland and its 20 largest export partners 
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Notes: data for the Czech and Slovak Republics are the same for the period 1970-92, due to the 
lack of separate data for the two republics of Czechoslovakia. Highlighted are the 
correlation coefficients statistically significant at a 5% level, underlined - at a 10% level. 
Source: own calculations based on: IMF (2001) (for Czechoslovakia: IMF, 1999). 
The results show that the Polish business cycle in 1970-2000 was similar to the 
United Kingdom, the Slovak Republic (and Czech Republic)1, the United States and 
Hungary, and also to the Netherlands and Denmark. Interesting are the results showing 
Counting correlation for the Czech Republic and Slovakia with Poland after the division of 
Czechoslovakia there were non-significant values received: 0.194 and 0.461 respectively, but after the 
transformation crisis in these countries (since 1994), it was: 0.248 and 0.974 respectively (last figure - 
significant value). 
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no cycles’ relations between Poland and its main trade partner - Germany. It could 
mean that the increase of economic growth rate in Poland’s western neighbour did not 
have an influence on its rate of GDP growth in 1970-2000. Similar conclusions can be 
drawn from the cases of Italy and France. 
There can be a few reasons for this fact. The most important is the choice of 
method, which is not perfect. The second is the change of the economic system, and 
with it - trade relations. Additionally, the ‘apparent correlation’ could have appeared. 
Thus, the relations between other countries should be taken into consideration. Some 
of these relations (with the countries which were the strongest connected with Poland) 
were shown in the graphic form (fig. 2). 
Figure 2. Gravitation picture of business cycle synchronisation of chosen countries 
(1970-2000) 
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Source: own elabouration based on: table 2. 
The distance from Poland shows (fig. 2) the strength of linkages between the 
business cycles (measured by the value of correlation coefficients between them). The 
arrows show the likely (because correlation is not able to judge it) direction of the flow 
of conjuncture impulses. 
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There can be a quite clear distinction between two groups of countries shown 
(fig. 2), which are interlinked with each other. It concerns the region of CEE countries 
and Western Europe with the United States, too. The Polish business cycle has a 
similar course as those two groups. As we can see from the picture, there is the 
‘apparent synchronisation’ of the Polish and Danish business cycles, because the latter 
shows significant relations with the United States and the United Kingdom. It is also 
justified by the small trade exchange between Poland and Denmark, which is too small 
to be able to influence the course of the business cycle of Poland. A similar situation 
can be in the case of the Netherlands, however, Polish exports to this countiy are larger 
(than in the case of Denmark), and also the size of a Dutch economy is much larger, 
than the Danish one. Poland also shows a similarity to Czechoslovakia and the 
countries that emerged after its split (especially to Slovakia), but the direction of the 
relations should be rather from Poland, than to it. However, the likeliness can be 
caused by similar, although quite independent, economic changes in both countries 
(due to the transition process). 
3.1. Lagged synchronisation in the period 1970-2000 
To verify the possibilities of the influence of other countries on the Polish 
economy the next year, proper correlation coefficients were calculated. It is justified by 
the rules of the economic phenomena: the influence of one countiy upon another does 
not have to be seen in the same year, but may also influence the economy later or the 
influence may begin later, e.g. one year. Such a delay was studied further in this text. 
Without presenting the whole correlation table a few results will be shown. 
The statistically significant (5%) values of correlation coefficient were obtained 
for: Poland (0.433), Austria (-0.389), Sweden (-0.377) and the UK (0.370). It means 
that the pace of economic growth of Poland (or more exactly: the value of the deviation 
of trend obtained with the use of HP filter, as it was used again in this exercise) was 
positively influenced by the pace of growth of Poland and the UK in the previous year. 
Although it could be quite obvious that last year’s economic situation of Poland 
significantly influenced its performance in the following year, the results obtained for 
the UK are still surprising. 
The conclusion for the economic policy in Poland is that the policy makers should 
analyse not only the past economic condition of Poland in the previous year, but also 
(although to smaller extent) the situation in the UK. Again: it does not mean that the 
UK is the only country which could influence the Polish economy one year later, but 
regarding the countries connected with trade linkages with Poland and with 
themselves, the UK shows the largest similarities. 
The influence of Austria and Sweden can be negative, but the connection should be 
explained also by factors different from Polish trade (because of their small share in 
Polish foreign trade). 
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3.2. Rolling correlation in the period 1970-2000 
The presented calculations concerned a very long period - 31 years. The changes 
during this period can be checked, analysing shorter subperiods. To achieve this, the 
technique of rolling correlation was adapted. It enabled analysis of the so-called 
problem of stationarity of the time serie. 
Table 3. Correlation coefficients between deviation of HP trend for real GDP of the 
largest receivers of Polish exports (9-years periods during 1970-2000) 
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1981 0.67 0.38 0.72 0.08 0.90 0.61 0.14 0.59 -0.26 0.38 0.17 0.62 0.61 0.60 0.06 -0.10 
1982 0.65 0.39 0.75 0.05 0.92 0.66 0.30 0.55 -0.14 0.31 0.06 0.61 0.70 0.66 0.07 0.07 
1983 0.57 0.40 0.69 0.00 0.91 0.68 0.27 0.52 -0.05 0.51 0.15 0.49 0.66 0.68 0.44 0.21 
1984 0.63 0.42 0.68 0.12 0.90 0.74 0.34 0.54 -0.10 0.60 0.20 0.65 0.60 0.75 0.23 0.22 
1985 0.67 0.68 0.70 0.32 0.84 0.74 0.43 0.44 0.61 0.72 -0.06 0.62 0.40 0.75 0.37 0.46 
1986 -0.18 0.36 0.19 -0.08 0.77 0.51 -0.14 0.53 0.21 -0.14 0.29 0.18 0.06 0.55 0.27 0.48 
1987 -0.84 0.19 0.00 0.14 0.87 0.67 -0.05 0.60 0.45 -0.28 0.69 0.20 0.24 0.68 0.05 0.72 
1988 -0.81 0.51 0.07 0.34 0.79 0.65 0.31 0.59 0.42 -0.34 0.74 0.26 0.21 0.65 0.01 0.70 
1989 -0.65 0.21 -0.03 0.15 0.78 0.67 0.05 0.88 0.29 -0.44 0.77 0.07 0.19 0.63 0.02 0.66 
1990 -0.65 0.19 -0.09 0.20 0.77 0.67 0.07 0.87 0.33 -0.44 0.81 0.07 0.14 0.63 -0.06 0.67 
1991 -0.66 0.25 -0.19 0.20 0.75 0.69 0.09 0.81 0.37 -0.47 0.80 0.05 0.09 0.64 -0.08 0.69 
1992 -0.66 0.20 -0.16 0.15 0.74 0.69 0.03 0.80 0.32 -0.46 0.82 -0.05 0.15 0.65 0.01 0.69 
1993 -0.73 0.12 -0.15 0.03 0.77 0.66 -0.05 0.80 0.29 -0.53 0.82 -0.13 0.19 0.65 0.26 0.68 
1994 -0.81 0.04 -0.40 -0.19 0.79 0.63 -0.19 0.78 0.24 -0.69 0.79 -0.30 0.31 0.62 0.49 0.64 
1995 -0.69 0.14 -0.06 -0.01 0.83 0.88 -0.04 0.84 0.35 -0.51 0.87 -0.14 0.28 0.86 0.34 0.79 
1996 -0.45 0.03 -0.28 -0.45 0.46 0.50 -0.14 -0.16 0.07 -0.19 0.45 -0.23 0.32 0.61 0.71 0.35 
Notes: The years indicate the middle of the period (e.g. 1996 means the period 1992-2000). 
Other notes and sources: as in table 2. 
The above results can be presented in a graphic form, choosing the most important 
countries (from the point of view of strength of correlation) as shown in figure 3. 
Quite clear is the growing strength of correlation coefficients between deviation of 
the trend of real GDP for Poland and a sample of the most industrialised countries 
(apart from France) in 1970s and their stabilisation (usually at an insignificant level - 
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apart from the UK and the Netherlands) in 1980s. However in the 1990s the situation 
changed. The correlation with the United Kingdom and the United States remained 
high. It decreased in other cases, and for Germany had negative values (often 
statistically significant). It means that the opinions of some economists about the 
influence of the German economy on the Polish one are not supported by the results of 
quantitative methods. There was also a high correlation between Poland and Hungary 
and between Poland and Czechoslovakia (after 1992: the Czech and Slovak Republics) 
in 1990s. 
Figure 3. Dynamics of correlation coefficients for 9-year periods in 1970-2000 
between deviations of HP trend of real GDP of Poland and its largest 
receivers of export 
as— Great Britain United States 
—•—Czech Rep. —®— Hungary —* —Slovakia 
Notes and source: see table 3. 
The strength of correlation linkages have changed (fig. 3), in some cases greatly 
and for the Polish present situation the most important are those of the last years (after 
the transformation crisis). Thus, the course of rolling correlation in the last few years 
should be analysed. Taking into account only the last 9-year long period, does not 
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guarantee the best results, due to the existence of ‘apparent correlation’ (see: table 3). 
This period was characterised by huge variations in the results. These could be caused 
not by external factors, but primarily - by internal, due to the rapid and deep changes 
in economic structure during the transition process. During the last few years, a 
significant influence of the external situation could be observed in Poland, especially in 
the fourth quarter of 1998 and in the first quarter of 1999 (impact of the Russian crisis), 
and at the end of 2001 with 2002 (the world recession). Thus the arithmetic average for 
the last three periods was counted (from table 3), i.e. 1990-98, 1991-99, 1992-2000, 
which covers the whole 1990s period (see: table 4). 
Table 4. Average correlation coefficients between deviations of HP trend for real GDP 
of the largest receivers of Polish exports in last three 9-years periods 
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-0.65 0.07 -0.25 -0.22 0.69 0.67 -0.12 0.49 0.22 -0.46 0.70 -0.22 0.30 0.70 0.51 0.59 -0.29 0.18 -0.18 -0.55 
Notes: 
The strongest (positive) values of coefficients are in bold. 
* « 
average for last two periods (because of the lack of data for 1990). 
Source: as in table 3. 
We can observe that there are similarities between business cycles of Poland and of 
Hungary, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and the United Kingdom. The synchronisation 
for Finland might be apparent. Calculating the correlation coefficients of Finland’s 
business cycles with others for the period 1992-2000 have verified it. It appeared that 
the largest (significant) values were for Slovakia (0.92) and the United Kingdom 
(0.82).2 
Attention should be paid to Germany once again. The coefficients had negative 
values. With such a large importance of this country, as the main trade partner of 
Poland, it could mean, that the lower (higher) the rate of real GDP growth in Germany 
is, the higher (lower) it is in Poland. Of course, the results of correlation counts do not 
indicate the logical linkages between the two phenomena, and the data obtained might 
be a result of different internal changes: unification of Germany and transformation in 
Poland. Anyway: there is no positive relation between Poland and Germany in terms of 
■j 
business cycle correspondence/ 
' Further results: Lithuania (0.79), Sweden (0.73), Denmark (0.73), Spain (0.71), Italy (0.68), and at the 
10% significance level: France (0.64) and Hungary (0.6). 
3 Although Germany is the country often taken as a basis for analysing the business cycle synchronisation 
within the EU. See: Artis and Zhang (1997). 
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4. Conclusions 
Poland’s economy opens increasingly more during the transition period, as other 
countries. It also assimilates with EU economies. This trend should have had an impact 
on the business cycle synchronisation of Poland and other countries. The Polish 
economy during the last decade shows the largest correspondence of its business cycle 
with the United Kingdom (and the United States), as well as with other Visegrad-4 
countries (Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic). 
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Macroeconomic Development of Slovakia 
during the Transition Process 
Gabriela Revilakova 
The chronology of the Slovak development examines alternative approaches to the 
understanding of economic policy and the process of transition. This section focuses on 
the results achieved at the macroeconomic level and as seen in the function of policies. 
The period of 1990-1999 is divided into several stages and supplemented with some 
characteristic features of the individual stages: 
• the period of initial stabilisation 1990-1992, 
• the reversal and revitalisation stage 1993-1995, 
• disbalanced growth stage 1996-1998, 
• equilibrium recovery 1999-2000. 
1. The period of initial stabilisation 1990-1992 
During the early stages of reform transition, the decision-making sphere in 
Czechoslovakia chose the method of so-called “shock therapy44. The decision was 
influenced by economic neo-liberalism. The refonn steps should have been 
implemented immediately because of the likelihood of a transition trap, i.e. a situation 
where the rules of the communist-type economy are already weakened but not fully 
functioning and economy is at the bottom. 
In 1990, a transition scenario was developed. A significant number of prices were 
liberalised on 1 January 1991. It was important that the first reform step gave 
preferences to stabilisation, to the establishment of equilibrium, to hinder inflation, and 
to eliminate state budget deficits. The success of that stage was measured by the fact 
that the shock of inflation could be stopped in a way compatible with a market based 
economy, e.g. by openly raising prices. The weakening of the economy’s performance, 
the growth of unemployment rates, and the reduction of real wages have demonstrated 
its failure. 
Anti-inflationary actions of the government were in the form of a restrictive 
monetary and budgetary policy that enabled a gradual stabilisation of price levels. The 
policy fiercely suppressed the economy. It resulted in either companies or households 
being unable to implement the necessary structural changes because of their adverse 
revenue situations. A reduction of production was expected but underestimated. The 
cumulative drop of GDP in Slovakia between 1989 and 1993 when the transition- 
related depression came to an end, was about 25%. This decrease was comparable with 
what was experienced in the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary. It was also less 
than the decline of GDP in a majority of less developed post-communist countries. 
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2. The reversal and revitalisation stage 1993-1995 
A “Strategy of economic revival^ was adopted in November 1992. The major points of 
this strategy were: 
• stimulation of macroeconomic expansion by relieving fiscal and credit policy; 
• an active trade policy that included support of exports to European countries and 
CIS (Community of the Independent States); 
• restructuring of industry under the leadership and financial assistance of the state. 
There were signs as early as 1992 that the bottom cusp of transition-related 
depression and subsequent revitalisation had been achieved. The most important 
influence was arguably the establishment of a new state even though it caused 
a temporary recurrence of economic problems. The World Bank (1995) and I. Miklos 
(1993) - Slovak deputy prime minister for the economy - noted that the recurring 
macroeconomic instability and the unavoidable economic drop in 1993 were economic 
consequences of changing the legal form of the state. 
Declines in GDP generation in 1993 were at a milder pace. From a macroeconomic 
viewpoint, the subsequent period of 1994 and 1995 can be determined, with a certain 
caution, to be the most successful to date. 
The 1994 revitalisation of Slovakia was achieved exclusively through the growth 
of exports. Slovakia’s structural weakness of having an excessive proportion of semi¬ 
products then became an advantage for quickly overcoming the recession. But the trade 
in such products is dependent on prosperity. 
Revitalisation from the outside gradually translated to re-growth of additional GDP 
components. The remaining problem was that domestic demand grew faster than GDP 
and caused a strong growth of imports. Slovakia did not seize the opportunity offered 
by revitalisation to implement necessary structural and institutional changes. 
3. Disbalanced growth stage 1996-1998 
During this period, economic policy gave preference to high growth rates and ignored 
institutional change requirements. There was no pronounced success in restructuring 
the economy and no completion of transition-related steps. It ignored and 
underestimated the potential of imbalances to produce questionable outcomes. 
In 1996, macroeconomic development was seen as a breakthrough year. In the 
presence of high economic growth, there were still problems of both internal and 
external imbalances, requiring marked interventions. The major reason for the 
macroeconomic disbalance was excessively expansive fiscal policy. 
The tendencies for imbalances fully manifested themselves in 1996, due to 
a pronounced contribution of fiscal policy. The policy provided a marked expansion of 
expenditures to cover the end-consumption by state administration along with a strong 
growth in capital investments, with an extraordinary portion allocated by the state. 
The imbalance between domestic demand and GDP generation was shown by 
a disturbance of external equilibrium, while the impact on prices was substantially less. 
We can say that changes in economic policy priorities after 1995, to the benefit of 
growth and to the detriment of equilibrium, became clearly reflected in the 
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macroeconomic development. The high growth rates of the period were forced and 
some manifestations of imbalance were no more acceptable during the subsequent 
development. 
4. Equilibrium recovery stage 1999-2000 
There was a significant change in transition process concepts towards the end of 1998. 
Efforts spent to eliminate the macroeconomic imbalance could not be sustained, even 
at the cost of temporarily weakening economic growth. 
The pillars of economic growth were defined as first, a new institutional 
framework, and second: a restructuring and improvement of competitiveness of the 
corporate sector. 
4.1. Short-term consequences of the stabilisation operation 
Experience from the stabilisation operation (short-term aspect) suggests that one of 
the goals of the economic policy, namely diminishing of external imbalance, will 
obviously be achieved. This goal is connected with an improvement of the domestic 
demand (rations of GDP increase), and of proportions between savings and 
investments. There is some dispute concerning the price to be paid for the 
reestablishment of equilibrium, being some negative trends of other parameters such as 
unemployment, GDP growth rates, or inflation rates. Economist Ivan Miklos considers 
a temporary worsening of some parameters as an unavoidable consequence of the 
previous development, and prefers establishing equilibrium and institutional changes 
warranting the growth of the economy at a higher quality level. 
4.2. Overview of the Slovak Republic economy development in 2000 
The economy development in the Slovak Republic in 2000 was strongly influenced 
by politics. In December 1999 the decision made by the European Council summit in 
Helsinki opened the negotiations on Slovakia entry to the European Union. The 
Slovakian government, in response to the challenge and also upon the needs of the 
economy itself, speeded up the reforms concluding the Slovak economy transition into 
a fully functional market economy. The reforms were, more than in the preceding 
years, oriented to changes in the institutional environment, for the restructuring of 
banks and company sector, for completion of the privatisation, all that with the 
intention to ensure a sustainable and irreversible reforming process. 
In line with the measures adopted in 1999, the economic policy continued also in 
the year 2000 in improvement of macroeconomic equilibrium. Its direct impact 
lowering real wages and increasing unemployment, represented one of the sources of 
social and political tension that led to the referendum on early parliamentary elections. 
Although, the outcomes of the Autumn 2000 referendum allowed the government to 
continue the economic policy reform process. 
The recorded GDP rate of growth in the year 2000 (analogously to 1999) was 
achieved by the combined influence of two circumstances. One of them was the 
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economic policy supporting the balance recovery and acting on behalf of the reforms 
(expect for other, including also several stages of still adequately powerful dynamism 
aligning regulated prices towards their market-balanced level). Secondly, it was the 
factor of a future development and probably also the culmination of the prospering 
world economy. Thanks to the interaction of the above described factors, the rate of 
GDP growth in 2000 was rather low, although it still ended up in the positive value of 
2.2%. A combination of the positive influence of the factors mentioned in 2000 
reflected also in an ongoing decline of the foreign trade balance deficit. 
Data on parameters and outcomes of the financial and monetary policy validated 
the ultimate approach that was adopted throughout the course of 1999 and 2000 with 
the aim to eliminate the causes of economic imbalance. 
Particularly the joint effect of the pro-reform economic policy and a favourable 
situation in the external economic environment in 2000 but also the growth of the 
prices of industrial producers, presumably led to an improved corporate financial 
situation. The measures adopted to support both external and internal market balance, 
together with implementation of restructuring goals and under low GDP growth in 
1999 and 2000 spilt over into a serious distortion on the labour market. 
Deterioration of economic equilibrium in the course of 1996-1998 was reflected in 
the overall economic development not earlier than in the fourth quarter 1998 and 1999, 
with a delayed effect. Average annual values regarding the overall situation of the 
economy indicated that in the year 2000 the stabilising measures started to bring their 
effect for a favourable development of the economy as a whole. 
In conclusion to the overall review on the economy of the Slovak Republic in 2000 
I would like to repeat, that the overall equilibrium improved. At the same time it is 
necessary to stress that the achieved equilibrium cannot still be considered as 
satisfactory and this improvement need not be sustainable. Several open and 
complicated tasks from the year 2000 pass into the next period (namely the 
accomplishment of restructuralisation of the banks, restructuralisation of the business 
sector and the social system provision). Without addressing these problems equilibrium 
cannot be maintained at the level already achieved. 
5. Conclusions 
The macroeconomic development of Slovakia has reflected two factors that have been 
underestimated during the process of transition to date: 
1. underestimation of the institutional framework of a functioning market economy, 
2. underestimation of the required coordination of macroeconomic policies during the 
restructuring of the economy. 
Repeated destabilisations of the economy were the result of these factors having 
been neglected. Therefore, even after a decade since the initial transition steps, the 
economic policy makers have frequently to consider problems similar to those they 
were facing at the very beginning: how to stabilise the economy, how to restructure it, 
how to prevent the existence of soft budgetary constraints, how to draft functional rules 
for the behaviour of economic entities under new conditions, etc. 
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Slovakia’s example suggests that macroeconomic successes forced by the 
economic and political centre through inadequate stimulation of financial policy tools 
will vanish, and will not be able to be supported by a sufficiently viable corporate 
sector. 
The fact that the imbalanced development has to be repeatedly remedied by 
packages of unpopular measures suggests the limited ability of the automatic economic 
regulators to operate, and the unreliability of the coordination mechanism of the 
economy. 
In view of the above, I consider it necessary that economic policy support the 
supply side of the economy. That type of support can improve economic performance 
through effects on formal and informal rules of behaviour, elimination of allocation 
mechanism distortions, restructuring, support of human capital development, and 
innovations. While supply side support is less direct and not as fast as demand-side 
support, supply side effects are long-term in nature. Higher quality economic growth 
and stability can be achieved by this approach. Going back to the economic stimulation 
of performance through domestic demand stimulation would likely result in a 
recurrence of the problems of economic imbalances. 
Table 1. Selected macroeconomic indicators of the Slovak Republic 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Real GDP growth (%) * 6.7 6.2 6.2 4.1 1.9 2.2 3.3 
Inflation CPI-average (%) 9.9 5.8 6.1 6.7 10.6 12.2 7.2 
Unemployment rate (%) ** 13.1 11.3 11.8 12.5 15.9 18.6 19.2 
Average monthly wage (USD) 242.2 266.0 274.4 283.9 259.0 247.4 256.0 
Notes: 
* up to 1999 according to ESA 793, 2000 according to ESA 954 
** Labour Force Survey (statistic method) 
Source: Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic, National Bank of Slovakia, Ministry of Finance of the 
Slovak Republic. 
A conceptual approach to completing the transition process is required. It must 
strive to improve the coordination of individual components of economic policy, 
provide links between macroeconomomic policies and microeconomic restructuring, 
and eliminate distorted parts of the institutional framework. It can establish an 
environment that will not require more packages of rescue measures for survival under 
strains and uncertainty. 
3 European system of integrated economic accounts - year 1979. 
4 European system of national and region accounts in the community - year 1995. 
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The International Debt of Poland 
Monika Bodo 
In the 1980s, an international debt crisis occurred. The increasing debt of countries 
resulted in a lack of capacity on the part of debtor countries to serve their debts. As a 
result of this, foreign debt became a problem for countries and banks - the creditors. 
This situation posed a serious threat to the world’s financial system and the world’s 
economy and could have brought about a world recession. Debts call for the necessity 
to work out surplus in the current account of the balance of payments, due to the fact 
that it is possible to pay on time instalments of credits taken out as well as interests for 
a given year. It is substantial that the surplus should not be a result of limiting the 
imports but that it should be caused by an increased dynamics of the growth of exports 
over imports. A safe threshold is constituted by a situation when the debt repayment 
does not exceed a fifth (i.e. 20%) of the exports value. At the beginning of the 1980s, 
debts were so large in the case of many countries that instead of being a factor to 
stimulate the economic development credits, they became a slowing-down factor.1 
Short-term credits granted by, above all, the Bank for International Settlements in 
Basle and the International Monetary Fund, were to counteract the crisis. These actions 
were defined as bridging finance. Their main purpose was to maintain the paying 
capacity of the countries in debt until long-term plans to solve the crisis were prepared. 
The creditor countries were ready to bear some costs in the face of the global crisis. 
The International Monetary Fund played a vital part in the change of the approach to 
the issue of debts. It became one of the main initiators of adaptation programmes in the 
countries in debt; at the same time, it induced commercial banks to change the debt 
repayment conditions they had adhered to up to this time and to grant further credits. 
Market means and techniques to reduce debts were developed in this period: trading in 
debts began, while a part of the debts was amortised by the countries-creditors (See: 
Kisiel-Lowczyc, 1997, p. 192-193; Lutkowski, 1996, pp. 143-144). 
Poland filed an application to join the IMF only in November 1981 (and was 
finally accepted in 1986). At this time, our country was in the situation of an open 
financial crisis. With the total debt of USS 23 billion and a deficit to the West of US$ 
2.3 billion, Poland was not able to pay the instalments of credits due. The approval by 
the IMF of the Polish adaptation plan and giving an access to credits, made it easier for 
Poland to hold talks with the Paris Club about restructuring our guaranteed debt. On 24 
April 1991, an agreement on the reduction and reorganisation of the guaranteed debt 
was concluded. The Paris Club then decided to amortise 50% of the debt, out of which 
30% was amortised at once and the remaining 20% was to be amortised only when 
1 In accordance with the calculations made, if a country in debt does not repay its debt on time this results 
in a five-times drop of the liquidity of the world’s financial system. A few factors contributed to upsetting 
this proportion in the 1970s and the 1980s: a rise in petroleum prices (years of 1973-1974 and 1978-1979): 
an increase of the number of petrodollars; a recession in industrialised countries and a drop in the demand 
for raw materials, which in turn contributed to the drop of the prices of these; it was easy to obtain credits 
and the interest rate was relatively low; using loans in a manner inconsistent with the declared purpose. 
See: Kisiel-Lowczyc (1997, pp. 190-192); Lutkowski (1996, pp. 142-143); Bernas (1995, pp. 336-339). 
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Poland had realised the adaptation programme presented to the IMF in the spring of 
1991. Poland made an offer to its creditors to buy out the debt from 1988, 41 cents for 
one dollar and the debts from 1983 and 1984 for 38 cents for one dollar. 99.5% of the 
debt was declared for the reduction contract and commencing 14 September, contracts 
with individual creditors began to be signed. On 14 April 1994, judicial creditors 
finally approved the reduction of the Polish debt by 50%. 
The agreement with the Parish Club opened the way to negotiations with creditors 
gathered around the London Club. An agreement with the London Club signed in April 
1994 defined general principles for the reduction of our debt. A debt estimated at US$ 
13.2 billion was reduced by 45.2%. The agreement was reached in accordance with 
Brady’s principles. 
In the years 1990-1998, Poland also received credits from the World Bank to the 
total amount of US$3.5 billion. These credits concerned definite projects in the country 
(table 1). 
Table 1. The World Bank credits for Poland, 1990-1998 
Years Amount (US$ m) Intend 
1990 
145 Railways Transport 
250 Energy Resource Development 
300 Structural Adjustment Loan 
1991 
200 Financial Institution Development Loan 
238 Privatisation and Restructuring Loan 
228 Heat Supply Restucturing and Conservation Project 
1992 100 Health Services Development 
1993 
104 Forestry Development Support Project 
150 Road Project 
300 Agriculture Structural Adjustment Loan 
325 Enterprise and Financial Sector Adjustment Loan 
1994 170 Debt and Debt Service Reduction Loan 
1996 160 Power Transmission Project 
1997 300 Road II 
200 Help for community suffer because of flood 
Source: Lesniewski and Zachurski (2002, pp. 52-56). 
Agreements with the creditors and their aid made it possible to lower the debt (tab. 2). 
Table 2. Polish foreign debt in the years of 1990-1998 (in million US$) 
Years 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Total gross 
foreign debt 
48,475 48,412 47,044 47,246 42.174 43,957 40,558 38,496 42,687 
Source: GUS (1991-1999). 
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An application of various techniques of debt reduction, for example, through the 
market of debts contributed to the debt decrease, as well. On the market of debts, the 
creditor countries offered for sale the debts of individual countries estimating their 
value depending on their nominal value and the possibility of receiving a given debt, 
that is as a result estimating a debt on market conditions, while the buying and selling 
powers of a given debt or its part played a vital role. It was private individuals who 
bought the debts most often, operating for an increase of their value or, of a company 
that intended to make an investment in a given country (Kisiel-Lowczyc, 1997, p. 193). 
A country in debt could also buy back a debt on this market by prior consent from 
the creditors: the so-called buy-back arrangement. Operations of this type are 
advantageous from a debtor’s point of view as they enable one to obtain a discount 
from creditors owing to buying a debt back on a secondary market. Moreover, while 
they do not result in money creation, they decrease foreign debts in a short period of 
time (in comparison with the buying back time through a repayment in instalments). 
The debtor can choose how to repay the debt: through its amortisation or increasing the 
imports (or the reserves). However, this buying back technique has some drawbacks, 
among others, a necessity to pay out financial means (the reserves of a country in 
debt), which can otherwise serve to make the economic development more dynamic. In 
the case of a shortage of sufficient reserves this makes the debtor use the resources 
transferred to short-term public spending. If these resources come from the IMF this 
country has to conform to the programme and the requirements of the IMF. The 
importance of this solution is shown by an increase of buy-back turnover, which in 
1989 amounted to USS 70 billion and in 1992, as much as USS 500 billion (Pangsy- 
Kania, 2001, pp. 84-86). 
A debt for equity swap is another way to convert debts. It consists in swapping a 
debt for the capital of a country in debt. Two methods exist applied in this restructuring 
technique: a direct method and an indirect method. The former concerns an entity 
which while being a creditor does not grant a discount and accepts on its own an 
investment risk swapping its debt for equities in the debtor country. In the indirect 
method, the debt is bought out from the creditor by a different entity on the market of 
debts (with a discount, which is higher, the higher the risk of not repaying the debt is) 
with the help of mediating institutions, e.g. banks. Next, the “new” creditor swaps the 
debt for the currency of the debtor’s country: the point of reference of the swap is a 
nominal debt. The currency swapped for, most often in the form of a title of 
ownership note, can be assigned solely for investments in a country in debt or for the 
purchase of raw materials and other materials. A possibility also exists for a debtor to 
define the required targets of investments. In Mexico, for example, a programme to use 
the debt swap operation provided for an assignment of the total of the resources gained 
to the stocks of privatised companies. An advantage of this method for a creditor is a 
possibility to obtain the currency of a given country for a relatively low price owing to 
the obtained quantity of discount on the market of debts, particularly if the creditor is 
“ A discount obtained on a market of debts can be very large, e.g. for 1 USS of the debt of Chile 60-61 
cents were paid in 1987, while in the case of Peru: 5-8 cents. See: Najlepszy (1993, pp. 337-339). 
Depending on whether this is a government debt, the debt is converted according to the official exchange 
rate. In the case of a private debt the rate is agreed upon (Woroniecki, 1988, p. 24). 
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intending to make an investment in a country with debts. This is also advantageous for 
this country with debts as it can buy back its debts for a lower price while at the same 
time it facilitates an increase in the number of investments in many economic sectors. 
Such an act of buying back improves the country’s balance of payments as it 
economises not only on decreasing the capital instalments but also on decreasing the 
possible interest should the debt not be bought back.3 
A phenomenon of a reduction of debts also appeared in return for investments in 
the area of environmental protection, the so-called debt for nature swap. In such a case, 
a debt is cancelled or sold with a discount to an ecological organisation, which in turn 
while swapping it for the currency of a country in debt or bonds makes at the same 
time investments that facilitate environment protection. Owing to this solution, the 
Minister of Finance created in 1992 the Eco-Fund, whose task was to manage the 
resources (c. USS 500 million) obtained through a debt for nature swap. The debt for 
nature swap enables settling a part of the foreign debt without the necessity to change 
the country’s currency into foreign exchange as the payment of the agreed part of the 
debt consists in transferring it to the Polish zloty through the mediation of the Eco- 
Fund to ecological investments, which serve not only the country but also improve the 
living conditions (decrease of pollution) of all the people. In order to encourage a 
country being a creditor to swap part of its outstandings for ecological investments in a 
country being in debt, during the realisation of investments machines and equipment 
are most often purchased in the country that agreed to debt for nature swap. The size of 
a debt for nature swap in relation to the whole of the debt in accordance with the 
agreement concluded between Poland and the Paris Club on the reduction and 
reorganisation of indebtedness, cannot exceed 10% of the total debt or USS 20 million: 
depending which is higher (Pangsy-Kania, 2001, pp. 81-84, pp. 134-139). 
The value of concluded debt-for-nature-swap contracts is presented in the table 
below: 
Table 3. The value of concluded debt-for-nature-swap contracts 
Date of debt for 
nature swap Country Amount 
Percent 
of debt Remarks 
1991 Finland USS 20 million Concerns projects agreed 
upon jointly by both 
countries 
1992 USA USS 367 million 10% 
1993 Switzerland CFIF 68 million 10% 
1993 France FRF 260 million 1% 
Source: Mozejko (1995). 
3 
If a company which is intending to invest in Poland would like to obtain Polish currency at a lower cost, 
it can order a bank mediating in operations on the international market to buy the Polish debt of USS 5 
million value for USS 2 million. The investor then changes this debt in the National Bank of Poland for 
PLN for an equivalent of e.g. USS 4 million. Owing to this operation the investor can obtain the Polish 
currency of USS 4 million value for a price half as low, and the central bank while buying back a debt of 
USS 5 million, pays for it 20% less, that is USS 4 million; example from: Pangsy-Kania (2001, pp. 73-75). 
The International Debt of Poland 187 
Apart from the above mentioned countries, three more countries showed their 
interest in this way to reduce the Polish debt: Sweden - US$ 6.5 million, Italy - US$ 
32.5 million and Norway. A sign of recognition of the actions of the Eco-Fund was the 
main prize that it received on the worldwide competition “Energy Globe - The World 
Award for Sustainable Energy” in March 2002 in the category of private and public 
initiatives for an application of the mechanism of the foreign debt swap for investments 
concerning environmental protection. The value of the 152 projects in this area during 
the whole period of the Eco-Fund activity exceeded PLN 1.2 million (the Fund itself 
supported them with the amount of PLN 240 million) (Budnikowski, 1989; Mozejko, 
1995; Pangsy-Kania, 2001, pp. 81-84, p. 135; Trzaskowski, 2002, p. 34). 
In most cases, buying back the debt is done in accordance with the terms and 
schedule of repayments. Flowever, sometimes this happens before the day of payment. 
This happened in the case of a part of Brady’s bonds, with the day of redemption on 27 
October 2024. A total of US$ 289.5 million of the debt was bought. These were the so- 
called RSTA type bonds, i.e. bonds concerning revolving credits not repaid by Poland. 
Owing to these actions, the structure of the debt was improved, its servicing costs 
decreased, as well. For example, a debt recently bought back saved US$ 330 million: 
this is the amount of interest till the year 2024 concerning this debt. This enabled a sale 
of a part of 30-years’ re-couponed bonds of the US government (the so-called 
collaterals), which secured the debt. A nominal value of collaterals is the same as the 
value of Brady’s bonds. Owing to the fact that a part of the debt was bought back 
earlier nominally the same value of American bonds could be sold on the market, as a 
result of which the ministry can recover 25% of their value, that is c. US$ 70 million. 
However, due to a high exchange rate of the Polish zloty, the sale of these bonds can 
occur later when the exchange rate of the Polish zloty falls down, thanks to which after 
converting the currencies a larger amount of zloty will be gained.4 
Money to retire Brady’s bonds was gained by the Ministry from the sale of 
Eurobonds in January 2001. An amount of 750 million euro gained on the international 
capital market in part (250 million euro) paid into a currency account in the National 
Bank of Poland enabled an anticipatory buying the debt back. A swap of an old debt 
originating from the communist period for Eurobonds is to facilitate an improvement 
of the credibility of Poland on the international capital market. This will be particularly 
important in the years of 2004-2008, when the largest repayments are due. 
Other instances of an anticipatory buying back in the previous years enabled 
Poland to buy back almost half of the debt in Brady’s bonds. In 1997, the total value of 
the Polish debt due for Brady’s bonds was US$ 7,739.7 million, the four retirements of 
Brady’s bonds so far totalled US$ 3,665.7 million, bonds of total USS 4,074 million 
remained. Out of which: 
• USS 2,487 million (c. 61%): PDI bonds, 
4 For example: in the year of 2000, the Ministry of Finance also retired a part of Brady’s bonds (USS 942 
million), thanks to which a total value of USS 1,553.7 million (with the redemption for 2022-2023) could 
be sold. The Ministry withheld this operation till 8 January 2001 when on the secondary market the price 
of these bonds reached a favourable level; the amount of USS 438.9 million obtained in this manner was 
converted into the Polish zloty in the National Bank of Poland (c. PLN 1.8 million) and was assigned for 
the current budgetary needs. See: Raport o dzialalnosci urzqdu w latach 1997-2007; Wprost (2001) No. 
17, p. 36; Rzeczpospolita (2001) No. 86. 
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• USS 745 million (18%): parity bonds, 
• USS 449 million (11%): RSTA bonds, 
• USS 393 million (10%): DCB discount bonds.3 * 5 
Brady’s bonds are traded on the secondary market of debts. They provide 
information to Poland on the interest shown in our debts and can become a starting 
point for a decision to issue Eurobonds, creating an opportunity for a successful 
emission. At the same time, their value on the secondary market reflects the country’s 
current economic situation, which is of importance to investors, as well. One of the 
highest selling prices is achieved by past due interest bonds as they are regarded as 
carrying the largest risk on the market, which is connected with a lack of collateral for 
these in the form of the US treasury bonds. 
Brady’s bonds are secured with the treasury bonds of the US government as they 
have been considered to be the safest. Poland has purchased American re-couponed 30- 
years’ treasury bonds, the so-called collaterals, which were then deposited on a blocked 
account of the Federal Reserve. The nominal value of these bonds is equal to the value 
of Brady’s bonds. The Polish government cannot sell collaterals on the secondary 
market until it retires the bonds with which they are secured. Collaterals, similarly to 
Brady’s bonds, have a maturity date in the year 2024. Interests from collaterals are 
calculated in various manners: depending of the type of Brady’s bonds they secure. 
The prevailing part the Polish foreign debt consists of credits that are repaid on 
time. At the end of 2001, the debt owed to Brazil was bought back. The nominal value 
of the debt was USS 3.32 billion with maturity in March 2009. As a result of a 
previously concluded agreement, Poland repaid this debt earlier. Advantageous terms 
were negotiated, the debt was repaid at one time but with a discount - below the 
nominal value - for USS 2.46 billion. The Ministry of Finance gained foreign 
exchange resources to realise the terms of an agreement with the National Bank of 
Poland from foreign exchange reserves. Thanks to such an operation Poland saved USS 
869 million on the nominal value of the debt alone, not counting the interest which it 
would have had to pay if the debt had been repaid on time. Earlier, Brazil offered 
security. As a result of this, Brazil was to issue on the international capital market 
bonds that were to be secured with the Polish debt. Such a collateral would cause an 
increase in the value of these bonds, however this would also mean bearing costs 
connected with the issue of the bonds and a risk in the case of a failure. This is why a 
decision was made to repay the debt directly by Poland. This debt originated from the 
1970s. It was the result of incurred imports credits. They were not repaid in the 1980s. 
The repayments were resumed only after the reduction of the Polish debt as a result of 
talks with the Paris Club.6 
3 PDI bonds - this kind of obligation came into being from no pay back and no extinction interests with 
the time of redemption 2014. Parity bonds - come into being from long- and middle-term debt, with the 
time of redemption 2024. RSTA bonds - come into being from short term debt, with the time of 
redemption 2024. Discount bonds - this obligation with the time of redemption 2024, come into being 
from debt creditors banks, with capital reduction (Rzeczpospolita, 2000, No. 11); Ministry of Finance, data 
on 1998 year; Rzeczpospolita (2001) No. 86. 
6 The value of the planned issue of the Brazilian bonds was to be USS 2.4 billion and was to include a 
period of 10 years. Due to the relatively good position of Polish commercial papers on the international 
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However, the repayment of the foreign debt entails the necessity to purchase a 
large quantity of hard currencies - most often, American dollars - hence the Ministry 
of Finance while foreseeing such a spending makes every effort to be prepared for it. 
One of the methods is to accumulate a proper quantity of the Polish currency on the 
domestic market so that it could be converted to dollars at the right moment. A method 
applied more often is to sell bonds and papers on the domestic market. This money is 
then deposited on an account in the National Bank of Poland in the form of, for 
example, a deposit so that they could in the right moment be converted and the 
instalments of the foreign debt be repaid. However, this entails the necessity to 
increase the domestic debt and to repay it (Rzeczpospo/ita, 2002, No. 42). In order to 
improve the repayment of the foreign debt in 1999 the National Bank of Poland 
proposed opening a foreign currency account to deposit money (in foreign exchange) 
originating from privatisation and which was to be assigned to the foreign debt 
repayment. This deposit was to contribute (among other things) to the attenuation of 
fluctuations of the Polish zloty exchange rate. As a rule, foreign investors while buying 
shares in privatised companies made all payments in Polish zloty first buying it on the 
market and leading to the increase of the strength of the Polish zloty. The government 
in turn while intending to use the funds accumulated in this way to repay the foreign 
debt converted it back to other currencies, as a result of which the Polish zloty 
weakened. In order to attenuate the foreign exchange rate fluctuations resulting from 
these operations the National Bank of Poland proposed to the government to make a 
part of payments connected with privatisation in foreign currencies. In October 2002, a 
part of payments for the sale of Telekomunikacja Polska S.A. came to this account. A 
part of this amount was assigned by the government to retire Brady’s bonds (US$ 942 
million). In the course of time, the guidelines concerning the sources of the origin of 
foreign exchange that can appear on this account were modified. Initially, this could be 
only foreign exchange gained solely from privatisation. At present, this account refers 
to other sources to obtain foreign exchange, among others from an issue of Eurobonds. 
However, the purpose of these resources is the repayment of the foreign debt. The 
government’s assumptions for the year 2000 provided for receipts from privatisation of 
PLN 20.1 billion, out of which PLN 8 billion (c. 40%) was to come to the account to 
enable the repayment of a part of the foreign debt of PLN 5.1 billion planned for the 
year 2000. The remaining amount could be used for an anticipatory buying back a part 
of the debt or could constitute a collateral of the repayment of the instalments due for 
the next year.* * * * * * 7 
market Brazil expected a better term of the credit: its lower interest. Before that, the Polish debt had 
already been once a collateral of the French government securities. In 1999, the French government 
agency issued a 7-years’ bonds with a nominal value of FRF 1,250 million and 10-years’ bonds of US$600 
million, whose collateral was the Polish debt owed to France. These bonds bore the risk on the part of 
Poland and their issue was agreed upon with the Polish government. Slojewska (2001); Rzeczpospolita 
(2001) No. 255; IFpm?/(2001) No. 38, p. 42. 
7 J^drzejewska (2000); ‘Dewizy na grosze jutro. Rozmowa z Boguslawem Grabowskim, czlonkiem Rady 
Polityki Pieni^znej o wykorzystaniu wplywow z prywatyzacji’, Rzeczpospolita No. 85; Rzeczpospolita 
(1999), No. 297; Rzeczpospolita (2000), No. 175, No. 239, No. 240, No. 257; Rzeczpospolita (2001), No. 
10. 
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Eurobonds constitute a part of the Polish debt. Eurobonds have almost all attributes 
of bonds with the exception of the fact that they are denominated in currencies 
different from the one of the country issuing them. Their sale and trading in them is 
done on international markets (stock exchanges). “A Eurobond is hence a bearer’s 
security. It constitutes an obligation on the part of the issuer to pay to the owner of the 
Eurobond the amount of the Eurobond (once or in instalments on specified dates) 
together with the interest after presenting this document as well as to pay interest 
coupons on conditions specified in it until the time of the redemption of the 
Eurobonds.” (R^czkowski, 1977, pp. 370-375). 
Until this day, Poland has issued bonds on the international market eight times. 
Table 4. Basic data concerning the issue of the Polish government Eurobonds 
Date of 
issue 
Amount Time of 
redemption Interest Banks - organizers 
July 1995 US$ 250 million 13 July 2000 7.75 JP Morgan 
July 1996 DM 250 million July 2001 6.125 CSFB and Deutsche Bank 
July 1997 US$ 300 million 1 July 2004 7.125 JP Morgan 
July 1997 US$ 100 million 1 July 2017 7.75 JP Morgan 
March 2000 600 million euro March 2010 6 CSFB and PNB Paribas 
January 2001 750 million euro February 2011 5.5 Deutsche Bank and 
Merrill Lynch 
November 
2001 
250 million euro February 2011 5.5 Deursche Bank and Merrill 
Lynch 
February 2002 750 million euro 12 March 2012 5.5 CSFB and SSSB 
Abbreviations applied: 
CSFB - Credit Suisse First Boston 
SSSB - Schroder Salomon Smith Barney 
Source: Ministry of Finance, data on: www.mf.gov.pl; Rzeczpospolita (2002) No. 49. 
Obtaining currencies for the foreign debt repayment is not the only reason for the 
issue of the Eurobonds. In March 2000, Poland issued 10-years’ Eurobonds (with the 
redemption time of 22 March 2010) of 600 million euro and an interest (a coupon) of 
6%. These were the first Eurobonds of the Polish government nominated in euro. 
Poland, while issuing these bonds, used the mediation of two banks: PNB Paribas and 
Credit Suisse First Boston. Before they were sold they were presented (the so-called 
road-shows) at the most important European financial centres. The image of Poland as 
a debtor is improving, which is evident in the interest these bonds enjoyed: the orders 
reached a total value of 2 billion euro. The purpose of this issue was to create a 
benchmark, i.e. a reference point for Polish enterprises if they were to gain resources 
(euro) on foreign capital markets.8 
Reasons why the government decides to issue Eurobonds may vary, for example, 
receipts from the sale of Eurobonds in November 2001 supplied the state’s budget and 
were used to finance its deficit. The issue of 10-years’ Eurobonds in February 2002 
8 
The issuing price of these bonds was 98.3% of the nominal value while the final profitability 6.24%, 
which is 0.82% more than the profitability of the bonds issued by the German government (therefore, the 
investors estimated that the risk of the insolvency of Poland exceeds by this value the risk connected with 
the German government securities); Rzeczpospolita (2000) No. 57. 
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was assigned just to the repayment of foreign commitments. The whole of the receipts 
was on the foreign exchange account of the Ministry of Finance in the National Bank 
of Poland. For the year 2002, the Ministry of Finance has planned an offer for foreign 
investors the value of US$ 800 million and 1 billion euro (PLN 7.328 billion).9 
It should be noted that an issue of Eurobonds, while enabling one to obtain foreign 
exchange for the repayment or buying back a part of the debt remaining so far, it does 
not significantly decrease the debt because the bonds themselves become a debt. 
However, an issue of these enables a change in the structure of the foreign debt, which 
is related to the improvement of the terms of the credit repayment. 
The size of the Poland’s foreign debt consists only in part of the State Treasury 
debt. In reality, the whole of the Polish debt at the end of the first quarter of 2001 was 
USS 69.2 billion, out of which USS 33.5 billion is the debt of the government sector 
and the remaining part of USS 29.3 billion is the debts of companies, USS 6 billion is 
the debts of the banking sector and USS 0.4 billion is the debt of the National Bank of 
Poland. In the recent years, the greatest dynamics of the foreign debt increase is to be 
observed in the case of companies. The total foreign debt in the first quarter of 2001 
was 43% of GDP (in 1996 - 33%). A positive phenomenon is a drop (commencing 
with the end of 1999) of the value of short-term credits (to be repaid during one year). 
In March 2001, their value was USS 9 billion (in relation to the foreign exchange 
reserves ca. 28%), while at the beginning of the year 2000 - 11.1 billion.10 
Also Polish companies use the possibility to obtain capital through an issue of 
Eurobonds. It was estimated in the middle of 2001 that foreign investors possess bonds 
of Polish companies of c. USS 3 billion value. At the end of the year, this value 
reached USS 3.6 billion. Telekomunikacja Polska S.A. (the main Polish 
telecommunications company) is the leader in this area, which till the middle of 2001 
sold on the international capital market Eurobonds of USS 1 billion and c. 1.5 billion 
euro. At the beginning, most of the issues were denominated in US dollars. At present, 
9 The issuing price of the bonds was 98.32% of the nominal value and their profitability was 5.725%, 
which is 75 points (0.75%) higher than the profitability of the German government treasury bonds. During 
the earlier issues in January 2001 the profitability of Polish bonds exceeds German bonds by 80 points 
while in case of a supplementary issue from November 2001 only 74 points. Ministry of Finance, data on: 
www.mf.gov.pl; Rzeczpospolita (2001) No. 279; Rzeczpo spoilt a (2002) No. 49. 
10 In the years of 1996-2000 the foreign debt in all sectors of the economy rose from US$ 47.5 billion to 
USS 68.2 billion at the end of the year 2000 (1997: USS 49.6 billion, 1998: 59.2, 1999: 64.9). One of the 
reasons for the increase of the debt of companies was issues of bonds on foreign markets, e.g. USS 3.6 
billion from the debt of companies is securities of companies in the hands of foreign investors. An 
additional factor contributing to an increased interest in foreign loans was a very disadvantageous interest 
on credits in the Polish zloty, as well as an unfavourable foreign exchange rate of the Polish zloty and its 
over-appreciation. This, however, poses a threat in the case of the depreciation of the Polish currency as it 
causes an increase of costs connected with the repayment of credits (more zloty will have to be used for 
the repayment of a credit of the same foreign exchange value) and, at present, not many companies can 
afford to protect themselves against such a risk. This risk is very high if one considers the worsening 
results of the foreign commerce, a decreasing rate of GPD growth, problems connected with the Polish 
budget and the burden of the government foreign debt servicing. Credits and loans taken out abroad 
constituted c. 43% of the debts of companies (the value as at the end of March 2001: USS 12.5 billion, 
which is 26% higher than in the previous year; USS 8 billion of credits obtained directly from foreign 
investors, the so-called parent companies; c. USS 5 billion of business loans, occurring as a result of 
deferred payments. Chroscicki (2001, p. 24). 
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owing to Poland’s expected entry to the European Union, many companies chose 
issues in euro. In the middle of 2001, the value of issues in both currencies was 
comparable. Also, part of entities of self governments obtain in this way resources for 
their businesses and investments. In the middle of 2002, the amount of foreign debt by 
way of the issue of securities was c. PLN 134 million and exceeded almost twice the 
amount of credits taken out abroad.11 
At the beginning of 2000, Poland’s foreign debt was US$ 31 billion, which 
constituted c. 21% of GDP. The fact that at the beginning of 1990’s this relation was 
on the level of 80% of GDP testifies to the progress Poland has made in this area. At 
the end of July 2000, Poland’s foreign debt was as follows (see: Rzeczpospolita, 2000, 
No. 11): 
• US$21,511 million - the Paris Club, 
• US$ 5,306 million - Brady’s bonds, 
• US$ 2,061 million - international financial institutions, 
• US$ 1,073 million - Eurobonds, 
• US$ 286 million - others. 
Figure 4. All rates (in million US$), which the Polish government should pay back 
annually until 2024 
2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019 2021 2023 2025 
Notes: Data base on budget presume in the year 2001, and estimate data for 31.07.2001- value 
of credit rates (in US$ million): 2001-1.278, 2002-1.413, 2003-1.905, 2004-2.697, 2005- 
2.929, 2006-3.339, 2007-3.778, 2008-4.199, 2009-2.348, 2010-913, 2011-1.006, 2012- 
344, 2013-438, 2014-451, 2015-101, 2016-93, 2017-186, 2018-85, 2019-81, 2020-9, 
2021-9, 2022-9, 2023-1, 2024-1.193 
Source: Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Poland. 
11 ’Zadluzenie rosnie powoli’, Rzeczpospolita (2000) No. 163; see also: Karpiriski (2001). 
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In the future, this diagram will change. The Polish government tends to pay back 
the debt before the time of redemption and improve the structure of payment, thanks to 
the sale of eurobonds or privatisation, for example. The same possibility is on the 
market of debts and new methods using to convert debts. All this activity helps to 
facilitate an improvement in the credibility of Poland on the international capital 
market. This will be particularly important when the largest repayments are due. 
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Consumption Patterns in Poland during Transition 
- Microeconomic Analysis with Regional Aspects 
Krzysztof Piech 
1. Introduction 
Consumption is one of the factors, which contributes most to economic growth. This 
has been known particularly since John M. Keynes tract was published in 1936. 
Consumption decreases during economic crises, but an opposite situation is also 
possible: decrease of consumption (for example due to the course of the business 
cycle) influences economic slowdown. Such dependence can be seen both in Poland as 
well as in many other countries, including Japan.1 Poland has struggled with the 
economic crisis connected with transformation in 1990-91, beginning with the increase 
in food prices in September 1989, causing a serious decrease in real households’ 
income and then - consumption demand. Since 2001 a slowdown in the pace of 
economic growth of Poland can be detected, which can be explained by the 
accompanying phase of the business cycle, called recession. 
This article however, is not aimed at explaining the macroeconomic relations 
between aggregated variables in the economy, but to describe some elements of 
microeconomic consumers’ behaviour during the early stages of the transformation of 
the Polish economy and later. It can have an influence on regional and even national 
economic development. There are two sets of data that can be used: the first - refers to 
a medium-sized city and the second refers to a richer part of the society, in one of the 
richest cities in Poland - its capitals The second group of data can be used as a forecast 
of trends in consumption structure and will estimate the prospects of consumption in 
Poland. 
It is very difficult to describe the changes in consumption behaviour especially 
during such a period of dynamic changes, like the 1990s in transition economies. In 
doing so, it is necessary to say a few words at least, on the specificity of consumption 
in a socialist system. 
This was the period described in literature as a “shortage economy”, as defined by 
Komai. It means, demand permanently exceeding supply. In other words, the shops 
were full of empty shelves. The most spectacular example of this phenomenon was the 
beginning of the 1980s (including the state of war period), when Polish citizens could 
purchase some products, with state permission. This was the so-called ‘cards system’, 
which regulated consumption demand for certain basic goods. Apart from this, people 
This paper was prepared within the framework of the research project: “Comparative study on 
consumption pattern in Poland and Japan”, conducted by the Hokkaido University in Sapporo (Japan) and 
the Department of Economic Policy of the Warsaw School of Economics. 
2 The broader results of the survey on consumption in Warsaw were published in: Chmielewski and Piech 
(2000, p. 196-203). 
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could buy some missing products on a black market or in luxury shops (Pewex), 
paying in ‘hard currency’ (dollars). 
Despite the lower income in Poland in comparison with more developed countries 
measured in PPP terms, there was a higher rate of household savings as shown in the 
analysis of consumption demand. They were the result of ‘forced savings’. The 
demand for savings was lower. The main reason being the lack of goods on the market 
thus the society was forced to save. 
Another characteristic of consumption in socialist economies was huge losses 
resulting from the lack of consumers’ intentions to rationalise their spending, caused 
by the lack of incentives for doing so. As I will show further, that was possible due to 
the lower sum of money spent on energy (gas, electricity), and water. When the 
consumers became obliged to pay only for things they really used, they received 
incentives to start making savings. 
That previous consumers’ behaviour was in part connected with another important 
characteristic of the socialist system: a very active social policy. The share of the state 
in the economy and in meeting consumers’ demand involved the lack of incentives for 
economic behaviour, as mentioned above. 
To describe the process of change in consumption structure, two cities were 
chosen. One of them was Chelm, which was the basis for statistical analysis, and 
Warsaw - for forecasts and collecting society’s opinion. 
Warsaw is a well-known European city. It has about 1.6 million inhabitants, a very 
low unemployment rate (one of the lowest in Poland), thus attracting people from other 
cities to migrate to the capital. The number of richest inhabitants is also the biggest in 
Poland. Chelm is a city with a 600-year history (one of most important Polish cities in 
13th and 14th centuries), in eastern Poland. It is situated about 230 km east of Warsaw, 
71 km east from Lublin and about 25 km from the eastern border of the country. For 
many years, Chelm has been a second largest city in region (in the new Lublin 
voivodship), with 70,759 inhabitants at the end of 1999.3 
A good example of the distance between members of these analysed social groups 
can be the differences in personal income (family income per one person). Earnings of 
less than 1000 zlotys (about USS 250) per month declared by 5% of the population 
questioned in mid-1999, between 1000 and 1999 zlotys - 8.3%, 2000-2999 zlotys - 
18.3, 3000-3999 zlotys - 20%, 4000-4999 zlotys - 11.7%, and above 5000 zlotys - 
36.7% (above 10000 zlotys - 18.3%). However, in practice the majority of Poles 
earned much less. Thus, inhabitants of the new Lublin voivodship represent the 
following structure: the lowest income per person (under 400 zlotys, i.e. c.a. 100 
dollars) had 8.5% of households (that was the highest score among all new 16 
voivodships), income between 600-800 zlotys - 11.6%, between 800-1000 zlotys - 
15%. The largest group of households was this one of income per person between 1000 
3 
The change in administrative structure in Poland after 1 January 1999 should be noted. Between 1975 
and 1998 Chelm has been the capital of the Chelm voivodship. After that, it joined the new, enlarged 
Lublin voivodship, which included also other parts of the region. Chelm became the capital of the county, 
which was smaller than the former Chelm voivodship and now includes a few smaller items - communes. 
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and 1400 zlotys - 17%. Only 0.46% of households reached level of income higher than 
5000 zlotys per person.4 
If Poland’s economy grows it will affect the individual’s personal income, it is 
justified to say that the structure of income in Chelm will approach the questioned 
group of the capital’s inhabitants. Another important assumption is that the behaviour 
of Chelm society’s represents the behaviour of Poland’s citizens, during the transition 
process. However, the exact data for Chelm should not be transferred directly to 
represent Poland. Moreover, the third assumption is that microeconomic analysis is 
more valuable in explaining society’s behaviour than the macroeconomic one. 
It is difficult to describe the consumers’ behaviour of the micro-community of 
Chelm. It is connected with the lack of appropriate research in this sphere and 
difficulties with collecting complete, or sufficient statistical sources. In the 1990s there 
were only two issues of the internal trade survey in the Chelm voivodship published (in 
1994 and in 1997). Other information about the transformation of consumers’ 
behaviour originated mostly from other published statistical sources. It was difficult to 
conduct the related surveys in this subject, because of administrative reform in Poland 
in 1999 and connected with this - change of ways of collecting and publishing the 
statistical data. Thus, it was sometimes impossible to describe notions related only to 
Chelm city in different time periods. 
2. Consumption patterns at the beginning of the transformation 
and in the mid-1990s - the case of the Chelm voivodship 
Some of main characteristics and trends in consumption in Poland on the break of 
systems (1989) and thereafter are described below. 
2.1. Ownership of shops 
After 1989 impetuous and permanent changes in the structure of trade and 
ownership of commercial activity could be observed. This was connected with the 
processes of restructuring and privatisation. In 1989 cooperatives’ trade had a share of 
c. 70% shops in the Chelm voivodship, and trade of state-owned shops - over 14%. In 
that time, private trade had about a 16% share, but its participation in turnover of retail 
trade was only c. 3-4%. In 1996 as much as 99.1% shops belonged to the private 
sector, of which only 10.8% was the property of cooperatives. In 1991, the number of 
shops belonging to the private sector (with the exclusion of cooperatives) reached 
71.8%, in 1992 year - 72%, in 1993 - 81%, in 1995 - 85.2%, in 1996 - 88.3%. The 
value of the turnover of the private sector reached 99.7% of public sales in the 
voivodship. This meant that the share of private ownership in sales increased steadily 
during transformation. From the point of view of further research, it means that this 
sector reacted more for demand of consumers, and in effect - was more flexible to the 
market signals, which could have been observed by the changes in the shops’ structure. 
4 According to the survey conducted by Claritas Polska Sp. z o.o. in year 2000. See: Kresy (2001, p. 6). 
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Thus it is justified to assume that the structure of shops represents the demand of 
inhabitants for goods they are specialised in, especially in further phases of 
transformation. 
2.2. Shops' specialisation 
The most numerous group of shops in 1993 was those of global food products, 
clothes and shoes shops, and the remainder: furniture, household and electric^ 
equipment. In part, this structure resulted not so much from the demand of inhabitants, 
but from the remainders of the former system. It was reflected in changes, which 
happened during the three following years (described below). 
Figure 1. Structure of shops according to their trade specialisation in 1993 in the 
Chelm voivodship 
remaining 
bookstores and 
stationer's shops 
4% 
furniture, electric 
and household 
equipment 
11% 
clothes&shoes 
19% 
bakeries 
1% 
nutrition products 
27% 
fruits&vegetables 
cosmetics 
7% 
off-licences 
3% 
Source: WUS(1994,p. 6). 
Figure 1 represents the structure of shops in the Chelm voivodship (not exactly in 
the city). There are hardly any more detailed statistical data of this type. It can be 
estimated by presenting the data on the structure of shops employing more than five 
people. These data are available (see table 1). 
In 1993 specialised shops employing more than five people have a share of c. 29% 
of the Chelm voivodship shops. A relatively bigger part of food shops were situated in 
former voivodship in the country (65%, at c. 50% of country-shops). Almost two thirds 
This group consists of radios and TV sets, as well as temporary lighting equipment. Group: bakery 
includes also confectioner’s products. 
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of butchers’ shops in the voivodship were located in Chehn, and only one fishmonger 
(and only one textile shop), too. Significant was the participation of Chehn in bakeries 
(c. 85%), shops with furniture and with lighting equipment (65%). 
Table 1. Number of shops according to their specialisation of trade and location in 
1993 in the Chehn voivodship 
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Notes: 
Data refer to economic units, in which number of employees exceeds five persons, and having 
board of directors located in the Chelm voivodship 
W - the Chelm voivodship 
Gm - urban communities in the Chelm voivodship 
Ch - urban community Chelm 
Source: WUS(1994),p. 12. 
About one third of the shops of the Chelm voivodship in 1993 located in its capital, 
specialised in selling books, stationeries and clothes (and the group of remaining 
products). The least share had shops specialising in the sale of alcohol beverages (c. 
10% shops of the voivodship). 
If we count the percentage structure of bigger shops in Chelm according to their 
specialisation, we find that 36% of them trade with global food products, and 25% sell 
items which are not included in detailed statistics. This could mean that the ways of 
measuring the internal trade changed slower that the real structures, which should be 
investigated. That is one more phenomenon of the transformation of the economic 
system. Other bigger groups of shops are bakeries (9%) and butchers (7%). Remaining 
groups had five percent or less as a share in this structure. 
There is also another interesting phenomenon, which could be observed at the very 
beginning of transformation and still exists especially in poorer parts of Poland.6 After 
6 Within the market-places in the Chelm voivodship trade was run in 416 permanent sales points in 1993, 
from which 356 were opened every day (568 and 504 in 1996, accordingly). At the end of 1993, four 
permanent market-places functioned in Chelm (there were no seasonal ones), and three of them had a 
majority of retail sales. All of them were opened daily. Their area was 34057 nr, and sales area - 29157 
m2. 244 permanent points of retail sale (that was 72.4% of all points of the Chelm voivodship) were found. 
At the end of 1996 there were the same number of permanent market-places in Chelm, and one more 
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1989 a large number of public market-places were established. They were often more 
competitive as far as the price was concerned in comparison to the shops. It was caused 
by lower payments than in the case of renting the offices for shops and connected with 
this: additional costs (energy etc.), as well as the frequent lack of fiscal burden when 
this economic activity was not registered. Finally, another phenomenon was noticed - 
smuggling. The regions near the border (like Chelm) were especially exposed to this 
kind of economic activity. 
2.3. Changes in shops' specialisation 
The facts mentioned above show the structure of shops and demand for the exact 
groups of goods in a given year. However, it was sufficient to describe the changes in 
consumption patterns during transformation. A time perspective should be presented. 
Figure 2. Structure of shops according to the specialisation of trade in the Chelm 
voivodship in 1993 and in 1996 (in %) 
Sources: WUS (1994, p. 6), US (1997, pp. 9-11). 
If the assumption that the structure of shops represents the structure of demand of 
the Chelm voivodship inhabitants and of its capital is true, the following conclusions 
should be drawn: the share of demand for global food products, and remained - not 
included in detailed statistics items, increased significantly (accordingly: from 28 to 
44.6%, and from 13.8 to 28.5%). The last fact can be explained by the growth of the 
number of shops specialising in different goods that traditionally have occurred in 
statistics, and in addition to the changes in consumption demand were faster, than the 
changes in research methodology. It has also a wider meaning: during transformation 
the demand for a variety of goods, which were available on the market (with many 
difficulties), increased. 
seasonable. They occupied the same area as three years earlier. The number of permanent points of retail 
sale grew up to 364. All of them were opened daily. See: US (1997, p. 18). 
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The third large group of shops was those selling clothes and shoes. Their share, 
however, went down in the course of three years by c. five percentage points. A bigger 
decrease (of about seven percentage points) referred fourth, regarding numbers of 
groups of shops specialising in the sale of furniture, electrical and household 
equipment. It can mean that the demand for these types of goods became satisfied, a 
characteristic of the first part of transformation (in anxiety for loss of value of money 
due to high inflation, people often bought durable goods). The decline also embraced 
the group of textile shops (about six percentage points). 
This analysis concerned only three years in the later course of transformation. A 
wider time range should be discussed. In spite of changes in structure, the growth in 
the number of specialised shops in comparison to 1991 could be seen. Thus in 1996, in 
comparison to 1991 the number of global food shops grew up by c. 70%, the number 
of cosmetics shops by c. 180%, the number of shops with textiles, clothes and shoes by 
about 20%, whereas the number of shops selling furniture, electrical and household 
equipment went down by about 30%. This was caused by concentration of sales in 
large shops, by the progressive process of liquidation of the smaller ones (see also: US, 
1997, p. 9). 
2.4. Retail sales in the Chelm voivodship in 1991-96 
There are some statistical data which present more accurate information about 
consumption in the Chelm voivodship. Unfortunately, they refer only to the sales in 
shops employing more than 20 persons. They could better represent the sales in cities 
(majority of bigger shops located there), but on the other hand, it eliminates all the 
small shops there. 
According to the Statistical Office of the Chelm voivodship, sales of food reached 
40.8% of general value of retail sale in 1993, alcoholic beverages 13.7%, and non¬ 
food-goods 45.5%.7 The largest group of food products in 1993 was the sale of meat 
and meat-products (32.4%), and breadstuffs and of confectioner's articles (29.2%). 
Among non-food-commodities, the greatest share had the sales of furniture, radio and 
television equipment, lighting and household equipment (28.3%) as well as clothing 
and shoes (20.0%) (US, 1997, p. 8). 
More detailed information about trends in retail sales structure in Chelm can be 
traced by the analysis of the period 1991-1996 (table 2). In 1996 the value of retail 
sales of food, of alcoholic beverages and of non-food-commodities for individual 
consumers reached: 31.8%, 8.8%, and 59.4%, respectively. 
The share of food sales increased until 1994, and then decreased, while 
participation of alcoholic beverages declined systematically from 23.9% in 1991 to 
8.8% in 1996. The sale of non-food-consumable products fluctuated in different years 
within the range 18-25%. 
7 Data originate from a statistical survey conducted by the Statistical Office of the Chelm Voivodship 
based on medium and large-sized companies (employing six and more people), as well as on the 
representative survey conducted among small-size companies (up to five employees). This survey referred 
to persons conducting registered economic activity or partnership in retail, wholesale - on the basis of 
confirmations of notification of activity economic, or in a form of civil partnership. 
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Table 2. Structure of retail sales in the Chehn voivodship a) (in %) 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Food 37.7 39.7 40.0 40.9 39.7 31.8 
Alcoholic beverages 23.9 19.1 16.7 13.6 10.0 8.8 
non-food-products: 
• consumable 24.4 25.2 24.9 22.5 18.1 22.5 
• non-consumableb) 14.0 16.0 18.4 23.0 32.2 36.9 
Total (value in 
thousands zlotys) 65372.7 56426.2 61484.5 63748.8 86187.4 122996.6 
Notes: 
Data concerns companies, where the number of employees exceeds 20 persons. 
Non-consumable products include these commodities, which are used mainly in 
production, especially commodities devoted to agricultural production (machines, 
pastures, manure etc.), building materials. 
Source: US (1997, p. 22). 
Table 3. Structure of sales in shops of the Chehn voivodship according to the goods 
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1991 0.9 12.2 2.3 8.5 13.4 9.0 0.0 2.4 2.8 5.5 4.9 3.3 5.7 5.0 3.5 20.6 
1992 0.8 10.2 2.7 7.6 12.4 11.7 1.4 2.6 3.6 5.2 2.7 10.1 4.1 5.0 3.3 16.6 
1993 0.7 12.8 2.0 11.9 13.7 13.4 2.9 2.9 3.4 4.9 4.2 6.3 3.6 3.0 0.9 13.4 
1996 0.5 10.3 1.6 3.6/ 
2.4 
3.5 6.4 3.1 1.5 2.5 3.7 3.9 4.7 3.2 0.1 0.4 48.6 
Notes: Data for years 1991-1993 are fully comparable. Data for 1996 contained positions 
which did not exist earlier: non-alcoholic beverages (1.3% - included by the author in 
the group of remaining foodstuffs), tobacco-products (1.6% - included in remaining 
non-food products), fuels (29.8% - as above). The items: breadstuff's and cereal 
processing, as well as sugar and confectioner's products, were separated. 
Source: Data assembled by the Voivodship Statistical Office in Chelm based on representative 
inquiry of questioned shops. For years 1991-93: WUS (1994, pp. 16-17); for 1996: US 
(1997, pp. 20-21). 
The share of non-food-non-consumable products grew constantly from 14% in 
1991 to almost 40% in 1996. It could have been caused by the growing demand for 
durable goods, mainly in the production sphere. 
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During the beginning of the transformation process, it could be noticed that there 
was a significant fall of participation in sales: of fruits and vegetables, of fish and fish- 
products, of alcoholic beverages, of clothing, of radios and TV sets, of household 
equipment, of books, newspapers & magazines, and stationer’s products. In 1996, the 
share of group of remaining non-food products increased significantly (however, it 
could be influenced by the changes in statistical categories). 
2.5. Consumption of other goods 
Consumption can be regarded not only in terms of commodities sold in shops. Part 
of it are also various expenses on the purchase of a flat and its maintenance (water, 
energy, telephone calls etc.), expenses connected with the purchase of a car, with 
culture, and so on. They are shown and analysed below (there is a lack of data on other 
expenses, like holidays, education etc.). 
Table 4. Dwellings completed per 1000 people in the Chelm voivodship 
1975 1980 1985 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
m 5.3 6.4 4.3 6.3 3.9 5.1 3.9 3.1 2.8 3.6 1.8 2.2 
i 20.7 23.7 17.5 26.9 17.1 21.3 16.1 12.2 12.2 14.6 8.3 9.5 
pu 329 409 321 506 317 371 287 228 228 269 165 185 
Notes: 
m - dwelling-places (flats) i - rooms pu - usable floor space in sq m 
Source: US (1998, pp. LiV-LV). 
In the period, which just preceded the system transformation, a high rate of 
dwellings (flats) increase was accounted. These were mainly the blocks of flats, built 
by cooperatives. 1989 was the last year when there was a growth in the number of 
rooms in use, over 22 per 1000 persons. In the worst, 1996, this indicator dropped to 
8.3 rooms per 1000 persons, which was over three times less than in 1989. This trend 
of worsening the house-building situation in the Chelm voivodship is also confirmed 
by the number of flats in use per 1000 persons, and their usable space. Some numbers 
o 
from 1998 also confirmed this trend. This process, which occurred and deepened in 
the second half of 2000 and the beginning of 2001 in the whole country, was a crisis of 
house building in Poland. 
The purchase of a flat (or a house) is one of the most important households 
expenses. Important factors contributing to the change in the number of flats built are: 
credits interest rate, as most of them are purchased in an instalment system, as well as 
the possibility of tax reduction. Possession of a house or a flat is also connected to 
other expenses. 
8 According to the author’s calculations (which were necessary, because of the change of statistical 
methodology of collecting and publishing data in 1999), there were 6.27 rooms in use per 1000 people in 
1998. If the structure of house building in the Chelm voivodship is similar to the Chelm county (originated 
in 1999 after administrative reform in Poland), there was an even bigger drop in the number of flats 
completed in 1998. 
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Until 1991, the use of water from cities’ water-supply systems increased 
systematically. Since then, according to the data available, it declined. This was caused 
by two main factors: the increase in prices, which - in the situation of the fall in 
personal income during transformation crisis - forced savings to be made, also by the 
rationalisation of use, made possible, in part, after the rather massive introduction of 
water-use meters, after introducing the new system of accounts in the blocks of flats 
owned by cooperatives.9 
Table 5. The use of different goods in households per person in the city’s population in 
the Chehn voivodship 
1975 1980 1985 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
WW 30.1 45.1 52.1 53.6 54.5 62.4 61.0 51.4 52.6 44.2 39.6 34.7 
ee 230.8 337.4 525.0 601.3 655.6 638.9 556.2 501.8 578.1 537.5 532.4 523.3 
gP 24.4 40.1 40.3 42.4 41.3 39.1 • • • • • • 
gs - - - 0.1 2.0 7.6 35.6 33.8 53.9 83.4 84.6 99.1 
Notes: 
ww - the use of water from the water-supply system in m 
ee - the use of electricity in kwh 
gp - the use of liquid gas in mJ 
gs - the use of gas from network in m3 
Source: US (1998, pp. LIV-LV). 
As far as the use of electricity is concerned, 1990 was the year of maximum use 
per person. Since then it declined (with the exception of 1993). On the other hand, the 
use of gas increased systematically. This was possible not only because gas was 
cheaper than coal and electricity, but primarily due to the installation of gas pipelines 
in the Chelm voivodship, not previously there. 
The purchase of a car is another very significant event in the life of a household 
that burdens its budget for a long time (by credit and its repayment). The number of 
registered cars in the Chelm voivodship increased constantly; no matter how large the 
drop of real personal income was (at the beginning of transformation). Cars became an 
item that started to be available for every person with a substanial amount of money10, 
and often families, which could not afford to buy a flat, bought a car, in their opinion, a 
kind of substitute. 
The next item of household expenses was the installation of telephones (or the 
purchase of a mobile phone) and the costs of phone calls (unit costs of phone calls 
decreased with the progress of demonopolisation of the telecommunication sector). 
The availability of telecommunication services has increased greatly in Poland since 
1989. Between 1989 and 1997 the number of private subscribers to cable telephones 
(all of them at that time used services of Telekomunikacja Polska S.A., a monopolistic 
9 Previously households living in blocks of flats paid according to the number of persons registered in the 
flat. After the introduction of water-meters, households paid only for the quantity they really used. 
10 There were huge problems with receiving a kind of state permission to buy a car before 1989. 
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company) grew by almost three times." The number of people permanently using 
telecommunication services is higher also because of the establishment and 
development of mobile telephone systems. 
Table 6. Transportation and communication in the Chehn community 
1975 1980 1985 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
So 13.5 37.5 61.8 75.4 87.8 102.1 122.4 131.7 139.0 144.6 157.9 173.3 
At 10.6 23.1 33.0 48.9 52.1 60.1 72.2 75.0 79.2 103.1 129.5 141.7 
Notes: 
So - registered private personal cars (as of 31 December) per 1000 persons (since 1991 in 
private sector) 
At - private subscribers of cable telephones (as of 31 December) per 1000 persons 
(having phones installed in private flats) 
Source: US (1998, pp. LVIII-LIX). 
Another item which has one of the least shares in household spending are the 
expenses connected with culture. A drop in the number of cinemas in the Chehn 
voivodship should be noted. 
Table 7. The use of entertainment in the Chehn voivodship 
1975 1980 1985 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
K 17 16 13 8 8 7 6 6 6 6 6 6 
Kw 12 11 9 4 4 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 
W 491.5 296.6 480.7 390.2 182.1 114.3 63.0 44.5 42.8 73.5 44.6 60.3 
W’ 2010 1288 2004 1589 738 462 254 179 172 294 178 242 
Ar 47.4 50.3 60.1 69.0 68.1 67.0 68.6 69.1 68.5 66.0 65.4 64.3 
At 33.4 45.4 57.0 62.1 61.1 60.1 62.2 63.0 62.4 60.4 59.5 59.3 
Notes: 
K - permanent cinemas in the Chelm voivodship (as of 31 December) 
Kw - permanent cinemas in the country (as of 31 December) 
W - cinemas’ audience in thousands 
W’ - cinemas’ audience per 1000 persons 
Ar - radio subscribers (as of 31 December) in thousands 
At - TV subscribers (as of 31 December) in thousands 
Source: US (1998, pp. XXXVII1-XXXIX). 
For the last several years, Chehn has had two cinemas. “ These figures do not show 
any possible change in spending in entertainment. More detailed information should be 
derived from another source. 
The number of permanent cinemas during a transformation period decreased 
considerably in the first part of this period. This is connected with the decrease of 
public funding as well as the drop in personal income level. The growth in audiences 
11 In 1998 there were 277 subscribers of cable telephones per 1000 persons and in 1999 - 302, almost 10% 
more than in the previous year (not only private subscribers). See: US (2000, pp. 20-21). 
12 Only one in 1998 and again two in 1999. There were another two in the remaining three cities in the 
Chelm voivodship during the last years. 
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can be seen since 1995, when the cinema crisis (connected with the level of society’s 
wealth) was over. The years of the socialist system was the period of the biggest 
popularity of films, related to relatively low prices, a larger share of pupils in the 
audience, but also the lack of substitutes: television (controlled by the state at that 
time), and modern technologies (satellite antennas, videos, and cable TV). 
Other smaller expenses of households’ budget are the costs of radio and TV 
subscription. The number of radio subscribers has decreased (with fluctuations) since 
1989. Since 1992, the number of TV subscribers decreased also. However, it is 
connected by the huge difficulties with enforcement of payment from subscribers, 
while some people noticing that opportunity, did not want to pay. This attitude may be 
caused by the willingness to save or to increase other goods of consumption. 
One of the phenomena that emerged at the beginning of transformation was the 
development of market-places and their changed structure. The demand for purchasing 
there decreased in favour of shops. This was the result of increasing supply and 
reaching the balance between these two economic forces. Other reasons can be added: 
the growing standard of living (higher income led to an increase in the purchase of 
more expensive goods), the growing prices of commodities abroad, and a higher 
quality of customs protection (decreasing illegal import of tradable goods). However, 
the prices of commodities traded on those markets were often lower than in shops, and 
were sometimes of the same quality. 
Another item, sometimes very important in some households, is alcoholic 
beverages. In former socialist countries, especially in Russia and in Poland, there was a 
relatively high consumption of strong alcohol per capita. During transformation, the 
price of alcohol went up, and due to the government economic policy of proper fiscal 
regulations, the price of vodka and other products with a higher share of alcohol in 
particular increased. Thus, the demand for beer increased and for vodka decreased, 
while the global consumption of alcoholic beverages decreased, too. 
3. Consumption patterns during transition and their future trends - the 
case of Warsaw 
This part of the analysis is based on a survey conducted in Warsaw in the summer of 
1999. It looked at the richer groups of Warsaw’s inhabitants. With the increase of 
welfare in Poland in the following years, those consumption patterns studied in 
Warsaw could be seen as a forecast of future average consumption patterns in the 
whole of Poland. 
In the structure of consumption before 1989, the domination of the expenses for 
basic commodities, connected with current consumption was characteristic. The group 
of people questioned in 1999 in Warsaw stated that the domination of spending for 
durable commodities (a flat and its equipment, car, electric equipment - 36.9% of 
responses) occurred. A few reasons for this fact can be indicated. One is that the Polish 
economy overcame the transformation crisis, resulting in the growth of average 
personal income. The second is the occurrence of “postponed demand”, which could 
not be met before 1989, due to the shortages in the economy. There were higher quality 
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commodities (part of them was imported). All of these factors led to the growth of 
expenses for durable goods. 
The second large group of responses (32.3%) indicated domination of expenses 
connected with current consumption of basic commodities (food, clothes, and the 
maintenance of a flat). It can be interpreted as a result of the huge growth of these 
prices (leading Poland to the structure of expenditures similar to those of countries 
with a long tradition of market economy). Interesting also is the occurrence of 
responses indicating expenses connected with family and children. 
The growing share (26.2% of responses of population questioned) of expenses 
connected with the consumption of luxury goods in households’ budgets, like holidays, 
and the rest could be observed. There was a small share (3.1%) of spending on culture 
and education (books, newspapers, theatres). 
Although there were people declaring huge expenses on current consumption, in 
many cases it was not the only answer given by respondents. The share of households, 
which can have savings and invest them (at stock exchange, own business) grew up (to 
6.2%). There was still a big interest in durable goods (25.2% responses). The changes 
in structure of households’ expenses are on figure 3. 
Figure 3. Changes in structure of dominating households’ expenses 
included) 
H before 1989 
M about 1994 
□ in 1999 
There is a very visible growth of expenses for durable goods and consumption of 
goods perceived as luxury. It means that in a few years there will be also an increase of 
purchases of those goods observed in the whole of Polish society. There are a few 
reasons for this. First, together with the growing level of wealth of Polish society, it is 
to be expected that such behaviour that is analogous to that observed in the 
subpopulation questioned (meeting the “demand hunger” for durable goods remained 
after the old system and later for other commodities and services). A growth of demand 
also originated from the growing role and size of the richest part of society (as well as 
the middle class during transformation). 
The next figure shows opinions of households on the changes of the expenses 
structure. These confirm the information and conclusions derived from figure 3. 
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For the huge majority of respondents the most painful growth of expenses were 
those related to the maintenance of a flat (or a house). The growth of expenses on 
current consumption was rated not so negatively, because in this period also the quality 
of consumption increased, too (also of basic commodities), there was broader variety 
of available commodities and thanks to it, opportunities for spending money. 
A significant improvement of the quality of the group questioned was also 
confirmed by the growth of a large part of household expenses for durable goods (for 
the reasons discussed above). The growth of income level influenced the growth of 
households’ investment. It was also caused by the increase of possible ways of making 
those investments, like own business, stock exchange etc. 
Figure 4. Households’ opinions on the share of expenses in 1999 in comparison to the 
situation before 1989 (divided in five categories) 
In the survey conducted, the respondents were also asked to compare their 
situation, as consumers, about 10 or more years earlier (the end of the old system) with 
their present situation (see figure 5). 
Figure 5. Opinions about consumption in 1989 compared to 1999 
Respondents agreed (86.21% of indications referring to exact answer) that 
previously their situation was worse. Among the reasons for this opinion, they 
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indicated: bad quality of service, worse availability to the goods and their low quality, 
shortages of goods’ supply, queues in shops. The present situation means for 
respondents a wider choice and variety of commodities, better conditions for doing 
shopping. Free market and competition mechanisms were shown as a reason for 
changes that came into being. The only bigger problem for consumers was the matter 
of having a sufficient amount of money. 
4. Prospects of consumption patterns in Poland 
To discuss the future possible consumption patterns of Poland’s citizens it is necessary 
to start from the basic analysis of the past and present situation. To do this, there 
should usually be a group of representative consumers chosen. In this survey, it was 
assumed that the society of Chelm (and if there was the lack of proper data - the 
society of the Chelm voivodship) represented Polish consumers, at least in main trends 
of changes during the transformation process. Later, some forecasts are usually made, 
using some quantitative methods, like extrapolation of time series, based on different 
trend lines or an econometric model. In this study another approach was chosen: the 
richer part of the richest subpopulation in Poland was investigated to approximate 
future consumption patterns. 
There was no more detailed survey conducted in Chelm in the 1990s as far as 
consumption was concerned. But it was possible to base on a survey referring to the 
new Lublin voivodship. One of the latest surveys was conducted by Claritas Polska Sp. 
z o.o. (an American company doing market research in various countries). 
One third of families in the Lublin voivodship do their shopping first of all in the 
nearest shop, one fourth mainly in supermarkets and one tenth - in the markets. The 
structure of household equipment is presented on figure 6. 
Figure 6. Households’ equipment in the Lublin voivodship in 2000 (according to 
Claritas Polska Sp. z o.o., in %) 
Source: ‘Jak si^ zyje na Lubelszczyznie’ (2001, p. 6). 
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According to the Warsaw survey (figure 7), the share of all of household 
equipment was bigger. All respondents answered that their household had a 
refrigerator, an automatic washing machine, and a telephone. Only one person 
answered that he/she did not have a colour TV set (their own choice not because of 
financial difficulties). 
Comparing these two groups (although the results of these surveys are not fully 
comparable, because of different methodologies and different groups of goods 
analysed), the conclusions should be drawn that there will be an increase in the 
following commodities, listed in the order of possible potential demand (approximated 
by the gap between corresponding groups of goods from figure 7, 6): 
1. computers, 
2. automatic washing machines, 
3. modems (allowing access to Internet), 
4. video, 
5. TV sets (mainly colour ones). 
Figure 7. Household equipment in a wealthier part of Warsaw (survey in Warsaw in 
1999, in %) 
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There will be also a slight increase of dish washing machines and washing 
machines with dryers. 
5. Conclusions 
The article based mainly on two sources of information: statistical data from or related 
to the Chelm voivodship and empirical survey on consumption of the richer part of one 
of the richest cities in Poland. The results show an increase of personal (and 
household) income, level of education and the share of society employed in the private 
sector. The household equipment of Polish society will increase in the direction shown 
on figure 7, according to the ranking presented (at the end of the previous chapter). 
Consumption Patterns in Poland during Transition... 211 
References: 
Chmielewski, T., Piech, K. (2000), ‘Konsumpcja w Polsce w okresie transformacji - 
wybrane wyniki badan empirycznych’, Studia i Prace Kolegium Zarzqdzania i 
Finansow, no. 14, SGH, Warsaw, pp. 196-203. 
Kresy (2001), ‘Jak si^ zyje na Lubelszczyznie’, Kresy - Tygodnik Chebnski, 7 January, 
no 1, p. 6. 
US (1997), Handel wewnqtrzny w wojewodztwie chelmskim w latach 1991-1996 r., 
Urz^d Statystyczny w Chelmie, Chelm, August. 
-(1998), Rocznik statystyczny wojewddztwa chehnskiego, Urz^d Statystyczny w 
Chelmie, Chelm. 
-(2000), Statystyka powiatow i gospodarki samorzqdowej wojewddztwa 
hibelskiego w 1999 r., Urzcj.d Statystyczny w Lublinie, November. 
WUS (1994), Handel wewnqtrzny w wojewodztwie chelmskim w 1993 r., Wojewodzki 
Urz^d Statystyczny w Chelmie, Chelm, September. 

Poland as the Insurance Market Leader 
among Countries of the Visegrad Group 
Tomasz Bemat 
Economic insurance is one of the most rapidly developing fields in the economy of 
both Poland and other countries of the Visegrad Group. The changes were triggered by 
the system transformation, which took place in the early nineties in the Central and 
East European countries (Jaworski 1998, p. 44). At present, further alterations are 
aimed at bringing the structure and function range of these markets in line with 
European standards (Devuyst et al., 2002). The development of the financial sector, 
inclusive of the insurance one, resulted, among other things, from the decline in 
insurance services present until the system transformation, commercialisation and 
demonopolisation of the market, aggressiveness of marketing policies, and from the 
introduction of new insurance regulations which adjusted them to the norms of the 
European Union (Holowinski, 1994, p. 188 and next; Moavero Milanesi and 
Winterstein, 2002). It is particularly visible where monopolistic framework has been 
replaced with a more competitive market with shares held by global companies that 
function and compete in numerous countries (Feldstein 1997; Szymanski, 2001, p. 95). 
It is also applicable to markets of insurance institutions . The objective of the following 
dissertation is to present and to evaluate the insurance market in the countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe, which are are striving to gain membership in the European 
Union. The macroeconomic data available for the countries examined paint a positive 
picture. Apart from a temporary decline in the economic situation and short-lived 
crises, all of the countries experienced an economic growth at the turn of the twentieth 
and twenty-first century. The assessment may be based on significant indices of 
economic expansion like the dynamics of gross domestic product, rate of 
unemployment, economic foreign relations, and inflation (Samuelson and Nordhaus, 
1996, p. 134). In the following study only two of them will be used, namely GDP and 
inflation. GDP is one of the most synthetic measures of development of the whole 
economy (Zienkowski, 2001, p. 16). Its values are presented in table 1. 
Table 1. Gross domestic product dynamics in Visegrad Group’s countries. 
Country 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Poland 5 7 6 7 5 4 4 
Czech Republic 3 6 5 -1 -1 0 3 
Hungary 3 2 1 5 5 4 5 
Slovakia 5 7 7 6 4 2 2 
Slovenia 5 4 4 5 4 5 5 
Source: GUS (2001). 
Insurance markets are penetrated by foreign investments to different extents. In some countries the 
predominant entities are domestic companies (usually former monopolists) e.g. in Poland, whereas in 
others the market is subjugated by foreign capital e.g. in Hungary. Compare: Jaworski (1998, pp. 46-47). 
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Figures presented in table 1 and on figure 1 clearly demonstrate that the countries 
examined worked out a positive GDP for most years. The sole exception is the Czech 
Republic, which during the period 1997-1998 experienced a fall in production growth. 
These were symptoms of a crisis, brought under control though in the following years. 
Another important criterion for our assessment is inflation. The rate of price 
growth in the countries examined is presented in table 2. 
Table 2. Coefficient of inflation in years 1994-2000 in Visegrad Group’s countries 
Country 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Poland 32 28 20 15 12 7 10 
Czech Republic 10 9 9 8 11 2 4 
Hungary 19 28 24 18 14 10 10 
Slovakia 13 10 6 6 7 11 12 
Slovenia 21 13 10 8 8 6 9 
Source: author’s elabouration based on GUS (2001). 
Data presented (table 2, figure 2) indicate that all the countries of our scope have 
been successfully struggling to beat inflation. Only Slovakia has had significant 
...9 
problems in recent years with retaining the decrease in inflation". The other countries 
are visibly aiming at adjusting themselves to the norms imposed by the European 
Union. Let us now briefly examine the situation of Poland with regard to the above- 
mentioned criteria. In the period analysed, Poland recorded a stable growth in gross 
domestic product2 3. The other nations suffered at different points brief (two-, three- 
year) setbacks of the economic growth pace. Inflation remained at a relatively high 
level, it did, however, tend to decrease, which consequently brought about a low rate of 
price increase in the period 2001-2002. 
The above data visibly indicate that economies of the countries discussed do 
exhibit steady growth tendencies. It holds true, however, to all the sectors. Let us now 
investigate the insurance market in the countries analysed in respect of the 
aforementioned data. 
The insurance sector in the period examined has been one of the most rapidly 
expanding ones (Sangowski, 2000, p. 43). It results from a number of reasons, some of 
which are (Jaworski, 1998, p. 56; Bernat, 2001, p. 946): 
• low saturation with insurance products at the beginning of system transformation, 
• increasing purchasing power of home currency, 
• market penetration by foreign competition, 
• aggressive advertising policies, 
• increasing number of insurance products which cater for customers’ more and 
more diverse needs, 
• increasing insurance awareness. 
2 
‘ In the case of Poland, inflation reached a very high level in 2000, only to fall sharply in the following 
years. 
3 Yet, in the following year and in 2002, a considerable fall in the growth rate of GDP became visible. It 
was a symptom of significant decline in economic expansion. 
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Figure 1. Real premium volume in Visegrad countries with regard to life and non-life 
insurance 
The insurance market in Central and Eastern Europe4 achieved during the period 
1997-1999 premium volume of approximately US$ 15 billion, equivalent to just under 
1% of premium income worldwide. Five countries of the Visegrad Group made up 
over 60% of this amount, which means more than USS 500 billion. These values can 
be accounted for by dynamic expansion of the insurance market in the nineties. It 
seems necessary, however, to highlight the uneven development pace of the two main 
parts of the insurance market, namely life and non-life insurance. Level of growth of 
these two kinds is presented below on figure 1. 
Figure 1 visibly indicates that the life insurance sector has been expanding much 
faster. It results first of all from the emergence of a modern life insurance market, 
greater insurance awareness, and from an increase in real income of citizens in the 
countries examined. The above synthetic data do not show, however, the degree to 
which particular countries contributed to the general expansion of the insurance market 
on the whole. The structure of premium growth during the period 1993-1999 is 
detailed below in table 3. 
Figures in table 3 do confirm the earlier mentioned assumption of more dynamic 
development of life, rather than non-life, insurance. As far as the former is concerned, 
during the period 1993-1999 Slovenia achieved the fastest growth pace (26.2%) 
whereas the Czech Republic the slowest (10.2%). Considering the growth in non-life 
insurance, Poland recorded the fastest pace of expansion (11.5%) while in Slovakia the 
demand for insurance fell by -7.5%. 
4 The data are applicable to all the countries in the region. Compare: Sigma (1998, 2001), Swiss Re. 
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Table 3. Insurance growth in examined countries 
Life insurance Non-life insurance 
Country 
In USS 
millions 
1999 
1993- 
1999* 1998 1999 
In USS 
millions 
1999 
1993- 
1999* 1998 1999 
Poland 1484 16.4% 18.5% 21.6% 3041 11.5% 6.5% 7.9% 
Czech Rep. 576 10.2% 7.4% 29.3% 1231 9.6% 3.6% 4.1% 
Hungary 507 16.0% 22.6% 21.6% 748 1.5% 3.3% 4.6% 
Slovakia 207 17.5% 28.8% 19.3% 366 7.0% 13.3% -7.5% 
Slovenia 159 26.2% 8.7% 12.1% 567 5.1% 4.7% 0.1% 
Total 2933 15.6% 16.9% 22.3% 5952 8.4% 5.8% 4.9% 
Notes: averaged real premium growth per annum. 
Source: Sigma (2001), Swiss Re, p. 12. 
It is interesting to notice that in countries of the European Union, the relation 
between the two aforementioned components of the insurance market (with regard to 
premium volume) is exactly the opposite. In countries of the Visegrad Group, non-life 
sector is much bigger in terms of premium volume and income of non-life insurers is 
twice as big as income of life insurers. In the European Union, total life insurance 
premium is almost double when compared with the non-life sector5. The growth rate of 
premium volume in both sectors was lower, however, in comparison with the countries 
of our interest. It amounted to 9.6% in life insurance (in proportion to 15.6%) and to 
1.7% in non-life sector (compared to 8.4%). 
Although it cannot boast the highest rate of growth in premium volume, Poland 
continuously manages to sustain its leadership among the countries analysed. It can be 
proved by the total premium volume of USS 4.5 billion and by the fastest pace of 
market expansion during the nineties. The growth rate of life insurance premium 
averaged above 16% whereas non-life insurance over 11% above the inflation level. 
These values greatly surpass results achieved by insurance companies in highly 
developed countries. The growth pace of particular market constituents both in Poland 
and in the other countries suggest that if it manages to be maintained (the proportion at 
least), insurance markets in Central and Eastern Europe are likely to reach the 
standards of those in economically developed countries. The life insurance market will 
come to play a vital role then. 
Apart from growth rate, the size of insurance markets in particular countries is an 
important means of further estimation. It is presented above in table 3. On analysing 
the data is becomes evident that Poland is a dominant country with regard to premium 
volume. Let us then examine what, in this respect, the framework of the insurance 
market is like in the countries studied. Figure 2 presents the proportions. 
Figure 2 presents Poland as a leader on the insurance market among other countries 
of the Visegrad Group. Both in the life and non-life sector the total premium volume 
reached over 50%. This makes Poland not only a front-runner but also a country 
attractive to foreign investors. 
5 Premium volume of life insurance amounted to USS 434,065 bn, whereas of non-life USS 268,666 bn. 
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Figure 2. Insurance market shares in the countries examined 
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Source: Sigma 1/2001, Swiss Some, p. 13. 
Such a state of affairs results from a number of reasons (Douglas, 1990; Tillson, 
1996), like a high rate of economic growth6, sharp and steady fall in inflation, large 
population, influx of foreign capital, increasing market competition, improvement of 
legal norms of both market insurance functioning and functioning of economy on the 
whole, legal and economic changes aimed at catching up with European standards. 
The insurance market constitutes an important part of the economy of each country 
and Poland is not an exception. Data concerning the country’s development as well as 
expansion of the insurance market clearly indicate that in Poland it has been 
developing very rapidly. The situation is similar in other countries of the Visegrad 
Group. In this environment Poland has been an unquestionable leader judging from the 
growth rate, the size of the insurance market, and from the condition of the economy 
on the whole. Further alterations, which should introduce economic conditions even 
more competitive than those in the remaining countries of the Visegrad Group, might 
cause the growth rate of both the country’s economy and of its insurance market to be 
retained or even enhanced. It depends, however, on a number of factors including the 
condition of the world economy, the course of globalisation (Economist, 1997), and, in 
particular, on actions of the state (government) (Fitzgerals, 2002). Still, it is difficult to 
anticipate directions of further changeovers on the market. Up to this point, some of the 
Polish government decisions and laws passed in the Polish parliament seem to be 
incompatible with these healthy rules of economic prosperity and expansion 
(Wilczynski, 2002a, 2002b; Orlowski, 2002; Balcerowicz, 2002). One should not 
renounce hope, however, that the market will stand up for itself. 
6 It holds true for the period 1994-2000, after which economic growth rate fell to the level of 0,5% p.a. 
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Regional Policy and SMEs in Zlin Region 
Marek Beran and Kamil Dobes 
This article is divided into three main parts. In the beginning the authors describe 
problems of regional policy and structural funds of the EU. The second part shows the 
region of Zlin from the regional policy perspective. The economic characteristics are 
also described here. The last part focuses on SMEs and their role in a society. First, the 
authors define this term from the European point of view, showing the advantages and 
disadvantages. Then the globalisation problems as well as the role of marketing in the 
SMEs are briefly explained. 
1. Regional policy 
1.1. The term “region” 
Region is, according to the common encyclopedic dictionary, defined as “part of 
the earth’s surface with specific typical features” (VE, 1997). Because the definition of 
the region could be shown in different contexts, the Council of Europe defined 
regionalism in Europe as follows: “The term region is described differently in different 
countries, but in general it is a human community, that lives within the frame of a 
bigger territorial entity. This community can be characterised by certain historic, 
cultural, geographical or economic homogeneity, or by the combination of these 
characteristics that gives the population a unity of common aims, features and 
interests.” (Waigel, 1997) 
In the case of a region, it is the territory under the level of the state. The region has 
to consist of its own state or/and other independent organisational structure. Of course, 
there are very different variations in size, population, economic and political 
importance. 
In respect of the European structural funds aid, the whole of the Czech Republic 
can also be partly counted as a region (Czema, 1999, 1999a). 
1.2. Development and position of the regional policy in the EU content 
Regional policy is one of the top priorities of European policy and a better 
economic policy system of the EU. This can be justified simply by the amount of 
money spent on reaching the regional and structural aims. And in the long-term 
perspective, it comes second just after agricultural policy. During the last few years, it 
has reached about 40% of the total EU budget expenses. 
The main aim of most European countries is the development of support for 
problematic regions, together with the effort for inter-regional divergence reduction. It 
is based mostly on the fact that restructuralisation strains the regional development so 
immensely, that the regions are not able to manage the necessary structural changes on 
their own. From the point of view of the national economy, it is better to provide 
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regions with the biggest structural changes and regional aid for this restructuralisation, 
as well as the competition activity support, than to pay out grants for maintenance of 
branches and companies in danger, or to take some protectionist measures. Hand in 
hand with this disposal of targeted regional disparities reduction the other aim of state 
capacity in all state regions is monitored (as well as the effective allocation of regional 
V 
resources) to maximise national economy efficiency (Had and Urban, 1997; CR, 1998). 
2. Regional policy in the Zlin region 
2.1. Territorial characteristics 
Since 1 January 2000, the Czech Republic has been newly divided into 14 regions. 
We will focus on the Zlin Region. This region is situated in the eastern part of the 
republic, bordering on the Jihomoravsky Region in the south-west, the Olomoucky 
Region in the north-west and with the Moravskoslezsky Region in the north-east. It 
also has a state frontier with Slovakia (Trencinsky and Zilinsky Regions). 
The Zlin Region consists of four districts: Kromeriz, Uherske Hradiste, Vsetin and 
Zlin. The total number of municipalities is 304, of which 28 are towns. The overall 
area is 3,964 knr (5% of the Czech Republic area). About 597,842 people live in this 
region (150,8 inhabitants/km - 5th place in the Czech Republic). In comparison with 
other regions, the Zlin Region has the third smallest surface area (see more in table 1). 
Table 1. District Population in the Zlin Region 
District Population Men Women Area in km2 Municipalities 
Zlin 196 723 95 539 101 184 1 031 82 
Uherske Hradiste 145 577 71 011 74 566 992 78 
Vsetin 148 377 72 690 75 687 1 141 58 
Kromeriz 108 754 52 800 55 954 800 79 
Celkem 599 431 292 040 307 391 3 964 297 
Czech Republic 10 299 125 78 867 6 234 
Source: Regionalni'(1998), p. 22. 
A total of eight cohesion regions were set up in the Czech Republic together with 
the coordination and realisation of economic and social policy and the use of structural 
funds - so called NUTS II. The Zlin Region together with Olomoucky Region creates 
NUTS II called Stredni Morava (METOD..., 2002). 
2.2. Economic characteristics of the region 
General economic features of the region are shown in the tables below. 
The Zlin Region reaches the lowest points according to the GDP. Also the GDP 
per capita in the Czech Republic is very low, reaching 57% of the EU average. 
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Table 2. Economic features of the region 
Year Zlin Region Czech Rep. 
GDP in Region (min CZK) 1995 70196 1381049 
1996 77010 1572257 
1997 85721 1668859 
1999 91411 1887325 
GDP / No. of unemployed (in thous. CZK) 1995 406,0 442,1 
1996 465,4 519,0 
1997 439,1 481,9 
GDP/Region Population (in thous. CZK) 1995 116,9 133,8 
1996 128,3 152,5 
1997 143,0 162,0 
Source: CSU and METOD... (2002). 
Table 3. Gross domestic product of Zlin Region and the Czech Republic 
Year Zlin Region Czech Rep. 
GDP participation in % 1994 5,3 100 
1995 5,1 100 
1996 4,9 100 
1997 5,1 100 
1998 5,0 100 
1999 4,8 100 
GDP per capita in PPS (EUR 15 = 100) 1994 54,73 59,94 
1995 55,42 63,43 
1996 55,69 66,16 
1997 57,25 64,99 
Source: CSU and METOD... (2002). 
2.3. Regional policy evaluation and its development in the Zlin Region 
Regional policy evaluation in our region could be very simple. One argument is that 
there is a lot of regions (14). Eight would be sufficient. A division into 14 regions does 
not respect historical layout, and for the EU our regions appear to be too small, etc. 
The fact is that a smaller amount of regions would mean lower administrative costs 
(e.g. regional authority, institutional building). If we look now at more radical regional 
policy changes in the Czech Republic, the trace could lead into 1996. In 1989-1996 
regional policy was not the priority of economic policy. It could not be, because our 
government had to cope with more difficult tasks and differences between regions were 
lower (e.g. unemployment). 
The breaking point came after the elections in 1996 when the new Ministry of 
Regional Development was founded. Pressure for regional policy improvement was 
exerted by the European Commission in its first paper called Progress Towards the 
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Accession, where the regional policy of the Czech Republic was evaluated negatively. 
Since then, marked progress in this area has been made. 
In looking at the regional policy, we have to differentiate two points of view. From 
the EU point of view, the Czech Republic as a whole is one region that fulfills the 
criteria for EU regional policy support. As for the bigger differences inside the 
republic, they are of government results and responsibilities. We can say that if there 
are problems in the region, the government should help in solving them. For this 
reason we think there should have been better decentralisation. 
A positive fact is that regional policy continuity can be seen even in the next 
electoral term in the Czech Republic, which is important, especially in this electoral 
year. 
Regional development conception of the Czech Republic, as well as the regions, is 
based on the following papers: 
a) The strategy of regional development of the Czech Republic and government 
decree No. 235/98 about government regional policy guidelines. 
b) The regional development plan of the Czech Republic (government decree No. 
417/98 for institutional framework of the Czech Republic participation in the EU 
structural funds and EU regulations for use of structural funds EC 98/0090). 
c) Regional development programmes for pilot regions (government decree No. 
235/98).' 
d) Regional development law No. 248/2000. 
As for the new Zlin regional authority, more information can be found at 
http://www.kr-zlinsky.cz or http://www.zlinsky-kraj.cz. Generally, this authority, as 
well as the whole region, can be characterised as very forward-looking with high 
industrial and spiritual potential. 
3. SME in the Zlin Region 
3.1. Specification of SME within the EU 
This article uses the definition of small and medium enterprises as specified by the 
European Commission. This definition is recommended for the member countries of 
the EU, by the European Investment Bank and European Investment Fund. At the same 
time it functions also as a framework for programmes, policy and regulations valid 
inside the EU in the sphere of small and medium enterprises. It has been in use since 1 
January 1998. 
This measure has a form of recommendation and joins together the following 
criteria: 
• number of employees, 
• turnover, 
• balance of trade, 
• independence. 
1 More see e.g. the Czech Republic government decree from 26 October 1998 No. 707 about 
determination of territorial entities NUTS in the Czech territory for statistical and analytical needs of the 
EU. See: Verejna sprava, 1999, No. 1, p. I-VIII; Prancl (1999). 
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According to this recommendation, companies can be divided into: the smallest 
enterprises with less than 10 employees, small enterprises with 10-49 employees and 
annual turnover up to 7 million euros and medium enterprises with 50-250 employees 
and annual turnover up to 40 million euros. 
In addition, all companies have to fulfill the independence criteria, i.e. a company 
may be owned by larger companies up to 25% of its share only (EURO - info, 1996). 
3.2. Advantages and disadvantages of SME 
Let us have a look at advantages and disadvantages of SME according to Barrow. 
Advantages include: 
• simpler structure, 
• higher flexibility, 
• higher sensitivity to market needs, 
• individual approach to the customer, 
• active participation in the innovative process, 
• creating new job opportunities, which encourages economic growth; ensuring 
social standards, lowering the costs using subcontractors, and small production. 
Disadvantages include: 
• low market share of SME, 
• lack of capital, 
• bad orientation in administrative, legislative and tax regulations, 
® uneasy access to public orders, 
• problems with participating in research projects, 
• difficult penetration into foreign markets, 
• observing the regulations connected with higher costs. 
One of the positive aspects of the present day, is the wide range of technologies 
accessible even for small companies, due to the Internet and the on-line databases. 
A typical feature of small companies lies in their long-term survival on the market. 
Small companies are founded at an increasing pace, however the majority go bankrupt 
in the first few years of their existence (Barrow, 1992). 
3.3. The impact of globalisation on SME 
We live in times of mergers resulting in companies becoming larger and stronger 
economic units. This can be seen, for example, in the car industry (German Daimler- 
Benz and American Chrysler), food industry (Grand Metropolitan and Guinness) or in 
banking and insurance (Deutsche Bank and Bankers Trust), where huge financial 
institutions with enormous capital have emerged. 
This may suggest that economic growth is determined exclusively by big global 
enterprises which rule not only over the amount of investment, but also over their 
placement. 
In spite of this fact, a dynamic growth of SME can be seen in all industrial 
countries. SME are crucial and dynamic elements of the economy. Inside the EU small 
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companies (under 20 employees) represent 94% of the total number of companies and 
employ over 33% of all employees. 
The potential of SME has been increasing and has become important even for large 
enterprises. SME can be faster in their production and organisation flexibility and 
exploit resources more consequently, which leads to better market realisation and 
innovation (Murphy, 1996). 
3.4. Marketing SME 
Marketing is frequently perceived as a tool for creating clever strategies in selling 
products. It is often reduced to advertising and sales. For this reason it is often located 
in the sales department even though the aims of the marketing and sales department 
differ substantially. 
Company managers should be capable of identifying the needs of a customer and 
finding a solution profitable both for the customer and the firm. This can be achieved 
by innovating products, increasing the quality and value, and good service. If these are 
not the objectives of the management, then no advertising campaign or sales support 
can save it. 
The understanding of competition is thus marked by the battle for the low price of 
a product, instead of increasing the value of the product. 
Every company which desires to be competitive and prosperous in a long-term 
cannot rely on sales only; it must invest and find ways of increasing the value of its 
products or create completely new ones according to the customers needs (Glogar, 
1999); Kotler, 1995). 
In 1999, a field study was carried out in the Zlin region. It included four districts: 
Zlin, Uherske Hradiste, Vsetin a Kromeriz and focused on the area of companies 
marketing. The sample accounted for 324 items. 168 items were small companies up to 
19 employees, 56 had 20-49 employees, 63 had 50-250 employees, and 37 had over 
250. 
Owing to the small range of this paper we can only shown the results of the study, 
however, it can be important for any further focus on this underestimated part of SME. 
The results clearly show that the majority of small and medium enterprises have no 
separate marketing employees. It is almost unbelievable that this situation occurs even 
in companies with over 250 employees. 
The usual practice is to include the marketing department inside the sales 
department. In such a case the whole of marketing is shrunk to promotion of the 
current products and there is not enough space for new concepts. 
We cannot consider these companies as direct marketing, because the marketing 
personnel do not participate in the management of the company. The integration of the 
marketing department in companies does not reflect the current tendencies in the 
organisation and management of a company. 
Further research showed that many employees of the marketing department have 
not the necessary qualification, i.e. an economics degree. 
Further, there are many “old hands” employed and there is a growing need for 
faster requalification. The study showed that although companies do requalification 
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courses, nevertheless their frequency and regularity is not satisfactory (Kloudova, 
2000; Novacek and Kloudova, 1999). 
The outcomes of the survey can be summarised into the following points: 
• The majority of companies do not put enough stress on the importance of 
marketing and see its position as part of the sales department. Marketing 
employees are not sufficiently qualified in the main and get their positions thanks 
mostly to restructuring. 
• We can see positive development in the implementation of information technology, 
which is better than with larger enterprises. 
• There is a high level of Internet use. Most companies have Internet connection or 
plan to get it soon. 
• A rather alarming situation is the exploitation of state funds designed to support 
enterprise. Most companies have no idea of any such organisations and their 
supporting programmes. 
At present another survey dealing with companies from the whole of the Czech 
Republic is being carried out. It started in 2001. 
4. Conclusion 
Greater complexity of the enterprising environment and its changes forces managers to 
obtain more complex information. Pressure on the part of the customer increases. It is 
necessary to realise how serious and costly wrong decisions may become. 
Our article has tried to pinpoint some of the aspects of the SME area related to the 
forthcoming entry of the Czech Republic into the EU from the national and regional 
perspective. 
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Part 4 
Technological Changes and 
Transition Countries’ 
Prospects for Growth 

The Institutional Infrastructure of the ‘New Economy’ and 
Catching-up Potential of Post-Socialist Countries+ 
Marc in Piqtkowski 
The contribution of the ‘new economy’ to economic growth in developing countries 
has been minimal when viewed from a macroeconomic perspective. Despite the recent 
‘new economy’ hype, this paper argues that the ‘old economy’ will for a long time be 
the fundamental force behind economic growth in transition economies. Nonetheless, 
in the longer run the ‘new economy’ offers great potential for faster economic growth 
and increasing standards of living in less developed countries, post-socialist countries 
included. 
Realising the potential of the ‘new economy’ is, however, not automatic. It can be 
left unharnessed if there is no suitable institutional infrastructure, which would allow 
for adoption, diffusion and productive use of innovative technologies. 
This paper constructs a New Economy Indicator (NEI) measuring the level of 
readiness of transition economies for harnessing the potential of the innovation and 
technology diffusion stemming from the ‘new economy” to accelerate the long-term 
economic growth and catching-up with developed countries. In the NEI ranking 
Slovenia scored the highest, followed by the Czech Republic, Hungary, Estonia, 
Slovakia, and Poland. Georgia, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Albania, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, and FR of Yugoslavia occupy the bottom of the table. The results seem 
to be congruent with a common knowledge that the most advanced transition countries 
should lead the ranking. Countries where the transition process has made the least 
progress rank at the very bottom. 
The NEI results largely square with the ranking of the Global Competitiveness 
Report published by the World Economic Forum (2001), which illustrates countries’ 
competitiveness. This suggests that fundamentals responsible for the development of 
both the ‘new’ and the ‘old’ economy are largely the same. Hence, since both 
‘economies’ rely on the same foundations, then there is no ‘new’ or ‘old’ economy: 
there is only one economy where old recipes for development still apply. 
1. Introduction 
The ‘new economy’ hype is over. The bursting of the stockmarket bubble instilled 
much needed realism into debates on the economic impact of the on-going 
technological revolution spurred by information and communication technologies 
(ICT), and most visibly embodied in the Internet. The business cycle is alive and 
kicking, unemployment is up, and shares prices are down. The economic nirvana of the 
‘new economy’ did not materialise. The ‘new economy’ thus still needs to be written in 
quotes. 
+ This paper was presented for the first time at the international conference on the “‘New Economy’ and 
Old Problems. Prospects for Fast Growth in Transition Economies’’, 14-15 March 2002, Warsaw, Poland. 
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The impact of the ‘new economy’ on the world-wide economy, despite the recent 
hype, has so far been quite limited, particularly in terms of its geographical reach. The 
‘new economy’ has been mostly felt in developed countries, some examples to the 
contrary notwithstanding (Bangalore in India is a fitting and often-cited example). 
However, the contribution of new technologies to growth in developing and transition 
economies has been minimal, particularly when viewed from a macroeconomic 
perspective. 
Despite a somewhat ambivalent start, in the longer run the ‘new economy’ offers 
great potential for faster economic growth and an increase in standards of living in less 
developed countries, transition countries included1. The acceleration in productivity 
and output growth could allow transition economies to shorten the process of their 
catching-up with developed countries. The relative low level of economic development 
together with technological backwardness gives them a handicap in development: 
thanks to absorption, imitation and application of knowledge, blueprints, ideas, 
technological and organisational advances, and superior technologies already 
developed in rich countries, post-socialist economies should now grow faster than 
developed economies. Post-socialist countries may be thus able to ‘leapfrog’ stages of 
technological development and subsequently considerably increase rates of economic 
growth. The ‘knowledge-like’, weightless nature of the ‘new economy’, which 
provides for easier and faster diffusion, can further accelerate the absorption process. 
Realising the benefits of the ‘new economy’ is however not automatic. Its potential 
can be left unharnessed if there is no suitable institutional infrastructure, which would 
allow for adoption, diffusion, and profitable use of innovative technologies. 
After more than a decade of transformation from a command economy to a market 
economy, the process of institution building is still far from being concluded. Like the 
technological revolution, the post-socialist institutional revolution is not over. The 
results of the latter revolution will bear upon the future prospects for development. 
Countries with insufficiently developed institutions are likely to find themselves in a 
“technological trap”, risking to be marginalised in a global economic community. 
Various speeds of adoption of the ‘new economy’ are also likely to add to the growing 
polarisation of growth rates in the post-socialist countries. Ultimately, the ‘new 
economy’ can have both its winners and losers. The existence of appropriate 
institutions will be one of the deciding factors. 
Hence, what are the institutional preconditions for transition economies to benefit 
from the potential of the ‘new economy’? What is the current level of institutional 
readiness for adoption of the ‘new economy’ among transition countries? Can it 
prosper in spite of the old problems of the poor “hard” infrastructure, lack of 
regulations and mature institutions, scarce capital, and finally lack of English language 
skills? What are the future prospects? 
1 The following terms: transition countries/economies, post-socialist countries/economies, and Central and 
East European and Central Asia countries (CEECA) will be used interchangeably. The category of 
transition countries in this paper includes 27 post-socialist countries of Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, FR Yugoslavia, FYR 
Macedonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Romania, 
Russia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. 
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This paper constructs a New Economy Indicator (NEI) measuring the level of 
institutional readiness of transition economies for harnessing the potential of the 
innovation and technology diffusion stemming from the ‘new economy’ to accelerate 
the long-term economic growth and catching-up with developed countries. The NEI 
indicator is comprised of ten variables believed to be the most pertinent for 
development of the ‘new economy’ and its profitable use. These are the following: 
• quality of regulations and contract enforcement, 
• infrastructure, 
• trade openness, 
• development of financial markets, 
• R&D spending, 
• quality of human capital, 
• labour market flexibility, 
• product market flexibility, 
• entrepreneurship, 
• macroeconomic stability. 
The structure of the paper is as follows: section 2 will succinctly discuss the 
phenomenon of the ‘new economy’ and its recorded impact on output and productivity 
growth. Section 3 will analyse current and prospective effects of the ICT revolution on 
growth in transition countries. In section 4 the NEI indicator of the quality of 
institutional infrastructure will be developed. Section 5 will conclude the paper. 
2. Is there a ‘new economy’? 
The existence of the ‘new economy’, the term itself so often put in quotes, is still 
open to debate. Still only a little more than a year ago the concept of the ‘new 
economy’ was meant to describe an emergence of an apparent non-inflationary growth 
paradigm spurred by the technological revolution of the 1990s, most visibly embodied 
in the worldwide Internet. Nowadays, the ‘new economy’ is most often construed as a 
superior economic structure perpetuated by innovations in information and 
communications technologies (ICT), which - while impacting all sectors of the 
economy - accelerates productivity and economic growth. Other definitions underscore 
the contribution of globalisation to the ‘new economy’ (Pohjola, 2001b), spillover 
effects of communications networks (Stiroh, 1999), and finally permanently higher 
growth rate in productivity stemming from the production, adoption, and continued 
diffusion of ICT (De Masi et al., 2001). The ICT is in turn defined as “those industries, 
which facilitate, by electronic means, the processing and display of information” 
(Bassanini et al., 2000). 
Kolodko (2001) explains why the ‘new economy’ should be always put in quotes. 
He asserts that “there is no ‘new economy’: there are only new technologies of 
production and distribution, which have a qualitative influence on ways of doing 
business”. Gordon (2000) indirectly subscribes to this assertion by arguing that faster 
economic growth in the US in the late 1990s was not due to the ‘new economy’ but to 
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productivity improvements in the ICT sector alone complemented by the cyclical 
effects of higher investments. 
So, is there a ‘new economy’? “Yes” or “No”? It depends on the definition and 
assessment criteria. These differ. On one hand, there is no ‘new economy’ if one agrees 
that the posited new paradigm of economic growth has so far not materialised. 
Furthermore, contrary to what was argued by the ‘new economy’ proponents, 
traditional economics seems to have not lost its power of explaining recent growth 
performance. On the other hand, however, there may be a ‘new economy’ if one agrees 
with its narrow definition: the ‘new economy’ is a complex of new economic 
phenomena and interdependent processes based on ICT products and services, which 
permeate the whole economy and induce new ways of doing business. Yet, this narrow 
definition situates the ‘new economy’ firmly within the traditional ‘old economy’: the 
‘new economy’ is just another emanation of a never-ending process of technological 
and economic progress. 
Faster economic growth progress due to ICT is confirmed by micro- and 
macroeconomic data on the recent performance of the US, Finland, Ireland, Sweden, 
Singapore, and Australia. All these countries increased their rates of output and 
productivity growth in the late 1990s. The extraordinary acceleration in productivity 
and output growth in the US economy in the 1990s, particularly in its second half (on 
which, by the way, the whole debate on the ‘new economy’ was mostly centered), 
coupled with low inflation and unemployment, suggested that indeed the ‘new 
economy’ existed. Between 1995-2000 American annual productivity as measured by 
GDP per hour worked in the non-farm sector increased to 2.5% (Economist, 2001b) 
from 1.4% in the 1972-1995 period (Pohjola, 2001b). A major part of it was driven by 
the ICT; the OECD (2001a) calculated that in the second half of the 1990s the ICT 
capital boosted annual average GDP growth in the business sector of the US by 0.9% 
(the winners-up, Australia and Finland, recorded 0.6% annual growth). 
It now seems that the American “new economy miracle” was driven by factors 
well-known to traditional economics - a significant increase in investment rates 
(capital deepening) driven by declining prices of ICT equipment, which enhanced 
growth in ICT-using sectors, much faster productivity and output growth in ICT 
industry itself, and much higher labour utilisation (Oliner and Sichel, 2000; OECD, 
2000, 2001a). While the impact of the spillover (networks) effects on the economy is 
less certain, these effects do indeed seem to have contributed to faster economic 
growth, as well. 
Notwithstanding the American ‘miracle’, the impact of the ‘new economy’ on the 
global economy has so far been negligible. Apart from the US, the ‘new economy’ was 
felt only in a handful of other countries: Finland, Sweden, Australia, Ireland, 
Singapore, and South Korea. The rest of the world hardly seems to have benefited from 
the technological phenomenon. Japan, Germany, France and Italy did not record any 
acceleration in economic growth. The contribution of ICT to annual average GDP 
growth in the business sector amounted to only 0.3% (OECD, 2001a) as compared to 
0.9% in the US. 
The ‘new economy’ in developing countries, aside from small-scale 
microeconomic improvements, did not seem to add much to economic growth, either. 
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Software industry development in Bangalore in India, fish markets in Bangladesh, east 
European information portals, or Internet coffee markets in Brazil have added much to 
the ‘new economy’ hype. Alas, these much-cited developments did not seem to have 
added equally to the economic growth of their countries. 
The impact of the ‘new economy’ was thus geographically limited. In addition, its 
contribution has so far been also only transitory - last year despite the ‘new economy’, 
the whole world (including the US - the paragon of the ‘new economy’) entered a 
period of much slower growth, often verging on recession. The business cycle, 
contrary to the predictions of the ‘new economy’ partisans, is alive and kicking. The 
economic boom was not sustainable. Technological revolution by itself was not able to 
drive the economy. The last phase of the cycle, driven by acceleration in investments 
and a boom in consumption propelled by the stockmarket bubble, has ended. The party 
is now over. 
3. The impact of the ‘new economy’ on transition countries 
Heretofore, macroeconomic impact of technological innovations underlying the ‘new 
economy’, on transition countries was negligible. Results of a comprehensive cross¬ 
country empirical study on the returns of IT investment in developed and developing 
countries (Kraemer and Dedrick, 2000), based on data from 36 countries for the period 
of 1985-93, show that returns on IT investment are “positive and significant for 
developed countries, but not statistically significant for developing countries”. The 
estimate of IT output elasticity is 0.057 (positive and significant) for developed 
countries2 3, but statistically indistinguishable from 0 for developing countries”. Pohjola 
(2001a) shows that the relative contribution of IT to GDP growth in developing 
countries was less than 2% (China, India, Argentina, Chile, Brazil, Thailand, 
Venezuela) compared to more than 10% in the US, Finland, Canada, Sweden, and the 
UK. No other studies, at least that the author is aware of, have found any sizable 
contribution of ICT to growth in developing countries. Surely, more research is needed 
on the impact of ICT on post-socialist economies (where lack of relevant data is a 
usual constraint). 
One reason for the apparent lack of benefits from the diffusion and adoption of the 
‘new economy’ in transition countries is still the relatively small value of IT 
investments, which does not find reflection in national accounts - the most advanced 
transition countries (Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia) in 1999 invested 
in IT between 1.9% (Poland) to 4.2% (the Czech Republic) of their GDPs compared to 
Sweden’s 6.5%, 5.3% in the US and the overall OECD average of 4.3% (OECD, 
2001b). Even in absolute numbers the value of IT investments in Central and East 
European countries was much smaller than in rich countries. IT investments in less 
developed transition countries (Central Asia, for instance) are not likely to exceed 1% 
of GDP. Thus, it seems, investments are too small to bear upon growth. 
2 A 10% increase in IT investment should result in 0.57% increase in output. 
3 According to IDC (2000), all transition economies spent a bit more than US$ 10 billion on IT in 1999. 
This is roughly equal to the IT investments of Sweden alone. 
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Yet, why don’t even small investments yield positive returns? Kraemer and 
Dedrick suggest that developing countries, as opposed to developed countries, have not 
been able to use profitably ICT products and services due to the lack of complimentary 
investments in infrastructure, human capital, R&D and so on. This seems to be right. 
Returns on many various high-value added investments depend on complimentarities. 
To put it into colloquial terms, a brand new high-tech factory in the middle of an 
underdeveloped (or ‘"developing” as euphemistically we all have learned to say), 
country will not be efficient owing to the lack of local suitable labour skills, 
infrastructure, regulations, taxation and so on (which together equates to institutional 
infrastructure, as we discuss more forcefully later). In this environment, returns on 
investments in basic infrastructure (drinking water, primary schools, irrigation) are 
very likely to be more productive than high-technology investments. As a result, some 
transition countries could rightly decide to invest in basic infrastructure while 
compromising ICT investments.4 Consequently, at least during the process of building 
basic infrastructure, a technological chasm between underdeveloped and developed 
countries could further widen. 
The technological gap could also widen between more or less developed transition 
economies. The ‘new economy’ may thus contribute to rising growth disparities in 
transition economies. Different qualities of institutional infrastructure and the resulting 
various speeds at which transition economies espouse the Internet revolution will most 
likely lead to further polarisation of patterns of economic growth in those countries. 
The least developed countries, like Tajikistan or Albania, can even find themselves in 
the technological trap. Initial development conditions therefore matter for the adoption 
of the ‘new economy’. This is because when one country is better developed than 
another, then it has higher chances for taking advantage of the ‘new economy’. 
Despite negligible macroeconomic impact, the IT revolution seems to have 
contributed to productivity and output growth on a microeconomic level in certain 
industries (retail, financial services, transport) and specific enterprises. Anecdotal 
evidence abounds - management information systems together with the use of e-mail 
seem to have been the most appreciated for their contribution to better productivity (as 
recently discussed with several CEOs in Poland). Yet, these effects are seemingly too 
small to reflect on the macro picture. 
The ‘new economy’ has contributed to a few success stories. Rapid development of 
e-banking5, e-commerce6, and Internet portals bears proof of the potential of new 
4 The technological trap is analagous to the poverty trap, which is very interestingly discussed in Easterly 
(2001). He explains the idea of a poverty trap by taking an example of the returns on education in an 
underdeveloped country, where it is more profitable for parents not to spend money on education of their 
children since benefits from being educated in a poor country are likely to be lower than a value of 
children’s lifelong work on the farm. 
5 The Polish Internet bank, mBank, has attracted more than 150,000 accounts in less than a year since its 
inception (Gazeta Finansowa, 2001); the runner-up, Inteligo, boasts of more than 100,000 accounts as of 
the end of 2001. Coupled with other banks, it is estimated that as of the end of 2001 there were roughly 
440,000 clients using internet accounts, six times more than in December 2000 (Rzeczpospolita, 2002a). 
Analysts project that by 2005 Poles will maintain some 2 million e-accounts (Prawo i Gospodarka, 2001). 
Note: the number of clients is not equal to the number of internet accounts - clients can maintain more 
than one account. 
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technologies. Yet again, far from being euphoric, the macro impact of e-business in 
transition countries is still insignificant. Growing penetration of the Internet, (more 
than 10% of Poles used the Internet regularly as of the end of 2001; more in Estonia, 
Slovenia, Hungary, the Czech Republic, but much fewer in other post-socialist 
countries), promulgation of e-signatures (the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Poland, 
Hungary), or attempts at introducing e-govemment (like in Slovenia: Economist, 
2001a) by itself does not much contribute to economic growth, either6 7. 
Microeconomic rapid progress in adoption of ICT innovations bears proof of the 
potential of the technological revolution for transition countries. As for now, though, it 
seems that much more time is needed for microeconomic progress to make a tangible 
impact on people’s well-being. Productivity improvements at the firm and industry 
level driven by information technology are, however, likely in the medium and long¬ 
term to contribute to acceleration in aggregate growth. Additionally, in the long run, as 
argued by the conditional convergence hypothesis, transition countries should also 
grow faster than developed countries owing to absorption of knowledge other than 
technology, organisational and managerial blueprints, and financial resources from rich 
countries. Benefits of convergence and IT will depend on the quality of national 
policies and the level of development of institutional infrastructure. 
The ‘new economy’ and the times of ‘punctured equilibrium” (Thurow, 2001) that 
it induces, offer quite a few opportunities for transition economies to achieve faster 
development. At the same time, however, it poses substantial threats. However, the 
scope of this paper does not allow for discussing these points in detail. Transition 
countries stand a chance to grow faster thanks to the low opportunity costs of 
switching from old to new technologies, (these are higher for developed countries - no 
‘sunk costs’ for transition economies), younger populations which generally tend to 
espouse innovations faster, and a relatively high level of educational attainment, the 
value of which is much higher in the ‘new economy’ environment. Additionally, the 
potential of the Internet revolution also stems from the weightless, knowledge-like 
nature of the ‘new economy’ (Quah, 2001), which allows for its faster diffusion and 
adaptability of innovations, and thus higher value of international R&D spillovers. 
These opportunities are mitigated by threats of digital divide and technological trap. 
Despite challenges, the economic potential of the technological innovations 
underlying the ‘new economy’ is significant. That is because in the long-run technical 
progress is everything - in his famous article Solow (1957) found that capital 
accumulation accounted for only 13% of economic growth in the US in the first part of 
the twentieth century. The rest, almost 90%, was attributed to technological progress 
(as expressed by TFP - total factor productivity). 
6 E-commerce is rapidly developing. International Data Corporation estimates that in 2001 the e- 
commerce market in four Central European countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia) will 
increase 6-fold to $650 million (Rzeczpospo/ita, 20 July 2001). In Poland www.ce-market.com, a 
successful B2B platform for transactions in non-ferrous metals, attracted more than 450 customers in less 
than six months from inception. In the same period, the total value of transactions amounted to some $6 
million - see: http://www.ce-market.com/ aboutus_what_press.asp. 
7 Although growing Internet penetration surely contributes to better access to information, convenience, 
customer choice and satisfacton. These factors may be captured only by some kind of a Human 
Convenience Index, the value of which surely catapulted after the emergence of the Internet. 
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In the shorter run, though, it appears that traditional accumulation of physical and 
human capital matters more than technological progress. This is also because of the 
pace of technological progress itself, still mostly embodied in equipment and 
machinery, largely depends on investment in physical capital. Investment in physical 
capital expands and renews the existing capital stock and enables new technologies to 
enter the production process. Welfe et al (2001) found that based on growth 
accounting calculations, between 1974-1990 Poland’s annual TFP growth amounted to 
0.73%, which represented only 26% of the period’s potential annual growth rates. 
Physical and human capital accumulation was responsible for the remaining 74% of the 
potential GDP growth. Calculations based on data for the 1990s revealed that 
investments in physical capital were responsible for almost half of the growth in 
potential GDP (1990-95) and between 80-90% of growth between 1996-2000. The 
effects of technical progress, driven by the increase in the quality of human capital and 
the absorption of foreign technical progress, were thus quite limited. 
Coe and Helpman (1995) show that between 1991-95 technological progress (TFP) 
in most developed countries of Western Europe was responsible for approximately 
o 
60% of the annual GDP growth rates , that is substantially more than in Poland. This 
suggests that for Poland, and - per proxy - other transition economies, accumulation of 
traditional factors of production, that is investments in physical, and - to a lesser extent 
- human capital, matters much more than for developed countries. Hence, traditional 
factors will long remain the mainstay of economic growth in transition countries. 
This may stem from the fact, as also argued by Kreamer and Dedrick (2001), in 
order for developing countries to reap the benefits of technological progress, they need 
to first develop physical infrastructure, invest in labour skills, and promote new 
institutions, which all amplify the effects of technological progress. 
One can conclude that the process of catching-up of transition economies will 
mostly depend on the ‘old’ economy. Nonetheless, the importance of the ‘new 
economy’ for economic growth is likely to increase gradually - diminishing returns to 
investment in physical and human capital imply that with time and rising incomes the 
growth of TFP driven by technological progress will have to accelerate in order to 
sustain high growth rates.* * 9 In the long run, then, the ultimate success of catching-up 
will also depend on the ‘new economy’. 
Similarly, Kolodko argues (Kolodko, 2001, p. 71) that “the post-socialist countries 
- unlike developed market economies - need not aptly utilise the potential of e- 
business, but first raise efficiency of the ‘old economy’, since these two ‘economies’ 
are destined for a lengthy coexistence”. One may add that the ‘old economy’ and 
capital and human accumulation, as prescribed by traditional development economies, 
also seem to be binding for developed economies. One of the paradoxes of the 
American productivity miracle in 1990s driven by the ‘new economy’ is the fact that 
s Potential TFP for Poland; actual TFP for Western European countries. See: Welfe et al. (2001) for 
methodological details. 
9 Welfe et al. (2001) argue, based on their econometric model for Poland’s economy, that in order for it to 
reach 6-7% annual growth of potential GDP during the next decade, and assuming that investments to 
GDP would equal 30% annually and the labour force would hardly change, the TFP will have to be 
responsible for at least 50% of the increase in potential GDP. Without acceleration in TFP growth, the 
potential GDP will only increase by 3 to 3.5% annually. 
The Institutional Infrastructure of the ‘New Economy ’ and Catching-up... 237 
the European Union, seemingly quite slow in adoption of the Internet revolution, has 
nonetheless recorded productivity growth in 1995-2000 of 1.5% annually, only slightly 
below the 1.8% recorded in the US.10 The EU experience suggests then, examples of 
Finland, Sweden, and Ireland notwithstanding, that improvements in the ‘old’ economy 
must have mostly contributed to this significant productivity growth. Therefore, even 
in developed countries the ‘new economy’ is not the only solution to faster economic 
growth - the ‘old’ economy still has a great role to play. Old-style efficiency 
improvements in structural, organisational and institutional frameworks of economies 
still matter. 
4. The New Economy Indicator (NEI) 
Neither the ‘old’ nor the ‘new economy’ will develop without appropriate institutions. 
These, while creating particular economic incentives, decide on the allocative 
efficiency of an economy. The quality of institutions largely explains differences 
across countries in productivity and economic growth (North, 1990; Hall and Jones, 
1996; World Bank, 2002; Clague, 1997). Likewise, technological progress also 
contributes to divergence in growth rates. 
The paper develops an institutional indicator - the New Economy Indicator (NEI) 
- with an objective to provide a best estimate of prospects, based on the level of 
development of the ‘new economy’ institutional infrastructure, for harnessing the ‘new 
economy’ by 27 transition countries for faster long-term economic growth and 
catching-up. 
As a word of caution, the NEI surely does not fully subscribe to the neo-classical 
model of economics, which heavily relies on hard data and mathematical models. The 
indicator, since it could not be falsified due to lack of reliable data, does not have any 
pretence to be a hard scientific proof. Nonetheless, the implications of the indicator 
seem indeed to add to the current stock on knowledge on the importance of institutions 
for adoption of new technologies. The lack of hard data should then not limit our quest 
for knowledge* 11. 
Motivation for the use of indicators, as argued by Zinnes, Eilat and Sachs (2001, p. 
321) is two-fold: “first, (...) indicators provide an easy way to capture a concept when a 
10 Calculated as Net Domestic Product (NDP) per man-hour {Economist, 2001b). If one takes into account 
GDP per hour worked in the ten years to 2000, American productivity in that period rose by an annual 
average of 1.6% in the ten years to 2000, but euro area productivity rose by 1.9%. Total factor 
productivity, which takes into account the efficiency with which capital and labour are used, also grew 
slightly faster in the euro zone than in America (Economist, 2001c). 
11 In a telling story, Krugman (1997) cites a paper on “the evolution of ignorance” about Africa. The paper 
describes the evolution of European maps of the African continent between the fifteenth and the 
nineteenth century. In the fifthteenth century, maps of Africa were relatively inaccurate. Yet, they 
described the interior of Africa often based on indications like “six days to the south, two days east from 
there”. In later centuries, cartography and the quality of information improved. The development of 
cartography, however, enhanced the standard of what would be considered valid data. Thus, “six days to 
the south” did not qualify anymore. As a result, maps developed in later centuries showed a sparser area 
for the African interior than on maps from the fifteenth century! As Krugman says “there was an extended 
period of time in which improved technique actually led to some loss in knowledge.” Ele further concludes 
that “doing economics ... is a kind of mapmaking.” This paper’s indicator is yet another kind of a map. 
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single, quantitatively measured variable cannot. (...) Second, the indicator approach 
helps to overcome problems of scarcity and quality of data, which are major obstacles 
to any work on transition economies”. In other words, indicators come in handy when 
relevant hard data is missing. 
Table 1. Variables 
Factor Proxy Source 
a) Quality of regulations and 
contract enforcement 
Legal system effectiveness & 
extensiveness 
EBRD 
b) Infrastructure Number of fixed telephone lines plus 
mobile phones per 100 persons 
EBRD 
c) Trade openness Exports plus imports to GDP EBRD 
d) Development of financial 
markets 
Broad money (M3) to GDP EBRD 
e) R&D spending Annual R&D spending to GDP Eurostat 
f) Quality of human capital Education Index 1999 HDI 
(UNDP) 
g) Labour market flexibility Unemployment rate EBRD 
h) Product market flexibility Competition policy index EBRD 
i) Entrepreneurship Private sector share in GDP EBRD 
j) Macroeconomic stability Inflation EBRD 
Douglas North, the father of institutional economics, defines institutions as formal 
and informal “rules of the game”. Institutions are deeply rooted in the social, political, 
ethical, and cultural processes of a particular country and place constraints on social 
interaction (North, 1994, 1997). This paper’s indicator, while building on the 
foundations of this definition, as well as theoretical and empirical macroeconomics, 
combines ten variables, which are believed to be the most relevant for the adoption and 
profitable use of technological progress “ The ten variables are as in the table above. 
5. Description of the variables 
First of all, a relevance of each variable for general economic growth will be 
established based on a selection of research results. Secondly, the relevance of each of 
the variables for harnessing the potential of the ‘new economy’ will be discussed. 
Thirdly, some comments will be made on the level of development of transition 
countries as regards to particular variables. 
The measure of the level of development of the ‘new economy’ institutional 
infrastructure will be reflected by a weighted sum of values of all ten variables for each 
country. It has been assumed that the variables of quality of regulations and law 
enforcement, financial development, trade openness, infrastructure, R&D spending, 
and human capital will be given twice as large relative weight compared to other 
variables (which have been multiplied by 0.5) as they are believed to be the most 
12 These are also based on various research projects (OECD, 2001a; IMF, 2001; World Bank, 1998/99). 
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important for the ‘new economy’. Due to either lack or limited availability of relevant 
data, variables are proxied only by observations available for the whole sample of 
countries. While it would be much more appropriate, for instance, to use a number of 
Internet hosts or a number of PCs per capita to measure the infrastructure variable, 
only data for fixed line telephone penetration is available for the full sample of 
transition economies. Simply, the best available sets of data were used to measure each 
variable. 
The construction of the indicators is based on the competitiveness indicator 
developed by Zinnes, Eilat and Sachs (2001, p. 322) and is performed in the following 
way: 
• variables are selected, ensuring that each of them is either entirely positively or 
negatively related to the main concept; 
• if variables are negatively correlated (like inflation), they are multiplied by-1 to 
insure that always “more is better”; 
1 
• variables are standardised. 
a) Regulations and contract enforcement 
As argued by Clague et al. (1997) the quality of regulations and contract 
enforcement mechanisms largely explain why some countries prosper while others do 
not. He shows that the high level of contract enforcement and respect for property 
rights lowers the cost of market exchanges. The lower costs of transactions due to 
better contract enforcement are especially important for transition countries, where 
costs of transactions, because of the low level of development of market exchange 
mechanisms, are much higher. Higher transaction costs stifle economic growth. Quite 
evidently then, the quality of regulations and contract enforcement is vital for long¬ 
term economic growth. 
Rule of law is equally important for the adoption of new technologies, particularly 
in less developed post-socialist countries, where contract enforcement traditionally has 
been lacking. New enterprises utilising innovations will not prosper if the legal 
environment is not conducive to their development. When faced with inadequate law 
enforcement, entrepreneurial effort tends to shift to less transparent grey and black 
markets. The law extensiveness and quality of contract enforcement is then prerequisite 
to emergence of the ‘new economy1.14 
13 The sample mean is subtracted from each number and then the result is divided by sample standard 
deviation. This implies a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one across countries in the sample. 
Hence, all results are comparable and can be aggregated. 
14 However, quite interestingly, software piracy, due to lack of contract/copyright enforcement, is 
beneficial to the adoption of the ‘new economy’ in transition economies. Billions of dollars’ worth of 
software has been pirated and then widely distributed at a low cost. As reported by Business Software 
Alliance (2001), in 1999 alone $12 billion worth of software was pirated globally. A couple of years ago, 
the majority of software used by local enterprises even in Poland were not licensed. In less developed 
countries, like Kazakhstan or Albania, almost all software is still illegal. Piracy pays: in the short run it 
definitely adds to faster diffusion of information technologies. Without piracy, technological catching-up 
would be considerably slower as local economies could not afford to pay the full price of software 
products. This Machiavellian idea does not, however, hold in the long run. In the longer perspective, the 
low quality of contract enforcement and regulations is inimical to growth. This is true also because 
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b) Infrastructure 
This is quite a self-evident category for the adoption of the ‘new economy’ - there 
will not be any ‘new economy’ without telephone and computer networks15. It seems 
probable that in order to benefit from the so-called network effects one needs to exceed 
a critical point in development of the network. While the exact position of the critical 
point is not known, it seems reasonable to assume that it is close to universal 
penetration. Network effects may then be non-linear - after exceeding the critical 
point, the economic value of the network increases more than proportionately. 
It is common knowledge that communications and computer/Internet infrastructure 
in transition economies significantly lags behind developed countries. According to 
Eurostat (2001) statistics on the EU-candidate countries for 2000, the number of PCs 
and Internet hosts in a covered sample of transition economies are relatively low 
compared to EU countries. Diversity in results is interesting - PC penetration in 
Slovenia almost equals the EU average of 28.6 PCs per 100 inhabitants; in Bulgaria 
though, the PC penetration amounts to only 4.4 per 100 inhabitants. Similarly with 
Internet hosts: Slovenia boasts of 1.4 hosts per 100 inhabitants compared to Bulgaria 
0.2 and the EU average of 3.3. Indeed, there is much to be done to improve the ‘new 
economy’ infrastructure. 
Persisting underdevelopment of infrastructure does not, however, change the fact 
that in recent years most transition economies have made big steps in up-grading their 
networks. Mobile telecommunications, one of the wonders of the ‘new economy’, 
allowed most countries to start rapid catch-up with developed countries. It is a perfect 
example for potential of technological “leap-frogging” - from years-long waiting lists 
for fixed line telephones to plentiful access to mobile telephones at affordable prices. 
c) Trade openness 
There is a broad consensus among economists that liberalised exports and imports 
are positively correlated with productivity and output growth. Trade openness is 
particularly important for diffusion of knowledge and innovations - imports are their 
main carrier. Open borders allow for international R&D spillover effects, which may 
represent a very potent contribution to economic growth in developing countries 
(According to Mohnen 2001, a 0.5% increase in R&D spending in terms of GDP in 
developed countries may result in a 14% increase in output in the long run in 
developing countries). Coe and Helpman (1995) find a significant relationship between 
import propensities and the ability to benefit from R&D spillovers: i.e. for a given 
level of R&D performed abroad, countries with a higher import propensity have higher 
productivity growth. 
d) Financial markets 
Schumpeter (1912) already asserted that a developed financial sector is important 
to economic growth. This assertion was confirmed by the evidence of King and Levine 
countries known for piracy, risk being isolated by the international trade community and thus lose access 
to knowledge spillovers. 
15 Other types of hard infrastructure are almost as important - the ‘new economy’ will not develop in a 
country with dilapitated transportation networks (“proverbial pot holes”), and low quality logistics system. 
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(1993), Levine (1997), and Greenwood and Smith (1997), to name a few. Financial 
markets play an important role in collecting and aggregating savings and then 
redistributing it for productive purposes. 
A developed financial market is evidently critical for the ‘new economy’. In 
particular, the value of venture capital (VC) investments is especially important as it 
finances start-up companies, which tend to predominantly utilise new technologies and 
ideas (as the experience of ‘dot.coms’ suggests). Equity markets represent the second 
important channel for financing the ‘new economy’. 
Unfortunately, neither of the two ‘new economy’ financial channels is sufficiently 
developed in transition economies. The total value of VC investments is negligible. 
According to available data (Global Entrepreneurship Monitor 2001) in 2000, domestic 
VC capital investment to GDP in Poland, one of the most developed countries in 
Central and Eastern Europe, amounted to less than 0.1% compared to 1.2% in Israel 
and 1.0% in the US. According to Dresdner Kleinwort Capital (2001), in the whole of 
Central and Eastern Europe, the average ratio of private equity funds raised (raised 
does not mean invested, though) to GDP as of the end of 2000, amounted to 1.3% 
compared to the UK with more than 5.1%, Sweden with 3.3% or France at 2.0% of 
GDP. In Poland alone the aggregate amount of VC capital invested was about EUR 
200 million in 2000 - that is only 0.1% of GDP! 
The allocative role of equity markets is equally small - the total value of equity 
sold through IPOs on the Warsaw Stock Exchange in 2000 amounted to some 0.6% of 
total annual investments in fixed capital. Hence, the financial infrastructure of the ‘new 
economy’ in transition countries is underdeveloped and undoubtedly limits prospects 
for realising the economic potential of the ICT. 
e) R&D spending 
Thanks to the findings of the endogenous growth theory and many other research 
papers, the importance of R&D for economic growth is by now quite obvious. Stiglitz 
(1998) states, “studies in returns to R&D in industrial countries have found individual 
returns of 20-30 percent and social returns of 50 percent and higher”. He further argues 
that “for most countries not at the technological frontier, the returns associated with 
facilitating the transfer of technology are much higher than the returns from 
undertaking original R&D”. Hence, it seems that an ability to absorb the technology is 
key to fast development. 
In transition countries R&D spending is at a very low level. It generally does not 
exceed 1.0 % of GDP compared to more than 2.0% on the average spent by the OECD 
countries. Low R&D spending puts post-socialist countries in a disadvantaged position 
since local R&D is extremely important for understanding and absorbing knowledge 
developed internationally, for up-grading their own R&D skills, and for active 
participation in international R&D networks. The OECD (2001a) argues that “domestic 
R&D (...) is key in tapping into foreign knowledge; countries that invest in their own 
R&D appear to benefit most from foreign R&D.” Domestic R&D is then essential for 
absorption of international R&D spillovers.16 
16 It has been argued that the rapid development of Japan since the 1950s and later Korea has been mostly 
based on successful adoption, imitation, and sometimes up-grading of innovations developed abroad. The 
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R&D spending is nevertheless not everything - what matters is a profitable 
application of the newly created knowledge. This is where the post-socialist countries 
seem to lag the most: the flow of knowledge between science and industry is very weak. 
Most R&D institutes in post-socialist countries, often quite sophisticated in the quality of 
their research, nonetheless are very incompetent in terms of diffusing the results of their 
research for business use. This is mostly due to the legacy of socialist times when all 
applications of R&D were controlled by the state. The state relinquished this role in the 
early 1990s and left it entirely to R&D institutes. But they proved unable to disseminate 
this knowledge because of the lack of clear incentives (like financial bonuses) and often, 
insufficient financial support. 
The ability of enterprises in transition economies to adopt R&D created both 
locally and internationally, is equally low. It is because the level of business R&D is 
particularly small. According to the OECD (2001b) Main Science and Technology 
Indicators, business enterprise sector R&D expenditure as a percentage of the domestic 
product of industry in 1999 amounted to 0.42% in Poland, 0.33% in Hungary, 0.69% in 
Slovakia, and 0.95% in the Czech Republic. This compares to Sweden’s 4.74% and the 
OECD average of 1.89%. 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) can play a substantial role in domestic absorption 
of international R&D. Its role should be growing. Yet, FDI inflows depend on the 
attractiveness of particular countries. Here transition countries lose in the global battle 
for FDI: they attract less than S30 billion annually, which is less than Brazil alone. 
Transition countries then have a lot to do to promote FDI and its R&D component. 
f) Human capital 
The role of human capital in economic growth is widely acknowledged. Various 
empirical studies have found that human capital is positively correlated with GDP 
growth rates (Benhabib and Spiegel, 1994; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995; Bassanini 
and Scarpetta, 2001b). 
Benefitting from the ICT requires the right skills and competencies. That involves 
building on the foundations of solid education and lifelong learning. Tertiary education 
is particularly important for the ‘new economy’ since mostly this level of education 
prepares people for absoiption of high-technology knowledge from abroad. In this 
context, it is also important to note that in order to benefit from ICT, tertiary education 
in maths, computer science and engineering rather than liberal arts should be 
1 H 
emphasised. 
The quality of human capital in transition economies is relatively high despite their 
low national incomes. Ukrainian human capital is better developed than Venezuelan 
and Tajikistani better than Nigerian. Human capital is one of the few positive legacies 
same path can be taken by transition economies. Yet, domestic R&D is needed in order to follow this route 
successfully. 
For instance, according to Stiglitz (1998) the high ratio of engineers in tertiary education in Korea and 
Taiwan (almost triple the US level) contributed to narrowing their productivity gap with developed 
countries. 
18 According to the Human Development Index 2001, the Education Index 1999 for Ukraine amounted to 
0.92, while its GDP index was only 0.59. This compares to, for instance, Venezuelan GDP index of 0.67, 
and Education Index of only 0.83. Post-socialist countries on the whole, thanks to a high value of the 
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of the communist or socialist era. Yet, formal education is not all - especially because 
ICT appropriate skills matter more than broad knowledge. ICT skills are lacking in 
transition countries. This is due to the relatively low numbers of maths, physics, and 
engineering oriented graduates. More importantly though, it seems to be due to lack of 
the culture of lifelong learning - it is very rare to see middle-aged people take courses 
in local universities. Yet, without lifelong learning people will not be able to keep 
abreast of ever-changing technology, whose progress - owing to the ‘new economy’ - 
has recently even quickened. 
Education also contributes to the driving demand for technological products. As 
argued by Quah (2001), the ‘new economy’ will not develop without demand for its 
products. Here again a lot can be done in post-socialist countries in terms of changing 
their attitudes towards adoption of innovations. Better education surely will help. 
Nonetheless, current attitudes will not be changed overnight - cultural and societal 
changes take decades to come about. This risk is however largely mitigated by an 
apparent strength - since youth tend to adopt innovations faster, then the relatively 
young populations of Eastern Europe and Central Asia should espouse technology 
faster than older and established societies in developed countries. 
g) Labour market 
The relevance of labour market flexibility for economic growth has been known 
for a long time. The OECD Jobs Study launched in 1994 was the first to find evidence 
that flexible labour markets result in reduction in unemployment (OECD, 1999). 
Higher employment translates into higher output. Di Telia and MacCulloch 
(Economist, 1999) found additional powerful evidence based on a survey of 21 
countries over seven years to 1990. 
Flexible labour markets are particularly important for the development of the ‘new 
economy’: adoption of e-business and emergence of new organisational and 
management structures predominantly require flexibility in re-allocating people from 
old to new tasks and new ways of doing business. Since innovation introduces new 
products and industries that replace existing ones, it leads to labour re-allocation 
between firms and sectors. Rigid labour markets, while stifling necessary changes in 
employment, inhibit the adoption of the ‘new economy’. Flexible labour markets are 
thus necessary for adoption and diffusion of the technological revolution (Johnston, 
2001). 
h) Flexible product markets and competition 
Competition, through lowering of the barriers of entry, improves incentives and 
thus leads to more productive use of resources. The importance of flexible product 
markets for economic growth has so far been plainly evidenced (Bassanini, 2001a). 
Competitive markets are very important for the growth of the ‘new economy’ and 
its contribution to increasing productivity. New, more productive enterprises using new 
technologies have to have a chance to compete with incumbent companies. Market 
regulatory framework has to push down the barriers of entry as low as possible. 
Education Index, score much higher in the HDI ranking than in the GDP ranking. For Armenia, the 
difference amounts to 44 places in the ranking; for Tajikistan, it is 36 places. 
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Telecoms companies are a case in point - in countries where the telecommunication 
market has been liberalised (the US, most of the EU, developed countries of the South- 
East Asia), the quality and cost of telecommunication services has considerably 
dropped in a short period of time. This is mostly not the case with telecom companies 
in transition economies, which retain their monopolistic positions. Market 
liberalisation is thus extremely important for the emergence of the ‘new economy’. 
i) Entrepreneurship19 
It is not enough to know. It is equally important to be able to put the knowledge 
into profitable use. That is where entrepreneurial spirit and thus entrepreneurs come 
into place. There would be no commercially utilised innovations without 
entrepreneurs. They transform somebody else’s ideas into economic reality. 
Schumpeter had a long time ago discovered the links between entrepreneurship and 
economic growth. He was the first one to assert that entrepreneurship is, next to 
innovations and credit, an important factor spurring economic growth (Blaug 1994). As 
forces of “creative destruction” replace old inefficient firms with new and innovative 
firms, the growth rate of productivity accelerates. 
To state the obvious, entrepreneurship is at the core of the ‘new economy’. There 
would not be Amazon, Yahoo, eBay, and other paragons of the Internet era without the 
risk-takers. 
j) Macroeconomic stability 
A high level and high variability of inflation increases uncertainty and decreases 
the efficiency of price mechanisms in allocating resources. As a result, inflation tends 
to lower the value and productivity of investments. However, specific evidence on the 
relationship between inflation and growth is ambivalent: while the relationship is 
robust in cases of high inflation, it is less so in cases of moderate or low inflation 
(Bruno and Easterly, 1998). Nonetheless, it is generally accepted that inflation, 
particularly high and variable inflation, is inimical to growth. 
Macroeconomic stability is equally relevant for the adoption and development of 
the ‘new economy’. In an unstable inflation-prone economy, no investments will 
flourish (not even ICT investments). Low and stable inflation rates are thus necessary 
for benefitting from the technological progress. 
k) Other factors 
The NEI could be complimented with additional variables of such harder-to- 
quantify factors like political freedom and stability (democracy, civil liberties, state 
support for the Internet), culture (openness to adoption of innovations), corruption, 
religion, ethnicity, or even command of English. 
19 Private sector share in GDP based on EBRD data is used as a variable in covering a full sample of 
countries. It surely is a flawed measure since it reflects both entrepreneurial activity and progress in 
economy-wide privatisation. Nonetheless, a large share of the private sector in the GDP of transition 
countries means that, first of all, the structural reforms that promote entrepreneurship are advanced. And 
second, grass-roots private business has been expanding, too (in most transition countries start-up private 
businesses rather than privatised companies now contribute a large part of the private economy 
contribution to GDP). 
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Table 2. Competitiveness of selected countries 
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Slovenia 1 10.1785 1.0846 1.7629 0.4393 1.2911 3.2527 1.1878 0.5269 1.0033 0.4107 0.3792 
Czech Rep. 2 9.4404 0.4310 1.3205 1.0642 2.4531 2.6677 -0.2700 0.3573 1.4730 1.3349 0.3826 
Hungary 3 7.3497 1.0846 1.5654 0.8087 0.8867 0.3669 0.8963 0.3361 1.4730 1.3349 0.3381 
Estonia 4 7.2152 0.8232 1.1783 1.7600 0.9481 0.1329 1.1878 -0.1728 1.0033 1.0268 0.5126 
Slovak Rep. 5 6.6799 -0.0266 0.8228 1.2058 1.9975 1.0688 0.3132 -0.6074 1.4730 1.3349 0.3963 
Poland 6 3.7016 1.0846 0.4436 -1.3954 0.6768 0.5618 1.1878 -0.3000 1.4730 0.7188 0.3929 
Bulgaria 7 2.9908 1.0846 1.0914 0.0268 0.3595 0.0159 0.0216 -0.6074 0.3769 0.7188 0.2937 
Latvia 8 2.3387 1.0846 0.7596 -0.5181 -0.0040 -0.5301 0.8963 -0.1092 0.3769 0.4107 0.6221 
Lithuania 9 1.6368 0.8232 0.8702 -0.2410 -0.3265 -0.0621 0.8963 -0.3424 -1.6586 0.7188 0.6357 
Croatia 10 1.3759 0.8232 1.2731 -0.7521 0.8765 -0.5301 -0.5615 -0.4166 0.3769 0.1027 0.4305 
Russia 11 1.0092 -0.0266 -0.0541 -0.8690 -0.6643 1.3418 0.6047 0.2619 0.3769 0.7188 -0.0039 
Kazakhstan 12 0.2158 1.0846 -0.7572 0.0299 -0.7258 -0.5301 0.6047 0.6541 -0.0928 0.1027 0.3552 
Ukraine 13 -0.2864 -0.4842 -0.1015 0.2238 -0.5620 -0.5301 0.6047 0.8449 0.3769 0.1027 -0.1989 
Moldova 14 -0.8892 0.4310 -0.6071 0.0145 -0.4698 -0.5301 0.0216 1.0570 -0.0928 -0.5134 0.0508 
Kyrgyzstan 15 -1.4902 0.1695 -1.0100 -0.3519 -0.9049 -0.5301 0.6047 0.6965 -0.0928 0.1027 0.3587 
Romania 16 -1.7719 0.6271 -0.2911 -0.8690 -0.3162 -0.3351 -0.5615 0.1771 0.3769 0.1027 -0.7086 
Armenia 17 -2.6630 -0.2227 -0.3701 -1.0076 -0.7616 -0.5301 0.6047 0.1347 -1.6586 0.1027 0.6699 
FYR 
Macedonia 18 -2.7710 -0.2881 
0.2382 0.2977 -0.3316 -0.5301 -1.1447 -2.1127 -0.0928 -0.2054 0.3860 
Turkmenistan 19 -3.3181 -2.6414 -0.9626 1.6768 -0.4698 -0.5301 0.6047 1.2902 -1.6586 -2.0536 0.4305 
Belarus 20 -3.6276 -1.7916 0.4515 0.8303 -1.0022 -0.5301 0.6047 1.0676 -0.0928 -2.3617 -2.9936 
Tajikistan 21 -3.7250 -1.5301 -1.3182 2.3048 -1.0585 -0.5301 -0.5615 1.0252 -0.5625 -1.1295 -1.3961 
Georgia 22 -4.0096 -0.6803 -0.6940 -1.0414 -1.1199 -0.5301 -0.2700 0.1983 -0.0928 0.1027 0.4442 
Azerbaijan 23 -4.5110 -0.6803 -0.8599 -0.7459 -0.9152 -0.5301 -0.5615 -0.1304 -0.0928 -0.8214 0.6084 
Uzbekistan 24 -4.5665 -0.2227 -1.0811 -0.1241 -0.8998 -0.5301 -1.7278 1.2266 -0.0928 -0.8214 -0.2742 
Albania 25 -5.1069 -0.6803 -1.2076 -1.6602 1.6085 -0.5301 -2.8940 -0.4908 -0.5625 1.0268 0.5400 
Bosnia 26 -7.2454 -1.3340 -0.8520 -0.5335 -0.0961 -0.5301 -1.1447 -2.9608 -1.6586 -1.4375 0.5468 
FR Yugoslav. 27 -8.1505 -0.0266 -1.6105 -0.5735 -0.4698 -0.5301 -1.1447 -1.6039 -1.6586 -1.1295 -3.1988 
Source: World Economic Forum (2001). 
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Yet, due to the very qualitative nature of these variables and for the sake of the 
NEI’s simplicity, these variables are not included. Nonetheless, the impact of political, 
social, and cultural factors on economic growth, and - in the paper’s context - on the 
adoption of new technologies, surely remains a rich field for further research. Slovenia 
scored the highest in the ranking, followed by the Czech Republic, Hungary, Estonia, 
the Slovak Republic and Poland. Uzbekistan, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and 
FR of Yugoslavia occupy the bottom of the table 2. 
The results seem to agree with a common knowledge: most advanced transition 
countries are ranked in the leading positions. Countries where the transition process 
has made the least progress (Georgia, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Albania) or where war 
wreaked havoc on the economy, as in Bosnia and Herzegovina and FR Yugoslavia, 
rank at the very bottom. 
The NEI results also largely square with the ranking of the Global Competitiveness 
Report published by the World Economic Forum (2001). As one might expect, the NEI 
indicator of readiness for harnessing the ‘new economy’ seems to be correlated with 
countries’ competitiveness. 
Table 3. Rankings of transition countries in Global Competitiveness Report (GCR) 
and NEI 
GCR NEI 
1. Hungary Slovenia 
2. Estonia Czech Republic 
3. Slovenia Hungary 
4. Czech Republic Estonia 
5. Slovak Republic Slovak Republic 
6. Poland Poland 
7. Lithuania Bulgaria 
8. Latvia Latvia 
9. Romania Lithuania 
10. Bulgaria Croatia 
11. Russia Russia 
12. Ukraine Kazakhstan 
Note: GCR lists only twelve transition economies. 
Source: World Economic Forum (2001). 
This suggests that fundamental institutional infrastructure responsible for the 
development of both the ‘new’ and the ‘old’ economy are largely the same. Hence, 
since both ‘economies’ rely on the same foundations, then there is no ‘new’ or ‘old’ 
economy: there is only one economy where old recipes for development still apply. 
We have also calculated the NEI indicator for an unweighted sum of values of all 
variables. Table 3 shows that the NEI ranking based on the unweighted sum is largely 
similar to the weighted ranking. 
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Table 3. Rankings for weighted and unweighted NEI 
Weighted NEI Unweighted NEI 
1. Slovenia Slovenia 
2. Czech Republic Czech Republic 
3. Hungary Hungary 
4. Estonia Estonia 
5. Slovak Republic Slovak Republic 
6. Poland Poland 
22. Georgia Tajikistan 
23. Azerbaijan Uzbekistan 
24. Uzbekistan Azerbaijan 
25. Albania FYR Macedonia 
26. Bosnia Bosnia 
27. FR Yugoslavia FR Yugoslavia 
Note: first six and bottom six countries 
Source: World Economic Forum (2001). 
Similar results of both rankings bear proof to the robustness of the results of the 
indicator: if changes in weights of variables were to result in big corrections to the 
NEI, than it might imply that the rankings are arbitrary. As shown, this is not the case 
here. 
6. Summary and conclusions 
The information technology revolution, like all previous industrial revolutions, is 
poised to change the ways of doing business on a global scale and thus contribute to 
faster productivity and output growth. The ‘new economy’ has already made its impact 
on growth rates in developed countries. Despite the current slowdown coupled with 
some pessimism, the information revolution is here to stay. Only more time is needed 
for its benefits to feed fully through to the whole economy. 
The ‘new economy’ has not yet, however, had any major impact on less developed 
countries. Nonetheless, it represents a significant potential for less developed and 
transition economies to attain long-term growth, sustained and fast socio-economic 
development, and catch-up with developed countries. However, the realisation of this 
potential is not automatic: it seems that sufficient institutional infrastructure must exist 
before these countries can tap into the benefits of the ‘new economy’. 
The New Economy Indicator (NEI) developed in this paper has been thus designed 
to show the level of institutional readiness of transition economies for adoption of the 
‘new economy’. As could be expected, countries most advanced in the transition 
process have received the highest rankings. Those countries where the process of 
transformation from planned economy to a market economy has progressed the least, 
rank at the bottom of the table. These countries risk finding themselves in the 
‘technological trap’ where, due to the insufficient quality of institutional infrastructure, 
investments in new technologies may yield lower returns than investments in older 
technologies. Hence, older technologies can prevail over new ones. 
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Different speeds of adoption of technological innovations resulting from the 
different quality of institutional infrastructure are likely to contribute - along with the 
traditional ‘old’ economy - to diverging rates of economic growth and thus add to the 
growing income polarisation among the post-socialist economies. The most advanced 
countries (front-runners like Estonia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and 
Slovenia) thanks to ICT are likely to speed ahead much faster, while economic growth 
in lagging countries (Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, FR Yugoslavia, and 
Tajikistan) may languish. 
Income polarisation among transition countries is likely to grow also because of 
the impact of the impending accession of ten transition countries to the EU. In the 
long-term, the accession to the EU is set to increase gradually the value of all variables 
in the NEI index of all new EU members. Financial assistance from the EU to new 
member countries worth some EUR 40 billion between 2004-06, will improve the 
institutional infrastructure of the ‘new economy’“ . 
The potential for harnessing the ‘new economy’ for faster and sustained long-term 
economic growth and catching-up of post-socialist countries will depend on the level 
of development of the institutional infrastructure. This is mostly influenced by national 
economic policies and strategies. The NEI index shows where much more emphasis 
should be put to promote diffusion, absorption, and the profitable use of innovations. 
All variables count for the ‘new economy’. But not only - they equally count for the 
‘old’ economy. It is because in reality there is only one economy, which - as has been 
the case throughout the whole history of mankind - combines the old with the new. 
Traditional recipes for development still hold: investment in physical and human 
capital will for a long time to come be the most important ingredient of fast growth. 
Yet, long-term growth will also depend on the speed of replacement of the old with the 
new. The IT revolution may accelerate the replacement process. This is particularly 
true for transition economies. The technological leap-frogging will not, however, 
materialise without appropriate institutions. Their fast build-up is the recipe for 
ultimate catching-up with the developed world. 
20 For instance, Poland is to receive EUR 1 billion in 2002 and 2003 and EUR 6.5 billion annually 
afterwards for infrastructure investments only (JPMorgan, 2002). 
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The Technology Gap and Catching-up Process 
in Visegrad Countries 
Martin Srholec 
The transition process can be considered completed, when transition economies 
approach the economic level of the least developed member countries of the European 
Union, they are sufficiently resistent to external shocks accompanying the process of 
financial markets globalisation and their market institutions stimulate economic agents 
to improvement of allocation and dynamic efficiency. Convergence toward the more 
developed countries requires both higher growth of incomes per capita and the capacity 
to maintain the positive growth differential for a sufficiently long time. Within the 
context of increasing income differentials considering the EU membership aspirations, 
the discussions after ten years of the transition process duration, focus on the 
evaluation of the present and prospective capacities of transition economies in 
transforming the system changes (so-called first transition: “from plan to market”) in 
sustained growth (so-called second transition: “from system changes to sustained 
growth”). This transformation is considered a condition of catching-up with developed 
countries. As to the methodology aspects, the shifting research focus requires adequate 
(structural, quality based) analytical methods, enabling the dsaggregation (to partial 
elements and their inter-relations) of the so far mostly analysed aggregate indicators 
and focus to technological changes of production and innovative capacity of economy 
during the transition. 
1. The first and the second transition 
The key dispute in the first stage of transition (“from plan to market”) mostly 
concerned the sequence and speed of fundamental system changes, i.e. the fulfilment 
of the Washington consensus principles: stabilisation, liberalisation and privatisation. 
Related questions concerned sufficiency of these measures as a condition for renewal 
of long-term (sustained) growth dynamics in transition economies. The optimistic line 
of the argument started with the assumption of a direct (automatic-like) relation 
between the speed of economic reforms and growth performance of transition 
economies. 
Opposing this line of argument, I do not consider the relation mentioned between 
the reforms and sustained growth, i.e. catch-up with the more developed countries, an 
automatic process. In my view, the fundamental system reforms are considered a 
necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for sustained growth. This view stresses 
comprehensiveness of the transition process (in the sense of country and time-specific 
social, political and technological characteristics), the role of non-economic historical 
factors, in the past accumulated development stressed the role of structural 
transformation. The real touchstone of the transition process completion is the capacity 
of reaching the sustained growth path, balanced internally and externally, providing 
efficient incentive structures. Within this context, the transition process is not 
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completed with the system changes as such, it requires an adequate response to the the 
challenges of the technology revolution - the sustained growth performance is not an 
automatic result of the restoration of fundamental market principles. 
The quantification of convergence/divergence trends in the last decade confirms 
the increasing differentials in per capita incomes between transition economies and 
between their groups (Central European and the Baltics, South Eastern Europe, CIS). 
The differences manifest themselves also in the development of convergence / 
divergence of transition economies to the average level of EU15. However, even the 
most optimistic scenarios assume the horizon of 15-30 years for the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland and Slovakia - under the assumption of annual growth rates in the 
range of 4.5-6% as compared to 3% in the less developed EU. The increasing 
differences in growth performance between transition economies bring in a number of 
questions concerning understanding the causes of the differences and the strength of 
the inherited distortions makes the standard analytical framework insufficient. 
2. Economics of technological changes 
The role of technology change is stressed in all the theoretical approaches to growth 
and its determinants, though; the approaches differ in attention given to the explanation 
of technology change. In neoclassical models, technology is taken as public good, 
generally available to all countries. Consequently, economies converge to the common 
rate of technology change. The technology change is exogenous, its nature remains 
unexplained. On the contrary, the endogenous growth models take the innovation rate 
as the result of purposeful, profit-oriented activity of economic agents. Technology 
change is considered endogenous. That opens the possibility of cross-country 
technology differences, attention is given to the explanation of their causes. The stress 
on diversity of technology change, at the same time, makes its analysis difficult, in 
terms of aggregate concepts and indicators applied in macroeconomic modeling of 
economic growth. The shift of the analysis to industry level seems necessary. 
The role of technology differences is stressed in the evolutionary approach, which 
considers technology capabilities, together with structural adjustment, as driving forces 
of economic growth (see: Dosi, 1988; Dosi et al, 1990; Verspagen, 1993; Dosi et al., 
1994; Metcalfe, 1998; Fagerberg, 1994, 2000). When the dynamic adjustment takes 
place due to new technology solutions, and the industry structure of an economy is 
analysed from the view of its technology level, we use the term technology adjustment 
and technology based competitive advantage. Evolutionary approach considers 
technology based competitive advantage as the result of learning processes (technology 
capabilities) which are firm and industry (industry group) specific, and reflect past 
experience (technology accumulation). The different capacity for generation of new 
knowledge (innovation capability) and imitation of knowledge, developed in other 
countries (capability of knowledge spillover assimilation), influences (industry 
specific) rate of technology change. The lasting differences in this rate result in a 
technology gap. Backward countries, however, may improve their growth dynamics 
through structural change linked to technology change, the creation or transfer of 
which are (due to different costs and technology knowledge) country specific. This 
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approach considers the structural change as an interaction between economic and 
technology changes, stressing the role of their qualitative characteristics. 
3. Technological and structural changes 
Economic transition opened up new technology opportunities from which the former 
socialist countries had been largely isolated in the past. Structural changes 
accompanying transition are historically unique as to the extent and concentration in 
time. Their evaluation, in respect of the growth conductive impulses, starts from the 
differentiation between the two aspects of “creative destruction”. Productive factors are 
released from technologically backward (energy and material intensive) economic 
activities, adjusting to the pressure of falling demand and growing competitive supply 
(passive restructuring). Long-term growth and high export performance are conditional 
on restructuring accompanied by profound technology change and development of 
technology intensive activities, especially in manufacturing industry. Turning these 
opportunities into reality requires improved dynamic efficiency, in the first place, 
effective incentives to accumulation and diffusion of technology knowledge and 
development of innovation capabilities. The knowledge accumulation and its 
innovative application are largely specific to individual economic agents, industries 
and industry groups. The inter-industry differences in the capacity for technology 
change influence the intensity and quality of structural changes in the economy, its 
growth dynamics and competitiveness. 
Structural change intensity reflects the structural mobility - how fast and deep the 
structural changes are. Within this context, the evaluation of the progrowth role of 
structural changes requires, besides the quantification of structural adjustment 
intensity, the analysis of their qualitative characteristics, which are specified in terms 
of factor input, technology intensity, product differentiation and market concentration, 
and labour skills. The combination of product differentiation and market concentration 
reflects the role of (non) price competitiveness and the possibility of market power 
exertion. The level of labour skills reflects the industry intensity in human capital. The 
intensity of changing qualitative characteristics reflects the transition economies 
capacity for taking technology opportunities. 
The openness to external economic relations brings opportunities for technology 
catch-up and transfer of technology knowledge from the countries at the best practice 
frontier. The decisive role in increasing growth dynamics and improving 
competitiveness of transition economies will be played by the pattern of foreign capital 
presence in respect of the targeted industries (their technology and skills intensities), 
the scope of the realised activities (especially the autonomous research and 
development), the degree of export orientation of the domestic production and the 
nature of its competitive advantage (quality vs. price based). 
The structural change intensity also usually increases in response to external or 
internal shocks. The shock impulses (in terms of changing relative prices of products 
and production inputs) intensify the pressure on the adjustment. The examples of such 
shocks are the increasing energy prices during oil-shocks in the 1970s, or the start of 
the transition process in the socialist countries in the late 1980s. Due to these shocks, 
256 Martin Srholec 
income declined (together with rising internal and external disequilibria). The 
structural adjustment capacity (degree of structural mobility) reveals itself in the speed 
of return to the original growth path. However, in the flexible economic system, 
structural changes take place continuously, even if their intensity is usually lower in 
the periods of stable development, reflecting rather the course of business cycles. On 
average (in longer time periods and in a larger sample of countries), we can observe a 
positive relation between the structural change intensity, and growth and export 
performance of national economies.1 
4. Technology intensity of exports 
The evaluation of technology intensity of exports is derived from classification of 
industries according to their intensity in research and development and acquired 
technologies. The classification applied in OECD analyses is based on the combination 
of three indicators (see: Hatzichronoglou, 1997): 
• the share of expenditures on research and development in value added, 
• the share of expenditures on research and development in production, 
• the share of expenditures on research and development and on technologies, 
embodied in intermediate goods and investment goods, in production.i' 
In terms of these criteria, the industries are divided into four groups: high 
technology, medium-high technology, medium-low technology and low technology 
intensive. 
Viewed from the role of interacting structural and technology changes, as positive 
we consider the higher share of technology intensive industries, employing the inputs 
more efficiently, employing a more skilled workforce, and paying higher wages and 
salaries. These industries also have higher potential for further learning, as they open 
the possibility for broader application of new scientific knowledge, generate new skills 
and general knowledge applicable in other activities. The industries with high 
technology intensity are the most important source of new technologies. The more 
intensive technology industries have also better growth prospects: their products are 
highly income elastic, generate new demand and substitute the older products more 
quickly. 
All the transition economies exhibit an increasing share of more intensive 
technology industries (HT+MHT). The Czech Republic takes the second position 
behind Hungary (65.2%, in comparison with 77.2% in Ireland, 70.1% in Germany, 
66.7% in G-7.) The lowest is the share of more intensive technology industries in 
Poland (32.6%). The development in Hungary is largely different, as compared to the 
other transition economies (even to more developed countries) due to the large share of 
the high technology intensive industries (HT, 24.2%) which (in relatively short time) 
overcame the average of G-7 (19.7%) and is approaching the level of Japan. In Ireland, 
For example, WIFO (2000) shows the relation between the production growth and export growth, and 
structural change intensity in EU, in 1988-1998. 
‘ The acquired technologies include research and development embodied in inputs and intermediate goods 
from domestic suppliers and imports. The share of acquired technologies is calculated in terms of input- 
output methods. 
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its share makes 41.4%, in the USA 31.0%, in Japan 25.6% (OECD STAN Industrial 
Database 2000). 
Figure 1. Export structure: technology intensity, international comparison, 1995-99 
(in %) 
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Note: presented sample includes (from left-upper comer): the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia, Germany and Ireland, respectively. Data for Poland and 
Slovenia are from 1998 instead of 1999. Germany and Ireland only in 1999. HT: 
industries with high technology intensity, MHT: with medium-high technology intensity, 
MLT: with medium-low technology intensity, LT: with low technology intensity. 
Source: Own calculations based on data of International Trade Center Database (2000). 
The Czech Republic exhibits the highest share of the industry group with medium- 
high technology intensity (MHT) among the transition economies, however, rather due 
to the initial advance, as the growth dynamics of the industry group is (beside 
Hungary) again higher also in Slovakia. The positive characteristic of Czech exports is 
the lowest share of the least technology intensive group (LT) among the transition 
economies. The growth dynamics of the more intensive technology industries 
(particularly HT group) is, however, relatively weak. 
The different development trend of HT and MHT groups between Hungary and the 
Czech Republic, suggests an interesting comparison between Ireland and Germany. 
While the development tendency in Hungary points rather to the structure with the 
dominant share of high technology intensive industries (HT), as in Ireland, the 
development in the Czech Republic suggests stronger similarity to the structure of 
Germany, i.e. with the dominant share of a medium-high technology intensive group 
(MHT). 
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Conclusions 
The technological change was the strongest in Hungary, with the starting qualitative 
position also already on a high level. That means, favourable technology characteristics 
of export structure at the beginning of the considered period, projected in the marked 
strengthening of the initial advance at the end of the period. On the contrary, in 
Slovakia and Poland, the relatively high value of qualitative change is to be ascribed 
rather to its initial low level (catch-up effect). The change in Slovakia, however, is 
much stronger than in Poland, the country with much lower intensity of structural 
changes in exports due to lower (outward) openness. 
The development in the Czech Republic and Poland points to the so far weaker 
capacity for closing the technology gap, or to weaker capacity for taking an 
opportunity of technology catch-up in improving the growth and export performance. 
Consequently, the more favourable future development requires higher intensity of 
structural changes through more vigorous market exit, which disengages production 
factors from the non-prospective industries. At the same time, it is desirable to support 
the entrance of high intensive technology economic activities (particularly through 
foreign direct investment) which also generate more effective pressure on improving 
the quality of national production factors. 
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The Competitiveness of Central and East European Countries 
and Economic Policy towards Transition to Digitalism 
Krzy sztof Piech 
The goal of this paper is to present the contemporary economic situation and 
competitiveness of chosen Central and East European countries looking at them against 
the background of the evolution of economic systems and EU convergence. The last 
term in the paper’s title bases on the knowledge-based economy, which nowadays is a 
modem trend in socio-economic development and research in many countries. The 
main conclusion is that it is necessary for the CEE countries, and for Visegrad 
countries among others, to introduce optimal ‘technological policy-mix’ to increase the 
competitiveness of these countries in order to transform their economies from 
socialism through different stages of capitalism to digitalism. 
1. Evolution of economic systems 
While analysing the economic history of the world, it is difficult to divide the countries 
into the groups of rich and poor, as well as undoubtedly enumerate factors leading to 
the development of economies. In seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the factors 
contributing to the welfare of nations started to be investigated and were identified 
with the amount of money, especially gold and silver, within a country. Thus according 
to the mercantilists, to increase the welfare of nations, there should be a pro-export 
economic policy conducted. However later, Adam Smith and others drew attention to 
the effects of the increase of money supply in circulation. He concluded that the 
welfare of nations depends on labour productivity, and - on accumulation of capital. 
David Ricardo’s theoiy of comparative advantage should also be mentioned, according 
to which the countries gain superiority through their specialisation (thus, not only 
effectiveness of work is important, but also the alternative cost of a good’s production). 
John Stuart Mill added to these explanations another one - the terms of trade. 
With the passage of time, more advanced explanations emerged, concerning the 
non-economic factors as well. One of them can be an institutional sphere of the society, 
the importance of which was emphasised by Joseph Schumpeter. According to him, 
entrepreneurs, who take risks and introduce inventions to the economy, cause 
economic growth. However, the entrepreneurship, as Peter Drucker formulated it, 
means also good management. Also Robert Solow’s surveys at the beginning of the 
1980s confirmed the importance of technological innovations and of increase of 
‘know-how’ in economy. However, in 1990s the growing role of knowledge was 
increasingly often emphasised. Some of the contemporary theories additionally 
underline that growth should be sustainable, which means that it cannot be the only and 
the most important goal, which if fulfilled, can damage the natural environment. 
We should also notice the tendencies to accelerate the technological development 
of the world. Thus, inventions find their purchasers increasingly faster. It means that 
the pace of creating discoveries and inventions accelerated (partly because the older 
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ones are getting outdated faster). Such factors like land, labour and even capital is 
becoming less important, and nowadays knowledge and the speed of its creation, 
become the most important factor of economic development. 
Another factor should also be mentioned. Countries owe economic success not 
only to internal, but also to external achievements, compared with the achievements of 
others. It was possible in the past for countries to reach internal economic growth 
without any external, economic relations (e.g. ancient China). It was possible to isolate 
a country almost completely from the rest of the world (some cases of autocratic or 
socialist countries). Nowadays, it is very difficult to maintain such a state. Thus, 
external relations contribute to the pace of economic development almost everywhere. 
Of course, they do not always contribute to the increase of economic growth. 
Sometimes the contrary: world recessions and for example, currency crises may 
significantly disturb the internal economic balance of a country. Nowadays, there are 
often situations where countries compete for the best relations with others in order to 
win as much welfare as possible for them (and their citizens). Moreover, if we regard 
the countries with very similar internal conditions for economic growth, they win the 
most. They are able to obtain better external relations. Therefore, economic growth and 
the welfare of nations also depend on the results of competition between countries. 
Thus, even among the countries of the same region the ‘incentives war’ may appear, 
when they introduce new solutions to attract e.g. FDI inflow. 
In addition, they depend very often on such factors as competitiveness of exports. 
Explained in a simple way it means that a good is more competitive when the demand 
increases and supply remains the same (at least in the short run). Moreover, the supply 
of those goods, which are new or their production is difficult, is very often limited and 
small. They are, for example, high-tech products. Their added value is usually larger 
than that of traditional goods. It means that the countries, which want to win 
competition with others, must specialise in the production of goods from the sector of 
advanced technologies.1 
However, the need for the new technologies, which more and more countries 
demand, will lead to the constant growth of the high-tech sector in many countries. It 
emerged on a larger scale in some countries and thanks to this factor they achieved a 
very high economic growth, especially in the second part of 1990s. 
There is no doubt that feudalism was a long lasting economic system: since the 
origin of the economies (not of the agricultural activity, because feudalism was an 
economic system) until the eighteenth century. As a system based on agricultural 
production, it needed only land (with some natural resources, like sun, wind, water) 
and labour force. In the pre-feudal period, labour was the main factor of production. 
Then with the progress of civilisation the unorganised groups of people started to 
cultivate the land and after organised into groups forming countries, economies 
1 To confirm it I recall the statement of Jerzy Kropiwnicki, one of the ministers of the Polish government 
(1994-97), head of the Government Centre for Strategic Studies, who asked a rhetoric question: 
“According to the theory of comparative costs of David Ricardo, England should specialise in production 
of clothes and Portugal - wine, because it will be the best for both of them. But you can see where 
Portugal and Great Britain now are”. See: Bienkowski (2001, p. 58). 
*) 
“ However this growth was not accompanied by internal balance and the overinvestment ended with stock 
crashes and economic recessions. It is typical in the development of new technologies (or innovations). 
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emerged and feudalism started. Feudalism created the agricultural society, based on 
very hierarchical, bottom-up relations. 
After the creation of the first textile manufacturing industries and the invention of 
the steam engine, giving rise to the first and second industrial revolutions, the drive to 
make profits, created the necessity of developing a banking system. Not only was the 
development of labour needed for achieving success, but also capital (and its 
accumulation), thanks to which it became possible to build factories and manufacture 
products, which were more sophisticated. They became standardised, their production 
was specialised and concentrated. The industrial society was created. 
In the middle of the nineteenth century the next step in the industrial revolution 
occurred. It was done by the invention and dissemination of electrical devices: 
followed by communication technologies. Then, after World War II, the invention of 
microelectronics enabled further development of economies and societies. This 
invention started the fourth phase of industrial revolution. 
Apart from capital, know-how has also become a necessity, knowledge of how to 
order things to work better.3 Pure knowledge without the ability to use it was 
worthless. It became especially noticeable after World War II, with the works of 
Solow. With the progress of social development, achieved also by the more and more 
intensive use of new technologies, the size of the services sector in the economy 
increased. The society became more leisure-time consuming. It was a post-industrial 
society. 
While analysing the economic systems, socialism should also be mentioned. 
However, contemporary economic history has shown that it was not a permanent 
system. It also underlined the importance of some inventions, like electricity, which 
can build industrial economy and society. As Vladimir Ilyich Lenin said: 'Communism 
is Soviets plus electricity'. 
Although its threat caused many of the most developed countries to have more 
intensive social protection than previously, at the beginning of socialism in Russia. 
Thus, the post-war capitalist system adopted many solutions of socialism. Liberal 
capitalism had to reform due to the increasing threat of communist expansion. 
Politicians remembered also the Great Recession (1929-33) and its consequences, 
which in Germany led to Nazism. Thus Ludwig Erhardt and Konrad Adenauer, based 
on works of Walter Eucken and Alfred Mueller-Armack, introduced in Germany a new 
economic order - social market economy (Soziale Marktwirtschaft). The Scandinavian 
countries (especially Sweden) also introduced many social solutions to the capitalist 
system. 
The last step in systems’ development, which is still visible today, is the growing 
share of high-technology industry and services, through the use of inventions like 
computers and Internet, as well as mobile telephones, on-line financial transactions, 
digital money (instead bank-notes or coins) etc. New factors became important for 
economic growth replacing the old ones. “The traditional factors of production - land, 
3 Here know-how means the abilities, having the skills, especially from the organisational point of view, 
rather than the knowledge, as a huge collection of information and the ability to use it. Knowledge has a 
wider meaning. It is usually divided into the tacit knowledge (know-how and know-who) and the codified 
knowledge (know-what and know-why). 
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labour and capital - are becoming restraints rather than driving forces. Knowledge is 
becoming the one critical factor of production.” (Schwartz, 1993) - Peter Drucker as 
quoted in ‘Wired’ magazine. With its use, it is possible to collect the capital, and later 
hire the labour force, also with expected managerial skills (entrepreneurship), and to 
buy a land. Possession of proper knowledge assists the earning of money, thus this 
factor dominates others. 
Nowadays, information is becoming more important than physical goods. During 
industrialisation, economies were based on finite exhaustible outputs, which were 
produced from the transformation of raw materials. Information cannot be described by 
the same rules. One piece of information can be used many times without depreciating 
its value and ownership is not lost but shared. There was a shift in the production 
process from mass production to individualisation, from universalism to adjustments to 
the customers’ needs. 
The changes in societies throughout history replaced agrarian populations with 
urban communities. Nowadays, we see that hierarchical, punctual, industrial society 
changed into a decentralised, networked information society. This process started after 
World War II, but accelerated at the end of the twentieth century. 
The contemporary sociological changes replaced punctuality and fixed working 
hours adjusting to the current situation and flexible working hours, instead of 
centralisation is decentralisation or networks. Society needs more leisure and exchange 
of information. It is the information society (or its early form: post-industrial society, 
as called by Drucker (1993): post-capitalist society) or the knowledge society. 
This society - through fast change and massive flow of information - has to adopt 
more knowledge, than ever before. “The illiterate of the 21st century will not be those 
who cannot read and write, but those who cannot leam, unlearn, and relearn.” - as 
Alvin Toffler has said. Thus, continuous learning is a necessity. 
Nowadays, knowledge is often collected electronically, because of faster access, in 
comparison with traditional documents. It can be stated that the digital notation is a 
basis of contemporary economic development. It is achieved not only by use of the 
labour force, land, and money, but also by the use of electronically transferable 
information, stored in the form of a binary code. 
“The growing codification of knowledge and its transmission through 
communications and computer networks has led to the emerging ‘information society’. 
The need for workers to acquire a range of skills and to continuously adapt these skills 
underlies the ‘learning economy’. The importance of knowledge and technology 
diffusion requires better understanding of knowledge networks and ‘national 
innovation systems’. Most importantly, new issues and questions are being raised 
regarding the implications of the knowledge-based economy for employment and the 
role of governments in the development and maintenance of the knowledge base.” 
(OECD, 1996, p. 3) Also John Dunning (1997) emphasises the need for change of the 
government role to be more market oriented on the present (since 1980) phase of 
capitalism (named “alliance” or flexible capitalism), which are dynamic and core 
competitive, than in previous phases (named: hierarchical capitalism (1975-1980) and 
entrepreneurial one (1770-1875)). 
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Figure 1. Evolution of economic systems 
The changes in the world economy were caused by the technological information 
revolution, of the 1980s and 1990s and its effects will continue for the next decades. It 
has led to substantial changes within economies which began to be called: knowledge- 
based economy, e-economy, digital economy, ‘new economy’ etc. However, the 
changes relate also to societies, to the basics of production, and sometimes also to 
economics. This further stressed that the changes are not only within the structure of 
economy, but are deeper. They may lead to the creation of a new economic system, 
which I would call: digitalism (Piech, 2002). 
266 Krzysztof Piech 
However, contemporary changes are not as simple as they were shown in Figure 1. 
Countries develop in different ways and at a different pace, as shown by the difference 
between Third World countries, developing ones and G-7. Michael Porter et al. (2000) 
distinguishes between the following countries: 
• Factor-Driven economies, where growth is determined by mobilisation of primary 
factors of production (land, primary commodities, and unskilled labour); 
• Investment-Driven economies, which harness global technologies (and capital) to 
local production with the use of FDI, joint ventures, outsourcing arrangements 
(licensing); thus the technologies are imported; 
• Innovation-Driven economies, which generate innovations and reach economic 
growth by facing global competition and winning it by high rates of social learning 
(especially science-based learning) and the rapid ability to shift to new 
technologies. 
They co-exist throughout the world, and there are only 21 innovation-driven 
economies in the world today. It creates a so-called digital divide, which can be 
another threat to the global economy.4 Civilisation discrepancy can be noticed also 
within a country, i.e. a division into its agricultural parts, industrial, urban (focused on 
services) or technological (like Silicon Valley). Moreover, it can also be a threat to 
societies and divide people into computer- (or new-technology-) literates and the rest. 
Thus, the presented simplified version of system evolution of the author’s origin 
(figure 1) does not show the changes in the whole world but the main trends in its most 
civilisation-advanced parts. 
2. Theoretical basis of passive and active pro-competition policy 
Economies may compete with others in many different ways. Their ability to compete 
depends on economic development strategy, which should be the basis for economic 
policy at least in the middle-run. The problem with economic development and policy 
is such that after the collapse of the socialist system and during the early stages of 
transition, policy makers as well as society in general, were unwilling to use state 
development strategies, which they associated with central planning. But it is well- 
known in management theory and practice that a company, which does not have a 
development strategy, performs much worse than those firms, which do. Thus, such a 
large ‘company’ like a state also, should have plans and strategies for a few years. 
There are two main approaches to competing: passive and active. The active 
(aggressive or expansionist, as in: Garelli, 2001, p. 49) approach assumes the 
expansion over other markets. Usually it happens with the use of foreign trade, foreign 
investment (direct and portfolio). The profits gained abroad are transferred to the 
mother country. 
There are also countries, that cannot afford such activities. Their economic 
performance is usually worse than that of the most development ones, and their export 
products and investment opportunities are worse, too. They can have a tendency to 
autarchy (veiy difficult and usually not favourable these days), or take steps to make 
4 Thus, G-8 established Digital Opportunities Task Force at the G-8 Kyushu-Okinawa Summit meeting 
(19 July 2000), to try to prevent it (WEF, 2000). 
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their economies attractive enough to convince foreign companies to invest there. The 
passive approach does not mean no state intervention, but instead of interventionism 
(and e.g. state direct investment), creating favourable conditions for entrepreneurship 
development, including foreign capital investment. 
Figure 2. Pro-competitive policy strategies 
PRO-COMPETITIVE 
policy 
active strategy 
i 
expansion abroad 
(supporting the domestic investment 
abroad, pro-export policy) 
passive strategy 
creating conditions 
to attract foreign investors 
(preferences for FDI, e.g. by fiscal policy) 
Countries can be divided into two groups, according to the competition strategy: 
1. countries which did not elaborate and implemented a competition policy: 
• countries with very liberal governments, which do not wish to intervene, 
• countries, which were not able to implement this policy, 
2. countries which elaborated and implemented a competition policy, and among 
them countries, which: 
• conduct active pro-competitive strategy, i.e. support exports and their foreign 
direct investment (e.g. Germany, Japan, Korea, the United States), 
• conduct passive pro-competitive strategy, i.e. make the national economy 
attractive for others (e.g. Singapore, Ireland), by introducing facilities and 
incentives for foreign investors,5 
• conduct pro-competitive policy-mix, which consists of the elements of two of 
the above strategies. 
The countries conducting active pro-competitive policy benefit (from exports, 
cross-border transfers of investment profits) and - according to the mercantilists - their 
welfare increase. They compete not to destroy the economies, but respecting (although 
not always) internationally accepted, moral nouns. This fight is aimed at achieving one 
goal - profits.6 
5 It can, for instance, help in the purchasing of land by foreigners, clear and equal investment rights for 
domestic and foreign companies, lower taxes, help with bureaucracy, help with opening new businesses. 
6 For example, Brazil in 1999 devaluated its real without looking at the negative effects for Argentina, in 
order to increase Brazilian profits from increased exports. However, the Argentinian economy does not 
depend strongly on the Brazilian one. Another example can be the support of the United States for China’s 
entry to the World Trade Organisation, in order to stimulate American investment on that huge (over a 
billion potential customers) market. Partly due to the good pro-competitiveness policy of China, it 
accounts for an average annual growth rate of 10.1% (1991-2000). Thus, China’s GDP doubled in ten 
years (!). This policy brought benefits also for American companies and the whole US economy. 
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Figure 3. Countries with highest real GDP growth rate in 2000 
Notes: the ranking was created according to the data of IMF for the countries for which IMD 
makes surveys.7 
Source: author’s elaboration based on: IMF (2001), IMD (2001). 
7 • • • 
Similar ranking makes also Swiss IMD, but some of its data vary greatly from those given by official, 
national statistical offices (taken info account by IMD and used in its reports). 
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On the other hand, if countries are able to utilise the inflow of foreign investment 
they can decrease unemployment significantly and this accounts for high economic 
growth (see: fig. 3). It should be clearly stressed, that their higher growth and 
employment rates were not achieved, although the countries were attractive for foreign 
investors, they were more attractive than other countries-competitors, also in receipt of 
this money. 
The examples of those countries (fig. 3) show that such a strategy may succeed. 
Until they do not strengthen the economy enough to be more independent from foreign 
investment, and to develop domestic expansion abroad, they will have to conduct an 
economic policy, which will be very well evaluated by foreign investors for a longer 
period of time. 
Figure 3 shows the fastest developing are those countries, which adopted the 
passive approach. For example in Ireland, which is often presented as a pattern to be 
followed by other countries, this strategy led to the average annual growth of real GDP 
by 9.5% in 1995-2000. After Putin became the Prime Minister, the Russian 
government changed the economic strategy and started to compete for foreign 
investment (although its very good results in 2000 resulted from the growth of world 
oil prices). 
Another example is Estonia. This is a country that also has big chances for fast and 
stable growth. After the transformation economic crisis, the Estonians needed only two 
years, to achieve the pace of economic growth in the third year of 10.6% (!). 
The Russian crisis hampered the economic growth of the former Soviet Baltic 
republics, but it was restored in 2000 and - according to IMF (2002) - Estonia’s real 
GDP grew by 6.9% (Latvia 6.6%). Slovenia benefits from a proper economic policy, 
too (4.6% in 2000), although it is not as open for foreign investment as any other 
transition country is.8 
Other trends in the world economy should be noted: the value of foreign trade in 
the world grew faster than world GDP: the relation of trade to GDP grew from 16% in 
1974 to 24% in 1999. The pace of foreign direct investment growth increased: in 1970- 
85 its value doubled, but in the next 15 years - 10 times (Porwit, 2001, pp. 151-152). 
Until CEE countries become economically strong enough to be able to compete 
with more developed ones, they should implement the passive strategy. With the 
inflow of new technologies, with a proper economic policy, the results in the form of 
faster economic growth should be seen. Nowadays, it can be accelerated by investment 
in knowledge creation or stimulation of knowledge and innovation inflow (through e.g. 
FDI). Hungary and Estonia have understood these processes and introduced substantial 
tax incentives for foreign direct investment, among others. 
The passive strategy taken by a government does not necessarily mean that it is the 
only possible solution. A competition policy-mix can be used, meaning that countries 
can implement both strategies in parallel: active and passive ones. It is possible to 
attract foreign investment inflow and promote export and investment expansion abroad 
in those sectors, which are internationally competitive. It is also possible to conquer 
those markets, in which western companies do not perform so well and where present 
8 Share of the private sector in GDP was in mid-2000 only 55%, and share of FDI inflow in GDP in 1997- 
98 (average) only c.a. 1.3% (while Estonia - ca. 8.5%), according to the World Bank (2000). 
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goods can be competitive. Those are the eastern markets, i.e. the former republics of 
the Soviet Union. In those cases, it is possible to describe this strategy thus: to conquer 
the markets, which are not taken over by others and then to survive in them. Large 
international corporations can do this with the use of their own financial and 
technological resources. Visegrad countries mostly do not have such companies. 
Therefore, the state (government) should intervene to support the development of such 
firms, for example by promoting them. On the other hand, an increase in the risk of 
over-investment or misdirected investment may result, leading to losses of taxpayers’ 
money, if the government want to engage state funds in this process. For example, if a 
country does not have products good enough to be competitive abroad, or if it wants to 
enter markets, where competition is too strong compared to the strength of the 
Visegrad countries, state activity will be exaggerated. Another argument is that state 
investment (or financial engagement) is usually not as effective as private investment. 
3. Competitiveness of the CEE countries’ economies 
According to the Swiss International Institute for Management Development rating 
(IMD, 2000), Central and East European countries were placed at the following places 
in 2000: Poland - 40th position, the Czech Republic - 37, Slovenia - 35, Hungaiy - 27 
(for comparison: Greece - 32, Portugal - 29, Spain 24). Thus, the worst competitive 
country among the mentioned above was Poland (see also fig. 4), and only seven 
countries were behind in this field (Turkey, Argentina, India, Columbia, Indonesia, 
Venezuela, Russia). 
Figure 4. Global competitiveness of chosen CEE countries 
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Notes: data presented is not the same as the date of publication of the IMD reports. For 
instance, the last report (IMD, 2002) was based on data for 2001, thus this year was 
indicated above. 
Source: IMD (2000), IMD (2002).9 
g Archive data given by IMD for various countries varied for the same year in next editions of WCY. Thus 
the latest possible data were used (IMD, 2002). 
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This could be caused by a lower starting point, but also by the lower growth 
dynamics (only by three places, and e.g. Greece - by eight positions, Hungary - as 
much as 12). This process had an even worse impact on the Polish economy in 2000 
(fig. 4). 
Between 1996 and 1999 overall competitiveness of the Czech Republic economy 
decreased - partly due to the economic crisis in 1997-1999 (see fig. 6). Poland and 
Hungary did not suffer the post-transition crisis (as I would name it), but the 
differences in competitiveness and its dynamics are plain to see (fig. 4). Hungary 
overtook Portugal and Greece in this field, while Poland is far behind. However, 
Hungary’s reforms have slowed down since 1999, after positive implementation of 
Bokros plan, introduced there after the banking crisis. Recalling logics of economic 
recessions, the following conclusion can be derived: after recent (2000-2001) recession 
in Poland, the necessary fundamental economic reforms should appear reflecting 
microeconomic performance, which should have effects both on GDP growth rate as 
well as on the competitiveness of Poland. 
One of the most important aggregates that decided the place in ranking is the pace 
of real GDP growth.10 For instance, in the case of Poland, in order to return to the 
satisfactory development path, it is necessary to increase the growth rate at least by 
five percentage points, in comparison to the situation in 2002. As far as the growth rate 
is concerned, other countries were able to experience similar results in previous years: 
real GDP growth in 1997-2000 was for: Poland - 19.8%, Estonia - 20.7%, Hungary - 
19.25%, Slovenia - 18.4%. 
The World Economic Forum annually publishes its report on competitiveness of 
countries. The last one (WEF, 2002) included evaluation of 75 economies. It created 
two main, complementary indices of competitiveness: Global Competitiveness Index 
(GCI) and Current Competitiveness Index (CCI). 
Figure 5. Overall competitiveness rankings of chosen CEE countries 
Fig. 5.1. Growth Competitiveness Index 
♦ 1 Poland —♦“-Hungary 
A-Slovenia - - X- - - Czech Rep. 
X— Slovak Reo. .#.Estonia 
10 Because it influences many other factors, as well as being a result of many phenomena - and not 
because this (GDP) indicator is biased with a larger weight. 
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Fig. 5.2. Current Competitiveness Index 
■4,“" Poland -—Hungary 
■Ar-Slovenia - - X- - - Czech Rep. 
X—- Slovak Ren. —#— Estonia 
Source: WEF (2002). 
The first one led by Jeffrey Sachs is aimed at presenting the medium-term 
prospects for economic growth (in five years), and the second, led by Porter - the 
current productive potential of the sample of 75 countries (figure 5). 
The results show that Poland is in the middle of the analysed group. The first place 
in 2001 ranking was occupied by Finland (in both cases of indices), the second - the 
United States.11 
Figure 6. Dynamics of real GDP growth rates of chosen CEE countries 
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11 Then as far as GCI is concerned: Canada, Singapore, Australia, Norway, Taiwan, the Netherlands, 
Sweden, New Zealand, Ireland and United Kingdom; and if CCI is looked at: the Netherlands, Germany, 
Switzerland, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Denmark, Australia, Singapore, Canada and France. 
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From all six, transition accession countries looked at above, Poland was placed at 
the lowest level. In both cases its position was 41st. The most advanced in competitive 
abilities was Hungary, and just behind it - Estonia. In terms of GCI, Poland was the 
fastest falling country from those analysed above, showing not such good prospects for 
this country. In the case of CCI, Hungary improved its current performance 
significantly, while Poland remained on the same level. 
According to the data available, and assumptions accepted (see note under fig. 7), I 
made a simulation of the changes of distance of Poland to the average level of 
development of the European Union by the year 2020 (fig. 7). 
Figure 7. Scenarios of Poland’s convergence to the EU average (real GDP, PPP) 
Poland - 4% 
Poland - 5% 
Poland - 6% 
Poland - 7% 
****%**** Poland - 8% 
Poland - 9% 
Notes: it was assumed that EU would develop on average at the same pace as in previous years 
(average from period 1998-2000 was taken, i.e. 2.93%); Poland starts from the level of 
39% of the EU average (regarding GDP per capita PPP). It is also assumed that the EU 
will develop at the same pace after enlargement, which additionally will not change the 
distance of Poland to the UE-15 average. 
Source: Eurostat, own counts. 
The conclusion is that almost 8% of annual growth will lead Poland to reach the 
average level of the EU in 2020. Some other countries, such as Slovenia, are in a better 
position, because they start from a higher level. According to Eurostat, the highest 
level of GDP per capita in terms of PPP (1999) as far as candidate countries are 
concerned has Slovenia (68%) and the Czech Republic (60%), then Hungary (49%), 
Slovakia (46%), Poland (39%) and Estonia (36%). Their scenarios of convergence with 
the minimum annual GDP growth needed to real convergence to EU-15 average are 
shown (fig. 8). 
If we assume that the pace of growth of Estonia and Poland as it was in 2000 does 
not change, Estonia will catch Poland up in 2003 and will catch-up with the European 
Union before Poland. 
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Figure 8. Minimal pace of real GDP growth for chosen CEE countries to catch up the 
EU average (real GDP, PPP) 
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Note: see previous figure. 
Source: Eurostat, own counts. 
According to Morita (1999), based on data from 1998 (taking dollar-denominated 
GDP instead of real GDP based on PPP), Poland will catch up with the GDP level of 
Spain in 15 years if it develops at 9% level annually, in 16 years if 8%, in 19 years if 
7%, in 22 if 6%, in 26 if 5%, 32 if 4%. The real convergence of Poland to the GDP 
level of Portugal will be: 12 years if 9%, 13 - 8%, 15 - 7%, 18 - 6%, 21 - 5%, 26 - 
4% and to Greece: 12, 14, 16, 18, 22, 27 years respectively. 
4. Competition policy in CEE countries 
The group of countries expected to enter the EU in the next wave of enlargement is 
Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Elungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland and 
Slovenia. They will probably be followed by a second wave of five countries including 
Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia. Global scores of candidate countries in terms of 
competition policy are similar. However, their policies vary in details. 
4.1. Competition policy in CEE countries - some remarks 
Figure 9 reports implementation effectiveness based on data for 1996-97 for 11 
transition countries. As Dutz et al. (1999, p. 6) noted, Poland and Hungary, the first 
adopters of competition law, the Baltic states and Romania have the most effective 
overall implementation of competition policy. 
The evaluation done later by the EBRD (2000) shows that indicators describing 
competition policy for Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and the Slovak Republic 
had a value 3, and for Estonia, and Slovenia - 3 (within a scale from 1 to 4 where 1 
implies little or no progress with reform and 4 implies a market economy). Other 
transition countries reached worse results. 
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Some countries, due to the introduction of very innovative solutions in economic 
policy, may substantially increase their competitiveness and develop faster. 
The reforms introduced in Russia (especially tax reform) may negatively influence 
the inflow of foreign capital to CEE countries. Transition countries suffer the lack of 
the middle class, which is (including e.g. entrepreneurs) often an engine of economic 
development. Those countries have greater chances for development where low taxes 
for this group of society are introduced and economic freedom ensured. One such 
policy innovation is the introduction of a flat personal income tax rate. Russia, Estonia 
and Latvia have done so (13%, 25% and 26% respectively), and this was well 
recognised abroad (although not always within the country). It can also stimulate to 
some extent, labour force emigration to less fiscally burdened countries. 
Figure 9. Competition policy implementation in 1997 - effectiveness indices 
Note: Equal weights to nine dimensions grouped into three categories, divided into three 
categories were assigned, namely (1) law enforcement, (2) competition advocacy and (3) 
institutional-related activities. Each dimension was assessed on a 0-1 scale. 
Source: Dutz et al. (1999). 
International fiscal competition exists also in the field of companies. Estonia 
introduced 0% rate for companies that re-invest all their profits in the country. This 
solution may convince some firms to move their location there (especially from 
neighbouring Finland). Additionally, Estonia’s international relations are also well 
seen and evaluated, thus improving its image abroad. As far as corporate taxes are 
concerned, Elungary also introduced incentives favourable for FDI, significantly 
lowering their rates. The Czech Republic competing for huge investment from Toyota 
in 2001, also introduced some incentives to attract this company. Later, when Poland 
lost the opportunity to build a large Toyota factory, after heavy criticism from public 
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opinion, parliament also passed a special law (2002), which convinced the Japanese 
management of Toyota to increase the value of investment in Poland. 
Nowadays, the competitive fight between the countries is won by those who are 
able to use its strengths and gain an advantage. It means for some smaller countries the 
necessity of specialisation, a position taken a long time ago by David Ricardo in the 
framework for the theory of comparative advantage. 
Examples of successful implementation of such economic development are well- 
known. The development of information technologies was in the last few years the 
priority of economic policy of, for example, Ireland and the Scandinavian countries. 
Estonia and Latvia also tried to expand it. Spain became for the European Union the 
bridge in trade with Latin American countries. Germany, the United Kingdom, France 
and Italy have universally developed economies, so they do not have to specialise in 
certain directions. But even they, like Germany, may be left behind an IT revolution 
and would not be able to profit from modern processes of IT development. Poland’s 
economy is not so large. It has also less tourist potential, unlike Greece, Italy, Slovenia 
or Spain. It obviously cannot also use the advantages of such a country as Luxembourg 
and specialise mostly in financial services. It is, unfortunately, also far behind the 
world technological changes and even other transition economies, like Hungary, the 
Czech and even Slovak Republics (OECD, 2001; OECD, 2002; Srholec, 2002; WEF, 
2002). Hungary profits from its international openness and, through its high-tech 
exports driven by FDI companies, is relatively technologically advanced, not only as 
for a transition country, when compared to some EU members (European Commision, 
2001, p. 59). 
4.2. Competition policy for Poland - some recommendations for strategy 
One of the changes, which Poland may use, is the role of a country enabling West- 
East economic contacts. ~ However, it cannot be the only ‘export product’ of Poland. 
This way adds not so much value and will keep Poland away from contemporary 
economic system changes. Also western countries may establish and develop such 
relations of their own, without Polish intermediations, and even if so, also the Baltics 
or the Czech and Slovak Republics are willing to play a similar role. Besides, such a 
strategy will be successful only if Russia and Ukraine develop steadily, still difficult to 
achieve, especially in the case of Ukraine. The role of intermediary also brings few 
profits, in the case of Russia or Ukraine at their present state of economic development, 
especially when compared with profits possibly derived from the high-tech sector. 
It is possible for Poland to choose the strategy of a large country and develop in 
many different directions or to concentrate on some chosen independently by the state 
(and not e.g. by labour unions, certain industrial lobbies), according to world, well- 
known trends of economic progress, e.g. high-tech industries (with biotechnology). 
However, it requires a conscious, at least middle-run, consequently run strategy of 
economic policy, which Poland nowadays does not have. Struggling with current 
problems, the main policy makers forgot about the future of several-year perspective. 
12* 
“ The choice of such a way suggests e.g. former main negotiator of Polish association treaty with EEC 
(Mulewicz, 2001). 
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One of the crucial elements of such a strategy is education. Countries may gain 
competitive advantage in a short- or middle-term through the cheap labour force. TNCs 
investing in such countries are also interested in minimising these costs, and will not be 
so interested in countries, where with the growth of productivity, exports etc. and 
welfare, personal income increases, too, what would induce the pressure for growth of 
salaries. It may lead to withdrawal from such a country and move to the cheaper ones. 
Thus, the proper economic policy in the long-run and in an open economy is to 
concentrate on an increase in labour skills. This factor can sustain economic growth, 
when the costs of labour increase and TNCs will want to leave the country. 
Estonia and Latvia, for instance (not mentioning obvious Scandinavian countries), 
noticed this necessity and support actions towards education, especially technical 
education. Similar factors also make poorer countries, like India, which despite huge 
emigration of specialists, does not stop the education policy, but tries to attract them 
and keep within the country. Anyway, such an education policy is profitable in the 
long-run. However, it does not refer to every kind of education. The transition 
countries should concentrate more on higher and adult education (continuous learning) 
instead of - giving up the free room of manoeuvre to the teachers’ labour unions - 
maintaining relative over-investment in primary and secondary level education (as it is 
in Poland), to invest in third level education (a very high, 5th position in ratings of total 
expenditure for education; IMD 2000; see also EC, 2001, p. 67). 
Higher education usually lasts 4-5 years, but the technologies (especially 
information ones) change faster than the educational systems. Thus the countries 
should develop systems of continuous learning, life-long learning and just-in-time 
learning (Piech, 2002b). Some human capital can also be imported, when there is lack 
of it or its education may last too long or be too expensive. Some countries do so, 
through reducing barriers of receiving permissions for stay and work, e.g. Canada, the 
US, New Zealand, and to some extent - Germany. 
In order to catch up with the most developed countries, many of them conduct an 
active economic policy, especially a pro-competitive one. There are some instruments 
and policies, which can be used to do so, connected with e.g. fiscal, customs and 
investment policy. 
Should countries really use investment policy? In my opinion, there is too high a 
risk of policy mistakes (policy failures) and overinvestment, what finds support in the 
results of empirical research. According to Wolfgang Michalski (2000, p. 64), 95% of 
all industrial policies have failed. They were concentrated on an increase in state 
expenses on huge industrial projects, what led to their ineffective usage. It is the 
argument for conducting a passive, pro-competitive policy on international markets: to 
create a favourable environment for foreign and domestic enterprises without direct 
state intervention. 
Bienkowski (2000, p. 13) enumerated three groups of activities to conduct 
effective, pro-competitive economic policy: 
1. reduction of inflation and increase of economic freedom through tax cuts; 
antimonopoly policy and deregulation of prices and capital flow; clear and stable 
economic policy; 
278 Krzysztof Piech 
2. supporting and improving of the law, a system of private and public institutions 
responsible for economic and social life; transparency of government and 
administration; increasing the quality of institutions to decrease the transaction 
costs; 
3. “politically neutral small industrial policy”, concentrated on strengthening the 
economy without favouring any sector through: development of infrastructure, 
natural environment protection, social education especially in computer sciences, 
public security. 
Although Bienkowski is in favour of development of all sectors, he underlines the role 
of computer science. In my opinion, Poland and the other CEE countries should also 
introduce a long-run pro-competitive policy, beginning with one for education, as soon 
as possible (in the case of contemporary Poland, after getting out from the bottom of 
the present recession, which should happen around 2002 and 2003), especially in the 
fields of information technologies, and widely-understood finance. Without it, Poland 
will not be able to capitalise on time and profit from the knowledge-based economy 
and the information revolution as well as enter the digitalism era. 
One of the factors which influences the pace of economic growth on a large scale, 
is export. The branches, which have the largest share in Polish exports, were (in 2000): 
automobiles - 2.5bn dollars, clothes - 2.5bn dollars, furniture - 2.0bn, machines - 
1.9bn. The furniture industry for instance, had a share of 6% of total Polish exports 
(c.a. 2% of GDP). The structure of Polish exports on a large scale is based on products, 
which do not require much knowledge and high technologies (Srholec, 2002). From 
the above mentioned, the most technologically advanced is the automobile industry, 
but it does not deliver very modern and internationally competitive products. Thus, 
Polish exports (and economy) dominate branches, which are not technologically 
advanced and knowledge-intensive.14 This situation is likely to be sustained, without 
state activity. It means that the perspectives to catch-up with the EU are far away. And 
the catch-up process which requires over 7% of annual growth until 2020 to reach the 
average level of the EU, will be very prolonged. With the use of present, old-fashioned 
potential only, which additionally seems to be exhausted (in the present state of 
business cycle, i.e. recession), Poland will be able to achieve about 4-5% stable growth 
in the long-run (since 2004), and will not achieve the pace of 7-10%, which would also 
be also possible (see figure 3). 
5. Conclusions 
When the present, downward phase of the world and Polish business cycle (due to its 
large connection to the world cycle; Piech, 2002c) ends, Poland will be able to 
introduce a proper, pro-competitive strategy, which it really needs. A key condition 
necessary to accelerate the pace of real convergence is an increase of competitiveness 
of domestic production, “which requires modernisation of production and exports 
based on it, towards branches connected with contemporary high technologies. The 
13 Poland ranks only in 39th position in IMD (2000), one of its five weakest points in this categoiy. 
14 Thus, some Polish economists support the opinion for the necessity of Polish economic transformation 
from the coal-based economy to the knowledge-based one - Kuklihski (2001). 
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future of the country depends on the achievement of Polish companies to participate in 
the world competition race.” (Sadowski, 2001, p. 14) Such a competition policy should 
be, in my opinion, introduced in Poland at the end of 2003, when the cyclical recession 
in Poland is expected to be at least partially overcome, and then conducted in the 
following years, as a strategy for Polish economic development. Education and science 
(R&D) should be put in the first place of government interests for long-term 
development. This is one of the key points of the now emerging knowledge-based 
economy. Sachs suggested such solutions (during a lecture given at the Warsaw School 
of Economics in 2001), too, adding that they should be introduced as soon as possible 
(even in 2001). Unfortunately, present budgetary problems and lack of political will (or 
even of proper consciousness of most politicians), postponed them. 
Poland should enter the new era of socio-economic development using new 
technologies, derived through innovations. Although according to Gordon, innovations 
were more critical for economic development of the breakeven of the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries, in terms of their influence on labour productivity, they are one of 
the most important factors of economic growth. Also according to Gordon (1999), the 
most important clusters of inventions were electricity (the electric engine, electric light, 
home electric appliances), engines (for car and air transport, highways, supermarkets, 
suburbs), “molecular engineering” (petrochemical products, artificial stuff, 
pharmaceuticals), communication / entertainment (telephone, radio, film, television). 
The most important innovations of the end of the twentieth century are information 
technologies (including PCs, internet), and genetics (genetically modified food, 
pharmaceuticals). 
“Knowledge is perhaps the most critical competitiveness factor. As countries move 
up the economic scale, the more they thrive on knowledge to ensure their prosperity 
and to compete in world markets. Plow that knowledge is acquired and managed is 
each nation’s responsibility.” (Garelli, 2000, p. 47) If Polish and other CEE countries 
economic politicians do not forget about it, they will significantly increase the chances 
for faster EU catch-up. 
The following economic policy steps may be taken, to increase competitiveness 
and to build the knowledge-based economy in CEE countries, aimed at beginning (or 
in some cases endeepen) the transition to digitalism: 
® To ensure the independent and strong monetary policy (to ensure economy 
fundamentals). 
• Economic policy should be conducted as a response to the markets’ (not budgetary 
or output allocation) needs. 
• Pro-competitive economic policy: stimulation of FDI inflow, efforts to increase 
export competitiveness etc. 
• Entrepreneurship stimulation, especially of the companies, which want to 
implement innovations and new technologies (but needs some support). 
• Support for technology import, but also efforts to domestic knowledge creation. 
• Development of infrastructure (telecommunication, fibre backbone networks 
support). 
• Global passive industrial policy, moderate activity in new technologies only. 
• Internet policy to reduce costs of internet access and enlarge its accessibility. 
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• Steps to stimulate information society development (according to EU requirements 
and advice). 
• Support for internationalisation of domestic companies’ activities. 
• Changes in public administration in the direction of intensive use of technologies 
(e-government solutions, with e-sign acceptation, WWW pages for public 
administration). 
• R&D policy directed to market needs; increase of scientists international exchange, 
more investment in best performing sciences. 
• Introduction of competition and market economy at universities (true competition 
for every academic post, short- or middle-term contracts with renewal option 
instead of almost ‘life-time employment’, rationalisation of expenditures, 
accreditation and incentives for education level upgrading). 
• Support for patents registration (faster procedures and help with patenting abroad), 
dissemination and accessibility of knowledge and counselling. 
• National systems of continuous learning (and support for e-leaming). 
• International research on foreign experiences with knowledge-based economy 
development policies aimed at indicating the ways of introducing them in certain 
CEE countries and practical economic policy, implementing these results. 
The thing that Central and East European countries needs now is the entrance to 
the second phase of economic transition, through the use of technological 
achievements and the globalisation process (Sadowski, 2001, p. 14). It should be the 
transition towards digitalism, or its first step - the knowledge-based economy, that will 
increase the global competitiveness of Poland and other CEE countries, as well as 
ensure constant, long-term, fast economic development and an increase in societies’ 
welfare. 
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The Visegrad Group and International Visegrad Fund - basic issues 
The Visegrad Group reflects the efforts of the countries of 
the Central European region to work together in a number of 
fields of common interest within all-European integration. 
The Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia have 
always been part of one civilization sharing cultural and 
intellectual values and common roots of religious traditions, 
which they wish to preserve and strengthen further. 
All the V4 countries aspire to becoming members of the 
European Union, perceiving their integration in the EU as 
another step forward in the process of overcoming artificial 
dividing lines in Europe through mutual support. 
The V4 Group was not created as an alternative to all-European integration efforts 
nor does it try to compete with the existing functional Central European structures. Its 
activities are in no way aimed at isolation or the weakening of ties with the other 
countries. On the contrary, the Group aims at encouraging optimum cooperation with 
all countries, in particular its neighbours, its ultimate interest being the democratic 
development in all parts of Europe. 
The V4 Group wishes to contribute towards building the European security 
architecture based on effective, functionally complementary and mutually reinforcing 
cooperation and coordination within existing European and transatlantic institutions. 
In order to preserve and promote cultural cohesion, cooperation within the V-4 
Group will enhance the imparting of values in the field of culture, education, science 
and exchange of information. 
All the activities of the Visegrad Group are aimed at strengthening stability in the 
Central European region. The participating countries perceive their cooperation as a 
challenge and its success as the best proof of their ability to integrate also into such 
structures as e.g. the European Union. 
The Visegrad Four is an unofficial name given to the four Central European post 
communist countries, the Czech Republic, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of 
Poland and the Slovak Republic. Originally, the group was called the Visegrad Troika 
and the Four is the result of the split of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republics. 
The name of this grouping was chosen during a meeting of the President of the 
CSFR Vaclav Havel, the Prime Minister of Hungary, Jozsef Antall, and the President 
of Poland, Lech Walesa at an event held at the north Hungarian city of Visegrad on 15 
February 1991. At this meeting the leaders signed a declaration on close cooperation of 
these three (today four) countries on their way to European integration. 
In order to strengthen The Visegrad Group cooperation, the Governments of the 
Czech Republic, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Poland and the Slovak 
Republic have concluded the Agreement concerning establishment of the 
International Visegrad Fund signed on 9 June 2000 in Prague. It was done to support 
the development of closer cooperation and the strengthening of the integration of the 
Visegrad Group countries into the EU. 
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